Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:19-cv-219-AT
2021-05-14
Chasity SPURLOCK, Holly Elliott, and Tiffany Thomas, Plaintiffs, v. COMPLETE CASH HOLDINGS, LLC, Relogio, LLC, Agora Notus, LLC, and Lisa Webster, Defendants.
Charles Ronald Bridgers, Mitchell Douglas Benjamin, Matthew Wilson Herrington, DeLong Caldwell Bridgers Fitzpatrick & Benjamin, LLC, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiffs. Michael West Evans, Christopher Paul Twyman, Cox Byington Twyman LLP, Rome, GA, for Defendants Complete Cash Holdings, LLC, Relogio, LLC, Lisa Webster. Christopher Paul Twyman, Cox Byington Twyman LLP, Rome, GA, for Defendant Agora Notus, LLC.
Charles Ronald Bridgers, Mitchell Douglas Benjamin, Matthew Wilson Herrington, DeLong Caldwell Bridgers Fitzpatrick & Benjamin, LLC, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiffs.
Michael West Evans, Christopher Paul Twyman, Cox Byington Twyman LLP, Rome, GA, for Defendants Complete Cash Holdings, LLC, Relogio, LLC, Lisa Webster.
Christopher Paul Twyman, Cox Byington Twyman LLP, Rome, GA, for Defendant Agora Notus, LLC.
ORDER
Amy Totenberg, United States District Judge
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs of Litigation [Doc. 99] in this Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") case. Plaintiffs seek $59,420.50 in attorneys' fees and $760 in costs. Defendants oppose Plaintiffs Motion, arguing that Plaintiffs' attorney and paralegal rates are unreasonable because the relevant legal market is Rome, Georgia, not Atlanta. (Doc. 102.) Defendants also accuse Plaintiffs of improper block billing, billing for clerical/ administrative time, and billing excessive time. (Id. ) The Court's ruling is set forth below.
In their initial Motion, Plaintiffs sought $59,429.50 in attorneys' fees, however in their reply brief, Plaintiffs propose a reduction of $2,161.54 (for a total of $57,258.96) to address Defendants' objections to certain allegedly clerical and administrative time. (Reply, Doc. 104 at 7-8) (proposing a 25% reduction of certain entries which arguably included administrative and clerical tasks and also excluding certain entries entirely for the same reason). The Court discusses this proposal below.
I. STANDARD
"Prevailing FLSA plaintiffs are ‘automatically entitled to attorneys' fees and costs.’ " P&k Restaurant Enterprise, LLC v. Jackson , 758 Fed.App'x. 844, 847 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Dale v. Comcast Corp. , 498 F.3d 1216, 1223 n. 12 (11th Cir. 2007) ). The determination of a reasonable attorney's fee is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge after proper application of a lodestar fee analysis. Hensley v. Eckerhart , 461 U.S. 424, 436, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) ; Natco, Ltd. P'ship v. Moran Towing of Fla., Inc. , 267 F.3d 1190, 1196 (11th Cir. 2001) (on appeal, reviewing fee award for abuse of discretion and applying Hensley analysis); Farley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. , 197 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. , 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974) ).
The starting point for calculating a reasonable attorney's fee award is the determination of "the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." Hensley , 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933 ; Norman v. Housing Auth. , 836 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1988). The product of this formula is the "lodestar." Loranger v. Stierheim , 10 F.3d 776, 781 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). However, the extent of a plaintiff's success may warrant an adjustment of the lodestar fee upward or downward based on the results obtained. Hensley , 461 U.S. at 434-440, 103 S.Ct. 1933 ; Dillard v. City of Greensboro , 213 F.3d 1347, 1353 (11th Cir. 2000). "A lodestar figure that is based upon a reasonable number of hours spent on a case multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate is itself strongly presumed to be reasonable." Resolution Trust Corp. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc. , 996 F.2d 1144, 1150 (11th Cir. 1993).
