Opinion
NO. 2017-CA-000365-MR
06-29-2018
MARTHA SPALDING APPELLANT v. MARION COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION AND TAYLORA SCHLOSSER, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SUPERINTENDENT OF THE MARION COUNTY SCHOOLS APPELLEES
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Jeffrey S. Walther Lexington, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Robert L. Chenoweth Lawrenceburg, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM MARION CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ALLAN RAY BERTRAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 09-CI-00306 OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: COMBS, JONES, AND KRAMER, JUDGES. COMBS, JUDGE: Martha Spalding appeals from the February 28, 2017, order of the Marion Circuit Court, which was entered following our remand. At the conclusion of a bench trial, the circuit court found that the Marion County Board of Education was not estopped from denying that Spalding was a "certified employee" as that term is used in the provisions of KRS Chapter 161. Substantial evidence supports the court's conclusion that the circumstances did not warrant the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel against the Board. Consequently, we affirm.
Kentucky Revised Statutes. --------
In Spalding v. Marion County Bd. of Educ., 452 S.W.3d 611 (Ky. App. 2014) (Spalding I), we recounted the following statement of facts and procedural history:
Beginning with the school year 2000-01, Spalding has been employed by the Board as a Family Literacy Instructor. This employment has continued under annual contracts renewed every school year since. The contracts do not specify whether the position of Family Literacy Instructor is "classified" or "certified" status. Spalding has maintained certification for grades K-4 through the Kentucky Education Professional Standards Board throughout her employment with the Board. Her position as Family Literacy Instructor primarily involves teaching General Educational Development ("GED") and Adult Education courses.
In February 2009, Spalding submitted a "Certified Re-employment Application," i.e., an annual contract, as she had done each year since 2000-01, indicating that she wished to be re-employed in the Marion County School District for the 2009-10 year. For the first time, Spalding indicated on the application that she anticipated a change in rank to Rank II for the 2009-10 school year, based on her belief that she had earned enough academic credits to be entitled to Rank II and its attendant salary
increase. See KRS 161.1211 (discussing rank and salary schedule).Spalding I, 452 S.W.3d at 613 (footnote omitted). Spalding appealed to this court.
In April 2009, the Superintendent sent Spalding a letter indicating that her employment was not being renewed for the 2009-10 school year. Thereafter, the Superintendent offered Spalding a one-year contract for her position as Family Literacy Instructor, at the same rate of pay. Spalding accepted the position, but expressed her disagreement with the Board's characterization of her employment status as that of a "classified employee," rather than a "certified employee," the latter status having certain attendant benefits and protections that a "classified employee" does not have.
Spalding then filed this action in the Marion Circuit Court seeking a determination that she was/is a "certified employee" within the meaning of KRS Chapter 161 and, as a result, is entitled to a continuing contract under KRS 161.740 and the benefits and protections afforded to "certified employees." Ultimately, both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted the Board's motion for summary judgment, denied Spalding's motion and dismissed the complaint. The trial court opined that the record demonstrated the Board properly classified Spalding as a "classified employee," and that her position as Family Literacy Instructor was not one requiring certification.
Following our review, we concluded that the circuit court did not err by determining as a matter of law that Spalding was a "classified employee." However, we concluded that "the record reveals that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the Board's conduct during the course of Spalding's employment led Spalding to reasonably believe that she was/is a "certified employee[.]" Spalding I at 615. We remanded the matter to the Marion Circuit Court for a determination as to whether the Board's conduct during the course of Spalding's employment led Spalding to reasonably believe that she was/is a "certified employee" and whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel could be invoked against the Board.
Upon remand, the circuit court duly considered the issue of equitable estoppel pursuant to our instruction. It heard live testimony and, upon agreement of the parties, reviewed a number of depositions. Following its study and review, the court found that the Board had not deliberately misled Spalding. It also found that Spalding had not relied on the misinformation provided to her. Accordingly, it declined to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel against the Board, reaffirming its original conclusion that Spalding was not a "certified employee." This appeal followed.
On appeal, Spalding contends that the circuit court erred by failing to find that equitable estoppel prevents the Board from denying that she is a "certified employee." She bases this contention on two premises. First, Spalding argues that the trial court erred by finding that she did not reasonably rely upon the Board's conduct and representations regarding the nature of her employment. Second, she argues that the trial court erred by failing to consider the application of quasi-estoppel to the circumstances.
Our review of a circuit court's findings of fact "is governed by the rule that such findings shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. A factual finding is not clearly erroneous if it is supported by substantial evidence." Gosney v. Glenn, 163 S.W.3d 894, 898 (Ky. App. 2005). "Substantial evidence" is evidence (when taken alone or in light of all the evidence) that has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the mind of a reasonable person. Id. at 898 (citations omitted).
In Spalding I, 452 S.W.3d at 615 (Ky. App. 2014), we observed as follows:
Equitable estoppel can be invoked against a governmental entity in unique circumstances; a court must find that exceptional and extraordinary equities are involved to invoke the doctrine. Sebastian-Voor Properties, LLC v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 265 S.W.3d 190, 194 (Ky.2008). "Estoppel is a question of fact to be determined by the circumstances of each case." Id.
The essential elements of equitable estoppel are[:] (1) conduct which amounts to a false representation or concealment of material facts, or, at least, which is calculated to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently attempts to assert; (2) the intention, or at least the expectation, that such conduct shall be acted upon by, or influence, the other party or other persons; and (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts. And, broadly speaking, as related to the party claiming the
estoppel, the essential elements are (1) lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question; (2) reliance, in good faith, upon the conduct or statements of the party to be estopped; and (3) action or inaction based thereon of such a character as to change the position or status of the party claiming the estoppel, to his injury, detriment, or prejudice.
Id. at 194-95 (citation omitted).
Spalding contends first that the trial court erred by finding that she did not reasonably rely upon the Board's conduct and representations regarding her status. We disagree.
Essential to Spalding's claim are: (1) her good faith reliance upon the Board's actions and representations and (2) her lack of knowledge and of the means of acquiring knowledge regarding her status. Based upon the evidence before it, the trial court specifically rejected Spalding's contention that she had reasonably relied to her detriment upon the Board's conduct and representations. As we recounted in Spalding I, the Board made numerous representations tending to indicate that Spalding was a "certified employee." However, we also observed that there were "elements in the record which may argue against equitable estoppel, specifically . . . the extent to which Spalding relied on the Board's representation of her status." Spalding I at 617. We noted that equitable estoppel is a factual determination which must be made by a fact-finder in the trial court. After our remand, the trial court specifically found that Spalding did not reasonably rely upon the representations or conduct of the Board. That finding is not clearly erroneous because it is supported by substantial evidence contained in the record.
Second, Spalding argues that the trial court erred by failing to consider the application of the doctrine of quasi-estoppel under the circumstances. She contends that the application of quasi-estoppel does not require proof of reasonable reliance and instead only requires examination of the Board's conduct. We agree with the Board that our directions on remand in Spalding I required the trial court to consider whether Spalding reasonably relied upon the Board's representations. Consequently, the trial court did not err by basing its decision upon a finding that we expressly required upon remand.
The order of the Marion Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Jeffrey S. Walther
Lexington, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Robert L. Chenoweth
Lawrenceburg, Kentucky