Opinion
A131178
12-21-2011
JEFFREY SPRAGENS, et al. Petitioners and Appellants, v. COUNTY OF SONOMA, Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Sonoma County
Super. Ct. No. SCV-247628)
I. INTRODUCTION
Appellants, Jeffrey and Joy Spragens, appeal from the judgment of the Sonoma County Superior Court denying their petition, brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, to set aside the decision of the Board of Supervisors of that county denying their request to reverse the denial of an Administrative Design Review permit request. The permit would allow the installation of lights at a private tennis court located at appellants' residence on Sonoma Mountain Road in an unincorporated area of Sonoma County known as Bennett Valley. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In November 2005, appellant Jeffrey Spragens submitted to the Sonoma County Permit and Resource Management Department (hereafter PRMD) his initial application for an Administrative Design Review of his plan to, among other things, add a lighted tennis court to his and his wife's property on Sonoma Mountain Road in the Bennett Valley area of the county. On March 7, 2006, his various requests were approved, albeit with a condition which prohibited lights on the proposed tennis court. In August 2006, Spragens renewed his request to install lighting at the tennis court, and that request was initially approved in January 2007. In April 2007, however, the PRMD revoked that approval because of a determination that "the proposed lighting is inconsistent with the development criteria of the Bennett Valley Area Plan." A few months later, a staff person of PRMD further explained the reasons for that denial in a letter to appellants' attorney.
On April 25, 2007, Spragens appealed the staff decision to the Sonoma County Planning Commission (Commission), as the PRMD staff had advised him he could do.
On July 16 and September 3, 2009, the Commission held hearings on appellants' appeal of the PRMD's denial of their request for permission to add lights to their tennis court. At the July 16 hearing, the Commission was presented with a further report from its staff, this time recommending qualified approval of the Spragens' administrative appeal. The staff recommended that the "Commission uphold the appeal and approve the project subject to the attached conditions of approval . . . ." The staff explained that they had determined that "there will be no significant environmental effect resulting from this project because the outdoor lighting has been mitigated to the extent that it will meet the County criteria for night lighting in rural residential areas." Attached to this report to the Commission, however, were numerous communications from neighbors of appellants (some attaching photographs), all objecting to the approval of the proposed tennis court lighting.
At the September 3, 2009, second hearing of the Commission, it heard statements from appellant Jeff Spragens, his attorney, a " lighting consultant" retained by the Spragens, and several neighbors. Several neighbors and, additionally, the Sonoma County Fire Marshall, presented reasons for disapproval of the appellants' administrative appeal. By a vote of 4-1, the Commission rejected appellants' appeal from the PRMD's denial of their permit for tennis court lighting. Among other things, the Commission found that the project is inconsistent with the General Plan's Open Space Element's " Policy for Outdoor Lighting," the Zoning Code's Scenic Resources section, and the Bennett Valley Area Plan's development criteria that requires the nighttime character of rural areas to be preserved, new construction to blend with the natural surroundings of the site, and that no new project have a significant adverse effect on adjacent properties. (Ibid.) The Commission further found that negative visual impacts to public and private views during nighttime would occur because the lighting was not designed to minimize spillage. The Commission also found that the project "will . . . be detrimental to the health, safety, peace, comfort, and general welfare of persons residing or working in the neighborhood of such use, and will be detrimental or injurious to property and improvements in the neighborhood or the general welfare of the area."
In its decision, the Commission also affirmed the prior findings of the PRMD that appellants' planned addition of lights to their tennis court was not subject to CEQA (California Environmental Quality Act) review or evaluation because it was covered by a specific CEQA exemption.
The following day, September 4, 2009, appellants appealed the Commission's rejection of their appeal from the administrative decision to the Sonoma County Board of Supervisors (Board).
On February 2, 2010, the Board held a hearing on appellants' appeal. It heard from the Commission's staff and also from appellants' lighting engineer and several neighbors. Several neighbors were strongly opposed to the idea of the lighted tennis court, and presented photographs showing the proximity of the tennis court to their properties in support of their objections.
At the conclusion of the public portion of the hearing, the court heard further from the Commission's staff, including a statement from two staff persons involved in the case that the "nearest [neighboring] dwelling [is] 37 feet from the tennis court" and that neither were "aware of any other lighted tennis courts that we've approved."
