Opinion
A166368
04-18-2024
In re J.E.H., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. J.H., Defendant and Appellant. SONOMA COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT, Plaintiff and Respondent,
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Sonoma County Super. Ct. No. 6563DEP
Fujisaki, Acting P. J.
Three-month-old J.E.H. (or minor) was detained by the Sonoma County Human Services Department (Department) after his X-rays revealed several broken bones in different stages of healing, including a fractured right humerus, metaphyseal corner fractures of the right and left distal femurs, and three broken ribs. Due to the nature and combination of J.E.H.'s injuries, the Department petitioned to have him declared a ward of the juvenile court. Minor's parents, J.E. (Mother) and J.H. (Father), denied that J.E.H. had been abused and claimed his injuries could be explained by various medical conditions, including metabolic bone disease, rickets, osteogenesis imperfecta, Ehlers-Danos syndrome (EDS), and vitamin D deficiency. After an extensive jurisdiction and disposition hearing, during which the juvenile court heard testimony from several medical experts on both sides, the court declared J.E.H. a ward of the court, found Father to be culpable for the abuse, and bypassed reunification services for him under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5) (section 361.5(b)(5)) and (b)(6) (section 361.5(b)(6)).
Further unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
On appeal from the juvenile court's jurisdiction and disposition findings and orders, Father's appointed counsel initially filed a brief under In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835 (Phoenix H.) raising no arguable issues. We then requested and received supplemental briefing from the parties on what evidence supported the finding of Father's culpability, and whether the juvenile court made all necessary findings to support its bypass ruling. After careful consideration of the parties' briefs and an exhaustive review of the record, we are satisfied that the record contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find by clear and convincing evidence that J.E.H. suffered severe physical abuse by Father. We further find no reversible error in the court's decision to bypass reunification services for Father. We therefore affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
On the afternoon of February 23, 2022, three-month-old J.E.H. was brought by his parents to the emergency room at a Kaiser Permanente (Kaiser) facility in Santa Rosa suffering from lethargy, fussiness, and a limp right arm. X-rays revealed minor had an acute (or recent) fractured right humerus and several healing fractures of his ribs, femurs, and left tibia. Doctors also observed a bruise on his abdomen and a lesion under his tongue.
A. Dependency Petition and Detention
After obtaining a protective custody warrant to have J.E.H. detained at the hospital, the Department filed a dependency petition under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (e), alleging severe physical abuse of the child by a parent or a person known to the parent and failure to protect him from the abuse. The juvenile court ordered that J.E.H. be detained and placed in a confidential foster home upon his discharge from the hospital.
B. Jurisdiction and Disposition Report
In its jurisdiction and disposition report, the Department recommended the juvenile court sustain the petition's allegations and deny the parents reunification services pursuant to section 361.5(b)(5) and (b)(6).
The Department reported that the parents had been arrested, but that no charges had yet been filed. They were interviewed by the Department in March 2022. According to the parents, they had been married for two years, and J.E.H. was their first child. The parents believed that minor's right arm may have been accidentally broken when they placed him in a "Halo Sleep Sack" the night before his hospitalization because "[t]he arms can be difficult to place in [the] sleep sack[,]" and that his other fractures were sustained during his "traumatic" birth. The parents maintained that J.E.H. had never fallen or been hit, squeezed, or shaken. Mother related the family's history of fractures and osteoporosis. She and Father reported that J.E.H. was "a happy baby" and "very easy to take care of," and that he did not "cry often."
Relatives and family friends interviewed by the Department described the parents as gentle and caring with the baby. Maternal grandfather, who was with J.E.H. a few days before his hospitalization and saw no injuries, told the Department that Father" 'may not be as gentle with the baby as [Mother] but there is no way he would hurt that baby, there has to be another explanation for these injuries.' "
A social worker consulted with Dr. Michelle Evans, medical director for the Child Abuse Services and Prevention program at Kaiser. Based on her review of medical records, Dr. Evans noted that all of J.E.H.'s fractures appeared to be healing and that he had not sustained any new fractures after detention. Evans concluded the rib and femur fractures were not the result of birth trauma because if that were the case," 'they would have been completely resolved by the time the scans were taken.'" Evans had" 'a high degree of confidence that all of the fractures were [n]on accidental'" and" 'no doubt this is child abuse. This one is very clear. The different levels of healing indicate chronic abuse, the combination of injuries indicate chronic abuse. The fact that in a new environment there are no new injuries, all points to this child suffering from serious chronic abuse.'" Evans explained that" '[o]steogenesis has been ruled out; the baby does not suffer from a bone condition. The lab results are completely normal[.]'" Although Evans had ordered additional testing for very rare conditions, she believed it was highly unlikely J.E.H. suffered from a medical condition that contributed to his injuries.
C. Addendum Reports
In its May 2022 addendum report, the Department reported it was working to place J.E.H. with a paternal aunt. The parents had been cooperative and were engaged in parenting classes, therapy, and weekly supervised visits with the minor. After two of the visits, minor cried inconsolably, and it was not clear whether this was a "trauma reaction" or because he missed his parents. J.E.H.'s foster mother reported that minor was happy and making great strides, but she was concerned about his fine motor skills (e.g., weakness in his arms) and noted his continued "difficulty with his self-regulation, hypervigilance, and night terrors." The Department reported that the District Attorney's office would not be filing criminal charges against the parents.
In its June 2022 addendum report, the Department attached additional medical records and the Petaluma Police Department's report. We now summarize these records.
1. Medical Records
J.E.H. was born in November 2021 by C-section. He had "fetal distress" and meconium in the amniotic fluid. He was initially limp, with a mottled color, and had to be resuscitated. There was bruising on his forehead and scalp.
In December 2021, Mother brought J.E.H. to the hospital for a lesion under his tongue. His pediatrician, Dr. Joe Uranga, diagnosed minor with a "[w]ell healing sublingual abrasion." In his notes, Dr. Uranga wrote, "Consideration given to bottle jamming, but inexperienced parents trying to bottle feed."
At a wellness check in January 2022, Dr. Uranga noticed that J.E.H.'s growth had dropped precipitously from the 40th to the 5th percentile. Mother raised concerns about intermittent spotting on minor's scalp, and Dr. Uranga noted that "[b]ruising [i]n an infant would be grounds for CPS, but review of lesions seems to be an extension of vasculature (in photo almost appears to be browning a bit, but was not so in person).... Close follow up." (Bold face omitted.)
Upon J.E.H.'s hospitalization on February 23, 2022, the attending physician, Dr. Peter Rowinsky, ordered a full skeletal survey. The survey revealed a right humerus fracture, acute and subacute metaphyseal corner fractures of the right and left distal femurs, a healing left midshaft femur fracture, a subacute left tibial fracture, and left posterior rib fractures of the 5th, 6th, and 7th ribs. A CT scan of his head was negative, and genetic testing found no abnormalities. Blood tests showed an "abnormal[ly]" low vitamin D level of 23.
J.E.H. was discharged from the hospital on February 26, 2022. A second skeletal survey performed on March 17, 2022, showed that the child's fractures were still evident, but healing, and that he had no new fractures.
2. Police Report
According to the police report, on February 23, 2022, Petaluma police officers responded to a Kaiser nurse's report of suspected child abuse. The police spoke with Dr. Rowinsky, who stated that minor's injuries were "concerning enough to indicate abuse." Officers also spoke with a Kaiser social worker who had interviewed Mother and "believ[ed] there was not an indication of abuse from [Mother]." Mother told the social worker that the only time the parents did not directly supervise minor was during a four-hour period on February 19, 2022, when Mother's friend, T.R., babysat him.
Mother further told police officers that she first noticed minor "was not as active as usual and appeared drowsy" on the morning of his hospitalization. At approximately 1:30 p.m., Mother noticed that minor's arm was not functioning properly, so she called an advice nurse and then brought minor to a Kaiser facility in Santa Rosa, where she was advised to seek treatment at a Kaiser emergency room.
Father told the officers he had watched J.E.H. alone the day before his hospitalization while Mother spent the day with her friend. Father said he did not observe minor getting hurt, and that their play involved gently tossing minor into the air and catching him, which minor enjoyed.
Petaluma police detectives also spoke with Dr. Kristin Steuerle, who had taken over for Dr. Rowinsky. Dr. Steuerle said that based on minor's skeletal survey, there was "high concern for '[n]on-accidental trauma,'" that the injuries could not have been caused at birth based on the state of healing, and that they "were consistent with child abuse." Dr. Steuerle also noted that another physician had noticed the bruise on minor's lower right abdomen.
The police spoke again with Dr. Rowinsky, who now believed the lesion under J.E.H.'s tongue "was more consistent with a tear associated and caused by violent shaking of the child's head[.]" Rowinsky further stated that "it would require a large amount of force to cause" the rib fractures, and that the humerus fracture "would have been caused by someone grabbing the arm and applying some kind of force against it."
Pediatric radiologist Dr. Joel Smith told police officers that based on the X-rays, he suspected minor's right humerus fracture occurred within the last 10 days, while the rib fractures were at least 10 days old. Smith expressed "great concern" and believed the injuries were likely nonaccidental.
