Opinion
June 19, 1997
Appeal from the Supreme Court (Tait, Jr., J.).
Defendant's appeal from Supreme Court's order granting plaintiffs a default judgment is dismissed since a party may not appeal directly from an order entered upon his or her default, the proper remedy being a motion to vacate the default and an appeal from any denial thereof (see, Matter of Campbell v Records Access Officer, 221 A.D.2d 201; Brannigan v. Dubuque, 199 A.D.2d 851).
We shall also dismiss the purported appeal from Supreme Court's letter, dated June 17, 1996, because that document is not an appealable paper (see, Prince v. Inverary, 235 A.D.2d 467). In any event, Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider defendant's motion since the motion papers were not in proper form.
Cardona, P.J., Mercure, Crew III and Carpinello, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the appeals are dismissed, without costs.