Plaintiffs, as the party seeking an award of fees here, bear the burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of the attorney hours worked and the rates claimed. Hensley , 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933 ; Norman , 836 F.2d at 1304. That burden includes:
supplying the court with specific and detailed evidence from which the court can determine the reasonable hourly rate. Further, fee counsel should have maintained records to show the time spent on the different claims, and the general subject matter of the time expenditures ought to be set out with sufficient particularity so that the district court can assess the time claimed for each activity.... A well-prepared fee petition also would include a summary, grouping the time entries by the nature of the activity or stage of the case.
ACLU of Ga. v. Barnes , 168 F.3d 423, 427 (11th Cir. 1999). Similarly, in opposing the Plaintiff's fee application, the Defendant has an obligation to make specific and "reasonably precise" objections and proof concerning hours it wants excluded from any award. Yule v. Jones , 766 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1341 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (citing Hensley , 461 U.S. at 428, 103 S.Ct. 1933 ). There is no precise rule or formula the Court must follow in determining what is a reasonable fee award. The court may "attempt to identify specific hours that should be eliminated, or it may simply reduce the award to account for the limited success." Hensley , 461 U.S. at 436-437, 103 S.Ct. 1933. A Court may not both engage in an hour-by-hour analysis and impose an across-the-board cut. Bivins v. Wrap It Up, Inc. , 548 F.3d 1348, 1351 (11th Cir. 2008) ("[T]he district court is to apply either method, not both.").
In determining reasonable attorney hours and fees, the Court "is itself an expert on the question and may consider its own knowledge and experience concerning reasonable and proper fees." Norman , 836 F.2d at 1303 (internal citations omitted). The Court notes that it has significant experience in assessing the reasonableness of fee requests in the employment law context and has reviewed the specific record in this case. Finally, the Court must bear in mind "that the measure of reasonable hours is determined by the profession's judgment of the time that may be conscionably billed ... not the least time in which it might theoretically have been done." Id. at 1306.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Procedural Background of Case and Fee Dispute
This FLSA overtime action was brought by three plaintiffs against an individual defendant and four corporate defendants, all doing business as "Complete Cash Discount Title Pawn." (Doc. 1.) According to Plaintiffs, as a result of a Department of Labor ("DOL") investigation into overtime violations, the business entities changed throughout Plaintiffs' employment and the businesses also used third parties to issue paychecks, thus making the proper corporate defendants difficult to determine. (Motion for Attorneys' Fees ("Mot.") at 1-2.) This case involved briefing on an initial motion to dismiss, in which defendants argued that Plaintiffs had already accepted a settlement supervised by the DOL, thereby barring their claims (Doc. 16); however, Plaintiffs responded that Defendants had not informed them of any DOL settlement. (Doc. 19.) The Court denied the Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 48.) Because of the complexity of determining the proper employer(s), Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed certain defendants (Docs. 66, 76) and then added another anew in an Amended Complaint (Doc. 82). There were a significant number of discovery requests and responses due to the large number of parties and the need to determine the proper defendants. Defendants also asserted a significant number of defenses including all three "white collar" exemptions under the FLSA. Plaintiffs contend that the "sheer number of defenses" necessitated additional discovery that would not have been otherwise required. (Mot. at 4.)
After the exchange of extensive written discovery, the Parties reached a settlement of Plaintiffs' claims, before any depositions were taken. However, after the Parties agreed to settle Plaintiffs' claims, Defendants served a Rule 68 offer of judgment on Plaintiffs' counsel but only for attorneys' fees and litigation costs. The Court held a teleconference in connection with this development and its effect on the motion to approve settlement. After the teleconference, Defendants then withdrew the Rule 68 offer. Defendants represented that after withdrawing their Rule 68 offer, they made a new settlement offer of $40,000 for Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees. (Def. Resp., Doc. 102 at 3.) Plaintiffs provided a counter-offer at $51,120.13. Defendants rejected this offer and the Parties ultimately submitted the issue to the Court.