On February 24, 2022, the parents were arrested and placed in the back of a patrol vehicle. A body worn camera inside the vehicle recorded their conversation. Mother "expressed multiple times that she couldn't believe this was happening. [Father] was in agreement and kept stating that he, 'Didn't know'. [Mother] further expressed concern about going to jail. [Father] responded stating that they were going to get bailed out. [Mother] expressed that she wasn't a child abuser and that the victim was never neglected. The remaining [] conversation between them revolved around denial of what occurred with the victim." "At one point, [Father] warned [Mother] that [the officers] would try and 'switch' them 'up,' 'Investigate' them, and 'fool' them. [Mother] expressed that she didn't do anything and to 'just be honest.' "
Following their arrest, the parents were advised of their Miranda rights and agreed to be interviewed again. Mother stated she had never seen Father angry or violent with J.E.H. and believed "the only way it could have occurred was by accident." She acknowledged "there had been times where she felt [Father] was being too rough" and had to readjust/loosen minor's sleep sack and diapers because Father had put them on too tightly. She "estimated she's had to tell [Father] not to be so rough and has adjusted diapers or sleep sacks, at least three times, she could not recall exactly how many times[.]"
Father told the officers" 'there's been a couple times'" when Mother told him to be more gentle, but he "thought [Mother] was being over protective and [he] did not think he was being too rough[.]" Father denied drinking, smoking, doing drugs, or having a temper. He recalled during one incident he "was changing the victim's diaper and may have been pushing too hard" and Mother told him to" 'be more gentle.' [Father] stated that had only occurred once or twice with the other time being when he was placing the victim into the sleep sack." Regarding the bruise on minor's abdomen, Father "stated that he could have caused the bruise when he was changing the victim's diaper."
Police officers also contacted paternal grandfather, R.H., who recounted an incident in which Father was changing minor's diaper and "pulled up his leg, you know, to wipe his ass, right, and the baby was crying, and he put it back down.' [Father] said to [R.H.], 'You know dad, he's always crying when he's doing this.' [R.H.] responded to [Father], 'No, no, no.'" R.H. believed minor's ribs may have been accidentally fractured when Father placed and secured him in a car seat, but R.H. maintained that Father "always handled the victim with care and there was no possibility [Father] would hurt his own child."
3. Data Extraction Review
Pursuant to a search warrant, police officers seized the parents' electronic devices, including two mobile phones, a tablet, and a laptop computer, and extracted the data using Cellebrite computer software technology. The police report listed or summarized various items extracted from each phone, including "web search history" by date and time in either coordinated universal time (UTC), or Pacific Standard Time (PST).
According to the police report, no relevant data was found on the parents' tablet and laptop computer.
One of the seized mobile phones was associated with Mother. On February 20, 2022, Mother messaged Father "asking when he would be home. [Father] stated he did not know when and [Mother] told him that the [minor] had been up every two hours that night. [Father] suggested the victim might be entering a new leap phase." On February 21, 2022, Mother "messaged [Father] asking him to 'not be an asshole' when he arrived back home. [Father] asked her what he did and [Mother] responded, 'nothing baby. I just know how you get towards me when company is over, I just want you to be nice to me'. [Father] responded with a 'thumbs up emoji.' "
As the parents explained in their testimony, the term "leap" phase (e.g., "leap four") refers to different stages of infant development based on a book and related software application called "The Wonder Weeks."
On February 23, 2022-the day of J.E.H.'s hospitalization-at 2:50 p.m. PST, Mother's phone was used to search Google for" '3 month old lethargic[.]'" The following day, Mother searched" 'can cps take a baby for broken arm California' ";" 'multiple fractures 3 month old' ";" 'can cps put you in jail' "; and" 'can cps charge you.' "
The other mobile phone seized from the parents' home was associated with Father. The police report contained numerous entries for internet searches performed on Father's phone between February 8 to 24, 2022. The report explicitly noted that timestamps listed in UTC were "a 8+ hour difference from" PST. The search entries listed in the report included the following:
“02/11/2022 6:42 PM UTC, ‘why does my 3 month old keep one arm up'
“02/15/2022 1:11 AM UTC ‘Signs a 3 month old has brain damage'
“02/15/2022 1:51 AM UTC ‘3 month old baby keeps moving head side to side'
“02/15/2022 1:51 AM UTC ‘baby shakes head side to side: causes.'
“02/21/2022 8:45 PM UTC ‘When do babies have the loudest cry'
“02/21/2022 9:00 PM UTC ‘4 month leap signs'
“02/22/2022 4:10 AM UTC ‘how is your baby in mental Leap 4?' Babycenter.ca
“02/23/2022 1:32 AM UTC ‘why are babies so unhappy at leap 4'
“02/23/2022 3:01 PM UTC ‘leap 4 insane crying'
“02/23/2022 3:01 PM UTC ‘leap 4 or colic?' -Babycenter.com
“02/23/2022 3:02 PM UTC ‘Leap 4 us [sic] hard'
“02/23/2022 3:02 PM UTC ‘why is leap 4 so hard'
“02/23/2022 3:02 PM UTC ‘how to survive leap 4'
“02/23/2022 3:26 PM UTC ‘leap 4 fussy phase'
“02/23/2022 3:30 PM UTC ‘teething at 4 months'
“02/23/2022 3:51 PM UTC ‘Melatonin'
“02/23/2022 3:51 PM UTC “Melatonin for 3 month old'
“02/23/2022 4:19 PM UTC ‘3 month old sleep regression'
“02/23/2022 5:46 PM UTC ‘melatonin for 3 month old'
“02/23/2022 6:01 PM UTC ‘leap 4 my baby will not stop crying'
“02/23/2022 6:01 PM UTC ‘Leap 4 crying!!!' - Babycenter.com
“02/23/2022 6:01 PM UTC ‘Leap 4 is killing me'
“02/23/2022 6:48 PM UTC ‘3 Month old arm over eyes'
“02/23/2022 9:55 PM UTC ‘do babies stop eat on leap 4'
“02/23/2022 9:55 PM UTC ‘Baby not eating during leap 4?' community.whattoexpect.com
“02/23/2022 10:28 PM UTC ‘so 3 month old babys feel pain'
“02/23/2022 10:31 PM UTC ‘the back of my babys arm popped'
“02/23/2022 10:56 PM UTC ‘Lethargic'
“02/23/2022 10:56 PM UTC ‘lethargic 4 month old baby'
“02/23/2022 11:11 PM UTC ‘Kaiser advice nurse'
“02/23/2022 11:11 PM UTC ‘Santa rosa advice nurse - kaiser
Permanente' Thrive.kaiserpermanente.org”
The police report then separately listed several entries identified as “Searches conducted after arriving at Kaiser Hospital (based on time frame).” These entries were as follows:
“02/24/2022 02:14AM UTC ‘dislocated shoulder 3 month old'
“02/24/2022 2:15 AM UTC ‘3 month old shoulder popping'
“02/24/2022 3:33 AM UTC ‘signs a baby has had a stroke'
“02/24/2022 4:02 AM UTC ‘Parental Rights when dealing with CPS' herlawyer.com
“02/24/2022 4:04 AM UTC ‘is it easy to dislocate a 3 months old shoulder'
“02/24/2022 4:42 AM UCT ‘can cps put you in jail'
"02/24/2022 5:11 AM UTC 'infant broken arm'
"02/24/2022 5:33 AM UTC 'can a social worker take a baby away for broken arm'
"02/24/2022 5:33 AM UTC 'my 5-month-old babys arm got broken while in wild in the care of his father' Quora.com
"02/24/2022 5:38 AM UTC 'have 3 months old broke arms'"
4. Father's Jail Call
The police report notes that on February 25, 2022, Father called his mother from jail. Father said "they needed to talk about what could happen to him and that he 'might be doing some jail time.' [Father's] mother responded that they would be getting a good lawyer to fight the charges because he didn't do it. [Father's] response was inaudible but his mother responded emphatically with, 'No.' "
D. Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearing
The contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing took place over the course of 12 days between July and September 2022. We now summarize the key testimony.
1. Mother
Mother testified she never saw Father being abusive, angry, or violent towards her or anyone else, even in times of stress. She had never witnessed anyone being abusive to J.E.H.
Regarding her medical history, Mother testified that she took Celexa for anxiety. During her pregnancy with J.E.H., she took "about a bottle a week of Tums" for heartburn. She described her labor and delivery of J.E.H. as difficult and said she experienced a sensation of "yanking and pulling" that felt painful and unnatural. After J.E.H. was born, Mother observed red marks on his body, and that his head was misshapen and bruised.
Mother contacted Dr. Uranga on a number of occasions about J.E.H.'s well-being, including in December 2021 for a bump under his tongue, and in January 2022 about discoloration on his head.
In or around February 2022, Mother returned to her employment at a hair salon in Petaluma, working two days a week. Father took care of the baby when Mother went to work.
Mother's longtime friend, T.R., visited the family from February 16 to 22, 2022. Father left for a camping trip on the morning of February 17, 2022. On February 19, 2022, T.R. babysat J.E.H. for four hours while Mother was at work. On February 22, 2022, Mother took T.R. sightseeing and then to the airport while Father stayed at home with the baby. That evening, minor slept as usual in a bassinet next to the parents' bed.
