Opinion
Case No. 4:19CV1578
2020-07-07
Donald Soto, Lisbon, OH, pro se. Mark K. Williams, Lisbon, OH, pro se.
Donald Soto, Lisbon, OH, pro se.
Mark K. Williams, Lisbon, OH, pro se.
ORDER
James G. Carr, Sr. U.S. District Judge
Pro se petitioner Donald Soto, presently incarcerated at FCI Elkton, brings this Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). Petitioner seeks a reversal of a Disciplinary Hearing Officer's ("DHO") finding the he committed a prohibited act of escape and return in violation of Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") Code 200 and restore twenty-seven (27) days of good conduct time and visitation privileges. (Id. at 9).
For the reasons that follow, I deny the Petition.
Background
At the time of the events at issue in the Petition, petitioner was serving a twenty-four month term of imprisonment at the Federal Prison Camp, McKean, in Pennsylvania imposed as a result of a guilty plea of conspiracy to distribute cocaine. (Doc. 1-1 at 1). On November 4, 2018, corrections officers performing a count at 12:15 a.m. determined that petitioner and another inmate, Ronald Ashby, were missing and not located during a search of the Compound. (Id. at 1-2). The Incident Report ("IR") is attached to the Petition. (Doc. 1-2). According to the IR, petitioner and Ashby were identified by Compound Officer Johnson as returning to the unit at approximately 1:10 a.m. (Id.).
The IR charged petitioner with escape, but the Unit Disciplinary Committee ("UDC") recommended that the charge be reduced to interfering with taking of the count (BOP Code 321) and being in an unauthorized area (BOP Code 316). (Doc. 1-1 at 2). But the DHO "overlooked the recommendation of the UDC" and concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that petitioner committed the prohibited act of Escape and Return in violation of BP Code 200. (Id.). As a result, the DHO imposed loss of twenty-seven days of good conduct time, thirty days of disciplinary segregation, and loss of visitation for one year. (Doc. 1-2 at 4).
Petitioner alleges that his appeal to the Regional Director was denied because of a government shutdown, but his appeal to the Central Office of the BOP was denied on the merits. (Doc. 1-1 at 2-3).
Standard of Review
Writs of habeas corpus "may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). Section 2241 "is an affirmative grant of power to federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus to prisoners being held ‘in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’ " Rice v. White , 660 F.3d 242, 249 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Section 2241(c) ). Because petitioner is appearing pro se, the allegations in his Petition must be construed in his favor, and his pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those prepared by counsel. Urbina v. Thoms , 270 F.3d 292, 295 (6th Cir. 2001). However, I may dismiss the Petition at any time, or make any such disposition as law and justice require, if I determine the Petition fails to establish adequate grounds for relief. Hilton v. Braunskill , 481 U.S. 770, 775, 107 S.Ct. 2113, 95 L.Ed.2d 724 (1987) ; see also Allen v. Perini , 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970) (holding district courts have a duty to "screen out" petitions lacking merit on their face under 28 U.S.C. § 2243 ).
Analysis
Petitioner claims he was denied due process with respect to the incident on November 4, 2018 and the subsequent process resulting in the loss of good conduct time because: (1) he did not receive a copy of the IR within twenty-four hours; (2) the regional director denied his appeal due to a government shutdown; and (3) there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty of escape. (Doc. 1 at 6-7). Petitioner asks that I restore his good conduct time and visitation privileges.
My ability to review prison disciplinary proceedings is limited. District courts have no authority to review a disciplinary committee's resolution of factual disputes, or to make a redetermination of an inmate's innocence or guilt. Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Walpole v. Hill , 472 U.S. 445, 455, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985). The only question that I may consider is whether the hearing complied with basic due process requirements.
This standard is not a difficult one to meet. To comply with the requirements of the Due Process Clause, prison officials need only provide a prisoner facing loss of good time credits with: (1) a written notice of the charges at least twenty-four hours prior to any hearing; (2) an opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals; and (3) a written statement by the fact finder as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action. Wolff v. McDonnell , 418 U.S. 539, 564-66, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974).
Due process requires only that disciplinary findings resulting in the loss of good-time credits be supported by "some evidence" in the record. Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Walpole , 472 U.S. at 454-56, 105 S.Ct. 2768. This standard is satisfied where "there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board." Id. The DHO is not required to base findings on overwhelming or irrefutable proof of guilt. Even where the evidence is contradictory or partially exculpatory, a DHO may base a finding of guilt on only "some evidence" that indicates the prisoner is guilty. Id. at 457, 105 S.Ct. 2768.
In this case, the incident occurred on November 4, 2018 and petitioner received the IR on November 8, 2018. Petitioner claims that he was prejudiced by this delay because the charge of escape was "arbitrary, capricious, and not supported by the record." (Doc. 1-1 at 5). The disciplinary hearing was conducted on December 11, 2018. (Doc. 1-2 at 2). Petitioner does not allege that his receipt of the IR four (4) days after the incident, but more than a month before the hearing, prejudiced his ability to defend himself at the hearing. Accordingly, the first due process requirement of Wolff is satisfied.
According to the DHO report, Petitioner requested two witnesses at the UDC hearing but waived those witnesses at the DHO hearing and presented no documentary evidence. (Id. at 3). Petitioner does not contend that he was not permitted to present documentary evidence at the DHO hearing. He states that he waived his request for witnesses because the DHO had not noticed his request for witnesses and petitioner did not wish to reschedule the hearing. (Doc. 1-3 at 2). Petitioner chose to go forward with the hearing on December 8, 2018 and waived his right to witnesses. The second due process requirement of Wolff is satisfied.
Lastly, petitioner contends that the DHO's finding that he was guilty of escape lacked supporting evidence. Wolff requires a written statement by the DHO as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action, and there must be "some evidence" in the record to support the disciplinary finding resulting in loss of good time credits. Here, the DHO fully explained the evidence he relied upon to support his finding, including the bed count at 12:15 a.m. which showed petitioner absent, the "search of SCP McKean" for petitioner with negative results, and Compound Officer Johnson identifying petitioner as returning to the unit at 1:10 a.m. The DHO also considered petitioner's statement that he did not "escape" because he did not leave the premises, but beyond this denial, petitioner presented nothing further. Based on the evidence considered at the hearing, the DHO concluded that greater weight of the evidence supported a finding that petitioner committed the prohibited act of Escape – Return Within 4 Hours. (Doc. 1-2 at 3-4). The third due process requirement of Wolff is satisfied.
Here, all the due process requirements of Wolff were satisfied and there is "some evidence" to support the DHO's finding that petitioner was guilty as charged. Petitioner disagrees with the DHO's determination as to what constitutes "escape" but his disagreement with factual issues and finding of guilt does not demonstrate he was denied due process.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED THAT petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1) be, and the same hereby is, denied and this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), I certify that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. No certificate of appealability to issue.
So ordered.