Opinion
Case No. 2:99CV852K
August 4, 2000
ORDER
This matter is before the court on a Motion for Limited Intervention, to Dismiss for Failure to Join Indispensable Parties, and to Stay the Proceedings. The motion was filed by the State of Utah (the "State"), the School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration ("SITLA"), Emery County, Kane County, San Juan County, and Wayne County (the "Counties") (collectively, the "Applicants"). A hearing on that motion was held on July 31, 2000. At the hearing, the Applicants were represented by Stephen G. Boyden and Stephen H. Urquhart. Plaintiffs were represented by Heidi McIntosh and James Angell. Defendants were represented by Steven Roth. Defendant-Intervenors were represented by Paul Mortensen. Before the hearing, the court considered carefully the memoranda and other materials submitted by the parties. Since taking the matter under advisement, the court has further considered the law and facts relating to this motion. Now being fully advised, the court renders the following Order.
The Motion to Stay is now moot.
The School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration, Kane County and Wayne County were not listed as Applicants in the motion, but they were added in the Applicants' reply memorandum.
I. BACKGROUND
This dispute centers around Section 8 of the Mining Act of 1866, which provided that the "right of way for the construction of highways over public lands not reserved for public uses, is hereby granted." That provision became codified as Revised Statutes § 2477. Roadways and other public highways established under Revised Statutes § 2477 became known as "R.S. 2477 roads or rights-of-way." From 1866 until its repeal by the FLPMA, R.S. 2477 granted a right-of-way for the construction of highways over public lands. The State and the Counties are required by the provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 72-1-101 to exercise control over the construction, maintenance, and use of the state highway system.
The Applicants, upon information and belief, claim that they own rights-of-way in all of the areas subject to Plaintiffs' pending motion for a preliminary injunction.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Limited Intervention
The Applicants claim that they should be granted intervention as of right for the limited purpose of pursuing their motion to dismiss. Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure effectively creates four requirements for a party seeking intervention as of right. It states:
Defendants do not oppose the motions but have concerns about having to litigate R.S. 2477 issues in this action. Defendant-Intervenors also do not oppose the motions.
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action (1) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
Fed R. Civ. P. 24; see also Coalition of Arizona/New Mexico Counties for Stable Economic Growth v. Dep't of Interior, 100 F.3d 837, 840 (10th Cir. 1996). The Tenth Circuit has "tended to follow a somewhat liberal line" in allowing intervention. National Farm Lines v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 564 F.2d 381, 384 (10th Cir. 1977).
The Applicants claim that they are timely and that R.S. 2477 rights-of-way are property rights, "a clear legal interest." They contend that a ruling by this court granting Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction "would as a practical matter impair or impede the Intervenor-Applicants' ability to protect" its interests in controlling the State's transportation infrastructure. The Applicants also claim that they cannot be assured of adequate representation of their interests or vigorous defense of their position. The existing parties are adverse to the existence of R.S. 2477 rights-of way across public lands. See SUWA v. BLM, 2:96CV836C. As an alternative, they argue that they should be granted permissive intervention.
This court agrees that the Applicants meet the criteria for intervention, and are thus permitted to intervene "for the purpose of pursuing their motion to dismiss."
B. Motion to Dismiss
Having intervened, the Applicants seek to dismiss the case for failure to join them as indispensable parties because "there can be no binding adjudication of a person's rights in the absence of that person." Provident Bank v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 122 (1968). They argue that they are indispensable parties and that failure to join them is fatal to Plaintiffs' case.
Rule 19(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a person to be joined as a party if:
(1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or
(2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence may
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest or
(ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest.
The Applicants argue that complete relief cannot be afforded in this case because, pursuant to the FLPMA, the BLM has no jurisdiction over valid existing rights-of-way within the state highway system. They claim that the BLM simply cannot prohibit off-road vehicle use of these rights-of-way because management of traffic on these rights-of-way falls to the State. They also claim that the existing parties are clearly adverse to the existence of any R.S. 2477 rights-of-way across public lands. In SUWA v. BLM, 2:96CV836C, the BLM and SUWA are both challenging the counties' abilities to continue to manage their transportation infrastructure. The Applicants also claim that disposition of this matter without them would leave the BLM subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the Applicants' interest in their highways across the areas Plaintiffs seek to close.
In addition, the Applicants claim that ordering Plaintiffs to join the Applicants "would not serve the interests of justice because of the difficulties raised by Plaintiffs' overbroad and vague allegations and the clear overlap with already-pending cases."
In contrast, Plaintiffs claim that the Applicants' motion to dismiss should be denied. Plaintiffs criticize the Applicants for claiming that they are indispensable but then stating that they should not be joined. In addition, Plaintiffs claim that the motion to dismiss must not be granted because the Applicants' reliance on R.S. 2477 is misplaced because the 2477 claims have never been adjudicated or recognized by any court or agency body. Finally, Plaintiffs point out that the Applicants have failed to explain why it is not feasible to join them in this action if necessary.
Plaintiffs explain that in determining whether a Rule 19 motion to dismiss should be granted, a court must engage in a two-step analysis. First, the court must determine whether the moving party has established that an absent party is "necessary" under Rule 19(a). If the party is not necessary, the motion must be denied. If the party is necessary, the existing parties must join the absent party if feasible. Plaintiffs point out that Rule 19(a) does not suggest that joinder is discretionary, but rather, that if joinder is feasible, the party shall be joined. Plaintiffs argue that if the State argues that it is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, then it can waive its immunity. Furthermore, Plaintiffs argue that the Counties do not have immunity, and they would protect the State's interest because of their co-equal interest in 2477 rights-of-way.
The Applicants have gone to great lengths to convince the court that they are indispensable parties, and the court agrees that they are necessary. However, the court declines to dismiss the case for failure to join these parties. First, there is no reason why joinder of the Counties is not feasible. The court acknowledges that it will likely be a financial hardship for the Counties, but that fact does not make joinder infeasible. In addition, because the Counties will adequately represent the State's interests in R.S. 2477 because of their co-interests in the rights-of way, the court finds that the State is not an indispensable party. See Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. BLM, Case No. 2:96CV836C, Order dated July 20, 2000 at 2-3. Thus, there is no basis for dismissing the case for failure to join indispensable parties.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Applicants' Motion to Stay is DENIED as moot, their Motion for Limited Intervention is GRANTED, their Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Join Indispensable Parties is DENIED, and SITLA and the Counties are HEREBY JOINED in this action and subsequent captions should so reflect. The State will be allowed to intervene if it chooses to waive its sovereign immunity.