After deliberating, the Board took a "four one vote, straw vote, denying the appeal and agreeing with the Planning Commission's recommendation," and setting the matter for final action on March 16, 2010.
On that day, and by the same 4-1 vote, the Board formally rejected appellants' appeal from the Commission's decision, finding that the proposed lights would be located in a sensitive area, close to neighbors' homes, would necessarily emit considerable light into the nighttime skies and thus impact views, and would thus "adversely impact nighttime views on the Sonoma Mountains and in Bennett Valley, and unacceptably disturb the rural, scenic character" of those areas.
On June 23, 2010, appellants filed a verified petition for a writ of administrative mandamus, and the matter was thereafter extensively briefed by the parties. A hearing was held before Superior Court Judge Elliot Daum on December 8, 2010.
On January 26, 2011, that court issued its order denying appellants' petition for the writ on the basis that they had shown no abuse of discretion on the part of the Board or Commission, and that the decision sought to be overturned "was procedurally sound and indeed supported by substantial evidence."
Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal on February 8, 2011.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Our Standard of Review
Our standard of review of the denial of a petition for administrative mandamus is well settled. As we said very recently in Hines v. California Coastal Com. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 830, 839-840: "In McAllister v. California Coastal Com. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 912 (McAllister), the Court of Appeal reiterated the appropriate standard of review in cases like this: 'In reviewing an agency's decision under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, the trial court determines whether (1) the agency proceeded without, or in excess of, jurisdiction; (2) there was a fair hearing; and (3) the agency abused its discretion. [Citation.] An " '[a]buse of discretion is established if the [agency failed to proceed] in the manner required by law, [its] order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by substantial evidence.' " ([Citations]; § 30801; Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b).) [¶] The trial court presumes that the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence, and the petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating the contrary. [Citations.] In reviewing the agency's decision, the trial court examines the whole record and considers all relevant evidence, including evidence that detracts from the decision. [Citation.] "Although this task involves some weighing to fairly estimate the worth of the evidence, that limited weighing does not constitute independent review where the court substitutes its own findings and inferences for that of the Commission. Rather, it is for the [agency] to weigh the preponderance of conflicting evidence, as [the court] may reverse its decision only if, based on the evidence before it, a reasonable person could not have reached the conclusion reached by it." [Citations.] On the other hand, the trial court exercises independent judgment on pure questions of law, including the interpretation of statutes and judicial precedent. [Citations.]' (McAllister, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at pp. 921-922.) [¶] 'On appeal from the denial of a petition, our role is identical to that of the trial court. [Citations.]' (McAllister, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 922; accord, Alberstone v. California Coastal Com. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 859, 863 . . . .)"
In Saad v. City of Berkeley (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1206, 1211-1213 (Saad), this court explained the "identical with the trial court" concept by quoting approvingly from a decision by Division Three of this District: " 'The scope of our review of the subject administrative agency action in this case is identical with that of the superior court. The same substantial evidence standard applies, and the issue is whether the findings of the [agency] were based on substantial evidence in light of the entire administrative record. [Citations.] Moreover, . . . we must examine the findings made by the [agency] itself to determine whether they were supported by substantial evidence, rather than limiting ourselves to a review of the findings made by the trial court. [Citations.]' [Citation.]" We then went to say: "The burden is on the petitioner to show there is no substantial evidence whatsoever to support the findings of the board." (Saad, supra, at p. 1212; see also Breneric Associates v. City of Del Mar (1998) 69 Cal.App.4th 166, 174-176; Sierra Club v. California Coastal Com. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 602, 609-610.)
In their opening brief to us, appellants apparently agree that the "substantial evidence" standard of review is applicable; indeed, they quote several other (albeit mainly earlier) cases to that effect. They even conclude their formal argument on that point by saying: "Courts may reverse an agency's decision only if, based on the evidence before the agency, a reasonable person could not reach the conclusion reached by the agency." (Citing Reddell v. California Coastal Com. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 956, 962.) They then begin their argument as to why there was, in their view, no substantial evidence with this quotation: "It is acknowledged that under the substantial evidence test a court is required to resolve reasonable doubts in favor of the administrative decision and uphold that decision if there is any substantial evidence to support the findings." B. Substantial Evidence Supported the County's Rulings
However, in a later section of their opening brief, appellants appear to change their position somewhat and argue that "substantial evidence" means the "weight of the evidence." Based on the authority cited above, some of it (as noted) derived from appellants' opening brief, we categorically reject this seeming alternative argument.
