Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:01-CV-246-C.
April 27, 2002
ORDER
Petitioner Miguel A. Soto ("Petitioner"), acting pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 complaining that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction and sentence for tampering with or fabricating physical evidence. Respondent filed an Answer with Brief in Support and copies of Petitioner's relevant state court records. Petitioner has filed a response and objections to the answer.
Respondent has lawful and valid custody of Petitioner pursuant to a judgment and sentence of the 121st Judicial District Court of Yoakum County, Texas, in Cause No. 1882, styled The State of Texas v. Miguel A. Soto. On September 1, 1998, Petitioner was charged by indictment with tampering with or fabricating physical evidence and five prior convictions were alleged to enhance punishment. Although he pleaded not guilty, Soto was found guilty by a jury on February 3, 1999. The trial court subsequently found that two of the enhancement paragraphs were true and on February 24, 1999, sentenced Soto to twenty years' incarceration in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division ("TDCJ-ID"). Petitioner's conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the Seventh District Court of Appeals on April 4, 2000. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused his petition for discretionary review on June 28, 2000. Although Soto subsequently filed a state application for a writ of habeas corpus on April 2, 2001, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied the application without written order on June 20, 2001.
The indictment shows that Soto is also known as Miguel Soto Balluelos, Pedro Bauellos-Garcia, Pedro Garcia, Dellino Loya-Aragonez, Mike Soto, Johnny Salcido, Pedro Banuelos, Pedro Garcia-Banuelos, Pedro Garcia Danislos, Pedro Bauellos Garcia, Miguel Soto, Miguel Soto-Aragonez, Juan Sixto Salcido, Pedro Bauellos, Pedro Aragones, Delfino Loya-Aragonez, and Miguel Aragonez Soto."
Soto filed his petition after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"); therefore, the AEDPA standards apply. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) (holding that all non-capital federal writs of habeas corpus filed on or after April 24, 1996, are subject to the AEDPA). The AEDPA enacted the present 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d) which provides that a state prisoner may not obtain federal relief
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
"Adjudication on the merits" is a habeas term of art which refers to the state court's disposition; that is, whether the state court's disposition was substantive or procedural as opposed to the quality of the review. Miller v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 274, 281 (5th Cir. 2000). In Texas writ jurisprudence, a "denial" of relief usually serves to dispose of the merits of claims. Miller v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 274, 281 (5th Cir. 2000). See Ex parte Torres, 943 S.W.2d 469, 474 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997) (holding that "denial" signifies the Court of Criminal Appeals addressed and rejected the merits of a state habeas claim, while "dismissal" signifies the Court declined to consider the claim for reasons unrelated to the merits).
For cases found to have been adjudicated on the merits in state court, the Supreme Court has determined that a federal court may grant a writ under the § 2254(d)(1) "contrary to" clause, only "if the state court arrive[d] at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decide[d] a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). "Under the "unreasonable application' clause [of § 2254(d)(1)], a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the [Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413. "Distinguishing between an unreasonable and an incorrect application of federal law, [the Supreme Court] clarified that even if the federal habeas court concludes that the state court decision applied clearly established federal law incorrectly, relief is appropriate only if that application is also objectively unreasonable." Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 1918 (2001) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 410, 411).
Pure questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact should be reviewed under § 2254(d)(1) while pure questions of fact should be reviewed under § 2254(d)(2). Hill v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2000); Corwin v. Johnson, 150 F.3d 467, 471 (5th Cir. 1998).
Findings of fact made by the state courts should be presumed correct unless the petitioner rebuts such findings with clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(1). See Jackson v. Anderson, 112 F.3d 823, 824 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that the burden of rebutting the presumption was made more onerous by the AEDPA's amendment to § 2254).
