Opinion
C/A No. 6:19-cv-01694-BHH-JDA
06-17-2019
Hakiim Rashid Speaks, Plaintiff, v. Mark H. Dulude, Greenville County Sheriff's Office, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Hakiim Rashid Speaks ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Defendants violated his constitutional rights. Plaintiff filed this action in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. For the reasons explained below, the Complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee and is currently incarcerated at the Greenville County Detention Center. [Doc. 1 at 2.] This action arises from Defendant Dulude's arrest of Plaintiff on May 19, 2019. [Id. at 5.] Plaintiff contends that he was in a car with a passenger in a church parking lot. [Id.] Plaintiff contends that Defendant Dulude did not pull him over and did not request Plaintiff's license, registration, or proof of insurance. [Id.] Plaintiff contends that the interaction was a "street encounter" as he was already pulled over. [Id.] Plaintiff appears to maintain that a quantity of drugs was found in the car or that Defendant Dulude at least stated as much. [Id. at 5-6.] Plaintiff contends that he was racially profiled by Defendant Dulude. [Id. at 4.] According to Plaintiff, Defendant Dulude wrongly accused Plaintiff and singled him out as being a drug dealer, but Defendant set the white passenger free. [Id. at 5.] Plaintiff told Defendant Dulude that the drugs were not his. [Id.] Plaintiff also contends that Defendant Dulude incorrectly identified the amount of drugs found. [Id. at 6.] According to Plaintiff, Defendant Dulude's conduct was an abuse of his authority in violation of the Constitution. [Id. at 4.] Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Defendant Dulude acted with prejudice towards Plaintiff because he is black and his passenger is white. [Id.]
Plaintiff contends that Defendants' actions constitute violations of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. [Id.] For his injuries, Plaintiff alleges that he has suffered mentally due to these events and that, as a result of his arrest, he is suffering mistreatment at the Greenville County Detention Center due to overcrowding. [Id. at 6.] For his relief, Plaintiff asks that the Court fire Defendant Dulude and grant money damages in the amount of $160,000. [Id.]
The Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff has been charged in the Greenville County Court of General Sessions with trafficking drugs at case number 2019A2330204445, arising from his arrest on May 19, 2019, and the case remains pending against him at this time. See Greenville County Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Public Index, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Greenville/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search by case number 2019A2330204445) (last visited Jun. 14, 2019); see also Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that courts "may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record"); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) ("We note that 'the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'").
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute, which authorizes the district court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," is "frivolous or malicious," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, Plaintiff appears to be a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and "seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if Plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court would still be charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se pleading remains subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the Court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
The Complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 "creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. [Doc. 1 at 4.] Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Dulude engaged in racial profiling and wrongly accused him of being a drug dealer. [Id. at 4-5.] Plaintiff appears to allege that the encounter with Defendant Dulude was improper as it was a "street encounter" and that Defendant Dulude did not have the authority to stop Plaintiff or make an arrest. [Id. at 5.] Nevertheless, despite these allegations, the Complaint is subject to summary dismissal for the reasons below.
Defendant Greenville County Sheriff's Office is Entitled to Dismissal
Defendant Greenville County Sheriff's Office is entitled to dismissal from this § 1983 action. As an initial matter, Plaintiff makes no factual allegations against Defendant Greenville County Sheriff's Office, but simply lists this Defendant in the caption of his Complaint. Accordingly, this Defendant is entitled to summary dismissal from this action because Plaintiff provides no factual allegations to assert a plausible claim for relief under § 1983. See Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974) ("Where a complaint alleges no specific act or conduct on the part of the defendant and the complaint is silent as to the defendant except for his name appearing in the caption, the complaint is properly dismissed."); Newkirk v. Circuit Court of City of Hampton, No. 3:14-cv-372-HEH, 2014 WL 4072212, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 14, 2014) (explaining a complaint is subject to summary dismissal where no factual allegations against the named defendants are found within the body of the pleading). In the absence of substantive allegations of wrongdoing against this Defendant, there is nothing from which this Court can liberally construe any type of plausible cause of action arising from the Complaint against it. See Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting statute allowing dismissal of in forma pauperis claims encompasses complaints that are either legally or factually baseless); Weller, 901 F.2d at 389 n.2 (noting dismissal is proper where there were no allegations to support claim).