The remainder of appellants' briefs argue only two basic points but do so in, curiously, multiple sections of their briefs. Thus, in their opening brief, appellants first present three separate arguments as to why the County had not fulfilled the substantial evidence standard of review articulated above and then three separate arguments as to why the County was wrong in finding appellants' proposed addition of tennis court lighting to be exempt from the provisions of CEQA. In their reply brief, appellants condense these arguments into five sections, four of them seemingly based on the substantial evidence issue and one on the CEQA issue.
By our subsequent references to the findings and determinations of the "County," we mean to include both the Commission and the Board.
We agree with respondent County that there are, in fact, only two issues that need to be resolved in this appeal: (1) whether there was substantial evidence in the record supporting its decisions and (2) whether those decisions contravened any relevant provision of CEQA. We have no difficulty in determining that respondent County is correct on both points.
In their multiple arguments regarding the alleged lack of substantial evidence to support the County's decisions, appellants repeatedly stress that they, and only they, presented expert evidence (via both testimony and reports) from, specifically Jim Benya of West Linn, Oregon, a licensed California electrical engineer, while the only contrary evidence presented by the County was by neighbors of appellants, i.e., "laypersons" living along or near Sonoma Mountain Road, all of whom objected—some quite strongly—to the idea of a lighted tennis court on appellants' property. For example, appellants' argue that the trial court "erred in finding that substantial evidence existed in support of the County's various conclusory findings concerning lighting impacts because the county lacked any uniform criteria or scientific expertise upon which to credibly contradict and override the technical analysis and findings of no impact as found within the Benya study . . . ."
In the same vein, appellants continue: "[T]he Administrative Record . . . provides no evidence that the County ever possessed any technical expertise to support its absolute and unequivocal findings of lighting impact in contravention of Jim Benya's uncontradicted expert findings of no impact. In the absence of any supporting analytical link to any identifiable lighting criteria, standard, etc., the County's findings amount to no more than unsubstantiated speculation."
Appellants contrast the testimony and written report submitted by their lighting expert, Benya, with the opposing testimony and writings submitted in opposition to the planned lighted tennis court. Thus, they note that the Board of Supervisors received "testimony from 3 layperson speakers . . . all of whom offer generalized comments of concern and/or opposition to the project. These layperson speakers offer no credible testimony or scientific and/or technical evidence in contravention of the Benya lighting analysis . . . [and] no testimony or evidence of any kind contravening the expert qualifications of electrical engineer, Jim Benya."
Appellants are equally dismissive of the opposition (apparently transmitted mainly via letters and e-mails) presented earlier in the process to the PRMD and the Commission by neighboring landowners, repeatedly characterizing them as "laypersons." For example, appellants argue that "[I]n an effort to manufacture the appearance of evidentiary conflict, the County . . . contrasted PRMD's CEQA determination and Benya's uncontroverted expert findings with that of selected laypersons expressed in testimony before the Board as well as within various opposition letters submitted by neighboring property owners in opposition to the project." Appellants continue by arguing that "these layperson statements . . . made in opposition to the Spragens' project did not contradict Benya['s] expert analyses and findings and amounted to little more than unverifiable concern and supposition that does not equate to conflicting substantial evidence that is reasonable, credible, or of any solid value. [Citation.] Statements of area residents who are not environmental experts may qualify as substantial evidence only if they are based on relevant personal observations or involve non-technical issues. [Citations.] Conversely, expert testimony that a project would not have a significant impact, if uncontradicted, constitutes substantial evidence."
Our examination of the record convinces us that the evidence presented to the Commission and the Board was indeed "substantial" and cannot and should not be dismissed as readily as appellants argue.
First, as to Benya's testimony and presentations: His first presentation was apparently a nine-page document provided to the PRMD in August 2008 and revised in December 2008. Via both a single-spaced text and accompanying drawings and pictures, it submitted his and the appellants' plans for the lighted tennis court and outlined why and how its lighting would not impact on any neighbors. This presentation was then supplemented by Benya in a letter and single-page attachment sent to the PRMD staff person in charge of evaluating appellants' application to the Commission in July 2009.
