Opinion
No. CV 11-6016849 S
April 11, 2011
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE #103
On January 3, 2011, the plaintiff, Ash Srivastava, filed a three-count complaint against the defendant, Homesite Insurance Group, Inc., doing business as Homesite Insurance Agency, Inc. In the complaint, the plaintiff alleges the following facts. From August 14, 2009, until August 14, 2010, the defendant insured all of the plaintiff's personal property located in a residence at 157 Fountain Street in New Haven, Connecticut. In exchange for the insurance coverage, the plaintiff paid premiums to the defendant. On or about October 15, 2009, the residence was burglarized and the plaintiff's personal property was stolen. Subsequently, the plaintiff reported the theft to the defendant and filed a reimbursement claim with the defendant, pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy. The defendant refused to compensate the plaintiff for any of his personal property. In count one, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant breached the contract embodied by the insurance policy. In count two, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant's refusal to compensate the plaintiff constitutes a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act (CUIPA). In count three, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant's refusal to compensate the plaintiff constitutes a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA).
On February 15, 2011, the defendant filed a motion to strike counts two and three from the complaint and an accompanying memorandum of law. The plaintiff filed an objection to the motion to strike and a memorandum in support thereof on February 22, 2011. The complaint was improperly e-filed, and the plaintiff filed a motion for permission to amend the motion or pleading and an amended complaint on March 8, 2011. The court took the papers on March 7, 2011.
DISCUSSION
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). "We take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint that has been stricken and we construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency . . . Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied . . . Indeed, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 295 Conn. 240, 252-53, 990 A.2d 206 (2010). "In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 293 (1997).
The defendant argues that count two should be stricken because the plaintiff cannot bring a stand alone CUIPA claim and because the plaintiff only alleges one instance of insurance misconduct. The defendant argues that count three should be stricken because the plaintiff only alleges one instance of an unfair business practice. The plaintiff argues that count two should not be stricken on the ground that the court should follow the minority view and allow a stand alone CUIPA claim because the appellate courts have not stated that it is not a viable cause of action. The plaintiff argues that the defendant's failure to compensate the plaintiff pursuant to the insurance policy is sufficient to support both a CUIPA and a CUTPA claim.
In Lees v. Middlesex Ins. Co., 229 Conn. 842, 849, 643 A.2d 1282 (1994), the court stated: "The gravamen of the plaintiff's claim is that the defendant unfairly failed to settle her claim, and her claim alone. We concluded that the defendant's alleged improper conduct in the handling of a single insurance claim, without any evidence of misconduct by the defendant in the processing of any other claim, does not rise to the level of a `general business practice' as required by [CUIPA]." "In Mead v. Burns, 199 Conn. 651, 509 A.2d 11 (1986), the Connecticut Supreme Court held that a motion to strike was properly granted, because a litigant did not prove more than one act of insurance misconduct in a CUIPA claim based on unfair settlement practices. The court concluded `we believe that claims of unfair settlement practices under CUIPA require a showing of more than a single act of insurance misconduct.' Mead v. Burns, supra, 199 Conn. 659." Cuccia v. Allstate Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Norwalk, Docket No. CV 08 5009512 (March 24, 2010, Brazzel-Massaro, J.) [ 49 Conn. L. Rptr. 549].
In the present case, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant violated CUIPA by refusing to compensate the plaintiff. The allegations, even if assumed true, only demonstrate a single instance of improper insurance conduct as it only relates to the defendant's processing of the plaintiff's one claim. One instance of misconduct is insufficient to establish a general business practice. Therefore, the court need not address whether a stand alone CUIPA claim is a viable cause of action. The plaintiff alleges insufficient facts to raise the claim to a general business practice. Accordingly, the court grants the defendant's motion to strike count two.
"[A] simple breach of contract, even if intentional, does not amount to a violation of CUTPA in the absence of substantial aggravating circumstances." Metropolitan Trucking v. Rand-Whitney Containerboard, LP, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 095013770 (March 31, 2010, Cosgrove, J.) ( 49 Conn. L. Rptr. 584, 586). The plaintiff's failure to allege facts sufficient to establish a general business practice under CUIPA is fatal to a related CUTPA claim. Blayman v. Allstate Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 10 6005268 (January 6, 2011, Cosgrove, J.).
In the present case, the plaintiff utilizes his CUIPA allegations to establish a CUTPA claim. The above analysis demonstrates that the plaintiff's allegations amount to only one instance of insurance misconduct. An allegation of a single instance of misconduct is insufficient to set forth a general business practice. Therefore, the plaintiff's allegation of a single instance of misconduct fails to set forth a CUTPA claim. Accordingly, the court grants the defendant's motion to strike count three.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants the defendant's motion to strike counts two and three from the plaintiff's complaint.