In their Motion Plaintiffs seek $59,429.50 in fees, divided as follows:
| Time Keeper | Position | Billable Rate | Total Billed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Charles R. Bridgers | Partner | $425 | $8,412.98 |
| Mitchell D. Benjamin | Partner | $425 | $9,107.75 |
| Matthew W. Herrington | Senior Associate | $350 | $16,597.50 |
| Jessica Sorrenti | Senior Paralegal | $165 | $23,747.90 |
| Sarah Toenes | Paralegal | $125 | $1,371.62 |
| Kelsey Hyatt | Legal Assistant | $65 | $191.75 |
(Declaration of Charles R. Bridgers ("Bridgers Decl.") ¶ 9.) Plaintiffs also provide the below chart dividing time based on the phases of litigation.
| Phase of Litigation | Description | Amount Billed Per Phase and Percentage of Total Fees Sought |
|---|---|---|
| 01-Intake | Initial meetings with clients; initial development of factual narrative, advice about the process of litigation, decision to proceed, extensive pre-litigation settlement negotiations, and explanation of DCBFB Client instructions and Retainer Agreement | $447.15 |
| .75% | ||
| 02-Complaint_COIP_Service | Initial factual investigation; draft and revisions of Complaint; client review of Complaint; Certificate of Interested Persons | $4,107.41 |
| 6.91% | ||
| 02.5-Efforts re Serv Process | Efforts attempting to make service of process | $403.75 |
| .68% | ||
| 03-Answer_Disclosures_JPR | Review of Answer(s) filed; drafting, reviewing and finalizing Disclosures and Joint Preliminary Report | $3,323.15 |
| 5.59% | ||
| 04-AmendComl-Ans | Draft and revisions of Amended Complaint and Effort regarding Amended Answer | $1,428.75 |
| 2.4% | ||
| 05-Motion to Dismiss | Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss | $3,777.16 |
| 6.36% | ||
| 06-Damage Estimate | Damage Estimate: Efforts reviewing time and pay records to prepare an estimate of Plaintiff's damages | $4,402.25 |
| 7.41% | ||
| 07-Written Discovery | Efforts in preparing and responding to written discovery | $19,427.76 |
| 32.69% | ||
| 08-Subpoenas | Issuance and Response to Subpoenas for third party documents (different from written discovery) | $115.50 |
| .19% | ||
| 09-Protective-Order | Efforts re protective order motion and terms | $85.00 |
| .14% | ||
| 10-Conferral-Discovery | Efforts seeking documents in the conferral process | $993.00 |
| 1.67% | ||
| 12-Depositions | Scheduling, noticing, preparing for and conducting depositions of a Rule 30(b)(6) representative and both individual defendant | $228.25 |
| .38% | ||
| 13-Motions | Drafting and Responding to Motions including motion to extend time to answer and motion to approve settlement. | $9,790.69 |
| 16.47% | ||
| 16-Settlement | Efforts to resolve matter including negotiation and attempts to resolve attorney fee issues | $5,571.09 |
| 9.37% | ||
| 26-Client Comm | General communication with client during scope of representation not otherwise categorized | $429.50 |
| .72% | ||
| 27-Legal Research Other | Conduct legal research not otherwise categorized | $420.00 |
| .71% | ||
| 29-Miscellanous Case Efforts | Miscellaneous Duties Related to Case, review of incoming correspondence, incoming orders, extensions, staff assignments | $1,780.51 |
| 3.0% | ||
| 30-Factual Development | Interviewing witnesses and reviewing facts not otherwise categorized | $2,354.33 |
| 3.96% | ||
| 32-Offer of Judgment Activity | Efforts relating to offer of judgment per FRCP 68 | $344.25 |
| .58% |
In response to Plaintiffs' motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' Atlanta rates are too high for this Rome case, that Plaintiffs' counsel engaged in improper block billing, charged for clerical/ administrative time, and included excessive time specifically in connection with the fee petition. Accordingly, Defendants ask the Court to make an across-the-board 30% reduction to the fees requested for a total of $42,132.65. (Def. Resp. at 18.) As noted, in response to Defendants' objections regarding billing for administrative and/or clerical tasks, Plaintiffs propose in their reply a reduction by $2,161.54.
In assessing this attorneys' fees issue, the Court must first determine the reasonable hourly rate and reasonable number of hours to determine the lodestar.