On the morning of February 23, 2022, Father let Mother sleep in as he watched the baby. Mother woke up around 10:30 or 11:00 a.m. and noticed that minor "felt a little drowsy and not as active and not as interested in feeding[,]" but it was "[n]othing that raised red flags" for her. Mother later noticed that minor's "lower part of his right arm was moving" but "he wasn't raising it and that kind of set off a red flag in my head[.]" Mother did not notice any crying that sounded unusual that day. Mother messaged Dr. Uranga before calling the Kaiser advice line. A nurse asked Mother to bring the child to the Petaluma medical office. The parents then took minor to the Kaiser emergency room in Santa Rosa.
Mother testified that the only times J.E.H. was not in the care or supervision of his parents were when T.R. babysat J.E.H. on February 19, 2022, one occasion when he was left unsupervised with maternal grandfather "for maybe 30 minutes, and then also in the hospital when he would go to the nursery, so we could get sleep."
Mother acknowledged that she told Father "at least three times" not to be rough with the baby when changing his diapers or putting him in the sleep sack. Asked what she meant by "rough," Mother explained that she was referring to Father putting on the diapers or sleep sack too tight, or to "our different parenting styles," as Father would "hold my son with one arm" or put minor on his knee and shake his knee. Mother explained that putting the child in a sleep sack required "some maneuvering" to get his second arm through the arm hole. She testified she has never shaken, dropped, force-fed, or abused J.E.H.
Regarding Father's internet search," 'Why does my three-month old keep one arm up,'" Mother testified that Father was simply curious because J.E.H. tended to raise one arm, either right or left, and put it by his head. Regarding Father's search," 'Signs a three-month old has brain damage,'" Mother testified that because she had a difficult C-section, Father "was just making sure that his son was completely normal" and "would Google search pretty much anything," including whether babies would have cerebral palsy or brain damage from a C-section. As for the search on February 21, 2022," 'When do babies have the loudest cry,'" Mother denied having any issues with J.E.H. crying on that day and concluded "this was most likely a random Google search."
Asked about Father's search on February 23, 2022," 'Why are baby so unhappy at leap four,'" Mother testified that this and other entries reflected "a clicked link," not a search. She believed Father "probably searched leap four and then clicked on a link from the search." As to the February 23, 2022, search" 'leap four, insane crying,'" Mother testified that she heard no such crying on that day. Regarding the February 23, 2022, search" 'The back of my baby's arm popped,'" Mother testified that Father said "he doesn't know why he searched it. I believe he was typing in 'my baby's arm,' and when you type something into Google, it will have the suggestions. [¶] One of the suggestions was popped. I asked him if he heard a pop, and he said he didn't."
Mother was asked about a medical record in which a registered nurse reported that" 'mother asked frequent questions to father if he was . . . "rough with the baby," . . . and he responded with . . . "maybe. I don't know." '" Asked if Father clarified what he had meant, Mother responded, "I think at that point, we were just in shock and he might have been second guessing himself and trying to understand what was going on because nothing has happened."
Mother was asked about the text message in which she asked Father not to be an "asshole." She explained that when her friends would come over to their house, Father "could be short with me, a little frustrated because I'm doing hair. I have hair stuff everywhere. I would just say, being short with me."
Mother testified that Father "possibly could have said" to her in the back of the patrol car that the police officers would try to "switch" them up, but she explained that this was simply because they had watched movies where "police try to switch it up."
2. Father
Father testified that he and Mother had been married for almost three years, and that they had always wanted to have children. After J.E.H. was born, Father took paternity leave, and the two parents shared caretaking responsibilities.
Father recalled that when J.E.H. was born, the minor's head was black and blue and had a cone shape in the back, and Father was concerned about these and other features, including markings on the child's ribs and a cut and bruising on his legs, but a nurse reassured him that these were normal after a C-section birth.
Father testified that he conducted daily internet searches about the baby both before and after his birth, and that the police report log of his search entries included only a small portion of his search history. He maintained that many of the search entries listed in the police report reflected "clicked links or auto-fills," not search terms he had typed out. For instance, Father testified that portions of the search entries regarding minor's "leap four" stage (e.g., "Why is Leap 4 so hard," "Leap 4 fussy phase," "Leap 4 crying!!!") were auto-filled by the search engine or were recommended links based on his other searches. Father acknowledged he had to click on the suggested links in order for them to appear in his search history.
Father also acknowledged searching about melatonin for a three-month-old, and for "Signs a 3-month old has brain damage," but he said he did so because J.E.H. "would tend to move his head back and forth, side to side. And . . . him being cross-eyed was my main concern, and I wanted to make sure that was all normal."
Father testified that he "could have possibly" searched "3-month old shoulder popping" on February 24, 2022, because he was "Google-searching everything. I don't know exactly why I searched that, but I was trying to figure out what happened, even-I wanted to make sure what the possibilities of any of this could have been." Father did not recall searching for" 'Dislocated shoulder 3-month old'" but explained that he was "searching multiple things on possibly how he could have got this[.]" Father recalled searching" 'The back of my baby's arm popped'" but maintained that he had simply typed," 'My baby's arm,' and the very first suggestion was 'popped,' so then [he] clicked on that[,]" which led him to information on a condition called" 'nursemaid's elbow[.]'" According to Father, J.E.H. never had a dislocated shoulder, and Father had never heard the baby's shoulder pop.
Asked whether he searched, "When do babies have the loudest cry" on February 21, 2022, Father responded he "could have possibly searched that" and that minor "could have possibly been crying" at the time, but Father did not remember how long minor was crying.
As for the search on February 24, 2022," 'My 5-month-old baby's arm got broken while in the care of his father,'" Father explained that he did not manually type those search terms; rather, he clicked on a suggested link "to get answers from other Google searches" and to "get more information on possibilities" because he "was confused on what was going on" and "was trying to search everything."
Father maintained J.E.H.'s fractures were caused by the sleep sack, and nothing would ever change his mind about that. He said he "explored the possibility" of whether he "put that in too hard, did I move his arm too rough" and concluded "[t]here's no way I could have ever possibly put his arm in that too rough. There's no way." Father acknowledged that he told the police he could have caused the bruise on J.E.H.'s abdomen during a diaper change, but he testified that he was simply speculating based on the area of the bruise.
Regarding his comment to Mother in the back of the patrol car, Father testified that at the time, he thought the police were going to "switch us up" based on what he knew from books, podcasts, and television shows, "[a]nd to be honest, they did that to us." According to Father, the police told the parents that "if we tell on one of each other, that if we sign a piece of paper, that we'll get our babies back." Father also claimed the police lied to him about the blood tests having been completed at the time of the interrogation when, in fact, they were not.
On cross-examination, Father was asked by the Department's counsel what story he wanted to coordinate with Mother, and he responded, "No different story, sir. We said the same exact thing in both of our interrogation[s]. And like I said prior, was, the detectives did try to switch us up." The Department's counsel clarified, "I'm talking about before you went in and spoke with the detectives.... Why were you . . . concerned about, your story versus [Mother's] story? Why were they different?" Father responded, "I was not concerned with anyone switching any stories up. [¶] Q. So then why did you say that to [Mother]? [¶] A. I believe I was concerned with them trying to switch up-trying to switch me and [Mother] up. [¶] Q. In what way? [¶] A. I don't know....But what I'm trying to say, sir, is that they- when we were being interrogated, they did try to switch us up."
Regarding the events leading up to minor's hospitalization, Father testified he returned from his camping trip early on February 21, 2022, and saw no concerns with J.E.H. when he arrived home other than a little fussiness. Father testified that he and Mother first noticed on the "afternoon" of February 23, 2022, that one of minor's arms was not moving as much as the other, and that nothing had physically happened to J.E.H. prior to that point. He had not fallen or been dropped, and he was not crying or showing any signs of pain.
Father testified that he never hurt J.E.H. and that the child never reacted in pain to anything he did. Father never heard a snapping sound while touching J.E.H. and never applied pressure to the child's arm in the area of the fracture. Regarding Mother's comment that he was sometimes "rough," Father explained that Mother was "very cautious" and was simply referring to putting the diaper or sleep sack on too tight or bouncing the child on his knee. He testified he never forced the bottle into the baby's mouth and did not know how J.E.H. suffered the lesion under his tongue. Asked whether he told Mother he was" 'maybe'" too rough with the baby, Father testified that he did not recall the conversation but acknowledged "it's possible" he said that because he "was exploring everything. At that time, I was questioning, was I? Was I too rough? And so I could have possibly said that." Father nevertheless maintained it was not possible that he had caused J.E.H.'s injuries.
Father testified that the reason he told his mother he "might be doing some jail time" was because "[w]e were being charged on two felony counts of child abuse, and I didn't know what was going to happen[.]"
3. Medical Experts
a. Dr. Evans
Dr. Evans testified that J.E.H. was a victim of child abuse because he had "injuries in different stages of healing, injuries that could not have occurred with routine care and there is no adequate history or mechanism to explain the injuries."
The lesion under J.E.H.'s tongue (lingual frenulum tear) raised Dr. Evans's suspicion of child abuse because it would require a "considerable" or "excessive" amount of force to cause it, and such injuries are often caused by "a frustrated caregiver jamming the bottle into the mouth forcibly." Evans opined that the discoloration on minor's forehead was not infant vasculature but nonaccidental bruising.
Dr. Evans identified a photograph from February 23, 2022, showing pinpoint bruising (petechiae) on J.E.H.'s penis, which "could be from pinching the tip of the penis," as she has seen in other child abuse cases. Evans noted that Drs. Uranga, Rowinsky, and Steuerle had all physically examined J.E.H. and identified the marking as petechiae.
