Summary
granting a stay in proceedings because the claim was pending before the medical review panel with respect to two indispensable defendants
Summary of this case from Barrack Children's Irrevocable Trust v. PailetOpinion
Civil Action No. 03-2942, Section "N" (3).
July 1, 2004
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are three motions: (1) the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction filed by Defendant Norville H. Schock, Ph.D. (Rec. Doc. No. 9); (2) Plaintiffs' Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Completion of Medical Review Panel Proceedings (Rec. Doc. No. 4); and (3) Plaintiffs' Motion to Statistically Close Case Pending Completion of Medical Review Panel Proceedings (Rec. Doc. No. 6). As stated herein, Defendant Schock's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction is GRANTED. Plaintiffs' Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Completion of Medical Review Panel Proceedings and Motion to Statistically Close Case Pending Completion of Medical Review Panel Proceedings are also GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
This is a medical malpractice action arising out of medical care rendered to Dominic Sousa at Children's Hospital in New Orleans, Louisiana, in May 2002. At that time, an affiliation agreement existed between Children's Hospital and Garden City Hospital in Michigan, whereby Garden City Hospital would send orthopedic surgery residents in training to Children's Hospital to complete three-month rotations. Pursuant to that agreement, James Prosser, D.O., an orthopedic surgery resident from Garden City Hospital, was working at Children's Hospital, and treated Dominic Sousa, at or around midnight on May 13, 2002.Dr. Greg Gilot, another orthopedic surgery resident at Children's Hospital, examined Dominic later in the day on May 13, 2002. Dr. William Accoustie, also an orthopedic surgery resident, examined and treated Dominic at Children's Hospital on or about May 15, 2002. Dr. Robert Dehne, a pediatric orthopaedic specialist at Children's Hospital, examined and treated Dominic Sousa on May 17, 2002. According to Plaintiff, Dr. Dehne was the on-call pediatric orthopaedic specialist at Children's Hospital when Dominic was transferred there from Chalmette Medical Center on May 12, 2002. He also was the supervisor of Drs. Prosser, Gilot, and Accoustie.
See Petition at ¶ 16 (Rec. Doc. No. 1).
See Petition at ¶ 8.
See Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Stay Proceedings and to Statistically Close Case Pending Completion of Medical Review Panel Proceedings (Rec. Doc. No. 6) at 2.
On or around November 21, 2002, Plaintiffs filed a medical malpractice complaint with the Louisiana Patients' Compensation Fund against Dr. Prosser, Dr. Dehne, Dr. Gilot, Dr. Accoustie, and Children's Hospital regarding the medical treatment Dominic received at Children's Hospital in May 2002. Plaintiffs subsequently received notice that Dr. Prosser was not a qualified health care provider, for purposes of the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act, and, thus, was not covered by the Louisiana Patients' Compensation Fund. Thereafter, on or about July 3, 2003, Plaintiffs filed a petition for damages in Louisiana state court naming Dr. Prosser, Garden City Hospital, Norville H. Schock, Ph.D., Steve Worley, and Alan M. Robson, M.D. as defendants.
See Petition at ¶ 18; Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Stay Pending Completion of Medical Review Panel Proceedings (Rec. Doc. No. 4) at 1.
See Memorandum in Support of Stay Pending Completion of Medical Review Panel Proceedings at 1.
Dr. Schock was the Vice President of Medical Education at Garden City Hospital and Program Coordinator of the affiliation program between Children's Hospital and Garden City Hospital at the time of Dominic's treatment at Children's Hospital. He had signed a written affiliation agreement with Children's Hospital on behalf of Garden City Hospital and had selected Dr. Prosser for participation in that program. Steve Worley was the President and CEO of Children's Hospital in May 2002. Dr. Robson was the Medical Director of Children's Hospital at that time.
On or around October 16, 2003, the state court ordered the dismissal of Mr. Worley and Dr. Robson from the lawsuit so that the claims against those defendants could be submitted to a medical review panel. Dr. Prosser and Garden City Hospital then removed the action to this Court on October 21, 2003, on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Private or state medical review panel proceedings remain pending against Children's Hospital, Mr. Worley, Dr. Robson, Dr. Dehne, Dr. Gilot, and Dr. Accoustie (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the medical review panel defendants").
Id. at 2.
Id. at 1-2 and n. 1.