B. Reasonable Hourly Rate
The Parties dispute the hourly rates that should apply for work done by members of Plaintiffs' firm in this action. Plaintiffs and Defendants differing rate proposals are shown in the charts below, the first provided by Plaintiffs, the second by Defendants:
| Time Keeper | Position | Billable Rate | Total Billed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Charles R. Bridgers | Partner | $425 | $8,412.98 |
| Mitchell D. Benjamin | Partner | $425 | $9,107.75 |
| Matthew W. Herrington | Senior Associate | $350 | $16,597.50 |
| Jessica Sorrenti | Senior Paralegal | $165 | $23,747.90 |
| Sarah Toenes | Paralegal | $125 | $1,371.62 |
| Kelsey Hyatt | Legal Assistant | $65 | $191.75 |
| Name | Position (years of exp.) | Hourly Rate | Total Hours | Total Billed |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| C.R. Bridgers | Partner (18) | $ 300.00 | 19.8 | $ 5,940.00 |
| Mitchell Benjamin | Partner (18) | $ 300.00 | 21.43 | $ 6,429.00 |
| Matthew Herrington | Associate (7) | $ 200.00 | 47.7 | $ 9,540.00 |
| Jessica Sorrenti | Paralegal (20) | $ 85.00 | 143.92 | $ 12,233.20 |
| S. Toenes | Paralegal (10) | $ 80.00 | 10.98 | $ 878.40 |
| Kelsey Hyatt | Legal Assist. (1) | $ 40.00 | 2.95 | $ 118.00 |
| TOTALS = | 246.78 | $ 35,138.60 |
(Bridgers Decl. ¶ 9; Def. Resp. at 9.)
"A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation." Norman , 836 F.2d at 1299. Generally, the "relevant legal community" is that of the place where the case is filed. Cullens v. Ga Dep't of Transp. , 29 F.3d 1489, 1494 (11th Cir. 1994). "If a fee applicant desires to recover the non-local rates of an attorney who is not from the place in which the case was filed, he must show a lack of attorneys practicing in that place who are willing and able to handle his claims." ACLU v. Barnes , 168 F.3d 423, 437 (11th Cir. 1999) ; Brooks v. Georgia State Bd. of Elections , 997 F.2d 857, 869 (11th Cir. 1993) (upholding district court's determination that there were no Brunswick attorneys familiar with voting rights actions who could have handled case) (citing Johnson v. University College , 706 F.2d 1205, 1208 (11th Cir. 1983) (explaining that "civil rights litigants may not be charged with selecting the nearest and cheapest attorney"), cert. denied , 464 U.S. 994, 104 S.Ct. 489, 78 L.Ed.2d 684 (1983) ). Defendants argue that the "place where the case is filed" means the particular division of the Northern District, i.e. , Rome, Georgia. Plaintiffs first contend that the authority does not necessarily demand that the "place where the case is filed" be the specific division of a district, as some courts have defined the relevant legal community at the district level rather than the division. (Reply at 2.) Beyond that, Plaintiffs primarily argue that even if the relevant legal community is defined at the division level (and thus is Rome), their rates are reasonable because there are "virtually no attorneys who represent plaintiffs in FLSA matters with the experience necessary to handle a case of this complexity" in Rome. (Mot. at 9.)