As to the bruise on J.E.H.'s lower right abdomen, Dr. Evans testified the injury was "very concerning for abdominal trauma" because "[i]n a child this age, we don't expect to see any bruises . . . because it's not overlying the bony prominence." As Evans explained, "[t]he contents of the abdomen are soft and so to cause a bruise at the abdomen would require a significant amount of force." The mechanism for such bruising was "a direct blow to the abdomen" with an inappropriate amount of force.
Dr. Evans also identified several images from J.E.H.'s first skeletal survey in February 2022. She identified a metaphyseal corner fracture of the right femur, or a "bucket handle fracture, . . . like a chip that has come off the edge of the bone[.]" Such fractures, she explained, are "highly specific" for child abuse because they are typically caused by shearing forces, meaning "if the limbs are flailing because the baby is being shaken or moved violently, then the limbs can flair and it can cause part of the end of the bone to chip off." Evans consulted with two pediatric radiologists who estimated that the metaphyseal fracture of the right distal femur was less than ten days old. The follow-up skeletal survey in March 2022 showed evidence of healing, which confirmed the existence of the fracture.
She was later shown images of metaphyseal corner fractures "both in the right distal femur and in the left distal femur" and testified that these fractures, along with the left tibial fracture, were nonaccidental.
Dr. Evans identified images showing healing fractures of J.E.H.'s tibia and fibula. As of the first skeletal survey, the fractures were older than 10 days. In the follow up skeletal survey, there was callus formation "consistent with healing fractures[.]" The mechanisms for these fractures were "flailing of the limbs from shaking or a direct blow to the leg."
Dr. Evans testified that an X-ray of J.E.H.'s chest and upper arm from the first skeletal survey showed a "significant" fracture in the shaft of the right humerus. At the time, the fracture was less than ten days old. Possible mechanisms for this fracture included "a direct blow to the upper arm," or rotational force. Evans further explained that a premobile infant could not cause the humerus fracture under his own power, and that this type of injury would not be sustained during routine care.
Regarding J.E.H.'s rib fractures, Dr. Evans identified callus formation consistent with healing and opined that the fractures were "older than about three weeks" at the time of imaging. She further opined that the rib fractures were from a traumatic injury because "[t]he known mechanism for posterior rib fractures of this type is anterior posterior compression of the chest," for example, "holding the baby with the thumbs in the front of the chest and the fingers at the back of the chest, and squeezing the baby."
Dr. Evans testified that putting a baby into a sleep sack would not cause the types of fractures J.E.H. had sustained. His injuries were not those typically associated with birth trauma such as "nerve injuries from pulling of the baby" or clavicle fractures.
Dr. Evans explained that the screening process for determining whether J.E.H. had metabolic bone disease included a series of blood tests and a genetic consultation, and her review of the test results did not indicate any concerns for metabolic bone disease. A Kaiser geneticist tested J.E.H. with a full panel and saw no indication of metabolic bone disease, osteogenesis imperfecta, or rickets, including healing rickets. Nor did the pediatric radiologists find anything in J.E.H.'s X-rays consistent with rickets. As far as Evans knew, there was no diagnosis of this child for EDS. Thus, Dr. Evans did "not believe that this baby has any condition that makes his bones more fragile." If he did, he would have "continue[d] to have fractures when removed from that environment."
Dr. Evans was aware that J.E.H. had a vitamin D level of 23, which was below the normal range of 30 to 100, but she characterized this as "slightly outside the range of normal and not a significant value, given that the other lab values were normal and would not contribute to increased fractures with routine care." Evans testified that prenatal use of antidepressants or Tums would not contribute to a baby's bone fragility.
According to Dr. Evans, J.E.H.'s injuries would have caused him significant pain, but the nonperpetrator would not have known of the injuries because "babies can have fractures and no external evidence of fractures[,]" and the practice of swaddling an infant can effectively splint the fracture and "cause the baby to calm down."
b. Dr. Smith
Dr. Smith, a board-certified pediatric radiologist, testified that J.E.H. had metaphyseal corner fractures of the right and left distal femurs, and that these fractures were highly suggestive of child abuse. The mechanism of action was "either a shaking or a quick grasp and yank." The fractures were acute at the time of the first skeletal survey.
Dr. Smith further testified that an image of J.E.H.'s left femur showed a thin white line along the lateral cortex that was new bone formation consistent with a healing fracture. Smith believed this femur fracture was "subacute" and occurred probably between 7 and 21 days before the date of imaging. Smith also identified images of J.E.H.'s left tibia and fibula, which showed signs of healing fractures at least a couple weeks old.
As for J.E.H.'s rib injuries, Dr. Smith explained that the first skeletal survey showed healing fractures of the posterior part of the ribs with hard callus formation, indicating the fractures were three to five weeks old. The mechanism was "squeezing or a pushing" on the anterior chest wall that created force posteriorly. Smith's opinion was corroborated "by the fact that there are three consecutive ribs. [¶] If the fractures [were] being caused by some other thing, it would be unusual to see three fractures in the same area of the chest broken like that, so that's why these are considered highly suggestive [of] non-accidental trauma." In contrast, he explained, birth trauma typically results in "isolated fractures" to the ribs, and it is "unusual to see multiple posterior rib fractures."
As to the right humerus fracture, Dr. Smith testified there can be "any number of mechanisms" for this injury, including an accidental fall. But given that J.E.H.'s humerus fracture was more recent than the rib and femoral fractures, and that the rib fractures and the metaphyseal corner fractures were highly suggestive of nonaccidental trauma, Smith believed the humerus fracture was also nonaccidental.
Dr. Smith explained that rickets is a group of diseases or disorders usually resulting from vitamin D deficiency that causes the ends of bones to be misformed. While evidence of rickets indicates the bones are weaker, the types of fractures seen in nonaccidental trauma "are distinct from what you see in rickets[,]" and it is very unlikely to see metaphyseal corner fractures and consecutive posterior rib fractures in rickets. Smith saw no indication of rickets, healing or otherwise, in J.E.H.'s bone survey. Nor did Smith see evidence of metabolic bone disease, and moreover, he explained that "even if there is a metabolic disease, metaphyseal corner fractures and posterior rib fractures are not fractures you associate frequently with those conditions. They are highly suggestive of non-accidental trauma, even if there was a metabolic bone disease, which I do not see in this case."
Dr. Smith testified that his opinions were supported by the fact that J.E.H. had no further fractures since being removed from the parents' care. As he explained, "if these fractures were secondary to a fragility syndrome or rickets, you would expect that the bones would continue to be weak and you would see additional fractures."
c. Dr. Bryce Mendelson
Dr. Bryce Mendelson, a medical geneticist and expert in pediatrics and genetics, testified that a gene panel on J.E.H., which included testing for rare disorders, showed no evidence of EDS, osteogenesis imperfecta, or any known genetic bone fragility disorder or any type of genetic disease. In Mendelson's view, the genetic testing was "extra thorough" and "the results were entirely negative."
Dr. Mendelson further explained that J.E.H. did not have the rare genetic type of EDS that causes bone fractures. And even if Mother or other family members had "hypermobile" EDS, fractures are neither part of the diagnostic criteria for hypermobile EDS or a recognized complication. Mendelson agreed with an article published in the American Journal of Medical Genetics that it is inappropriate to use studies on adults with EDS to account for unexplained fractures in infants. As Mendelson explained, "a lot of the criteria for hypermobile Ehlers-Danlos are felt to not apply to young children because they are naturally more flexible, and that's not an abnormal state, and it does not normally lead to fractures."
Dr. Mendelson further testified that although vitamin D deficiency can affect bones in extreme situations, J.E.H.'s vitamin D level of 23 was "borderline," but not "shockingly low[,]" and therefore did not explain his fractures. Nor would a family history of osteoporosis provide a medical explanation for his fractures.
d. Dr. Marvin Miller
Mother's first medical expert was Dr. Marvin Miller, an expert in pediatrics, genetics and metabolic bone disease, with his primary research interest in unexplained infant injuries. He testified about bone development and factors that cause bones to weaken, including Mother's ingestion of Tums and Celexa, vitamin D deficiency, healing rickets, and failure to thrive. In Miller's view, J.E.H. had many of these risk factors, and he concluded the minor has metabolic bone disease. He testified that the child's X-rays showed healing rickets, which began in the third trimester of pregnancy and started to heal at birth, leaving him vulnerable to bone fractures in the first six months after birth. Miller concluded J.E.H.'s fractures were fragility fractures, and that it was highly unlikely the fractures were from child abuse.
Dr. Miller acknowledged it is generally accepted in the pediatric radiology and child abuse communities that metaphyseal corner fractures typically happen when a child is forcibly snatched. He further acknowledged that his opinion that most classic metaphyseal lesions are indicative of metabolic bone disease is not accepted in the pediatric radiology community.
e. Dr. Michael Holick
Dr. Michael Holick, a doctor specializing in endocrinology, diabetes and nutrition, testified as an expert in internal medicine, endocrinology, EDS, and vitamin D. He was contacted by Mother in March 2022, and based on a questionnaire and videoconference call with Mother, as well as a meeting with the parents in April 2022, Holick concluded with "a high degree of medical certainty" that Mother has EDS, hypermobility type, which increases her risk of fragility fractures.
