Summary
denying Rule 11 sanctions where warning notice was not given
Summary of this case from Knowledgeaz, Inc. v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc. (S.D.Ind. 2006)Opinion
Case No. 1:03-cv-1447-DFH-VSS.
September 30, 2004
ENTRY ON MOTIONS FOR SANCTIONS AND ORDER REQUIRING SCREENING OF PLAINTIFF'S FUTURE FILINGS IN THIS COURT
On August 6, 2004, the court granted plaintiff's motion to dismiss this action with prejudice and entered a final judgment. That judgment did not, however, resolve the collateral matters of the two pending motions for sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure filed by the Marion County defendants and by the Marion County Democratic Party, Lula Patton, and Joe Turner. See, e.g., Finance Inv. Co. (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Geberit AG, 165 F.3d 526, 535 n.* (7th Cir. 1998) (sanctions can be subject of separate post-judgment order); see also Budinich v. Becton Dickinson Co., 486 U.S. 196 (1988) (a post-judgment award of attorney fee is separate from the judgment on the merits for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and appeals can be taken separately from each of these). Plaintiff Srivastava has not responded to the motions for sanctions.
In their Rule 11 motion, the Marion County Democratic Party, Patton, and Turner seek dismissal, which has already occurred. These defendants also seek an award of attorney fees and costs incurred in defending this action. Under the present terms of Rule 11, the court may not award monetary sanctions unless the alleged violator received notice of the potential liability, either from the moving parties under Rule 11(c)(1)(A) or from the court under Rule 11(c)(2)(B). There is no indication that the moving defendants complied with the 21-day "warning shot" provision of Rule 11(c)(1)(A). The court also did not issue an order to show cause under Rule 11(c)(2)(B). Accordingly, these defendants' Rule 11 motion for sanctions must be and is hereby denied. The motion is moot to the extent it seeks dismissal, and the court may not award monetary sanctions now because no warnings were given.
The Marion County defendants' motion seeks an entirely different type of relief: an injunction against plaintiff Srivastava barring her from filing additional lawsuits without first obtaining leave of court to do so. Such orders are rare, but they can be a proper means for courts to defend themselves and other litigants from a few litigants' abuses of their right of access to the courts. E.g., In re Chapman, 328 F.3d 903 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming injunction); In re Davis, 878 F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1989) (same); see also In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180 (1989) (prospectively denying leave to file in forma pauperis); Bridgewater Operating Corp. v. Feldstein, 346 F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 2003) (affirming injunction).
Over the past seven years, plaintiff Carolyn Srivastava has built a record of relentlessly frivolous pro se litigation in this court and in the state courts in Marion County. In this federal court, her uniformly unsuccessful lawsuits have included:
Srivastava v. Pescovitz, IP 97-704-C M/S
Srivastava v. Trustees of Indiana University, IP 98-242-C H/GSrivastava v. Newman, IP 00-617-C Y/G
Srivastava v. Bepko, IP 00-1980-C H/G
Srivastava v. Cottey, IP 01-744-C M/L
Srivastava v. Marion County Election Board, et al., 1:02-cv-1385 LJM-WTLSrivastava v. Bepko, 1:03-cv-421 JDT-WTL
Srivastava v. Bepko, 1:03-cv-952-DFH-TAB
Srivastava v. Trustees of Indiana University, 1:03-cv-406 LJM-WTLSrivastava v. Pescovitz, 1:03-cv-805 JDT-VSS
Srivastava v. Marion County Circuit and Superior Court, 1:03-cv-1024-LJM-VSS
Srivastava v. Carroll, 1:04-cv-0810-SEB-WTL (still pending)
Srivastava v. Bepko, 1:04-cv-0945-RLY-TAB (still pending)
To this list may be added this case, in which plaintiff voluntarily dismissed all claims after the defendants moved for sanctions. The court has not attempted to catalog plaintiff's state court litigation, which eventually led the Marion Superior Court to enjoin plaintiff from filing any further lawsuits against the parties who have been involved in one way or another with attempts to collect this court's judgment imposing monetary sanctions in the first Trustees of Indiana University case, No. IP 98-242-C H/G. See Def. Ex. C.