The Court finds that Plaintiffs' charged rates – of $425 for partners, $350 for Mr. Herrington, $165 for Ms. Sorrenti , $125 for Ms. Toenes, and $65 for Ms. Hyatt—are reasonable under the circumstances. Without question, Plaintiffs' rates are reasonable measured at the district level, as evidenced by the number of cases in which these exact rates, or rates very close to these, have been approved by courts when approving FLSA settlements. See e.g., Gertman v. City of Atlanta , 1:17-cv-04960-MLB, Doc. 82 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2020) (listing same rates for the partners, Ms. Sorrenti and Ms. Toenes and finding "that the hourly rates requested are reasonable"); Smith, et.al. v. Childfirst 24 Hour Childcare, et.al. , 1:18-cv-03786-WMR, Docs. 55 at n.12; 56 (N.D. Ga. June 4. 2019) (approving motion for settlement listing partners and paralegals at same rate and Mr. Herrington at $325); Kelly v. BNFocus 3D Trucking, LLC et al. , 1:20-cv-02781-WMR, Docs. 18 at 7-8, 19 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 15, 2020) (granting motion to approve settlement and motion for attorneys' fees that listed same rates as requested here); Ogier v. M-Entertainment Properties, LLC, et al. , 1:19-cv-372-TWT, Docs. 46, 50 (N.D. Ga. May 15, 2020) (granting motion to approve settlement that listed same rates as requested here). Weakland et al. v. Unique Refinishers, Inc. et al. , 1:19-cv-2581-MHC, Docs. 85, 86 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 23, 2021) (approving FLSA settlement that listed same rates).
Defendants specifically object to Ms. Sorrenti's rate. Ms. Sorrenti has over 23 years of experience as a paralegal and over 11 working on FLSA cases with Plaintiffs' firm. (Affidavit of Jessica Sorrenti, Doc. 100 ¶¶ 2). As Mr. Bridgers declared, much of her work in this matter could only be done by an associate attorney, who would be billing at a higher rate. (Declaration of Charles Bridgers, Doc. 99-2 ¶ 16.) As detailed herein, her rate of $165 has been approved as reasonable on many occasions. The evidence thus shows that Ms. Sorrenti is clearly skilled and deserving of her proposed rate of $165 for her significant contributions in this case.
This is by no means an exhaustive list.
Indeed, Plaintiffs' rates have been approved in the Rome division on at least two prior occasions. See e.g., Lawson v. Natco Prods. Corp. , 4:19-cv-0009-WEJ, Docs. 13,16 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 29, 2019) (approving settlement listing same rates for partners and paralegals and $325 for Mr. Herrington); Lopez v. Dalton Hospitality Hotel Services, LLC, and Guatam Nanda , 4:18-cv-0017-HLM, Docs. 55, 56 (N.D. Ga. June 19, 2019) (approving FLSA settlement listing same rates for partners and paralegals and $325 for Mr. Herrington). Other non-Rome attorneys have also been approved at comparable rates in the Rome division. See e.g., Johnson et al. v. Floyd County, Ga. , 4:18-cv-127-HLM, Docs. 19,20,21 (approving FLSA settlement that included fee rates of $400 for partners, $325 for associates, and $150 for paralegals); Wooldridge v. Gateway Transp. Of Georgia , 4:19-cv-53-HLM, Docs. 35, 37 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 31, 2019) (approving FLSA settlement including fee rate of $400 for Texas attorney admitted PHV); Ratchford v. Regions Financial Corp. et al. , 4:18-cv-103-HLM, Docs. 27, 32 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 8, 2019) (approving FLSA settlement and motion for attorneys' fees for founding partner (Roy Barnes) at $750 per hour, junior partner at $350, and paralegal at $150). The Court also notes, for good measure, that Plaintiffs' rates have been approved in the Middle District of Georgia as well. See e.g., Haddock v. Jasper County, Ga. , 5:18-cv-292-MTT, Docs. 13-1, 14 (M.D. Ga. June 3, 2019) (approving FLSA settlement listing partner rates at $425 and Ms. Sorrenti at $165); Cooper et al. v. Parker Promotions, Inc. , 4:17-cv-116-CDL, Docs. 64-65 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 6, 2019) (approving settlement detailing same partner and paralegal rates, and Mr. Herrington at $325).
Besides that these rates, or closely comparable rates, have been previously approved as reasonable in Rome, the Court finds that Plaintiffs could likely not have found "lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation," Norman , 836 F.2d at 1299, representing plaintiffs in FLSA cases in Rome, especially ones sufficiently experienced to handle the complexities this case presented in a successful and thorough manner, as Plaintiffs' counsel did. This case was more complex than a typical FLSA case in the initial stages because of the many entity defendants (and the defendants' denials of employment relationships) and their relationships to one another, as well as the DOL investigation and connected arguments at the motion to dismiss stage. Indeed, had Plaintiffs retained counsel with less FLSA experience, it might have taken more hours to untangle the knot of defendants and address other issues.