Dr. Holick explained that EDS "is a disorder that is associated with joint hypermobility." The most common form is EDS hypermobility type, which causes significantly increased elasticity of ligaments and joints, and increases the risk of fragility fractures. The disorder is genetic, and a child has a 50 percent chance of inheriting it from a parent; thus, Dr. Holick believed J.E.H. very likely has the same disorder. Holick acknowledged he did not physically evaluate J.E.H. But based on J.E.H.'s medical conditions and photographs, Holick concluded "with a high degree of medical certainty" that he had acquired EDS from Mother.
Dr. Holick explained he had been terminated from his employment at Boston Medical Center due to a "political issue" (testifying against the pediatricians at the hospital in child abuse cases), and a concern that he was diagnosing infants when he is not a pediatrician.
On cross-examination, Dr. Holick explained he cannot exclude child abuse in any case and can only comment on a child's increased risk for fragility fractures if they have a diagnosis of a genetic disorder, vitamin D deficiency, or rickets. He further testified that there is no genetic test for EDS.
f. Dr. Susan Gootnick
Dr. Susan Gootnick, a board-certified radiologist and expert in radiology and pediatric radiology, testified that J.E.H. had rickets, which was the cause of his fractures. Her opinion was based in part on the evidence of J.E.H.'s difficulty growing and gaining weight, and his low vitamin D levels. Based on minor's X-rays, Gootnick opined that J.E.H.'s bones were "abnormal" and showed "delayed healing."
Dr. Gootnick believed the X-rays of J.E.H.'s left femur did not show evidence of a fracture, but rather, metabolic bone disease with a periosteal reaction. She agreed with Dr. Smith that there was a metaphyseal corner fracture of the right distal femur but found there was no fracture on the left distal femur; rather, there was "poorly developed cartilage" and "healing rickets." Additionally, Dr. Gootnick opined that images of J.E.H.'s distal right femur showed signs of inadequate calcification and vitamin D, which demonstrated that rickets were the cause of that fracture as well.
According to Dr. Gootnick, it would be unlikely that grabbing or squeezing a child would cause rib fractures only on one side as they did with J.E.H. She opined the rib fractures were possibly from birth trauma, and the reason they were not fully healed by the time the X-rays were taken in February 2022 was because his rickets delayed the healing of his bones.
Asked about the prevailing view of the pediatric radiology community that metaphyseal fractures were highly suggestive of child abuse, Dr. Gootnick testified that doctors previously believed any fracture in a nonmobile infant was abuse, but "there's been more work done which demonstrates that that's not always the case." Gootnick agreed "to a certain extent" that the metabolic bone disease explanation for a child's fractures is not generally accepted in the scientific community.
Dr. Gootnick opined that J.E.H. has a 50 percent chance of having EDS because Mother was diagnosed with it, and Gootnick listed EDS as one of the possible causes of minor's fractures.
g. Dr. Christopher Sullivan
Dr. Christopher Sullivan, a pediatric orthopedic surgeon specializing in children's bone and joint problems, testified that images of J.E.H.'s left femur and tibia showed a periosteal reaction, not fractures. He further opined that the image of the right distal femur showed a Salter-Harris fracture through the growth plate, which occurs in children who are still growing and can be caused by a bending force as a result of trying to put on clothing. Sullivan acknowledged that Salter-Harris fractures are "relatively uncommon" in infants.
Dr. Sullivan further testified that J.E.H.'s right femur fracture was a nondisplaced fracture, meaning less force was used than in displaced fractures, making the fracture harder to notice. J.E.H.'s right humerus had a transverse or oblique fracture that was minimally displaced, and Sullivan opined that normal handling of a baby could cause this type of injury, particularly in a child with metabolic bone disease. According to Sullivan, the rib fractures could have been birth injuries, as J.E.H. was stuck in the birth canal and had to be delivered by emergency C-section.
In Dr. Sullivan's view, it was "[o]verwhelmingly . . . unlikely these injuries were due to abuse[,]" and they were instead "easily explainable by accidental means." That J.E.H. did not suffer further fractures after his detention did not change Sullivan's opinion, because once J.E.H. received "adequate Vitamin D, we would expect all of these problems to go away[.]"
Dr. Sullivan acknowledged that he has testified in about 130 cases, always "on behalf of the defense, meaning the parents or the daycare[.]"
4. Social Work Experts
Social worker Juan Perez was designated an expert in social work. He testified that the parents had participated in parenting classes and therapy, and that their visits with J.E.H. were going well. However, he could not make appropriate referrals for services because the parents had not admitted the underlying problem, and thus, there was no way to track their progress. In Perez's view, "both parents . . . are in total denial this was child abuse[] and our expert is telling us there was. [¶] .... And when the problem is not being acknowledged, . . . we can't make the right referrals[.]" For the same reasons, Perez testified that so long as the parents remained in "total denial" that abuse had occurred, services were not likely to prevent reabuse.
Licensed clinical social worker, Dr. Mayola Miranda, testified for Father as an expert in child risk assessments, reasonable efforts, family reunification services, and issues pertaining to bypass. Based on her interactions with the family, her review of the records, risk assessment tools, and the overall level of cooperation shown by the family, she believed the parents should receive family reunification services. Miranda explained that the parents had completed parenting classes, never missed or came late to a visit, and always engaged in positive interactions with J.E.H. She observed attachment between the parents and the child, including the child responding to the parents' voices, touching their faces, making eye contact, and "mirroring" their expressions. Miranda opined that the baby's crying reactions at the ends of visits did not indicate a trauma reaction, since those types of reactions typically happen at the first exposure to the traumatic stimuli.
Dr. Miranda disagreed with Perez's view that an admission of culpability from a parent is necessary for reunification services that would likely prevent reabuse. She testified she was not aware of any policy or criteria under standard risk assessment tools that required an admission of guilt from a parent in order for the child welfare agency to provide the parent with services. Miranda believed the focus should instead be on moving forward to prevent future maltreatment.
5. Juvenile Court's Decision
The juvenile court issued its jurisdiction and disposition findings and orders on September 26, 2022. The court found the allegations under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (e) to be true.
In so concluding, the juvenile court discussed in detail its views of the medical evidence and expert testimony. According to the court, the parents' medical experts were academically and professionally well-qualified but less persuasive because they "collectively testified for parents in child abuse cases. Only for parents . . . who are accused [of] child abuse where they deny having anything to do with the injuries." Additionally, the court found that the parents' experts "all had different takes on what the diagnosis was[,]" that Dr. Holick's EDS theory was speculative, and that Dr. Gootnick attempted to testify on subjects that are clearly out of her expertise, such as obstetrics and gynecology. The court also emphasized Dr. Miller's acknowledgment that his "opinions on the subject of metabolic bone disease in otherwise healthy infants is not a mainstream medical opinion and that it's not generally accepted in the medical community. He was very clear about that." The court also found that the medical articles relied upon by the parents' experts were materially distinguishable and did not bolster the metabolic bone disease theory in this case.
The juvenile court instead found that J.E.H.'s injuries were "classic types of injuries seen in child abuse" and "highly specific for child abuse according to the mainstream medical opinion." As the court observed, the "Kaiser work-up was methodical and thorough[,]" and the doctors "considered bone disorders, including metabolic bone disorders, osteogenesis imperfecta, they looked at the phosphorous level, calcium levels and they did genetic testing for rare types of diseases." "The tests all came back normal for osteogenesis imperfecta, metabolic bone disorder, and . . . any type of genetic disorder." The court concluded that "based upon the testimony of Dr. Evans and the medical records, including the x-rays, the blood workup, the genetic testing, testimony of Dr. Smith, Dr. Mendelson, there is clear and convincing evidence of non-accidental injuries and that the child falls within" sections 300, subdivisions (e), (a), and (b).
The juvenile court explained that its finding of "nonaccidental child abuse" was "bolstered by some of the Google searches that [Father] did on or about the date [J.E.H.] was taken to the hospital with his limp arm, and actually the Google searches from before" that date. The court summarized some of Father's searches from the police report, including the search query regarding a three-month old having brain damage, the searches regarding crying babies, and the searches for" 'Do three month olds feel pain,'" " 'The back of my baby's arm popped,'" and" 'Signs that a baby has had a stroke.'" In the court's view, "[t]he timing of these Google search[e]s by [Father] and the subject matter are non-coincidental and circumstantial evidence that [Father] was likely the person who perpetrated the injuries. [¶] These search[e]s are circumstantial evidence that the baby's arm popped in his care, which is the reason the baby was brought to the emergency room with a limp arm, in pain, crying, not eating, not smiling, and injured."
The juvenile court made express findings "by a preponderance of the evidence" that the allegations of the petition were true and that jurisdiction was established, and furthermore, that "[b]ased upon the evidence, . . . there is clear and convincing evidence of child abuse inflicted on Baby [J.E.H.] by one of the parents, which the Court finds is the father."
As to Mother, the juvenile court found that she "would not have known about the abuse as the non-perpetrator. [¶] Throughout the medical records, the mother has been documented to be attentive and appropriate with Baby [J.E.H.] and that she was the one who called with questions and brought the child in due to concerns starting in December with a frenulum tear." However, because the parents still lived together, the court found that J.E.H. would be at significant risk of further injury if he were to be returned to the same home.
