Opinion
20-P-850
08-24-2021
Keith SOR v. Kimberly T. LIM.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
After a bench trial, a judge of the Superior Court found that the plaintiff, Keith Sor, transferred property at 51 Nottingham Street in Lowell (property) to the defendant, Kimberly T. Lim, by quitclaim deed conveying a fee simple determinable interest. The judge found that Lim had failed to comply with the conditions of the deed and that a fee simple interest in the property reverted to Sor. The judgment declared Sor "to be the owner in fee simple of the property." Because the matter involved registered land, the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to impose this remedy, and the judgment is a legal nullity. See Harris v. Sannella, 400 Mass. 392, 395 (1987).
Discussion. General Laws c. 185, § 1 (a 1/2), gives the Land Court "exclusive original jurisdiction" over "complaints affecting title to registered land." Thus, a Superior Court judge lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate claims that seek a remedy that affects title to registered land, and lacks jurisdiction to impose such a remedy. See, e.g., Johnson v. Christ Apostle Church, Mt. Bethel, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 699, 701-702 (2019) ; Feinzig v. Ficksman, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 113, 116-117 (1997).
Here, the quitclaim deed is endorsed with a reference to the certificate of title, indicating that it is registered land. See G. L. c. 185, §§ 63, 64. As the effect of the land registration system on this proceeding was not raised below or briefed on appeal, this panel invited the parties to submit supplemental memoranda on the issue. See Department of Revenue v. C.M.J., 432 Mass. 69, 76 n.15 (2000) (parties have right to notice of grounds for adjudication). Both parties submitted a timely response; Lim expressed the view that because the Superior Court lacked "authority to render [the] judgment," the case must be vacated or remanded for transfer to the Land Court. Sor agreed that his claim seeking to quiet title to the property was outside of the jurisdiction of the Superior Court but argued that his two remaining claims were jurisdictionally proper and, as such, the "findings and judgments in [those] underlying [claims] should stand."
The electronic records of the North Middlesex Registry of Deeds confirm that the property is registered land. See Marhefka v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Sutton, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 515, 516 n.5 (2011) ("facts ... readily ascertainable from authoritative sources are appropriate for judicial notice" [citation omitted]). See also Whiteside v. Merchants Nat'l Bank of Boston, 284 Mass. 165, 172 (1933) (Land Court procedure to register land judicial in nature).
It is irrelevant whether any of the individual counts that formed Sor's complaint, properly pled, could have been brought in the Superior Court. Regardless of the particular legal theories advanced by Sor, both the complaint and the pretrial memorandum (filed jointly by the parties) indicate that Sor sought a declaration that he owned the property in fee simple. Thus, as the remedy sought affects title to registered land, and the Land Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to entertain such claims, Sor's complaint could not be heard in the Superior Court. See Johnson, 96 Mass. App. Ct. at 702 (Superior Court lacked jurisdiction over nuisance claim where plaintiff sought remedy that encumbered registered land). See also O'Donnell v. O'Donnell, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 409, 412 (2009) (Land Court retains exclusive original jurisdiction over actions that "have the effect of altering the registered title").
Although the complaint also sought damages, presumably on the breach of contract and fraud claims, Sor did not press the issue at trial or include a request for damages in the pretrial memorandum.
Conclusion. Because the Superior Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, we vacate the judgment. However, "when faced with a jurisdictional issue, in order to avoid waste of judicial resources, the judge should not dismiss the case, but rather ask the [chief justice of the trial court], pursuant to G. L. c. 211B, § 9, to transfer the case, the judge, or both to the appropriate court." ROPT Ltd. Partnership v. Katin, 431 Mass. 601, 608 (2000). See Johnson, 96 Mass. App. Ct. at 702. See also Skawski v. Greenfield Investors Prop. Dev. LLC, 473 Mass. 580, 592 (2016). Thus, we remand for entry of orders consistent with this decision.
So ordered.
Vacated and remanded.