Opinion
No. 00-3136
April 19, 2001
ORDER
This cause is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for an Injunction Pending Appeal.
Plaintiffs have filed the instant motion asking the Court for an injunction while they appeal the Court's denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction. Specifically, Plaintiffs ask the Court to enter an injunction preserving the status quo for 21 days, thereby preventing the City from hiring the ten white, male firefighters until May 21, 2001, rather than on April 30, 2001, as planned. Plaintiffs assert that this three week injunction will allow the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit time to consider their appeal of this Court's denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction. Defendants object to Plaintiffs' motion.
This Court has jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs' motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8(a)(1)(C) which requires requests for an injunction pending an appeal to be filed first with the district court. In addition, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(c) grants district courts the discretion to "suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction during the pendency of the appeal. . . ." Id.
In Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770 (1987), the United States Supreme Court established four factors which must be considered in deciding a motion under Rule 62(c): "(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies." Id. at 776. Some courts have held that even where an applicant cannot show that he has a substantial likelihood of success on appeal, a stay may be appropriate if the other factors weigh strongly in the applicant's favor. E.g., Thomas v. City of Evanston, 636 F. Supp. 587, 590-91 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (applying a "sliding scale" approach in considering preliminary injunctive relief).
In the instant case, the Court finds that the factors which it must consider in deciding Plaintiffs' motion weigh in favor of denying the motion. First, as noted in the Court's previous Opinion denying Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs have not made a strong showing that they are likely to succeed on the merits. In addition, Plaintiffs have offered no new argument, facts, or evidence in their current motion with which to convince the Court that its previous ruling was in error.
Second, Plaintiffs have not offered any evidence that they will be irreparably injured absent a stay. In fact, Plaintiffs have not even made such an allegation in the instant motion.
Third, the stay will substantially injure the City. As explained in the Court's previous Opinion, not only will the City be required to expend a great deal of funds in overtime payments if the firefighters are not hired by April 30, 2001, but the City's citizenry will also be at risk because the current firefighters will likely become fatigued due to having to work longer hours. The requirement that firefighters work these longer hours will also increase the risk of injury to themselves and to those with whom they work.
Fourth, as explained supra and in the Court's previous Opinion, the public interest lies in allowing the City to hire these new firefighters as soon as possible. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' one page motion has provided an insufficient basis for the Court to grant them an injunction pending appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(c) and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8(a)(1)(c).
Ergo, Plaintiff's Motion for an Injunction Pending Appeal (d/e 63) is DENIED.