In February 2010, Benya prepared an extensive written presentation to the Board entitled "6700 Mountain Road Proposed Tennis Court Lighting," complete with many more drawings, photographs, tables, etc. He also made a verbal presentation to and answered questions from the Board at its hearing that month.
In summary, Benya indicated both in writing and verbally to the two County bodies (i.e., the Commission and the Board) that his plan was to install eight (8) tennis court lights on posts 15 feet high and that all of them would be shielded both on their tops and backs. The lights would each be 1,000 watts. He opined that only "two adjacent residences will be aware that the lighting systems are in fact tennis court lighting." Before the Board, he stated that he believed the proposed lights "can't be seen from almost any vantage point."
The objections to appellants' plan to install lights on their tennis court started even before any presentations, written or verbal, by Benya, i.e., in 2007. The first such consisted of seven e-mails addressed to the PRMD staff from individuals who claimed to be neighbors of appellants, and all of whom objected to the idea of tennis court lights being allowed on appellants' property. One attached two photographs showing how close the tennis court was to her property.
The second batch of objections were dated in 2009 and 2010 and were addressed to both the Commission and the Board; our count reveals approximately 22 such letters and e-mails, some with photographs attached, and some from the same signatories— although dated at different points of time. The objections registered in these communications argued, in summary, that the hillside on which the tennis court had been built was both fairly high up (943 feet above sea level according to the staff report) and hence quite visible from the surrounding area, and that lights from it, no matter how well shielded, would inevitably be visible to neighbors both above and below. According to one such neighbor, they would "seriously pollute the night sky" for appellants' neighbors and their families and guests.
Three of the authors of these objections appeared before the Board on February 2, 2010, and reiterated their objections to the prospective intrusiveness to their homes and properties of a nearby lighted tennis court, especially during evening hours.
Perhaps most significant regarding the County's final decision was the disclosure, during the hearing before the Board, that the closest distance between the tennis court and one neighbor's residence was only 37 feet, with the next closest neighbor's residence apparently being only 57 feet away. In the course of noting this distance, and after receiving the statements of both appellant Jeff Spragens, lighting engineer Benya, and three objecting neighbors, some very relevant dialogue took place between some members of the Board and the PRMD staffers who were most involved in the staff's analysis of the lighting proposal.
First, one of the supervisors noted that a possible additional problem was "noise pollution," so that if "people are playing at night, there could be a certain amount of noise and people talking or yelling back and forth . . . and that concerns me if you have people living close by."
The PRMD staff person most involved with appellant's administrative appeal to the Board replied: "The nearest dwelling at 37 feet from the tennis court. What we have in the Waldrew Heights subdivision, it's a very, very old subdivision. And we have parcels that are substandard in size and so we've got structures that are located closer to property lines than we would normally allow today. So that may be the circumstance in the case of the neighbor's location of his dwelling in relationship to the Spragens' property. It may not meet current required setbacks. It's possible that it was built some time ago."
The supervisor responded to that information thusly: "That means, Madam Chair, 37 feet is very close to this kind of a facility and I find it very hard to believe, no matter how much you direct lights or try to direct lights away from neighboring homes and stuff how that isn't going to impact them at least at some level, and again, the noise issue I think is of concern for me, anyway."
Another PRMD staff person then responded to another supervisor's question regarding whether the County had a "specific ordinance in the County in place that determines" rural sky dark standards. She said: "Through the Chair if I might add, the Planning Commission attempted to look at establishing some methodology for measuring offsite light and glare and impacts to the neighbors. They did ask the applicant to take a look if there's a way that they could do that. The applicant came up with a proposal. It was something the Planning Commission thought about but decided that they weren't sure they wanted to establish that sort of precedent here and they eventually decided not to utilize that method. They, I think, picked up on some of the issues that Supervisor Kerns mentioned that the proximity to the existing homes, the Bennett Valley policies are very strong about protecting not only the public views but also private views. It is an area that is highly visible; this particular site is highly visible, both from offsite and from some of the neighboring homes, and the main thing I think that pushed the Planning Commission over into denial is that they felt that it was a precedent in this area. It is a scenic landscape unit; there was a lot of public outcry at the Planning Commission meeting over the idea of lighting tennis courts and allowing other night lighting in the area and so they eventually decided to deny this request, just for the lighting."
That exchange resulted in the confirmation by both of the staff people that the County had not previously approved any outdoor tennis lighting (in, presumably, residential areas).