The juvenile court ordered reunification services for the Mother as the nonoffending parent. The court adopted the Department's recommendation to bypass reunification services for Father under section 361.5(b)(5) and (6), as there was "clear and convincing evidence that severe physical harm has been inflicted on the child and there's a factual finding made that it would not benefit the child to pursue family reunification with the offending parent or parents." In closing, the juvenile court remarked that it did not "know what is going on with [Father]. There's one text between mom and dad where mom asks him not to be an asshole and he gets-the parents both deny any behavior that suggests he can be an asshole. [¶] The Court suspects that [Father] may have an alcohol problem or some sort of drug problem or an anger management problem, but there's something going on here that we don't know about. [¶] These injuries did not happen but for physical abuse and I believe the evidence points to dad. I mean, I hope I'm not wrong about that. [¶] The parents both present the picture to the Court of perfection, perfect marriage, no arguing, never fighting or physical abuse. Perfect patience and attention to each other and the baby. [¶] Oh, and the baby's perfect. He doesn't cry. He's happy. He's easy to care for, and nothing about him would cause them to lose patience or tolerance. [¶] So I do wonder why this overall picture, there's something wrong with this overall picture. Combining the picture with the lack of information shared from the therapist leads the Court to wonder what is going on here."
E. Father's Appeal
Father timely appealed from the juvenile court's jurisdiction and disposition findings and orders. His appointed counsel initially filed a Phoenix H. brief stating there were no arguable issues to raise on appeal. Counsel notified Father of the filing of the Phoenix H. brief, but Father did not request permission from this court to file a brief in propria persona. (See Phoenix H., supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 844.)
We then requested and received supplemental letter briefs from the parties on the following questions: "(1) What evidence supports finding that [F]ather was the perpetrator of the abuse that caused the minor's injuries? Your response should include consideration of the following: whether the parents' Google searches are evidence [F]ather committed child abuse; what evidence other than Google searches supports finding [F]ather caused the minor's injuries; if the court speculated that [F]ather has an alcohol, drug, or anger management problem. [¶] (2) Did the juvenile court make sufficient findings to justify denying [F]ather reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5) or (b)(6)? Your response should include consideration of the following: whether the court should have ordered reunification services for [F]ather pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (c)(2) and (c)(3); whether the court complied with section 361.5, subdivision (k). [¶] (3) Did the
[D]epartment comply with its duty under section 361.5, subdivision (c) to investigate the likelihood of successful reunification? Your response should include consideration of whether the court was misled by the [D]epartment's view that [F]ather should be penalized for refusing to admit that he abused the minor."
While supplemental briefs were pending, the Department moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing the appeal was moot after the case was transferred to San Diego County and dependency jurisdiction was dismissed with sole physical and legal custody of J.E.H. going to Mother. We denied the motion to dismiss but granted the Department's additional request to give formal notice of the proceedings to minor's trial counsel.
Discussion
Although reunification services are normally provided to the parents of dependent children (§ 361.5, subd. (a)), section 361.5, subdivision (b), sets forth circumstances under which the juvenile court may deny (or bypass) those services. As relevant here, section 361.5, subdivision (b), provides: "Reunification services need not be provided to a parent or guardian described in this subdivision when the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, any of the following: [¶] . . . [¶] (5) That the child was brought within the jurisdiction of the court under subdivision (e) of Section 300 [section 300(e)] because of the conduct of that parent or guardian; [¶] (6)(A) That the child has been adjudicated a dependent pursuant to any subdivision of section 300 as a result of . . . the infliction of severe physical harm to the child, a sibling, or a half-sibling by a parent or guardian, . . . and the court makes a factual finding that it would not benefit the child to pursue reunification services with the offending parent or guardian."
On review from a juvenile court's order bypassing reunification services, we determine whether the record contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find clear and convincing evidence that a bypass provision applies. (See In re Patrick S. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1254, 1262 (Patrick S.).) Substantial evidence is evidence of reasonable, credible, and solid value. (In re E.H. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 659, 669 (E.H.).) "Clear and convincing evidence requires a high probability, such that the evidence is so clear as to leave no substantial doubt." (Patrick S., at p. 1262; see Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995-996 (O.B.).) "Consistent with well-established principles governing review for sufficiency of the evidence, in making this assessment the appellate court must view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give due deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence." (O.B., at p. 996.) Thus, "[w]e do not reweigh the evidence, nor do we consider matters of credibility." (E.H., at p. 669.)
A. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court's Culpability Finding Against Father
The juvenile court made the express finding by clear and convincing evidence that J.E.H. came within the court's jurisdiction under section 300(e) because he was the victim of child abuse by Father. Father contends this finding was not supported by substantial evidence that meets the clear and convincing standard of proof. We conclude otherwise.
As discussed, section 361.5(b)(5) bypass applies when the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the child comes within the court's jurisdiction under section 300(e). In turn, section 300(e) applies where "[t]he child is under the age of five years and has suffered severe physical abuse by a parent, or by any person known by the parent, if the parent knew or reasonably should have known" of the abuse. (§ 300, subd. (e).) "[S]evere physical abuse" includes "more than one act of physical abuse, each of which causes bleeding, deep bruising, significant external or internal swelling, bone fracture[.]" (Ibid.) Taken together, sections 361.5(b)(5) and 300(e) require that "the facts establishing the section 300(e) abuse finding were clearly and convincingly proven" in order for the court to bypass reunification services. (K.F. v. Superior Court (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1388, italics omitted.)
On the disputed issue of whether J.E.H. was abused, the juvenile court credited the testimony of the Department's medical experts, which provided substantial evidence establishing the nonaccidental nature of J.E.H.'s injuries. As those experts explained, J.E.H.'s young age and nonambulatory state made it highly unlikely his injuries were self-inflicted, and his rib fractures did not likely stem from birth trauma given that the ribs were consecutively fractured and still healing at the time of the first skeletal survey. The different healing patterns for J.E.H.'s fractures indicated multiple instances of abuse over time, and the abdominal bruising was highly concerning given his immobility and the softness of the injured area. The likely mechanisms for the injuries included direct blows to the abdomen and right humerus, squeezing of the ribs, shaking, and jamming a bottle in his mouth.
The juvenile court also resoundingly rejected the parents' defense that the fractures were the result of an underlying medical condition that purportedly made J.E.H.'s bones fragile, such as metabolic bone disease, EDS, vitamin D deficiency, and rickets. Again, the testimony of the Department's medical experts, along with the medical records of J.E.H.'s X-rays, bloodwork, and genetic testing, provided substantial evidence supporting the court's conclusion. Moreover, as the court found, many of the theories advanced by the parents' experts were not generally accepted in the medical community and were instead developed to defend against child abuse allegations in litigation. That J.E.H. suffered no further fractures after his removal from the parents' home underscored the unlikelihood that his injuries stemmed from a medical condition.
In short, the record contains substantial evidence from which the juvenile court could reasonably find it highly probable that J.E.H. was the victim of "severe physical abuse" within the meaning of section 300(e), e.g., "more than one act of physical abuse, each of which cause[d]" "deep bruising" or "bone fracture."
Once this determination was made, the next question was whether J.E.H.'s nonaccidental injuries were caused by a parent or someone known by a parent to be abusing him. (§ 300, subd. (e).) On this score, it was undisputed that J.E.H. was in the virtually exclusive care and supervision of his parents. Although the parents identified T.R., maternal grandfather, and unnamed nurses as each having handled J.E.H. unsupervised on brief, isolated occasions, the juvenile court could reasonably rule out the culpability of these individuals given the number of different injuries involved and the different ages of those injuries.
This left Mother and Father as the only likely suspects. But as between them, only Father had a history of being "rough" with the baby, including "at least three" instances that Mother could recall involving Father adjusting the baby's diaper or sleep sack. The juvenile court could reasonably infer from Mother's willingness to admit to "at least three" incidents that there were more problematic instances of Father's handling of the baby. Indeed, paternal grandfather also recounted that he once objected to the manner in which Father changed J.E.H.'s diaper while the baby cried. The court was entitled to reject the parents' efforts to downplay Father's rough handling as a mere difference in parenting styles or Mother being overprotective.
Additionally, as between Mother and Father, only Father performed internet searches in the days and hours prior to J.E.H.'s hospitalization that, when viewed in a light most favorable to the juvenile court's decision, suggested his undisclosed awareness that the baby had been injured. As we discuss more fully below, Father's search history included highly suspicious queries regarding signs of brain damage in a three-month-old, whether a three-month-old feels pain, and the back of a baby's arm popping, and some of these searches were performed just prior to J.E.H.'s hospitalization for an acute humerus fracture.