Further, the Greenville County Sheriff's Office is subject to summary dismissal based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. Sheriff's departments in South Carolina are state agencies, not municipal departments. See S.C. Code Ann. § 23-13-550; 1975 S.C. Att'y Gen'l Op. No. 47 (Jan. 22, 1975); see also S.C. Code Ann. § 23-13-10 (providing that only the Sheriff has the authority to hire or terminate employees of the Sheriff's Department, and that the Sheriff is responsible for neglect of duty or misconduct by a deputy sheriff); Edwards v. Lexington Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 688 S.E.2d 125, 127 n.1 (S.C. 2010) ("[U]nder South Carolina law, the sheriff and sheriff's deputies are State, not county, employees."); Comer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir. 1996) (explaining the sheriff of Greenville County is "an arm of the State"). Thus, a suit against the Greenville County Sheriff's Office is a suit against the state of South Carolina for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Gulledge v. Smart, 691 F. Supp. 947, 954-55 (D.S.C. 1988) (explaining that a sheriff's office is a state agency and noting sheriff's office is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit); see also Cash v. Thomas, No. 12-1278, 2013 WL 3804375, at *7 (D.S.C. July 19, 2013) ("It is well settled, both in South Carolina and federal law, that a Sheriff in South Carolina is an arm of the State and not a County employee and therefore is entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity in his or her official capacity from suit in Federal Court.") (citations omitted). The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution divests this Court of jurisdiction to entertain a suit for damages brought against the State of South Carolina or its integral parts. U.S. Const. Amend. XI; see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 752 (1999); Harter v. Vernon, 101 F.3d 334, 338-39 (4th Cir. 1996); Bellamy v. Borders, 727 F. Supp. 247, 248-50 (D.S.C.1989).
Under Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984), a state must expressly consent to suit in a federal district court. However, the State of South Carolina has not consented to suit in federal court. See S.C. Code § 15-78-20(e) (1976) (South Carolina statute expressly provides that the State of South Carolina does not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity, consents to suit only in a court of the State of South Carolina, and does not consent to suit in a federal court or in a court of another State); see also McCall v. Batson, 329 S.E.2d 741, 743 (S.C. 1985) (abolishing sovereign immunity in tort "does not abolish the immunity which applies to all legislative, judicial and executive bodies and to public officials who are vested with discretionary authority, for actions taken in their official capacities"), superseded by statute, S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-100(b), as recognized in Jeter v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 633 S.E.2d 143 (S.C. 2006). Because the Eleventh Amendment bars the relief that Plaintiff requests against the Greenville County Sheriff's Office, the Complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted against this Defendant. Accordingly, Defendant Greenville County Sheriff's Office is entitled to summary dismissal from this § 1983 action on this basis.
Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to hold the Greenville County Sheriff's Office liable under a respondeat superior theory, such a claim is not available in a § 1983 action. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009); Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). The Greenville County Sheriff's Office would be liable for injuries stemming from a deprivation of constitutional rights by the Sheriff's deputies only "if [they] cause[d] such a deprivation through an official policy or custom." Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91). Sources of "official policy or custom" giving rise to liability include (1) "written ordinances and regulations"; (2) "affirmative decisions of individual policymaking officials"; (3) omissions by policymaking officials "that manifest deliberate indifference to the rights of the citizens"; or (4) a practice "so persistent and widespread and so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Plaintiff makes no allegations regarding the policies or customs of the Greenville County Sheriff's Office; therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a § 1983 claim against the Sheriff's Office. See Carter v. Georgetown Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. 3:09-cv-779-CMC-JRM, 2009 WL 1393509, at *4 (D.S.C. May 18, 2009) (granting summary dismissal because "a municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 solely because it employs the tort-feasor; rather, a plaintiff must identify a municipal 'policy' or 'custom' that caused the plaintiff's injury"). Plaintiff's Claims are Barred by Heck
Additionally, the Complaint as a whole should be dismissed because it is legally frivolous. A finding of frivolousness can be made where the Complaint "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). Thus, under § 1915(e)(2)(B), a claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989).
The crux of this action appears to be a challenge to Plaintiff's arrest for drug trafficking and his incarceration in the Greenville County Detention Center. For his relief, Plaintiff purports to seek money damages for the allegedly unlawful search and arrest and incarceration at the Greenville County Detention Center. To the extent Plaintiff is seeking release from custody, such relief is not available in this civil rights action. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (stating that "habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983"); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-88 (1973) (explaining a challenge to the duration of confinement is within the core of habeas corpus).