In support of their position that Rome lacks FLSA plaintiffs' lawyers, Plaintiffs have presented a list of FLSA cases filed in the Rome division since 2015 and the corresponding counsel representing the plaintiffs. (Doc. 99-3 at 8.) Most of these attorneys are located in the Atlanta metro area. (Id. ) In a number of cases, the plaintiffs are represented by a duo of attorneys, John McCown and Scott Jackson. (Id. ) Mr. McCown is located in Dalton (in the Rome Division), and Mr. Jackson is located in Nashville, Tennessee. (Id. ) Plaintiffs argue that Mr. McCown himself does not represent FLSA plaintiffs and instead serves as local counsel for Mr. Jackson, as Mr. McCown's website does not advertise him as taking FLSA cases or employment discrimination cases and instead says that he "primarily focuses his practice on personal injury cases and workers' compensation claims." (Doc. 99-3 at 10.) Mr. Jackson does specialize in FLSA cases, per his website. (Id. at 12-13.) Plaintiffs also represent that Mr. McCown is not a member of the National Employment Lawyers Association or its Georgia division. Defendants rely on affidavits from individuals who represent defendants in employment cases or general practitioners who would be willing to represent plaintiffs in FLSA cases. (Doc. 102-1.) Defendants also argue that Mr. McCown is an FLSA practitioner as he is listed counsel on a large number of FLSA cases in the Rome division.
Defendants' affidavits are insufficient to persuasively show that competent counsel with sufficient FLSA experience were available to represent Plaintiffs in this case, which included various complexities described herein. And while the Court acknowledges that Mr. McCown has clearly taken on representation of plaintiffs in a number of FLSA cases, this representation is typically as local counsel alongside Mr. Jackson, a FLSA attorney from Nashville. It is clear from Mr. McCown's website that he himself does not advertise as taking wage and hour cases or specialize in this area.
None of the attorneys who provided affidavits have represented a plaintiff in an FLSA case in Rome since 2015, per the list provided by Plaintiffs. (Doc. 99-3 at 8.) The Court also notes that conflicts for counsel can arise if they represent plaintiffs in employment cases and then seek to represent employers in other more remunerative litigation.
The Court is also not persuaded by the two unpublished cases cited by Defendants, one in Rome, the other in Newnan. In the Rome case, Ewing v. Daystar Logisitics, Inc. , 4:13-cv-20-HLM, 2013 WL 12382357 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 23, 2013) (the Rome case), the Court found that plaintiff had not established that "no attorney in the Rome Division would be willing to take the case." Id. at *4. But that is not the appropriate standard, and it is not clear how any plaintiffs' counsel could make such a showing. Rather, Plaintiffs' counsel must show (and has shown) that there were not local Rome attorneys with experience representing plaintiffs in complicated FLSA actions that could have effectively handled this case. Brooks , 997 F.2d at 869. Under the standard propounded by Defendants, plaintiffs in Rome and similar areas would be disadvantaged and might be unable to attract adequate representation altogether, as plaintiffs' lawyers might not find it worthwhile or economically feasible to take on these cases.
Attorneys representing FLSA plaintiffs might also be hesitant to take these cases even where, as here, the fact that the case was filed in Rome as opposed to Atlanta had little practical difference in terms of representation. Indeed, the Court in this case is located in Atlanta, and had hearings or a trial been conducted, it would have been in Atlanta. Much of the work was assuredly conducted remotely from the attorneys' offices as a result of the pandemic and the ever-increasing technological era in which we operate. As a result, the Court does not place such significant weight on the 70-mile difference between Atlanta and Rome, as Defendants do.