The evidence further showed that Father had ample opportunities to commit the abuse with no witnesses present during the two days a week he was home with J.E.H., and it appears Father alone watched the baby in the hours prior to his hospitalization while Mother slept in. Adding to the evidence against Father was his candid remark to Mother that he" 'maybe'" was too rough with J.E.H.; his acknowledgment to police that he may have caused the bruise on the baby's abdomen (an area where, according to Dr. Evans, a child this young would not normally show bruising unless excessive force is used); and his statement to paternal grandmother shortly after his arrest that he" 'might be doing some jail time.' "
The juvenile court could also reasonably infer Father's consciousness of guilt from his remarks to Mother in the back of the patrol car. Viewed in a light most favorable to the court's decision, Father's warning to Mother that the police would try to "switch" them up reflected his concern that Mother would say something to inculpate him, as well as an attempt to sow her distrust of the officers. Father's remark was in stark contrast to Mother, who responded that "she didn't do anything and to 'just be honest.'" The court was entitled to reject Father's self-serving testimony that his remarks were simply the product of media consumption and to infer that Father was trying to prevent Mother from fully cooperating with law enforcement. (See Ross v. Superior Court (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 667, 684 [evidence that party sought to suppress or alter witness's testimony may indicate consciousness of guilt]; People v. Spencer (1922) 58 Cal.App. 197, 223-224 [attempts to coerce or fix testimony could be viewed by reasonable juror as evidence of consciousness of guilt].)
In contrast to the evidence against Father, the record discloses no evidence of Mother's history of rough treatment of J.E.H.; no data extracted from her phone suggesting her undisclosed awareness that J.E.H. suffered an arm or other injury; and no evidence evincing her consciousness of guilt. Rather, as the juvenile court pointed out, the medical records documented that Mother was at all times attentive and appropriate with J.E.H., and that she promptly sought medical attention for any concerns regarding the child.
It was only after J.E.H. was diagnosed with various fractures that Mother's phone was used to search for information on "cps" (or child protective services), multiple fractures for a three-month-old, and the possibility of being charged or losing custody of the baby.
Viewing the record in a light most favorable to the juvenile court's decision and according appropriate deference to the court's credibility findings and resolution of factual disputes, we conclude substantial evidence supports a reasonable inference that, as between Mother and Father, it is highly probable Father was the person culpable for J.E.H.'s nonaccidental injuries. Only Father had a history of rough treatment, suspicious internet searches, and other statements suggestive of culpability or consciousness of guilt. Having found a high probability of child abuse, and faced with identifying a perpetrator from the only two reasonably likely suspects, the juvenile court weighed the evidence and resolved the factual dispute based on substantial evidence that, in our view, left "no substantial doubt" of Father's guilt. (Patrick S., supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 1262; O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 995-996.)
Father's arguments to the contrary are unavailing. He contends substantial evidence meeting the clear and convincing threshold was lacking because there was no direct evidence of abuse, and the circumstantial evidence of his culpability was "weak." As to his first point, direct evidence was not necessary for the juvenile court to make its culpability finding or for this court to affirm that finding on appeal. (See Conservatorship of S.A. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 48, 57 [substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences flowing from it]; In re Brittany H. (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 533, 549 [same].) Indeed, "where there is no identifiable perpetrator, only a cast of suspects, . . . [a] finding may be supported by circumstantial evidence.... Otherwise, a family could stonewall the Department and its social workers concerning the origin of a child's injuries[.]" (E.H., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 670.) Here, the juvenile court expressly found that the parents' "picture . . . of perfection, perfect marriage, no arguing, never fighting or physical abuse" was belied by the medical and other evidence. Thus, to avoid the parents' potential stonewalling, the court was entitled to rely on circumstantial evidence to resolve the question of culpability.
Father's contention that the circumstantial evidence against him was weak ignores our standard of review. (See O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 996 [appellate court must defer to how trier of fact resolved conflicts in evidence]; E.H., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 669 ["[w]e do not reweigh the evidence"].) The juvenile court was entitled to reject Father's self-serving explanations for his search queries, and this is a credibility determination we will not revisit.
Moreover, even if we construe Father's argument as challenging the reasonableness of the juvenile court's inference of a high probability of Father's culpability, we conclude the argument falls short. As evident from the court's remarks, it was the "timing" of Father's searches relative to the events surrounding J.E.H.'s hospitalization that raised suspicion of Father's culpability and evinced a consciousness of guilt. These reasonable inferences are supported by substantial evidence. For instance, in his statements to the Department and law enforcement, as well as in his testimony, Father claimed he and Mother did not notice anything concerning about J.E.H. until after Mother woke up around 11:00 a.m. on February 23, 2022, at which time they observed the baby was lethargic, fussy, and had a limp arm. Father also testified that he had never heard a popping or snapping sound from J.E.H.'s arm or shoulder or witnessed the baby reacting in pain to anything he did. Yet a trier of fact could reasonably conclude otherwise based on the evidence that Father conducted numerous searches over the course of several hours on February 22 and 23, 2022, about how to deal with an incessantly crying baby, as well as two searches just prior to J.E.H.'s hospitalization regarding a three-month-old's ability to feel pain and the back of a baby's arm popping.The juvenile court was free to reject Father's self-serving testimony that he merely typed in "my baby's arm" before the search engine automatically filled in the word "popped," and in any event, Father acknowledged he affirmatively clicked on the suggested link.
The police report indicates these searches were performed on February 23, 2022, at 10:28 p.m. UTC (or 2:28 p.m. PST), and 10:31 p.m. UTC (or 2:31 p.m. PST), respectively. The police report classifies these searches as occurring prior to J.E.H.'s hospitalization and Father does not dispute that classification.
Father's proffered explanation that he was merely exploring possibilities after X-rays revealed minor's broken arm does not explain why he inquired about a baby's arm popping before J.E.H.'s diagnosis if the only arm-related concern was limpness. It strains credulity that Father would search for information on an infant's arm or shoulder popping, not once but twice right around the time J.E.H. was diagnosed with an acute humerus fracture, without ever having heard such a sound. The evidence of these searches within the likely time frame of J.E.H.'s injury supports the inference that Father was not being truthful when he claimed to have never heard minor's arm pop. As such, the juvenile court could reasonably find that Father's untruthful statements and testimony evinced a consciousness of guilt to conceal the fact of J.E.H.'s arm injury while in his care. (See People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 142 [inference of consciousness of guilt from willful falsehood or fabrication is supported by common sense]; People v. Beyah (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1249-1250 [false trial testimony can be considered evidence of consciousness of guilt if jury could conclude testimony was intentionally false].)
Father maintains "[t]here was quite a bit of confusion about the timestamps on the Google searches, because some were listed in the police report in UTC time, while others were 'converted' from UTC to [PST]." We cannot agree. The police report clearly indicated when the time stamps were listed in UTC, while also explicitly noting that these time stamps reflected an "8+" hour difference from PST. The police report also clearly delineated when the time stamps had already been converted to PST by the data extraction software. Finally, the police report clearly demarcated the searches performed after J.E.H.'s hospitalization with the heading "Searches conducted after arriving at Kaiser Hospital (based on time frame)[,]" implying that the entries preceding the heading were performed prior to minor's hospitalization. In sum, there was no confusion that prevented the juvenile court from accurately comparing the time stamps to the timeline of relevant events and drawing inferences therefrom.
Father justifiably criticizes the juvenile court for its statement, "The Court suspects that [Father] may have an alcohol problem or some sort of drug problem or an anger management problem[.]" We agree that this offhand remark, made at the tail end of the hearing, was speculative and therefore misplaced. We also think the text message in which Mother asked Father not to be an "asshole" had minimal probative value given that their discussion had nothing to do with Father's handling of the baby. That said, we reject Father's suggestion that these matters were critical to the court's culpability finding. To the contrary, as our discussion above reflects, the court's findings were based on a broad array of evidence from which the court could reasonably find a high probability of Father's culpability.
For all of these reasons, we conclude the record amply supports the juvenile court's finding that clear and convincing evidence established Father's culpability.
B. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err in Bypassing Reunification Services for Father
Once the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence that a bypass provision under section 361.5, subdivision (b), applies, "the general rule favoring reunification is replaced with a legislative presumption that reunification services would be' "an unwise use of governmental resources." '" (In re Allison J. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1112.) To overcome this presumption, an affected parent must make an appropriate showing under section 361.5, subdivision (c)(2) and (3).
Section 361.5, subdivision (c)(3), provides that bypass of reunification services is mandatory "in any situation described in" section 361.5(b)(5) unless the juvenile court finds, based on "competent evidence," that services are "likely to prevent reabuse or continued neglect of the child" or that" 'failure to try reunification will be detrimental to the child because the child is closely and positively attached to that parent.'" It is the parent's burden to make this showing. (In re Raul V. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 290, 300 (Raul V.).) To assist the juvenile court, "[t]he social worker shall investigate the circumstances leading to the removal of the child and advise the court whether there are circumstances that indicate that reunification is likely to be successful or unsuccessful and whether failure to order reunification is likely to be detrimental to the child." (§ 361.5, subd. (c)(3).)
Section 361.5, subdivision (c)(2), provides in relevant part that bypass is mandatory for any parent described in section 361.5(b)(6) unless the juvenile court "finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is in the best interest of the child." Again, it is the parent's burden to make this showing. (In re I.A. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 19, 24.) If the juvenile court finds that section 361.5(b)(6) bypass applies and that reunification is not in the child's best interests, section 361.5, subdivision (k), requires the court to "read into the record the basis for a finding of severe sexual abuse or the infliction of severe physical harm" under section 361.6(b)(6), and to "specify the factual findings used to determine that the provision of reunification services to the offending parent or guardian would not benefit the child."