Before the 4-1 negative "straw vote" was taken by the Board, the Board's chair summed up her conclusion from the views and material presented to it: "The Sonoma Mountain area and the Bennett Valley area are extremely sensitive areas. The number of times that we have seen projects and issues in those areas is clear to most all of us on this Board. It has taken a lot of effort by a lot of people in those areas to sustain a certain environmental quality that is, I think, commendable. I am sorry that this has taken such a long process to clarify but, from my perspective, anyone can have a tennis court that they want to. Putting lighting in a sensitive area is just not appropriate, and I don't have any, I appreciate Mr. Benya's very lengthy 101 on lighting and Pima County, which is fairly flat, last time I looked, but here in Sonoma County and in this area, and in certain areas, especially areas that are rural, there is a very high degree of sensitivity to the amount of light that neighbors put on their property. So I'm, I'm actually feeling like the putting in and removal, I can't even imagine how that process works. And I certainly wouldn't want it to be based on a private consultant that comes in and makes that determination when, in reality, it's affecting everybody around them in that area."
Both the discussions between the Board members and the PRMD staff persons responsible for reviewing the tennis court lighting proposal, plus the just-quoted comments from Board members leave no doubt in our mind that appellants are simply wrong in arguing to us that "respondent Board of Supervisors did not engage in any known deliberative weighing of any evidence, be it oral or written, in support of its final determination." We also have no difficulty in concluding, from all of the evidence and material presented to both the Commission and the Board, there clearly was substantial evidence to support the County's ultimate decision and that of the trial court.
This is particularly so in view of the law in one of the cases cited to us in appellants' opening brief. In Ocean View Estates Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Montecito Water Dist. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 396 (Ocean View), our colleagues in Division Six of the Second District had before them an appeal by a homeowners association representing residents of a hillside area in Santa Barbara County overlooking a water reservoir. Those residents objected to the decision of the water district that operated and maintained the reservoir to, at the encouragement of the County's Department of Health Services, place a cover over the reservoir to maintain "the reservoir's water quality." The water district thus "decided to cover the four-acre reservoir with an aluminum roof." (Id. at p. 398.)
The homeowners association filed a petition for a writ of mandate seeking to compel the water district to file an EIR for that project; the trial court denied that petition, but the Court of Appeal reversed that denial. Writing for a unanimous court, Presiding Justice Gilbert agreed with the appellant association that "[a]ny substantial negative effect of a project on view and other features of beauty could constitute a significant environmental impact under CEQA," (Ocean View, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 401, citing Quail Botanical Gardens Foundation, Inc. v. City of Encinitas (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1597, 1604 (Quail).) The court noted that the water district conceded " 'that the reservoir and [aluminum] cover will be visible from two homes that are at higher elevations.' " But, it went on: "The District argues that expressions of concern, questions or objections do not constitute substantial evidence of an adverse environmental impact. (Citing CEQA Guidelines [Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14], § 15384, subd. (a).) The District points out that [in Quail] substantial evidence of view obstruction was based on photographs with story poles and the testimony of an expert surveyor. [¶] It is true there is no such evidence here. But we are not considering a matter as objective as whether the project will obstruct views. Here we are concerned with the overall aesthetic impact of an aluminum cover. Consideration of the overall aesthetic impact of the cover by its very nature is subjective. Opinions that the cover will not be aesthetically pleasing is not the special purview of experts. Personal observations on these nontechnical issues can constitute substantial evidence. [Citation.] [¶] If it were merely the matter of expressions of concern by one or two people, we might agree that there is no substantial evidence of a negative impact. But here the county urged the District to adopt mitigation measures if the cover can be seen from public or private view areas. The District did adopt landscape screening, but there is substantial evidence that the cover will be visible from some private and public view areas, despite the screening. The evidence here goes beyond a few people expressing concern about the aesthetics of the project. There is substantial evidence to support a fair argument that the project may have a significant adverse aesthetic impact." (Ocean View, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at pp. 402-403, italics added.)
