Opinion
Civil 4:21-CV-372
10-18-2021
DEONTE SPICER, Petitioner, v. E. BRADLEY, Respondent.
Brann Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Martin C. Carlson, United States Magistrate Judge
I. Statement of Facts and of the Case
A. Introduction
This case presents a federal habeas corpus petition filed by the petitioner, Deonte Spicer, which invites us to examine the results of a prison disciplinary hearing that led to the forfeiture of 41 day of good time and other privileges. Because we find that Spicer was afforded the full panoply of procedural protections and find that there is sufficient evidence to support the prison's finding of misconduct, it is recommended that this petition be denied.
B. DHO Proceedings
This case arises out of disciplinary proceedings that commenced after a January 2020 incident in which Spicer was admittedly found under the influence of alcohol inside the prison. With respect to this episode, the pertinent facts are as follows:
On January 23, 2020, at approximately 6:12 p.m., the reporting officer encountered Spicer as he was being escorted from his housing unit by compound staff who believed he was under the influence of alcohol. (Doc. 7, Ex. 1 Declaration of Erin Frymoyer ¶ 4, Attach A Incident Report Number 3356210, at 1). Spicer was taken to the lieutenants' holding area for a visual search and an alcohol test. (Id.) A breathalyzer test was conducted at 6:12 p.m. with a positive result of .220. (Id.) The second test conducted at 6:28 p.m. confirmed this initial test result, recording with a positive result of .105 for Spicer. (Id.) Questioned, Spicer admitted having two drinks. (Id.)
An incident report was then prepared, and a copy of the report was provided to Spicer on January 23, 2020, at 8:00 p.m. (Id.) While Spicer now complains that some blocks on the incident report form were not filled in, the report contained a straightforward and succinct narrative describing this institutional infraction. (Id.) When the incident report was delivered to Spicer, the investigating lieutenant advised Spicer of his right to remain silent. (Id., at 3). Spicer acknowledged he understood his rights but told the investigating lieutenant that he had a little to drink. (Id.) Spicer did not identify any witnesses and the incident report was referred to the Unit Disciplinary Committee (UDC) for further disposition. (Id.)
On January 24, 2020, a UDC hearing was held in Spicer's case. At the conclusion of this hearing, the UDC referred the incident report to the Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) for further disposition. (Id., at 1-2). The UDC records indicate that Spicer was informed of his discipline hearing before the DHO and was advised of his rights, including his right to a staff representative, to call witnesses, and to present documentary evidence. (Id., Ex. 1, ¶ 6, Attach. B Inmate Rights at Discipline Hearing). There is no indication that Spicer ever requested a staff representative or witnesses. (Id., Ex. 1, ¶ 6, Attach. C Notice of Discipline Hearing Before the DHO). Rather it appears that he waived these rights.
Spicer's case then proceeded to a DHO hearing on January 29, 2020. (Id., Ex. 1, ¶ 7, Attach. D DHO Report for Incident No. 3356210). At the onset of the hearing, Spicer was advised of his rights before the DHO. (Id.) Moreover, prior to the hearing, Spicer had waived his right to a staff representative and witnesses. (Id., Ex. 1, ¶ 6, Attach. C). During the DHO hearing, Spicer admitted the charge stating, “I was drinking hooch.” (Id., Attach. D, at 2). In addition to the incident report and Spicer's verbal statement at the hearing, the DHO also considered the following evidence: an alcohol test sheet dated January 23, 2020, a memorandum from a correctional officer, a memorandum from a health services staff member, a Health Services Clinical Encounter dated January 23, 2020, and four photographs. (Id., Ex. 1, ¶ 7, Attach. D, at 2). The daily alcohol test sheet identified a reading of .220 at 6:12 p.m. and a reading of .105 at 6:28 p.m. on January 23, 2020. (Id.) The Health Services Clinical Encounter found that Spicer had slurred speech, a strong smell similar to that of alcohol on his breath, an abnormal gait, normal vital signs, and a normal blood glucose level. (Id.)
Given this evidence, which corroborated Spicer's repeated admissions that he had been drinking homemade alcohol, the DHO concluded that Spicer committed the prohibited act of Use of Any Narcotics, Marijuana, Drug, Alcohol, Intoxicants, or Related Paraphernalia Not Prescribed for the Individual by Medical Staff (Code 112). (Id.) The DHO imposed the following sanctions: disallowance of 41 days of good conduct time, 30 days of disciplinary segregation, loss of phone privileges for 360 days (suspended for 180 days pending clear conduct), loss of email privileges for 360 days, loss of MP3 privileges for 360 days, loss of commissary privileges for 360 days, and loss of visiting privileges for 360 days (expiring January 22, 2021). (Id., at 3).
