Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-3973-14T2
06-09-2016
DANIELLE N. SPATAFORE, Appellant, v. BOARD OF REVIEW, and ALLIED DENTAL PRACTICES, Respondents.
Danielle N. Spatafore, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review, (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Anthony DiLello, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Respondent Allied Dental Practices has not filed a brief.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Carroll and Sumners. On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Docket No. 041,245. Danielle N. Spatafore, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review, (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Anthony DiLello, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Respondent Allied Dental Practices has not filed a brief. PER CURIAM
Claimant Danielle N. Spatafore appeals from the final decision of the Board of Review (Board), which affirmed the decision of the Appeal Tribunal that Spatafore was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). Following our review of the arguments advanced on appeal, in light of the record and applicable law, we affirm.
The facts are not in dispute. Spatafore worked as a full-time accounts receivable clerk at Allied Dental Practices (Allied Dental) from July 2010 to February 22, 2014, until she resigned to accept a higher paying position at the New Jersey Department of Corrections (DOC). She worked full-time at the DOC as a training-recruit from February 24, 2014 to March 17, 2014, when she stopped working due to a work-related knee injury. Thereafter, she collected workers' compensation benefits until she recovered from her injury on October 21, 2014. Since Spatafore could not return to the DOC until a new academy class began, she applied for unemployment benefits in the interim based on her employment at Allied Dental.
The Deputy Director denied Spatafore's request, finding she was disqualified for unemployment benefits from February 16, 2014, on the ground that she left Allied Dental voluntarily without good cause attributable to her work. Moreover, although Spatafore had subsequent employment at the DOC, the Deputy Director held that she did "not earn[] at least ten times [her] weekly benefit rate in at least eight weeks of employment as required by law."
Spatafore subsequently challenged the decision to the Appeal Tribunal. At the hearing, when asked by the hearing examiner why she left her employment with Allied Dental, she responded that she left for a position at the DOC "so I can actually start my career and better myself to actually get benefits and a better pay." The Appeal Tribunal affirmed the Deputy's determination, holding Spatafore disqualified for unemployment benefits because "her sole reason for leaving" Allied Dental was "to accept a better job opportunity" with the DOC, which, though a "valid reason," was "personal." Relying on Self v. Bd. of Review, 91 N.J. 453 (1982), the Appeal Tribunal found that "a claimant who leaves work for a personal reason, no matter how compelling, is subject to disqualification." The Appeal Tribunal reasoned:
The burden of proof is on the claimant to establish good cause attributable to the work for leaving. The reason for leaving must relate directly to her employment, which was so compelling as to give her no choice but to leave her employment. That burden has not been met. Therefore, the claimant is disqualified for benefits as of []2/16/14, under [N.J.S.A.] 43:21-5(a), as the claimant left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work.The Appeal Tribunal further added that Spatafore had subsequent employment with the DOC where she worked for four weeks and had a total earnings of $2,084.28, which the Tribunal found was insufficient to remove the disqualification.
Spatafore timely appealed the Appeal Tribunal's decision to the Board. Without conducting a hearing, the Board, on February 13, 2015, mailed its undated decision to the parties affirming the Appeal Tribunal's findings. The Board explained, "[s]ince [Spatafore] was given a full and impartial hearing and a complete opportunity to offer any and all evidence, there is no valid ground for a further hearing. On the basis of the record below, we agree with the decision reached." This appeal followed.
Before us, Spatafore contends that she was entitled to unemployment benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) because she left her job for good cause. Relying upon Rider College v. Board of Review, 167 N.J. Super. 42 (App. Div. 1979), she argues she left Allied Dental to pursue a better career opportunity at the DOC which offered her health and dental benefits, a higher salary, and a pension. We are not persuaded.
While this appeal was pending in our court, N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) was amended, effective May 4, 2015, allowing benefits for a claimant who leaves employment for equal or better employment. L. 2015, c. 41, § 1. However, since Spatafore never argued retroactive application of the amendment, we need not address the question. Noye v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 238 N.J. Super. 430, 432 n.2 (App. Div.) (noting that an issue not argued in a brief is deemed abandoned), certif. denied, 122 N.J. 146, and certif. denied, 122 N.J. 147 (1990). Nonetheless, in our published decision, Ardan v. Board of Review, ___ N.J. Super. ___, ___ (App. Div. 2016) (slip op. at 2), we rejected a retrospective application of the amendment under similar circumstances. --------
We are guided by some well-established principles in our review of the Board's decision. The scope of appellate review of an administrative agency's final determination is limited. In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011) (citing Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579 (1980)). Agency decisions are given a "strong presumption of reasonableness," and we will not reverse such a decision unless it was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or not supported by evidence in the record. Thurber v. City of Burlington, 387 N.J. Super. 279, 301-02 (App. Div. 2006) (first quoting Matter of Vey, 272 N.J. Super. 199, 205 (App. Div. 1993), aff'd, 135 N.J. 306, 308 (1994); then citing Campbell v. Dep't of Civil Serv., 39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963)), aff'd, 191 N.J. 487, 502 (2007); see also In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27-28 (2007).
