Opinion
No. 1487 C.D. 2012
05-06-2013
Zhaorui Song and Ying Song, Appellants v. Housing Authority of Indiana County, Pennsylvania (HAIC)
BEFORE: HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE McGINLEY
Zhaorui (Z.) Song and Ying (Y.) Song, father and daughter (the Songs), appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Indiana County's (trial court) order that affirmed the Housing Authority of Indiana County's (HAIC) April 27, 2012, decision that terminated the Songs from the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program, commonly known as the Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Section 8 program (Program). The issues for this Court's review are: (1) whether the trial court erred when it exercised jurisdiction under Section 754 of the Local Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. § 754; (2) whether the trial court erred when it failed to find that the hearing officer was not impartial; (3) whether the trial court erred when it failed to address the Songs' objection to the hearing officer's bias in favor of the HAIC; and, (4) whether the trial court committed an error of law and/or abused its discretion when it found that the HAIC established that the Songs failed to report all of their income and that there was a sufficient basis to terminate them from the Program. This Court affirms.
On July 13, 2009, Z. Song executed a Program voucher (form HUD-52646) upon his entry into the Program. Section 4.B.1 of the Voucher requires that "[t]he family must: 1. Supply any information that the [public housing agency] PHA or HUD determines to be necessary including evidence of . . . information for use in a regularly[-]scheduled reexamination or interim reexamination of family income . . . ." Certified Record (C.R.) Item 1 Ex. B at 3.
In July 2011, as part of an annual recertification process, the Songs reported that their family's annual income was $4,758.00, and their monthly expenses were $460.00. Y. Song was reported to be an Indiana University of Pennsylvania (IUP) student with no income. When verifying their information, Program Coordinator Holly Hall (Hall) determined that Z. Song earned $7,877.00 as an Indiana County Humane Society employee. Based upon bank and credit card statements supplied by the Songs, Hall also determined that the Songs' expenses were $10,342.80, and that an average monthly payment of $485.00 was made on Y. Song's Visa credit card. There was no record of IUP tuition payments.
According to Y. Song, three of the credit card purchases reflected on her statements were made for other people (Yao Wang - $408.19 Coach bag and $687.90 auto fee; Qiaoqi Chen - $111.29 Coach bag) who repaid her in cash. She applied the money to her credit card.
By September 20, 2011 letter, Z. Song explained that their income changed because Y. Song no longer worked a part-time job at IUP. At the Songs' request, the HAIC held informal conferences on October 5, 2011 (attended by the Songs, Hall and hearing officer Donna Franks (Franks)) and November 22, 2011, (attended by the Songs, Hong Jiang (Jiang), Hall and Franks) at which the Songs were represented and presented evidence of their income and expenses. According to Hall, Jiang paid Y. Song's IUP tuition by letter dated December 4, 2011. Because there were no terms in the letter to lead her to believe otherwise, Hall interpreted that to mean that Jiang was providing the Songs a financial gift.
Jiang did not provide this information to Hall at the November 22, 2011, meeting she attended with the Songs.
By December 9, 2011, letter, the HAIC notified the Songs that their Program contract would be terminated effective January 31, 2012, and that they were suspended from the Program for 3 years for:
Failure to report financial support estimating approximately $28,520.75 plus $5,831.36 of credit card payments averaging $485 a month payments.
Therefore, you have violated your Family Obligation that is listed on your House Choice Voucher Form. I have enclosed a copy for you to review the parts that we have highlighted for you:
Page 2, #4: Obligations of the Family, #B: The family must: #1: Supply any information that the PHA or HUD determines to be necessary[,] including evidence of citizenship or eligible immigration status, and information for us in a regularly[-]scheduled reexamination or interim reexamination of family income and composition.
Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 32a. An informal hearing was held on December 29, 2011, before Franks. By January 3, 2012, letter, Franks, on the HAIC's behalf, upheld the Songs' termination from the Program. The Songs appealed to the trial court on January 25, 2012, and claimed that they required the services of an interpreter.
If you disagree with our conclusion . . . , you have the right to an informal hearing.
Hall testified that the Songs have communicated with the HAIC since 2009 in English. Y. Song attended IUP for four years, and was in its graduate program. Y. Song testified that while her primary language is Mandarin Chinese, she understands English. The January 25, 2012, appeal was the first time the Songs ever requested an interpreter.
On February 10, 2012, the trial court remanded the matter for the HAIC to make a full and complete record pursuant to Section 754(a) of the Local Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. § 754(a). A remand hearing was held on April 18, 2012, before Franks, with an interpreter present. On April 27, 2012, Franks issued a decision and terminated the Songs from the Program. The Songs appealed to the trial court. On July 3, 2012, the trial court affirmed the HAIC's decision. The Songs appealed to this Court. The trial court issued its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion on October 23, 2012.
According to the trial court's opinion, because they had not yet been transmitted, on May 18, 2012, the trial court ordered the HAIC to file the decision and the record pursuant to Section 754(b) of the Local Agency Law. The record was filed May 23, 2012. The hearing officer's decision was filed June 28, 2012.