Dissatisfied with the outcome of these proceedings, Spicer filed the instant federal habeas corpus petition challenging this prison incident report issued to him and sanctions subsequently imposed upon him by the DHO. In this petition, Spicer complains that the initial incident report lodged against him was not completely filled out and further alleged that he was denied the assistance of staff as part of a multi-facetted attack upon the procedural and substantive aspects of this disciplinary hearing. This matter has been fully briefed by the parties and is now ripe for resolution.
For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that this petition be denied.
II. Discussion
A. This Petition Fails on its Merits.
This habeas corpus petition fails on fundamental substantive grounds. In this habeas petition, the petitioner launches a two-fold constitutional assault upon this prison disciplinary decision, challenging the disciplinary process generally on procedural due process grounds, and asserting that the decision is substantively flawed since there is insufficient evidence to support a finding of misconduct on his part. Yet, the petitioner faces an exacting burden of proof in advancing these two constitutional claims.
(1) Procedural Standards for DHO Hearings
First, with respect to his procedural due process concerns, it is well established that “[p]rison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). The Supreme Court has, however, recognized a set of minimum procedural protections that must apply to prison disciplinary proceedings, including the right to: (1) advance written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety or correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence as part of a defense; and (3) a written statement by the fact finder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. Id., at 563-67.
Due process also requires that a prison disciplinary tribunal be sufficiently impartial. Meyers v Alldredge, 492 F.2d 296, 305-07 (3d Cir. 1974). The requirement of an impartial tribunal “prohibits only those officials who have a direct personal or otherwise substantial involvement, such as major participation in a judgmental or decision-making role, in the circumstances underlying the charge from sitting on the disciplinary committee.” Meyers, 492 F.2d at 306. In the past, inmates have often invited courts to set aside disciplinary hearing results based upon general assertions of staff bias. Yet, such requests, while frequently made, have rarely been embraced by the courts. Instead, the courts have held that a “generalized critique” of staff impartiality is insufficient to demonstrate the degree of bias necessary to prove a due process violation. Lasko v. Holt, 334 Fed.Appx. 474 (3d Cir. 2009). Furthermore, in the absence of a showing that the hearing officer was “personally or substantially involved in the circumstances underlying [the investigation of the] charge, ” Greer v. Hogston, 288 F. App'x. 797, 799 (3d Cir. 2008), courts generally decline to strike down disciplinary decisions on claims of staff bias. See Redding v. Holt, 252 Fed.Appx. 488 (3d Cir. 2007).
In the federal prison system, the Bureau of Prisons has, by regulation, adopted specific guidelines for inmate discipline procedures which are set forth at 28 C.F.R.' 541.1 et seq. These guidelines are specifically tailored and designed to meet the due process requirements outlined by the Supreme Court in Wolff. See Von Kahl v. Brennan, 855 F.Supp. 1413 (M.D. Pa. 1994). Under these regulations, when prison staff have reason to believe that a prohibited act has been committed by an inmate, an incident report must be prepared and referred for investigation. 28 C.F.R. § 541.5. After investigation, the incident report is referred to a UDC for an initial hearing. § 541.7. The inmate, in turn, is entitled to notice of any proposed violation. The UDC may either reach a finding regarding whether a prohibited act was committed, or refer the case to the DHO for further hearing. § 541.7(f)-(g). The DHO then has the authority to dismiss any charge, to find a prohibited act was committed, and to impose any available sanction for the act. § 541.8. The DHO hearing is conducted pursuant to the procedures set forth at 28 C.F.R. § 541.8.
Throughout this hearing process, the inmate is provided with a series of procedural rights. For example, the inmate is entitled to notice of the alleged infraction. Specifically, the Warden must give the inmate advance written notice of the charges no less than 24 hours before the DHO hearing. 28 C.F.R.' 541.8(c). The inmate is also entitled to assistance at DHO hearings. In particular, the Warden must provide the inmate with a full-time staff member to represent him at the DHO hearing. § 541.8(d).
The inmate also has a series of procedural rights at the hearing itself. Thus, at the DHO hearing, the inmate is entitled to make a statement and present documentary evidence. The inmate also has the right to submit names of requested witnesses and have them called to testify and to present documents. While the DHO need not call repetitive witnesses or adverse witnesses, 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(f), the DHO shall call those witnesses who have information directly relevant to the charges and who are reasonably available. The inmate has the right to be present throughout the DHO hearing except during deliberation or when institutional security would be jeopardized. § 541.8(e).
In addition, the regulations prescribe procedural standards for DHO decision-making. Thus, the regulations require that the DHO must consider all evidence presented at the hearing. The decision of the DHO must be based on the facts presented, and if there is conflicting evidence, it must be based on the greater weight of the evidence. Finally, the DHO must prepare a record of the proceedings. This record must be sufficient to document the advisement of inmate rights, the DHO's findings, the DHO's decision and the specific evidence relied upon by the DHO. The record must include a brief statement of the reasons for the sanction imposed. A copy of this record must be delivered to the inmate. 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(h).