Plaintiffs filed the motions to stay and to statistically close this action pending completion of the medical review proceedings on January 8, 2004, and February 3, 2004. Dr. Schock filed his motion to dismiss on March 3, 2004.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
I. Defendant Schock's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
"In a diversity suit, a federal court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant to the same extent that a state court in that forum has such jurisdiction." Patin v. Thoroughbred Power Boats Inc., 294 F.3d 640, 652 (5th Cir. 2002). This determination generally requires a two-step evaluation to ensure that exercise of jurisdiction is proper both under the state long arm statute and under federal principles of constitutional due process. Id. "However, because Louisiana's long arm statute is coextensive with the limits of due process, `the sole inquiry into jurisdiction over a nonresident [under Louisiana law] is a one-step analysis of the constitutional due process requirements.'" Id. (quoting Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. v. Avco Corp., 834 F.2d 510, 514 (5th Cir. 1987)).
"`[T]he constitutional touchstone' of the determination whether an exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with due process `remains whether the defendant purposefully established "minimum contacts" in the forum State.'" Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, Solano County, 480 U.S. 102, 108-09 (1987) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985) (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945))). To satisfy due process, the defendant through his own affirmative acts must have established contacts with the forum state such that he can be said to have "`purposefully avail[ed] [him]self of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.'" Asahi Metal, 480 U.S. at 112, 109 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475); see also Holt Oil Gas Corp. v. Harvey, 801 F.2d 773, 777 (5th Cir. 1986) ("for an exercise of personal jurisdiction to be consistent with due process, the nonresident defendant must have some minimum contact with the forum which results from an affirmative act on the part of the nonresident"), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015 (1987). "The defendant's conduct and connection with the forum state must be such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court in the forum state." Holt Oil, 801 F.2d at 777.
Minimum contacts can take two forms. Where "litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to" the defendant's contacts with the forum state, see Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 253 F.3d 865, 868 (5th Cir. 2001), it is the "`relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation'" that must be examined to determine whether the defendant has purposely availed himself of the forum state's benefits and protections. See, e.g., We're Talking Mardi Gras, LLC v. Davis, 192 F. Supp.2d 635, 637 (E.D.La. 2002) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)). Where this relationship is sufficiently strong, the Court is said to have "specific jurisdiction" over the defendant. Id. Where a defendant's "`operations within a state [are] so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against [the defendant] on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities,'" then "the Court is said to have `general jurisdiction.'" Id. (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318).
When a nonresident defendant asserts a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating the existence of that jurisdiction. Gundle Lining Const. Corp., v. Adams County Asphalt, Inc., 85 F.3d 201, 204 (5th Cir. 1996). "When a court rules on this issue without a full evidentiary hearing, plaintiffs need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction." Planet Beach Franchising Corp. v. C3ubit, Inc., 2002 WL 1870007, *1 (E.D. La.) (citing Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 648 (5th Cir. 1994)). In doing so, "the Court must accept as true all uncontroverted allegations in plaintiffs' complaint and resolve any factual disputes in their favor." Id. (citing Latshaw v. Johnson, 167 F.3d 208, 211 (5th Cir. 1999).
Emphasizing that he never treated Dominic Sousa, Dr. Schock argues that Plaintiffs' complaint does not demonstrate that he purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in Louisiana. Rather, he argues that his limited connections with Louisiana, resulting from his position within a residency program and hospital that supplied residents to a Louisiana hospital, are insufficient for this Court to exercise specific or general jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs counter that specific jurisdiction exists here because Dr. Schock entered into an affiliation agreement with Garden City Hospital and Children's Hospital. Plaintiffs further contend that, in selecting and sending Dr. Prosser to Children's Hospital, Dr. Schock in effect treated Dominic at Children's Hospital.
Dr. Schock additionally asserts that the fiduciary shield doctrine precludes this Court from exercising personal jurisdiction over him. The gist of that doctrine is the principle that "jurisdiction over a foreign corporation does not necessarily confer jurisdiction over the individual officers and employees of that corporation." Fuller v. American Recreational Vehicles, 801 So.2d 642, 645-48 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/12/01) (citing Cobb Industries, Inc. v. Hight, 469 So.2d 1060, 1063 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1985)); see also, e.g., Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1985) and 18 JAMES W. MOORE, ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 108.42[3][b][iii]. Rather, acts of a corporate officer in his corporate capacity generally are not sufficient to provide personal jurisdiction over that person in his individual capacity. Id. Instead, personal jurisdiction must be premised on the officer's personal contacts with the forum state. Id. The fiduciary shield doctrine will not apply, however, when the corporate officer acts as the "alter ego" of the corporation, when the officer allegedly commits an intentional tort or fraud directed at the forum state, and/or when the officer acts outside of his legitimate corporate authority. Id.; see also Estate of Monroe v. Bottle Rock Power Corp., 2004 WL 737463, *8 (E.D. La.).