In Poole v. Meriwether Cnty., Georgia , 3:18-cv-56-TCB, 2019 WL 3757785 (N.D. Ga. June 21, 2019), though the court determined that Newnan rates should apply rather than Atlanta rates, the Court did not address any argument that there were a lack of attorneys practicing in Newnan who were sufficiently experienced to represent the FLSA plaintiff in that case. In addition, the Poole Court found that plaintiff's counsel, who was assuredly less experienced than counsel here, did not exercise reasonable billing judgment, unreasonably delayed and thus stymied settlement negotiations, and did not substantiate the reasonableness of certain attorney or paralegal rates. Id. at *3-4. None of those circumstances apply here, where Plaintiffs' counsel have significant experience representing FLSA plaintiffs, have provided stellar representation, engaged in no comparable delay, and have substantiated their rates by citing to a plethora of past cases.
In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' rates are reasonable considering their experience and past judicial approval of these rates, as well as the circumstances and complexities of this case.
C. Reasonable Number of Hours
After finding that the Plaintiffs' Atlanta rates should apply, the Court turns to whether the number of hours in this case were reasonable.
For purposes of determining the reasonable number of hours, the fee applicant must "maintain[ ] records to show the time spent on the different claims, and set[ ] out with sufficient particularity the general subject matter of the time expenditures so that the district court can assess the time claimed for each activity." Eason v. Bridgewater & Associates, Inc. , 1:11-cv-2772-TCB, 108 F.Supp.3d 1358, 1362 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (quoting Laube v. Allen , 506 F.Supp.2d 969, 976 (M.D. Ala. 2007) ). Attorneys' fee applicants are required to utilize proper "billing judgment" and "excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary hours should be excluded" from the Court's calculus. Norman , 836 F.2d at 1301 (quoting Hensley , 461 U.S. at 434, 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933 ). The determination of which hours should be excluded as excessive "must be left to the discretion of the district court." Id. A party opposing as fee application is obligated to identify the hours that should be excluded from the Court's lodestar calculation in "specific and reasonably precise" terms. Barnes , 168 F.3d at 428.
Here, Defendants assert three main challenges to the number of hours expended by Plaintiffs' counsel in this matter including: (1) improper block billing; (2) billing for certain administrative/ clerical tasks; and (3) excessive time working on Plaintiffs' fee petition. (Def. Resp. at 11-17, Ex. 2.)
i. Block billing
Defendants argue that a number of Plaintiffs' time entries reflect improper "block billing" because certain time entries list multiple tasks and so it is difficult to determine how much time was spent on each task, and therefore difficult to exclude tasks that are administrative or clerical and thus non-recoverable. (Response at 12.) In reply, Plaintiffs acknowledge that Defendants have identified several instances of multi-task billing but argue, and provide authority, that multiple-task time entries are not improper where tasks are specific and related because "[c]ombining multiple related tasks into a single entry is both reasonable and efficient and should not automatically be punished." (Reply at 6-7) (citing DeKalb Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Specialties & Paper Prods. Union No. 527 Health & Welfare Fund , No. 1:13-cv-343-TWT, 2015 WL 4231774, at *4 (N.D. Ga. July 13, 2015) ) (finding that, although plaintiff's counsel occasionally included multiple tasks in a time entry, this was not unreasonable block billing since each task was specific and related, and no reduction of hours was warranted). The Court finds that Plaintiffs' billing method was not improper. Plaintiffs did not list 8-hour chunks of billing with no detail. Like in DeKalb Med. Ctr. , the listed entries detail specific and related tasks. 2015 WL 4231774, at *4. Practically speaking, completing one particular task—such as drafting discovery responses—will often require an attorney or paralegal to review documents, converse with clients, and collaborate with other members of the firm to discuss any issues. Listing the multiple aspects of a broader task, as Ms. Sorrenti did in many of her entries, is not unreasonable nor should it be discouraged. While Defendants object to Ms. Sorrenti's including the phrase "file review" in her entries, she explains that this refers to reviewing discovery, pleadings, attorneys' notes and her own notes from discussions with clients in order to prepare pleadings, such as the JPRDP, or discovery. (Second Declaration of Jessica Sorrenti, Doc. 104-2 ¶ 7.) No reduction of hours is warranted based on alleged block billing.
ii. Billing for Clerical or Administrative Tasks
Defendants also object to a number of entries that include certain clerical tasks such as bates stamping or indexing documents, e-filing documents, and burning document production on to discs. (Def. Resp. at 15, Ex. 2.) In reply, Plaintiffs argue that most of Defendants' objections are meritless but propose a "generous 25% reduction" of certain itemized billable hours, and propose the exclusion of other listed entries, for a total reduction of fees by $2,161.54. (Reply at 7-8.)