Soto complains only that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction and sentence for tampering with or fabricating physical evidence. Although Soto raised this issue in his state habeas application, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied the application without written order and the trial court made no findings but allowed the application to be overruled by operation of law. Tex. Code Crim. P. Art. 11.07, § 3(c). Nevertheless, the intermediate court of appeals addressed the sufficiency of the evidence and made the following findings of fact:
While on patrol in the Denver City area, Deputy James Melendez of the Yoakum County Sheriffs Department herd an engine accelerating and observed a cloud of dust where a blue and white Bronco, driven by [Soto], had entered the roadway. As was customary while on patrol, Deputy Melendez had activated his patrol car's video camera. He then turned on his overhead lights and pursued the Bronco until it turned down a dead-end street at which time the deputy stopped appellant for contest of speed. When asked to identify himself, [Soto] stated that he had no identification but did identify himself as Isidro Aragonez (later identified as Miguel Soto). In the meantime, the passenger in the vehicle opened the door and discarded a beer can. Deputy Melendez observed that [Soto] had a "very strong odor of alcohol coming about his breath, red and glassy eyes," and noted that his speech was very incoherent and repetitious. When the deputy asked [Soto] if he had been drinking, [Soto] responded that he had "a few shots of tequila." After [Soto] failed a field sobriety test, Deputy Melendez placed [him] under arrest for DWI and two traffic offenses. The passenger of the Bronco was also arrested for public intoxication. Both were handcuffed and [Soto] was placed in the front passenger seat of the patrol car while his passenger was placed in the backseat. In conjunction with the arrest, Deputy Melendez searched [Soto] and found plastic sandwich bags with the corners missing which was significant because the deputy found items like these to be used for narcotics.
The day after [Soto] was arrested, Deputy Melendez reviewed the videotape from his patrol car's camera as he was preparing his case report. The video camera in the patrol car had recorded everything [Soto] and his passenger had said to each other and to Deputy Melendez. The recorded conversations were translated from Spanish and transcribed. This transcript was then introduced into evidence and read to the jury. The following excerpts are pertinent for our analysis:
Soto: I thought you had thrown it away.
Passenger: Thrown it? How?
Soto: You can't take it out right now?
Passenger: I am tired.
Soto: Tired? I am going to get it really bad. I'm on probation. Oh well. Hide that damn thing!
Passenger: Where do I stick it at?
Soto: In the back of the seat. In the very middle of it. In the middle all the way to the bottom. Leave it there so that it can go to hell.
Passenger: I put it in the very middle of the seat.
Soto: Did it stick? Put is as far as you can. Why didn't we take it out. . . . For that damn thing. So what . . . who gives a damn.
Upon hearing this conversation between [Soto] and his passenger, Deputy Melendez and another officer went to his patrol car, unlocked it and pulled out the bottom of the back seat. The officers found a plastic bag similar to those found on [Soto] and inside the bag were five smaller bags containing cocaine. [Soto's] passenger subsequently plead guilty to possession of cocaine . . . .
The court of appeals viewed "the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict," and concluded that "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979). See Tex. Penal Code § 37.09 (stating that a person commits the offense of tampering if that person knows that an offense has been committed, or knows that an official investigation is in progress, and the person alters, destroys, or conceals anything with the intent to impair its legibility or availability as evidence in any investigation related to the offense).
"Habeas relief under section 2254 on a claim of insufficient evidence is appropriate only `if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'" West v. Johnson, 92 F.3d at 1393 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 317). "A determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct," and the petitioner "shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(1); Carter v. Johnson, 131 F.3d 452, 460 (5th Cir. 1997).
The Court has reviewed the state court records and Soto's pleadings, and finds that he has failed to present clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that the state-court findings of fact are correct. Although he argues that there were conflicts or gaps in the evidence which should have been resolved in his favor, "a federal habeas corpus court faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume — even if it does not appear affirmatively in the record — that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution," and the federal habeas court "must defer to that resolution." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 326.
After reviewing the facts as determined by the state appellate court "in the light most favorable to the prosecution," this Court finds that "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the [felony offense of murder] beyond a reasonable doubt." See Donahue v. Cain, 231 F.3d 1000, 1004 (5th Cir. 2000) (internal quote and citations omitted) (holding that a federal habeas court must determine "whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt").
Accordingly, the Court finds that Soto has failed to demonstrate that the state court adjudication was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," and his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be DENIED and dismissed with prejudice. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1).
SO ORDERED.
All relief not expressly granted is denied and any pending motions are denied.