Here, as discussed, the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that section 361.5(b)(5) applied because J.E.H. was brought within the court's dependency jurisdiction under section 300(e) due to the conduct of Father. Accordingly, section 361.5, subdivision (c)(3), prohibited the court from ordering reunification services for Father unless it found that those services were likely to prevent reabuse, or that not attempting reunification would be detrimental to J.E.H. (In re Madison S. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 308, 325-326 (Madison S.).) While the juvenile court did not make an explicit finding that reunification services would not likely prevent reabuse, we may reasonably infer this finding from the record and conclude substantial evidence supports it. As the record reflects, Father consistently disputed the opinions of J.E.H.'s treating doctors and continued to deny the possibility that anything he did led to the baby's injuries. The court could reasonably conclude that because Father refused to acknowledge that his conduct required correction, the circumstances that led to the dependency would not likely change, and J.E.H. could be abused again under Father's care. (See In re A.E. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1124, 1147 (A.E.) [services not likely to prevent reabuse where parents "continue to be in complete denial about the existence of the abuse"]; Madison S., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 327 ["difficult to imagine" services would likely prevent reabuse where "neither parent was even willing to acknowledge that nonaccidental injury occurred"]; In re A.M. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1067, 1077 (A.M.) ["there are no services that will prevent reabuse by a parent who refuses to acknowledge the abuse in the first place"].)
We may also infer the juvenile court's finding that J.E.H. would not be detrimentally affected by the failure to attempt reunification services. The court could reasonably conclude that in light of J.E.H.'s young age (10 months old at the time of the finding) and the abuse he suffered under Father's care, it is unlikely he developed a sufficiently close emotional attachment with Father to overcome the presumption against reunification. (§ 361.5, subd. (c)(3); see, e.g., A.M., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 1076 [no evidence of close and positive attachment when child was removed before he was three months old]; In re Rebekah R. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1638, 1653 ["Because the child had been detained at an early age, there could be no legitimate claim she was closely and positively attached to her father"].)
In addition to section 361.5(b)(5) bypass, the juvenile court also found by clear and convincing evidence that section 361.5(b)(6) applied because J.E.H. was adjudicated a dependent under multiple subdivisions of section 300 as the result of the infliction of severe physical harm to him by a parent, and that "it would not benefit the child to pursue family reunification with the offending parent." Father contends the court did not adequately state the basis for the latter finding as required by section 361.5, subdivision (k). He further maintains the court's "only finding regarding benefit to the child was a positive one: the court found that the child 'enjoys his visits' with his parents." We are not persuaded by these points.
As a threshold matter, in light of our discussion above upholding the juvenile court's bypass decision under section 361.5(b)(5), any purported failure by the court to comply with section 361.5, subdivision (k), which pertains only to bypass under section 361.5(b)(6), provides no basis for reversal. (See Madison S., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 324 [only one valid ground under § 361.5, subd. (b), is necessary to support bypass decision].) In any event, we may infer any necessary findings under section 361.5, subdivision (k), so long as they are supported by substantial evidence (In re S.G. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1254, 1260), and here, the evidence of Father's culpability, his complete denial of the abuse, and the lack of sufficient evidence of a close and positive attachment between Father and J.E.H. provided an ample basis for the court to conclude that reunification services would not benefit J.E.H. That J.E.H. enjoyed his visits with the parents does not persuade us otherwise. As the court specifically observed, the visits were like "a party every time" with "Mom, dad, grandparents, cousins, and it's celebratory, fun, games, pictures and everything revolves around the baby. That's fine, but that also can't go on forever." In other words, the fact that J.E.H. enjoyed festive gatherings with his family has no ultimate bearing on the issue of whether he would benefit from reunification services given Father's lack of insight into and responsibility for his conduct that led to the dependency.
Finally, we conclude the Department complied with its statutory duties under section 361.5, subdivision (c)(3). The Department investigated the circumstances of J.E.H.'s injuries by conducting multiple interviews of the parents, family members and friends, law enforcement, and medical personnel. The Department then advised the juvenile court concerning the prospects of reunification by explaining that in light of the parents' refusal to recognize the abuse and take responsibility for it, it was "highly unlikely that they will be able to benefit from services. One cannot begin to fix a problem, if one cannot first admit that there is a problem." Social worker Perez echoed this sentiment in his testimony that reunification was not likely to succeed where the parents remained in total denial about the fact of the abuse. On this record, we conclude the Department satisfied its investigatory and advisory obligations under section 361.5, subdivision (c)(3).
Father concedes the Department "minimally met" its statutory duties but still criticizes Perez for failing "to provide an adequate evidentiary basis" for his testimony. In Father's view, Perez's personal opinion of the likelihood of successful reunification was inadequate without his reliance on assessment tools, evidence-based research, or consultation with experts. These criticisms fall short. Not only did Perez testify as to his reliance on the medical opinions of Dr. Evans, but his testimony was similar to that of social workers in other cases finding agency compliance with section 361.5, subdivision (c)(3). (See, e.g., Raul V., supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 302 [child welfare agency met its statutory obligations by conducting extensive investigation and recommending against reunification" 'in light of the parents' denial of physical abuse and failure to explain the child's injuries' "]; Madison S., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at pp. 326-327 [upholding bypass of services where social worker advised that services would not likely protect minor due to nature of injuries to very young child and lack of reasonable explanation from parents].)
Father next argues it was improper for the Department and the juvenile court to even consider his refusal to admit guilt as a basis for bypassing reunification services. In support, he relies on the discussion in Blanca P. v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1738 (Blanca P.) of the so-called" 'confession dilemma'" faced by "a parent who is falsely accused of sexually molesting his or her child. If the parent denies what any decent person must regard as a horrible act, that denial itself . . . may end up preventing reunification." (Blanca P., at pp. 1752-1753, italics omitted.) Blanca P. characterized it as "Kafkaesque" and "an outrageous injustice to use the fact parents deny they have committed a horrible act as proof that they did it." (Ibid.)
In Blanca P., after a prior dependency proceeding led to the removal of four siblings for excessive corporal punishment, a subsequent petition was filed alleging the father had sexually abused one of the children. (Blanca P., supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 1742.) At a combined six-month review and hearing on the subsequent petition, the juvenile court appeared to be confused as to the nature of the proceedings and initially believed the sexual abuse allegations had already been established. (Id. at p. 1743.) Even after realizing its mistake, the court appeared to acknowledge it "hadn't even looked at" the subsequent petition (which the court referred to as a "supplemental" petition) before issuing its decision that the allegations of sexual abuse had been established. (Id. at pp. 1744-1745, original italics omitted.) Later, at the 18-month review hearing, despite new evidence that the father had no propensity to commit sexual abuse, "the question of whether [the father] had really committed any child molestation was not litigated. Rather, the evidence focused on how [the parents] reacted to reunification services in light of the assumption that [the father] had committed child molestation." (Id. at p. 1747.)
We find Father's reliance on Blanca P. to be unfounded for several reasons. First, Father's denial of the abuse was not used as "proof that [he] did it." (Blanca P., supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1752-1753.) Rather, it was submitted by the Department as evidence that reunification services would not likely prevent reabuse, and as already discussed, the courts of this state have repeatedly held that a parent's complete denial of abuse is relevant to the determination of whether reunification services will likely prevent reabuse for purposes of section 361.5, subdivision (c)(3). (See A.E., supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 1147; Madison S., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 327; A.M., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 1077.)
Second, and critically, Blanca P. highlighted the confession dilemma not as a basis to bar consideration of a parent's denial of abuse, but to emphasize the importance of a careful and thorough evidentiary hearing on a section 300 petition alleging sexual abuse. As Blanca P. explained, "In the context of California's statutory scheme, the confession dilemma places an extraordinary premium on the correct adjudication of a petition alleging sexual abuse. If an injustice occurs there, the hard fact of life is that the very innocence of the parent will in all likelihood render the family asunder. And it is also irrefutable that no honorable person will want-or should have-to admit to a despicable sexual act of which he or she is innocent. The hearing on a contested petition alleging child sexual abuse is thus, to repeat, extraordinarily important. It is not the sort of thing to be rushed, or taken routinely. Allegations of child molestation are serious; they merit more than a rubber stamp." (Blanca P., supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1753-1754, original italics.)
Notably, Blanca P. made these observations against the backdrop of unique circumstances in which "significant evidence indicated that the father had been falsely accused of sexual molestation; the juvenile court had failed to consider seriously the allegation in finding jurisdiction on a subsequent petition; and the father's continued denials negatively impacted his ability to reunify." (Madison S., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 327, citing Blanca P., supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1741-1747; see also Constance K. v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 689, 693 [distinguishing Blanca P. as involving "conclusory reports which find no corroboration in the conduct of the parent"].) As such, the Blanca P. court remanded the matter for a new 18-month hearing so that the molestation allegations could be "fully explored and resolved" in the first instance. (Blanca P., at pp. 1759-1760, original italics.) Here, in contrast, the record reflects that the juvenile court held an extensive evidentiary hearing, considered copious testimonial and written evidence, and "fully explored and resolved" (ibid.) the critical issues of child abuse, the medical evidence, Father's culpability, and J.E.H.'s best interests. Thus, on the record before us, Blanca P. provides no support for Father's contention that the juvenile court erred in considering the evidence of his complete denial of the abuse for purposes of section 361.5, subdivision (c)(3).
Disposition
The juvenile court's jurisdiction findings and disposition orders are affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Petrou, J. Rodriguez, J.