Based on its review of the evidence and Defendants' objections, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' billing statement does include billing for some administrative and clerical tasks that are not recoverable. The Court appreciates Plaintiffs' candid acknowledgement of this and their proposal to reduce their requested fees by $2,161.54 based on certain entries. However, Plaintiffs' proposal omits certain time entries that Defendants object to as clerical that the Court finds are in fact administrative. Instead of conducting a cumbersome and time-consuming line-by-line reduction of certain allegedly clerical entries, the Court will make an across-the-board reduction to account for the small number of improperly billed clerical tasks, as described below.
iii. Excessive Time
Finally, Defendants argue that certain time entries reflect "excessive time," including certain time on discovery, Mr. Bridgers' time spent reviewing fees to eliminate excess hours, and the hours Plaintiffs' counsel spent drafting their fee motion, brief, and supporting declarations, considering that Plaintiffs' firm frequently submits fee petitions. (Def. Resp. at 16.) In reply, Plaintiffs emphasize that Defendants' own actions and obfuscations caused Plaintiffs to expend more hours than would have otherwise been necessary determining the proper defendants through discovery, obtaining discovery related to the many defenses asserted, calculating damages where defendants did not keep accurate time records, and responding to the Rule 68 offer of judgment for only attorneys' fees, a peculiar tactic. (Reply at 9.) Plaintiffs also defend the amount of time spent on the fee petition, acknowledging that they can and do use templates from past cases with respect to the biography of counsel and the basic law on fee recovery, but noting that much of the fee petition preparation is case-specific:
What does change is the procedural history of the case at hand, the volume of billing records and types of tasks that were performed and that now must be supported, and the minutiae of the individual case that have to be reviewed in the exercise of billing judgment. Defendants point to absolutely nothing in the work that was performed on Plaintiffs' fee petition as specifically unreasonable.
(Reply at 10.)
First the Court finds that Plaintiffs' time spent on discovery or preparing damages calculations was not excessive. As detailed above, Defendants actions contributed to complexities on these fronts. As to whether Plaintiffs' time spent in connection with the fee petition was excessive, the Court notes that, without question, attorney time preparing a fee motion is recoverable. Martin v. University of South Alabama , 911 F.2d 604, 610 (11th Cir. 1990). In addition, the authority requires that fee applicants take time to review fees and exercise "billing judgment" to exclude unnecessary hours. Norman , 836 F.2d at 1301 (quoting Hensley , 461 U.S. at 434, 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933 ). In total, Plaintiffs billed approximately 20 hours for preparation of the fee petition. The Court understands that being thorough and accurate takes time and does not seek to discourage such behavior. However, Defendants' objections to certain administrative tasks, such as time Mr. Bridgers spent running fee reports, that occurred in preparing the fee petition are valid objections. In this way, Defendants' objections are overlapping ones. The Court thus considers the small portion of administrative time spent in connection with the preparation of the fee petition that it determines to be improper in its across-the-board reduction.
In light of the relatively small portion of time improperly included for administrative and clerical tasks throughout the case, as well as the minimal excessive time in the preparation of the fee petition, the Court reduces Plaintiffs' total fees by 10% off of the original requested amount of $59,420.50. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to fees in the amount of $53,478.45 . Taking a comprehensive view of the facts and circumstances of this case and the successful outcome for Plaintiffs, the Court finds this to be a reasonable amount for fees.
To the extent that Defendants request an additional reduction after the lodestar calculation, the Court finds that this request is without merit. Defendants have articulated no basis to reduce Plaintiffs' fees under particular factors set out in Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc. , 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs [Doc. 99] in the amount of $53,478.45 in fees and $760 in costs.
Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiffs are entitled to $760 in costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 14th day of May, 2021.