We defer to the agency's fact-findings if reasonably based on the proofs. Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997) (citing Charatan v. Bd. of Review, 200 N.J. Super. 74, 79 (App. Div. 1985)). "'[T]he test is not whether an appellate court would come to the same conclusion if the original determination was its to make, but rather whether the factfinder could reasonably so conclude upon the proofs.'" Ibid. (quoting Charatan, supra, 200 N.J. Super. at 79). Thus, the issue is whether the factual findings "are supported 'by sufficient credible evidence[.]'" Ibid. (quoting Self, supra, 91 N.J. at 459). The court "may not vacate an agency determination because of doubts as to its wisdom or because the record may support more than one result[,]" but is "obliged to give due deference to the view of those charged with the responsibility of implementing legislative programs." In re N.J. Pinelands Comm'n Resolution PC4-00-89, 356 N.J. Super. 363, 372 (App. Div.) (citing Brady, supra, 152 N.J. at 210), certif. denied, 176 N.J. 281 (2003). That said, we do not simply act as a "rubber stamp" of the agency's decision. In re Berwick Ice, Inc., 231 N.J. Super. 391, 397 (App. Div. 1989) (quoting N.J. Guild of Hearing Aid Dispensers v. Long, 75 N.J. 544, 575 (1978)); see also Henry, supra, 81 N.J. at 579-80.
A claimant is not entitled to unemployment benefits unless he meets the statutory conditions of eligibility, and is not otherwise disqualified. Bocchino v. Bd. of Review, 202 N.J. Super. 469, 473 (App. Div. 1985) (citing Krauss v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 13 N.J. 447, 454-55 (1953)). Usually, the burden is on the claimant to demonstrate his or her eligibility for unemployment benefits. Brady, supra, 152 N.J. at 218 (citing Zielenski v. Bd. of Review, 85 N.J. Super. 46, 51 (App. Div. 1964)).
As noted, the statute in question here, N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), provides that a person is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits when he or she leaves work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work. An employee's "'decision to leave employment must be compelled by real, substantial and reasonable circumstances . . . attributable to the work.'" Shuster v. Bd. of Review, 396 N.J. Super. 240, 244-45 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting Fernandez v. Bd. of Review, 304 N.J. Super. 603, 606 (App. Div. 1997)); see also In re N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.6 ex. rel. State Dep't of Labor, 395 N.J. Super. 394, 399-400 (App. Div. 2007). Causes that are personal to a claimant and not attributable to the work require disqualification of benefits under the statute. White v. Bd. of Review, 146 N.J. Super. 268, 270 (App. Div. 1977) (citing Stauhs v. Bd. of Review, 93 N.J. Super. 451, 457-58 (App. Div. 1967)).
Applying these standards, we discern no reason to disturb the Board's decision that Spatafore was disqualified for benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) because she voluntarily left her employment without good cause. Spatafore's reliance upon Rider College is misplaced. There, we held that merely leaving work for a better position "is personal and in no way related to claimant's [work.]" Rider Coll., supra, 167 N.J. Super. at 48. Thus, we rejected the Board's conclusion "that leaving work to accept a 'substantially more favorable position' [warrants qualification] for benefits, [because it] does not comport with the statutory test which provides for payment of benefits in the case of a voluntary quit only if leaving the work is with good cause attributable to such work." Ibid.; see also Domenico v. Bd. of Review, 192 N.J. Super. 284, 288 (App. Div. 1978) ("'Mere dissatisfaction with working conditions which are not shown to be abnormal or do not affect health, does not constitute cause for leaving work voluntarily.'" (quoting Medwick v. Bd. of Review, 69 N.J. Super. 338, 345 (App. Div. 1961))).
Here, Spatafore did not claim that there was anything wrong with her job at Allied Dental; she simply left on her own volition for a better position. Thus, we conclude the Board's decision was correct.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION