Opinion
C.A. No. 01C-03-023
Date Submitted: January 4, 2002
Date Decided: February 22, 2002
Upon Defendant's motion for summary judgment.
DENIED
Gregory J. Weinig, Esq. of Cooch and Taylor. 824 Market Street, Suite 1000, P.O. Box 1680, Wilmington, Delaware 19899-1680. Attorney for Defendants.
Perry F. Goldlust, Esq. of Heiman, Aber, Goldlust Baker, First Federal Plaza, Suite 600, 702 King Street, P.O. Box 1675, Wilmington, Delaware 19899. Attorney for Plaintiffs.
ORDER
On this 14th day of February 2002, upon consideration of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, the response filed by Plaintiffs, and oral argument, it appears to the Court that:
(1) Plaintiffs filed this action for declaratory judgment on March 2, 2001 against Defendants. The action was instituted to determine the ownership of the property at 3709 Lafayette Street, Wilmington, Delaware 19808. On March 15, 1957, Charles J. Connor and Rose E. Connor purchased this property. The habendum clause described the tenancy as "tenants by the entireties." A question of fact exists as to whether Charles and Rose were ever married.
On April 12, 1974, Rose died intestate. Plaintiffs, the children of Rose, contend that at her death, half of the property became theirs. Plaintiffs contend that Rose and Charles never married and thus a tenancy by the entirety could not be created. In support of their contention that no marriage between Rose and Charles existed, Plaintiffs cite the lack of a finding of a marriage certificate, that Rose never wore a wedding ring, that Rose told her children they were not married, and that at Rose's death the children received Rose's Social Security disability benefits.
From Rose's death until Charles' death on February 26, 2000, Charles continued to occupy the property in question. Plaintiff Spry contends that during the four days after her mother's death she had a conversation with Charles allowing him to live in the house as long as he did not marry. No further dealings with the property occurred until Charles death.
Charles left a will leaving his entire estate, sans a trailer home, to his niece Phyllis. Plaintiffs' attorney contacted Phyllis with Plaintiffs' contention that half of the property in question belonged to them. On September 26, 2000, a "Statement of Claim" was filed against Charles' estate, which represented that the claim arose on the day of Charles' death. Phyllis, as Executrix of Charles' will, rejected this claim. Plaintiffs then filed a Petition for Partition in the Court of Chancery on November 21, 2000. Upon Defendant's Motion to Dismiss that petition, the Court of Chancery stayed that proceedings so that Plaintiffs could file a suit in the Superior Court to determine who held title to the property in question. Thus, this suit was filed.
(2) Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party has shown that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In considering such a motion, the Court must evaluate the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Summary judgment will not be granted under circumstances where the record reasonably indicates that a material fact is in dispute or if it seems desirable to inquire more thoroughly into the facts in order to clarify the application of law to the circumstances.
Moore v. Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679 (Del. 1979).
Id.
Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467 (Del. 1962).
(3) Defendants raise four arguments in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment: (1) Plaintiffs' claim is barred by the statute of limitations; (2) Plaintiffs' claim is barred by the doctrine of laches; (3) Plaintiffs' claim is barred by adverse possession; and (4) Plaintiffs' claim is barred because the deed conveyed a joint tenancy and not a tenancy by the entirety. Plaintiffs' main argument to each of these contentions is that a material question of fact exists as to each one to bar a finding of summary judgment. Indeed, as Defendants raised this motion, the facts must be looked at in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs.
(4) The Court denies summary judgment on Defendants first ground that Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs filed a claim on the Estate within the statute of limitations, on September 26, 2000. The claim arose before Charles' death. Thus, an eight-month statute of limitations applies and the claim was properly filed within that time frame, as stated in 12 Del. C. § 2102(b). Further pursuant to 12 Del. C. § 2102(c), an actual claim was brought within three months of the Executrix's rejection of the claim. Within three months of the rejection, Plaintiffs filed a Partition Petition in the Court of Chancery. Based on the foregoing, Defendant's Motion is Denied on this ground.
(5) The Court denies summary judgment on Defendant's second ground that Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the doctrine of laches. It is correct that the defense of laches may be used in a court of law. There are two elements to this defense: (1) knowledge of the claim by Plaintiffs; and (2) prejudice to Defendants stemming from Plaintiffs' unreasonable delay in bringing the claim. The defense of laches requires a factual inquiry, and thus is rarely granted on summary judgment. Here, there is no evidence of prejudice to Defendants when taking the facts in light most favorably to the Plaintiffs. To find prejudice would require a determination of factual issues, which is inappropriate on summary judgment. Thus, Defendant's Motion is denied as to this ground.
USH Ventures v. Global Telesystem Group, Inc., Del. Super., C.A. No. 97C-08-086, Quillen, J. (May 9, 2000).
Fike v. Ruger, 752 A.2d 112, 113 (Del. 2000).
Clark v. Packem Associates, Del. Ch., C.A. No. 1326, Chandler, V.C. (Mar. 6, 1991).
(6) Defendants' third ground for summary judgment, adverse possession, also fails. Defendants argue that even if Plaintiffs acquired half of the property from their mother through the intestate laws, Defendants have now acquired the property through adverse possession. This contention fails because a material question of fact exists as to whether Charles possessed the land with hostility or ousted his co-tenants. Therefore, the Court denied Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment on this basis.
(7) Defendants' last contention that the deed conveys a joint tenancy also fails. A material question of fact remains in this case about whether Rose and Charles were married; thus the Court cannot decide which type of tenancy was conveyed by the deed. If the parties were not married, the general rule in Delaware is where two parties are not married, they take property as tenants in common. In a similar Delaware case, the court did not have to address the issue of which type of tenancy the deed created as the parties did not dispute a tenancy in common existed since the parties were not married. Defendants cite a string of Pennsylvania cases which hold that when the habendum clause states the parties are holding property as tenants by the entireties even though they are not married, the tenancy is converted into a joint tenancy. Delaware, unlike Pennsylvania, does not recognize common law marriages. Thus, in Pennsylvania if a couple tries to take property by tenancy by the entirety and are not married, by holding themselves out as married there exists the possibility of a dining of a common law marriage. The property in question is located in Delaware, therefore Delaware law applies. Thus, if the evidence were to show that Rose and Charles were never married, the Court would follow the Delaware general rule; which is where two parties take property as tenants by the entirety but are not married, title is converted into a tenancy in common.
In the Matter of that Certain Lot and Parcel of Land Recorded in Names of Campher, 498 A.2d 1090 (Del. 1985).
Camphor, 498 A.2d 1090.
See e.g. Maxwell v. Saylor, 58 A.2d 355, 356 (Pa. 1948).
For the aforementioned reasons, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is Hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.