Here, Dr. Schock contends and, though given the opportunity to do so, Plaintiffs have not disputed, that all of his actions were taken in his corporate capacity on behalf of his corporate employer, Garden City Hospital. Dr. Schock coordinated the affiliation program between Children's Hospital and Garden City Hospital and signed the agreement establishing that program. He, however, did not personally render professional services to Dominic. Further, there is no suggestion that Dr. Schock committed a fraud or intentional tort against Dominic, acted as Garden City's alter ego, or acted outside of his corporate authority. Finally, Dr. Schock has never been to Louisiana and has no personal contacts with the state. Under these circumstances, the Court finds that the fiduciary shield doctrine precludes any assertion of personal jurisdiction by this Court over Dr. Schock. II. Plaintiffs' Motions to Stay Proceedings and Statistically Close Case Pending Completion of Medical Review Panel Proceedings
Plaintiffs were instructed to respond, on or before Tuesday, June 1, 2004, to any supplemental submission regarding the fiduciary shield doctrine that Dr. Schock provided to the Court on or before Monday, May 24, 2004. See May 17, 2004 Minute Entry (Rec. Doc. No. 12). To date, the Court has not received any such response from Plaintiffs to Dr. Schock's May 24, 2004 supplemental memorandum (Rec. Doc. No. 13).
Because Dr. Prosser, Dr. Schock and Garden City Hospital are not qualified health care providers, for purposes of the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act, Plaintiffs were not required to first submit their claims against those defendants to a medical review panel before filing suit in court. Plaintiffs nonetheless seek to stay and administratively close this judicial proceeding until such time as the medical review panel proceedings are completed, so that Plaintiffs may add the persons against whom those proceedings are pending as defendants to this action. Plaintiffs contend that the present suit cannot proceed to trial without those persons as defendants because they are "necessary" parties to this litigation. Plaintiffs assert that this is particularly true with respect to Dr. Dehne because he directly supervised Dr. Prosser. Plaintiffs further argue that the absence of the medical review panel defendants from this litigation will inhibit settlement efforts, and prejudice Plaintiffs by requiring the payment of costs necessary for two separate trials regarding the same events.
The Court notes the interrelated nature of the claims asserted against Garden City Hospital and Dr. Prosser and the claims asserted against the medical review panel defendants. Staying and statistically closing this action pending resolution of the medical review panel proceedings will avoid piecemeal resolution and ensure consistent results. In addition, judicial economy will be served by having these matters litigated only once. Cf. Cooper v. Sofamor, Inc., 1993 WL 17634, *2 (E.D. La.) (staying products liability action pending resolution of medical review panel proceeding in the interests of judicial economy, preventing procedural confusion, and avoiding piecemeal resolution of claims); Hayden v. Cunningham Pathology Assoc., 1991 WL 62101, *1 (E.D. La.) (staying federal proceeding until physician subject to medical review panel proceeding could be joined as a defendant). In any event, though the Court is not certain how long resolution of the medical review panel proceedings will require, any party may seek to lift the stay and reopen the case if that party later believes a change in circumstances warrants that relief.
Nor have Defendants persuaded the Court that a stay would be inappropriate. Indeed, Defendants filed a formal response only to Plaintiffs' first motion. In that opposition, Defendants asserted that Plaintiffs did not allege that the medical review defendants will be added as defendants to this action. Plaintiffs clarified this point in their second motion by stating that they fully intend to add those persons as defendants to this suit upon completion of the medical review proceedings. Defendants further contend that they "have attempted to move this matter to trial," but state that Plaintiffs have resisted those efforts by failing to respond to discovery requests and requests for deposition dates. The record, however, does not reflect the filing of a motion to compel or a single notice of deposition. In any event, there is no demonstration of how Defendants will be prejudiced by a delay in the progress of this matter.
See Opposition to Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Completion of Medical Review Panel (Rec. Doc. No. 10) at 2-3.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Schock's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (Rec. Doc. No. 9) is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Completion of Medical Review Panel Proceedings and Motion to Statistically Close Case Pending Completion of Medical Review Panel Proceedings (Rec. Doc. Nos. 4 and 6) are also GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is instructed to statistically close this action pending further order of this Court. Any party believing a future change in circumstances warrants lifting the stay and reopening the case may file a motion seeking that relief.
New Orleans, Louisiana.