Opinion
12-21-2016
Carolyn SPANN, appellant, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., respondents (and another title).
Chelli & Bush, Staten Island, N.Y. (Laurel A. Wedinger of counsel), for appellant. Landman Corsi Ballaine & Ford P.C., New York, N.Y. (Andrew P. Keaveney and Jonathan Adler of counsel), for respondents City of New York, MV Transportation, Inc., New York City Transit Authority, and Jose Casanova. Law Offices of Martyn Toher & Martyn (Harris, King, Fodera & Correia, New York, N.Y. [Chikodi E. Emerenini], of counsel), for respondent Farrah Ficco.
Chelli & Bush, Staten Island, N.Y. (Laurel A. Wedinger of counsel), for appellant.
Landman Corsi Ballaine & Ford P.C., New York, N.Y. (Andrew P. Keaveney and Jonathan Adler of counsel), for respondents City of New York, MV Transportation, Inc., New York City Transit Authority, and Jose Casanova.
Law Offices of Martyn Toher & Martyn (Harris, King, Fodera & Correia, New York, N.Y. [Chikodi E. Emerenini], of counsel), for respondent Farrah Ficco.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Aliotta, J.), dated July 14, 2015, as, upon renewal, adhered to a prior determination in an order of the same court dated July 17, 2014, granting the cross motion of the defendants City of New York, MV Transportation, Inc., New York City Transit Authority, and Jose Casanova, and the separate cross motion of the defendant Farrah Ficco, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d), and denied that branch of her motion which was for leave to reargue her opposition to those cross motions.
ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed, without costs or disbursements.
The appeal from so much of the order dated July 14, 2015, as denied that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for leave to reargue must be dismissed, as no appeal lies from an order denying reargument (see Viola v. Blanco, 1 A.D.3d 506, 507, 767 N.Y.S.2d 248 ). Additionally, the appeal from so much of the order as, upon renewal, adhered to the original determination in the order dated July 17, 2014, must be dismissed as academic in light of our determination in Spann v. City of New York, ––– A.D.3d ––––, 43 N.Y.S.3d 143, 2016 WL 7380636 (Appellate Division Docket No. 2014–09980; decided herewith).
HALL, J.P., SGROI, MALTESE and DUFFY, JJ., concur.