Given the panoply of procedural protections afforded to inmates by these regulations, courts have consistently held that when prison officials comply with these regulations, they fully satisfy the requirements of procedural due process in this prison disciplinary setting. See, e.g., Fiore v. Lindsay, 336 Fed.Appx. 168 (3d Cir. 2009) (upholding disciplinary decision); Macia v. Williamson, 219 Fed.Appx. 229 (3d Cir. 2007) (same); Reynolds v. Williamson, 197 Fed.Appx. 196 (3d Cir. 2006) (same); Levi v. Holt, 193 Fed.Appx. 172 (3d Cir. 2006) (same); Sinde v. Gerlinski, 252 F.Supp.2d 144 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (same).
In this case, the gravamen of Spicer's petition is his assertion that the incident report submitted in his case was legally insufficient. In this setting, “[t]he sufficiency of notice hinges upon whether it allows the prisoner to ‘marshal the facts' to prepare a defense.” Nelms v. Young, No. CIV.A. 07-1661, 2009 WL 1160682, at *6 (W.D. La. Apr. 29, 2009) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564 (1974); Driver v. Scott, 163 F.3d 1355 (5th Cir. 1998)). Thus, in order to satisfy an inmate's rights to due process, an incident report need only provide “advance notice of sufficient facts to inform the accused of the behavior with which he is charged.” Falor v. Superintendent, No. 3:08-CV-160 RM, 2008 WL 3992241, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 22, 2008). As long as these essential rudiments of notice are provided in the incident report, other typographical errors in the report are not material shortcomings in the disciplinary proceedings which warrant habeas corpus relief. Millhouse v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 785 Fed.Appx. 931, 935 (3d Cir. 2019).
(2) Substantive Standards Governing DHO Decisions
In his habeas corpus petition, the petitioner also attacks the substance of the DHO decision, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of misconduct on his part. Like the procedural due process challenge, this substantive attack on the sufficiency of the evidence in this disciplinary hearing must meet a demanding legal standard to succeed. A prison disciplinary determination comports with due process if it is based on “some evidence.” See Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-56 (1985) (“[T]he relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board”). This standard is minimal and does not require examination of the entire record, an independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or even a weighing of the evidence. See id. at 455; Thompson v. Owens, 889 F.2d 500, 501-02 (3d Cir. 1989). Therefore, it is well settled that the decision of the DHO is entitled to considerable deference by a reviewing court and must be upheld whenever there is “some evidence” to support the decision. Hill, 472 U.S. at 457; Elkin v. Fauver, 969 F.2d 48 (3d Cir. 1992); Thompson v. Owens, 889 F.2d 500 (3d Cir. 1989); Franco v. Kelly, 854 F.2d 584, 588 (2d Cir. 1988); Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 955 (2d Cir. 1986).
Thus, in this setting the “function [of the court] is to determine whether there is some evidence which supports the decision of the [DHO].” Freeman, 808 F.2d at 954. As the Supreme Court has observed, the “some evidence” standard is a highly deferential standard of review, and:
Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the
credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-456.
Applying this deferential standard, once the reviewing court determines there is “some evidence” to support the finding of the DHO, the court must reject the evidentiary challenge by the petitioner and uphold the finding of the DHO. Griffin v. Spratt, 969 F.2d 16, 22 (3d Cir. 1992); Thompson, 889 F.2d 501; Freeman, 826 F.2d at 954. In practice, courts have rarely condemned correctional disciplinary decisions as being wholly lacking in evidentiary support and have frequently concluded that disciplinary findings are supported by the requisite degree of proof. See, e.g., Fiore, 336 Fed.Appx. 168 (upholding disciplinary decision); Macia, 219 Fed.Appx. 229 (same); Reynolds, 197 Fed.Appx. 196 (same); Levi, 193 Fed.Appx. 172 (same); Sinde, 252 F.Supp.2d 144 (same).
B. Spicer was Afforded Due Process at His DHO Hearing, There is Adequate Evidence to Support the Substantive Finding of Misconduct, and Spicer's Specific Claims Do Not Warrant Habeas Relief.