Further, to the extent that Plaintiff is seeking money damages based on his allegedly unlawful arrest and incarceration, his claim is premature because his conviction and sentence have not been invalidated. As noted, Plaintiff was arrested and is being detained in the Greenville County Detention Center on charges of drug trafficking. The Complaint is completely devoid of any allegations that Plaintiff's conviction or sentence has been overturned.
In Heck, the Supreme Court pronounced,
. . . in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, . . . a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.Heck, 512 U.S. at 481. Further, the Supreme Court stated that,
. . . when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.Id. This is known as the "favorable termination" requirement, which Plaintiff has not alleged he has satisfied. See Wilson v. Johnson, 535 F.3d 262, 263 (4th Cir. 2008).
The Heck holding applies to this case. Plaintiff seems to allege that Defendants acted improperly by violating his due process rights, by unlawfully arresting him and holding him in the Greenville County Detention Center. [Doc. 1 at 4-6.] However, Plaintiff does not allege that he has been convicted or that his conviction has been invalidated, for example, by a reversal on direct appeal or a state or federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. A favorable determination on the merits of Plaintiff's § 1983 claim would imply that the pending charges against him are invalid. Thus, this § 1983 claim should be dismissed because a right of action has not accrued. Abstention under Younger
The limitations period will not begin to run until the cause of action accrues. See Morris v. Cardillo, No. 0:10-cv-0443-JFA-PJG, 2010 WL 2722997, at *2 (D.S.C. Apr. 15, 2010), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2010 WL 2722992 (D.S.C. July 9, 2010).
Further, Plaintiff's claims related to his pending state court criminal action are not properly before this Court based on the Younger abstention doctrine and are therefore subject to summary dismissal. Liberally construed, the Complaint appears to assert that the pending state court criminal proceedings against Plaintiff are improper, violating Plaintiff's constitutional rights. [Doc. 1 at 4-6.] Granting Plaintiff's requested relief, however, would require this Court to interfere with or enjoin a pending state court criminal proceeding against Plaintiff. As discussed below, because a federal court may not award relief that would affect pending state proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances, this Court should abstain from interfering with it.
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings "except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances." Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44; see also Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013) (explaining the circumstances when Younger abstention is appropriate).
From Younger and its progeny, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: "[1] there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; [2] the proceedings implicate important state interests; and [3] there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings." Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). Here, Plaintiff is involved in ongoing state court criminal proceedings related to his arrest for drug trafficking, and Plaintiff asks this Court to award relief for alleged constitutional violations; thus, the first element is satisfied. The second element is satisfied for reasons the Supreme Court has explained: "[T]he States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief." Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). The third element is also satisfied, as the Supreme Court has noted "that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights." Gilliam, 75 F.3d at 903 (quoting Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975)).
A ruling in Plaintiff's favor in this case would call into question the validity of the state court criminal proceedings against him and would significantly interfere with those ongoing state proceedings. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45; Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1989) ("[F]ederal courts should abstain from the decision of constitutional challenges to state action, however meritorious the complaint may be, 'whenever [the] federal claims have been or could be presented in ongoing state judicial proceedings that concern important state interests.'") (citation omitted); Washington v. Tilton, No. 2:10-cv-997-HFF-RSC, 2010 WL 2084383, at *1 (D.S.C. May 19, 2010). This Court finds that Plaintiff can raise his federal constitutional rights in the state court proceedings. Thus, this Court should abstain from hearing this action. Because Plaintiff appears to seek relief from the pending state court criminal proceedings against him, his claims should be dismissed with prejudice. See Nivens v. Gilchrist, 444 F.3d 237, 247 (4th Cir. 2006) (explaining that "when a district court abstains from a case based on Younger, it should typically dismiss the case with prejudice; not on the merits").
RECOMMENDATION
In light of all the foregoing, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss this action without issuance and service of process. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 324-25. Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
The undersigned notes that any attempt to cure the deficiencies in the Complaint would be futile for the reasons stated herein. See Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 624 (4th Cir. 2015).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge June 17, 2019
Greenville, South Carolina
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).