Opinion
C. A. PC-2019-4868
03-27-2020
ENRIQUE SOSA, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF WOONSOCKET POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendant.
For Plaintiff: Gary T. Gentile, Esq. For Defendant: John J. Desimone, Esq.
For Plaintiff: Gary T. Gentile, Esq.
For Defendant: John J. Desimone, Esq.
DECISION
GIBNEY, P.J.
Before this Court is Plaintiff Enrique Sosa's (Plaintiff) "Application to Show Cause" as to why the Woonsocket Police Department denied him certain procedural rights under the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights (LEOBR), G.L. 1956 §§ 42-28.6 et seq. Plaintiff was terminated by the Defendant City of Woonsocket Police Department (Defendant or Department) without notice or a pre-termination hearing. Jurisdiction is pursuant to § 42-28.6-14(b) and G.L. 1956 § 9-30-1.
On September 13, 2018, Plaintiff was arrested in Uxbridge, Massachusetts. Plaintiff broke into his then-girlfriend's apartment, and an altercation ensued when she returned home. Plaintiff was charged with felony breaking and entering, felony assault with a dangerous weapon, and assault on a family/household member. That same day, Defendant suspended Plaintiff from the Woonsocket Police Department without pay.
Pursuant to § 42-28.6-13(g), "[a]ny law enforcement officer who is charged, indicted or informed against for a felony . . . may be suspended without pay and benefits at the discretion of the agency or chief or highest ranking sworn officers . . ." Plaintiff does not challenge the validity of his suspension.
Plaintiff appeared before the Uxbridge District Court on January 14, 2019 where he pled by admitting to sufficient facts as to the charged offenses. (Uxbridge District Court Transcript (Tr.) at 2:16-4:4, Jan. 14, 2019.) The court continued the case without a finding for one year and imposed probation conditions such as counseling, drug and alcohol screenings, and a batterers program. Id. at 7:16-19; see also Compl. Ex. C, Tender of Plea or Admission and Waiver of Rights at 1, Jan. 4, 2019.
On or about April 3, 2019, the Defendant terminated Plaintiff's employment effective immediately pursuant to § 42-28.6-13(i). (Compl. Ex. 4, Termination Notice, Apr. 3, 2019.) At oral argument before this Court on February 18, 2020, Defendant claimed that Plaintiff's admission to sufficient facts in the Uxbridge District Court was the equivalent of a guilty plea to a felony offense and therefore it did not need to provide the procedural rights under the LEOBR. Plaintiff initiated the present action on April 17, 2019, seeking a declaration of rights under § 42-28.6-4 and asking this Court to reinstate his employment and declare his termination unlawful because there was no notice or hearing. (Compl. at 4.)
Pursuant to § 42-28.6-14(b), an officer who is denied any right afforded by the LEOBRmay petition the Superior Court "for any order directing the law enforcement agency to show cause why the right should not be afforded." The LEOBR generally requires the law enforcement agency to provide notice and a hearing before a hearing committee prior to dismissal of the officer. Section 42-28.6-4(a). However, "[a]ny law enforcement officer who pleads guilty or no contest to a felony charge . . . may be dismissed by the law enforcement agency and, in the event of such dismissal, other provisions of this chapter shall not apply." Section 42-28.6-13(i).
The Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights, G.L. 1956 §§ 42-28.6-1 et al, '"was enacted to protect police officers from infringements of their rights in the course of investigations into their alleged improper conduct."' In re Sabetta, 661 A.2d 80, 83 (R.I. 1995) (quoting In re Denisewich, 643 A.2d 1194, 1196 (R.I. 1994)).
Rhode Island has no functional equivalent of an admission to sufficient facts followed by a continuation without a finding. In Massachusetts, it is well established that "[a]n admission to sufficient facts followed by a continuance without a finding is not a 'conviction' under Massachusetts law." Commonwealth v. Villalobos, 777 N.E.2d 116, 120 (Mass. 2002). However, when the admission "may ripen into an adjudication of guilt and imposition of sentence" should the defendant violate conditions imposed by the court, "it remains appropriate to treat an admission to sufficient facts as the equivalent of a plea of guilty" pursuant to the Massachusetts statute that governs procedural protections during guilty pleas. Id.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court has held that "[a] judge is entitled to treat an admission to sufficient facts as the functional equivalent of a guilty plea if the admission was made knowingly and voluntarily." Commonwealth v. Greene, 508 N.E.2d 93, 94 (Mass. 1987); see also Commonwealth v. Berrios, 998 N.E.2d 782, 786 (Mass. App. 2013) ("We see no compelling reason to create a distinction . . . between an admission to sufficient facts and a guilty plea."). However, this equivalence is generally within the context of procedural due process requirements, where the Massachusetts courts seek to ensure that defendants pleading to admission of sufficient facts receive the same rights as those pleading guilty or no contest. See, e.g. Berrios, 998 N.E.2d at 786 ("Because the procedural safeguards are identical, we conclude that the defendant's admission to sufficient facts . . . is the functional equivalent of pleading guilty to that crime for purposes of waiving nonjurisdictional defects in the charging document.") (emphasis added). Therefore, an admission to sufficient facts is not the automatic equivalent of a guilty plea but can be equated by the Massachusetts courts for purposes of procedural protections and statutory interpretation.
Here, the record is absent of any evidence that the Uxbridge District Court intended to treat Plaintiff's admission as the functional equivalent of a guilty plea. At Plaintiff's plea hearing, the court expressly continued the matter for one year without a finding and did not consider whether Plaintiff's plea was the equivalent of a guilty plea in any context. (Tr. at 7:16-17.) Plaintiff's signed plea also does not have any indication of guilt. (Compl. Ex. C at 1.) In addition, Plaintiff alleges that he complied with all conditions entered by the Uxbridge District Court and that the charges against him were ripe for dismissal as of January 4, 2020. Therefore, this Court finds that Plaintiff's admission to sufficient facts is not the equivalent of a guilty or no contest plea to a felony, and the Defendant was not entitled to terminate Plaintiff's employment under § 42-28.6-13(i). The Defendant therefore failed to provide Plaintiff with the requisite pre-termination notice under § 42-28.6-4(b) and a pre-termination hearing before the hearing committee pursuant to §§ 42-28.6-5 and 42-28.6-6.
Accordingly, this Court grants Plaintiff's request for an order to show cause and orders the Defendant to comply with the procedural requirements of the LEOBR if it wishes to terminate Plaintiff's employment. Counsel will prepare appropriate order for entry.