Throughout this campaign of litigation in this federal court, Dr. Srivastava has repeatedly asserted frivolous claims, has multiplied the proceedings vexatiously, and has used the litigation as a forum for venting baseless libels against various defendants and others, regardless of whether there was any foundation for the accusations or even any marginal relevance to the claims or issues at hand See, e.g., Srivastava v. Trustees of Indiana University, 2003 WL 1810507, *1 n. 1 (S.D. Ind. March 21, 2003). When she loses one case, she files a new one asserting the same claims.
This case is an example, and its filing shows its frivolous character and the violation of Rule 11. In this lawsuit, Srivastava's claims against the Marion County defendants arise from her criminal prosecution for stalking the rabbi and for her entry onto the property of the rabbi's congregation, resulting in her conviction for trespass. These same events were the subject of plaintiff's claims in Cause No. 1:02-cv-1385, which Chief Judge McKinney dismissed, and as to which plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her appeal. These same events were also the subject of at least two lawsuits in state court. There is simply no objectively reasonable basis in law or in fact for this attempt to revive these dismissed and duplicative claims.
Enjoining future litigation — more precisely, imposing a screen on such litigation before other parties are subjected to the expense and harassment of litigation — is a grave step. Courts are naturally reluctant to take such steps, even when they may appear justified to defendants frustrated with and even exhausted by plaintiff's efforts. This relief has been requested before by some of the parties victimized by Dr. Srivastava's barrage of litigation, but the court has not taken that step before. See, e.g., Chief Judge McKinney's Entry of December 11, 2002, in Cause No. 1:02-cv-1385, denying the Marion County defendants' motion for sanctions.
The court is now convinced beyond doubt, however, that such an injunction against plaintiff is fully justified. This case, for example, duplicates the claims against the Marion County defendants in Cause No. 1:02-cv-1385, and plaintiff filed this action just a few months after she voluntarily dismissed her appeal of Chief Judge McKinney's dismissal of her claims in that case. At that point, with any other litigant, the defendants would have been entitled to expect that the matter was closed, but not with this litigant.
The Second Circuit has identified five factors that courts should consider before imposing sanctions restricting a person's filings in court:
As our prior cases have indicated, the district court, in determining whether or not to restrict a litigant's future access to the courts, should consider the following factors: (1) the litigant's history of litigation and in particular whether it entailed vexatious, harassing or duplicative lawsuits; (2) the litigant's motive in pursuing the litigation, e.g., does the litigant have an objective good faith expectation of prevailing?; (3) whether the litigant is represented by counsel; (4) whether the litigant has caused needless expense to other parties or has posed an unnecessary burden on the courts and their personnel; and (5) whether other sanctions would be adequate to protect the courts and other parties. Ultimately, the question the court must answer is whether a litigant who has a history of vexatious litigation is likely to continue to abuse the judicial process and harass other parties.Safir v. United States Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 19, 24 (2d Cir. 1986).