The Quail decision cited and relied upon by the Ocean View court also held to the same effect, noting that "any substantial negative effect of a project on view and other features of beauty could constitute a 'significant' environmental impact under CEQA." (Quail, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 1604; see also Pocket Protectors v. City of Sacramento (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 903, 937 ["[T]he opinions of area residents, if based on direct observation, may be relevant as to aesthetic impact and may constitute substantial evidence in support of a fair argument; no special expertise is required on this topic."]; Bowman v. City of Berkeley (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 572, 583 ["Statements of area residents who are not environmental experts may qualify as substantial evidence if they are based on relevant personal observations or involve 'nontechnical' issues."]; Desmond v. County of Contra Costa (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 330, 339 ["There was ample evidence of community concern with the impact of a residential second rental unit on the general aesthetic character of the neighborhood . . . ."]; Oro Fino Gold Mining Corp. v. County of El Dorado (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 872, 882 [regarding "noise complaints"].)
The law just cited, in addition to the more general law on the substantial evidence standard discussed earlier, when combined with the factual record before this court convinces us that there is indeed substantial evidence supporting the County's determination to deny appellants permission to install the tennis court lighting. C. The CEQA Issue
As noted earlier, appellants also argue—indeed in no fewer than three sections of their opening brief—that the County and the trial court misapplied CEQA in their determinations. More specifically, appellants argue that the County's determination that its disapproval of the tennis court lighting application was not subject to CEQA (because of the language of a CEQA guideline) constituted an "abuse of discretion."
As noted above, both the Commission and, later, the Board, disapproved of the permit application although, for two brief periods of time, appellants had secured the approval of the PRMD staff for the lighting as designed by engineer Benya. However, the relevant CEQA regulation, California Code of Regulations, title 14, section 15270, subdivision (a), provides: "CEQA does not apply to projects which a public agency rejects or disapproves." The following subdivision, section 15270, subdivision (b), explains this further: "This section is intended to allow an initial screening of projects on the merits for quick disapprovals prior to the initiation of the CEQA process where the agency can determine that the project cannot be approved."
The specific statutory authority for these regulations is found in Public Resources Code section 21080, subdivision (b), which provides: "This division does not apply to any of the following activities: . . . [¶] (5) Projects which a public agency rejects or disapproves."
Although never quoting this statutory language, appellants appear to contend that the "quick disapprovals" phraseology of section 15270, subdivision (b) of the California Code of Regulations means that, when the disapproval is not "quick," both subdivision (a) of the regulations and the just-quoted enabling statute itself somehow become inapplicable, and thus the agency must conduct a thorough CEQA review of the project.
We categorically reject this argument, because it is patently inconsistent with both the clear language of Public Resources Code section 21080, subdivision (b)(5), and common sense. As our Supreme Court held in a recent and unanimous decision reversing a decision by the Third District Court of Appeal: "The Court of Appeal erred by deeming the consequences of a project denial to be part of the project itself. Its reasoning would effectively abrogate the statutory exemption for projects disapproved by a public agency. (§ 21080, subd. (b)(5).) In many cases, disapproval of a proposed project could have possible environmental impacts associated with alternative courses of action. 'Yet the Legislature has determined for reasons of policy to exempt project disapprovals from environmental review under CEQA. Our state legislators evidently concluded that public agencies should not be forced to commit their resources to the costly and time-consuming environmental review process for proposed private development projects slated for rejection, whatever the reason for agency disapproval. This court does not sit in judgment of the Legislature's wisdom in balancing such competing public policies. [Citations.] As we noted in Napa Valley Wine Train[, Inc. v. Public Utilities Com. (1990) 50 Cal.3d 370, 381], the very purpose of the statutory CEQA exemptions is to avoid the burden of the environmental review process for an entire class of projects, even if there might be significant environmental effects. [Citation.]' " (Sunset Sky Ranch Pilots Assn. v. County of Sacramento (2009) 47 Cal.4th 902, 909; see also Main San Gabriel Basin Watermaster v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1382 ["by the plain meaning rule . . . all project disapprovals by a public agency are exempt from CEQA review."].)
In sum, the clear intent of Public Resources Code section 21080, subdivision (b)(5), is to permit a body such as the Commission or the Board to finally disapprove a project at any point in time, even if there had been prior indications of possible approval, and by so doing to dispense with CEQA review. Nothing at all in the language of California Code of Regulations section 15270, subdivision (b), mandates a contrary result.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment denying the petition for a writ of mandate is affirmed. The County shall recover its costs on appeal.
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Haerle, J.
We concur:
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Kline, P.J.
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Lambden, J.