Judged against these standards, the petitioner's procedural and substantive challenges to this prison disciplinary proceeding simply fail. In this case, the DHO followed all of the procedures outlined in the regulations. Spicer was given a copy of the incident report on January 23, 2020, which provided him with notice of the charge against him. The UDC held a hearing and referred the matter to the DHO for sanctions. The DHO also provided Spicer with ample written notice of the hearing and the charges against him. Moreover, Spicer received notice of his procedural rights at these hearings, and elected to waive those rights, choosing instead to repeatedly acknowledge the prison infraction at issue here. On this score, while Spicer alleges in general terms that he was denied a staff representative at the DHO hearing, the record of these proceedings clearly indicates that he was advised of his right to staff assistance and waived that right. Moreover, the absence of a staff representative, by itself, does not automatically constitute a due process violation. See Howell v. Castaneda, No. 1:12-CV-2341, 2014 WL 5795604, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2014) (citing Macia v. Williamson, 219 Fed.Appx. 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2007)). Finally, Spicer has shown no prejudice arising from this decision to forego staff assistance, nor can he. Given Spicer's decision to admit to this prison rules violation on numerous occasions, he was not prejudiced by the absence of staff support at the DHO hearing in a way that would compel federal habeas corpus relief.
Spicer also suggests in general terms that he was denied an impartial decision-maker but cites to nothing to support this assertion beyond his dissatisfaction with the outcome of these proceedings. This will not suffice to prove a procedural due process violation. The requirement of an impartial tribunal “prohibits only those officials who have a direct personal or otherwise substantial involvement, such as major participation in a judgmental or decision-making role, in the circumstances underlying the charge from sitting on the disciplinary committee.” Meyers, 492 F.2d at 306. Fairly construed, Spicer's complaints allegations are little more than a “generalized critique” of staff impartiality, which is insufficient as a matter of law to demonstrate the degree of bias necessary to prove a due process violation. Lasko v. Holt, 334 Fed.Appx. 474 (3d Cir. 2009). See e.g., Greer v. Hogston, 288 F. App'x. 797, 799 (3d Cir. 2008), Redding v. Holt, 252 Fed.Appx. 488 (3d Cir. 2007).
Further Spicer's allegation that the incident report was legally insufficient does not justify federal habeas corpus relief. As we have noted when considering the legal sufficiency of charges of misconduct, an incident report need only provide “advance notice of sufficient facts to inform the accused of the behavior with which he is charged.” Falor v. Superintendent, No. 3:08-CV-160 RM, 2008 WL 3992241, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 22, 2008). As long as these essential rudiments of notice are provided in the incident report, other typographical errors in the report are not material shortcomings in the disciplinary proceedings which warrant habeas corpus relief.” United States v. Daraio, 445 F.3d 253, 262 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing States v. Balter, 91 F.3d 427, 441 (3d Cir. 1996)); see also Millhouse, 785 Fed.Appx. at 935.
In this case, Spicer's incident report clearly identified the prison rules infractions alleged against him. That report also described the date and time of the rules violation, and specified the evidence relied upon by prison officials. That evidence included both staff statements and breathalyzer examination results as well as Spicer's repeated admissions to drinking contraband alcohol. Given that “[t]he sufficiency of notice hinges upon whether it allows the prisoner to ‘marshal the facts' to prepare a defense, ” Nelms, 2009 WL 1160682, at *6, we find that this incident report fully comported with the requirements of due process and Spicer's challenge to the sufficiency of this notice simply fails. Accordingly, given that Spicer was afforded the procedural protections set forth in Wolff, in our view the DHO fully satisfied the requirements of due process in this case. See, e.g., Fiore, 336 Fed.Appx. 168 (upholding disciplinary decision); Macia, 219 Fed.Appx. 229 (same); Reynolds, 197 Fed.Appx. 196 (same); Levi, 193 Fed.Appx. 172 (same); Sinde, 252 F.Supp.2d 144 (same). Therefore, Spicer's procedural due process claims are unavailing.
With respect to Spicer's substantive due process challenges to the DHO proceeding, it is apparent that the DHO's decision is supported by adequate evidence. As we have noted, a prison disciplinary determination comports with due process if it is based on “some evidence.” See Hill, 472 U.S. at 454-56 (“[T]he relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board”). In this case, the DHO decision was plainly supported by some evidence. The DHO relied upon eyewitness reports, medical staff assessments, breathalyzer test results, and Spicer's repeated admissions to conclude that he possessed and drank contraband alcohol inside the prison in January of 2020. On these facts, we conclude that there was ample evidence to support this disciplinary finding. Since there is an adequate factual basis for this disciplinary finding, any substantive challenge to this disciplinary action should also be rejected. See e.g., Fiore, 336 Fed.Appx. 168 (upholding disciplinary decision); Macia, 219 Fed.Appx. 229 (same); Reynolds, 197 Fed.Appx. 196 (same); Levi, 193 Fed.Appx. 172 (same); Sinde, 252 F.Supp.2d 144 (same).
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, upon consideration of this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition be DENIED, and that a certificate of appealability should not issue.
The Petitioner is further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall
witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.