Plaintiff Srivastava easily satisfies all five of these factors. First, she has compiled a long history of litigation that involves vexatious, harassing, and duplicative lawsuits. She has constantly shifted theories, defendants, and claims. When she loses in one case, she asserts essentially identical claims in a new lawsuit. She has repeatedly used the many lawsuits as forums for asserting baseless and delusional libels against many defendants. Second, plaintiff could not have had an objective good faith expectation of prevailing in any of these lawsuits. She has sought as relief, for example, court injunctions appointing her as chancellor of Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis, or as chair of the department at the School of Medicine which had earlier declined even to reappoint her to the medical faculty. She has sued numerous judges for monetary damages based on their judicial rulings, naming as defendants all members of this court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court of the United States, and the Supreme Court of Indiana, as well as several state trial judges. Third, plaintiff has not been represented by counsel in any of these actions. (She has instead been seeking admission to law school herself, denial of which has also been the subject of her litigation.) Fourth, plaintiff has certainly caused needless expense to the many defendants she has pursued in all of these cases. She also has imposed unnecessary burdens on this court, detracting from the court's ability as an institution to deal with the cases of litigants who are using the court for its intended purpose of resolving genuine controversies within its jurisdiction. Fifth, other sanctions — including monetary sanctions, orders striking pleadings and dismissing cases, and repeated warnings that plaintiff should mend her ways — have not been sufficient to prevent these problems. The other sanctions have instead merely provided the occasion for further litigation by plaintiff. She has sued, for example, all parties involved in the efforts to collect on this court's earlier award of attorney fees and costs. The court's earlier reluctance to impose restrictions on plaintiff's access to the courts has resulted in still more abusive and expensive litigation. There is every reason to expect more of the same from Dr. Srivastava unless the court acts. The court's patience with such abuse is now exhausted.
Accordingly, the court hereby grants the Marion County defendants' motion for sanctions and issues injunctive relief to protect the court and other litigants from future abuses by plaintiff. An injunction of this kind must be carefully tailored to ensure that the enjoined party may still have legitimate access to the courts. The injunction affirmed by the Seventh Circuit in Davis provides a model here. The court hereby ORDERS as follows for any actions, papers, or other materials filed by plaintiff Carolyn Srivastava, except in cases that are already pending before the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana as of September 30, 2004:
1. The clerk shall create and maintain a miscellaneous file with the general title "In re Carolyn Srivastava." The miscellaneous file shall serve as the repository of this order, all documents proffered for filing by Dr. Srivastava covered by the terms of this order for which authority to file is not granted, and any order or minute order entered pursuant to this order. The clerk shall also maintain a miscellaneous docket associated with the file. All orders retained in the file shall be entered on that docket following standard docketing procedures. A brief entry shall be made on the docket indicating the receipt of any materials from Dr. Srivastava.
2. Whenever Dr. Srivastava proffers a document for filing, the clerk or the designated deputy shall accept the papers, stamp them "received" (rather than "filed") and forward them to the undersigned judge for review.
3. The court will examine any documents tendered by Dr. Srivastava and determine whether or not they should be filed. The court will deny leave to file the documents if they are merely duplicative of matters already litigated or currently pending or are legally frivolous.
4. If the court enters an order denying leave to file the materials, the clerk shall retain the order and a copy of the materials in the miscellaneous file and cause a copy of the order to be mailed to Dr. Srivastava.
5. If the court enters an order granting leave to file the materials, the clerk shall cause the materials to be stamped "filed" as of the date of the order and shall cause the assignment of the case in the manner provided by local rules. The clerk shall also cause a copy of the order to be mailed to Dr. Srivastava.
6. This screening requirement shall not apply to filings in cases already pending in this court as of this date, nor to filings appealing from this order. This order may be modified as the requirements of equity may demand This order shall expire on September 30, 2007 without further order of this court, but if the order does not accomplish its intended purpose, the court may consider modifying or extending the order.
7. The clerk shall mail a copy of this order to Dr. Carolyn Srivastava at 3105 Lehigh Court, Indianapolis, Indiana 46268, by certified or registered mail, return return receipt required.
Finally, the court expresses the hope that Dr. Srivastava may direct her energies toward obtaining the help that she needs, either for her own sake or for the sake of her family.
As this court noted in the original decision in the first Trustees of Indiana University case, based on plaintiff's own assertions in court, plaintiff has been diagnosed with serious mental illness. Documents she has filed in other court cases confirm this point. See Def. Ex. D (letter from plaintiff's mother filed by plaintiff in another proceeding).
So ordered.