"We are limited to determining whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, whether an error of law was committed or whether constitutional rights were violated." Allegheny Cnty. Hous. Auth. v. Liddell, 722 A.2d 750, 752 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998).
The Songs first argue that the trial court erred when it exercised jurisdiction over this case under Section 754 of the Local Agency Law, rather than Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. § 704. This Court disagrees.
The trial court indeed relied upon Section 754(a) of the Local Agency Law when it issued its February 10, 2012, remand order. See C.R. Item 4 at ¶ 1. It further referenced Section 754(b) of the Local Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. § 754(b), on May 18, 2012, when it ordered the HAIC to transmit its record. See C.R. Item 5 at ¶ 1. Additionally, it referenced both sections in its July 3, 2012 opinion and its 1925(a) Opinion. See C.R. Items 7, 15.
The Songs did not object to the trial court's exercise of its remand authority pursuant to Section 754(a) of the Local Agency Law when it issued its February 10 and May 18, 2012, orders.
Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, upon which the Songs aver this controversy should have been conducted, states in pertinent part: "The court shall hear the appeal without a jury on the record certified by the Commonwealth agency." (Emphasis added). Section 701 of the Administrative Agency Law makes it applicable "to all Commonwealth agencies . . . ." 2 Pa.C.S. § 701. Section 101 of the Administrative Agency Law defines "Commonwealth agency" as "[a]ny executive agency or independent agency." 2 Pa.C.S. § 101. "Executive agency" is defined in Section 101 as "[t]he Governor and the departments, boards, commissions, authorities and other officers and agencies of the Commonwealth government . . . ." Id. (emphasis added). "Independent agency" is defined as "[b]oards, commissions, authorities and other agencies and officers of the Commonwealth government which are not subject to the policy supervision and control of the Governor . . . ." Id. (emphasis added). "Commonwealth government" is defined as "[t]he government of the Commonwealth, including . . . agencies of the Commonwealth, but the term does not include any political subdivision, municipal or other local authority, or any officer or agency of any such political subdivision or local authority." Id. (emphasis added).
Based upon an identical definition in Section 102 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 102, this Court held relative to Section 5522(a) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5522(a), that for purposes of claim notice requirements, the Philadelphia Housing Authority is not a "Commonwealth government." Ford v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 848 A.2d 1038, 1050 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004).
Section 751(a) of the Local Agency Law, on the other hand, makes it applicable "to all local agencies." The General Assembly defined "local agency" as "[a] government agency other than a Commonwealth agency." 2 Pa.C.S. § 101. "Government agency" is defined as "[a]ny Commonwealth agency or any political subdivision or municipal or other local authority, or any officer or agency of any such political subdivision or local authority." Id. "Local authority" is not defined.
As the Songs assert, the Housing Authorities Law (HAL) purportedly infers that a housing authority is a Commonwealth agency. However, Pennsylvania courts have held that for jurisdictional purposes, housing authorities are local agencies, the appeals from which must first go to the trial court. See T&R Painting Co., Inc. v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 466 Pa. 493, 353 A.2d 800 (1976); see also City Council of the City of Phila. v. Greene, 856 A.2d 217 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). The Supreme Court reasoned in T&R:
Act of May 28, 1937, P.L. 955, as amended, 35 P.S. §§ 1541-1575. Section 3(a) of the HAL defines "housing authority" as "public body and a body corporate and politic created and organized, in accordance with the provisions of this act, for the purposes, with the powers, and subject to the restrictions hereinafter set forth." 35 P.S. § 1543(a). Section 10 of the HAL more specifically states that "[a]n Authority shall constitute a public body, corporate and politic, exercising public powers of the Commonwealth as an agency thereof . . . ." 35 P.S. § 1550. Section 22.1 of the HAL also provides: "In addition to the powers conferred upon an Authority by other provisions of this act, an Authority is empowered to act as agent of the State, or any of its instrumentalities or agencies, for the public purposes set out in this act." 35 P.S. § 1562.1. This Section was added by the Act of June 5, 1947, P.L. 449.
The language of the [HAL] does not specifically resolve the issue whether [the] Authority is a local or state agency.Id. at 498, 353 A.2d at 802 (footnote omitted). This Court noted in Greene:
We are left, then, with the task of determining the legislature's intent when it gave the Commonwealth Court original and exclusive jurisdiction of 'civil actions or proceedings against the Commonwealth' and sought to exclude from that jurisdiction actions against local agencies. The Commonwealth Court is intended to provide a judicial forum for uniform and consistent resolution of questions of statewide impact. . . . Conversely, there is no particular need for such uniform statewide resolution of issues involving the powers and duties of local authorities which operate within a single 'county, city or other municipality of the State . . . .'
[T]he [T&R] Court looked not only to the enabling provision in the [HAL] providing 'an Authority shall exercise public powers of the Commonwealth as an agency thereof' but also at eight other provisions in the [HAL] that supported a conclusion that it operated more as a local agency. The Court considered the local power to create the Authority, its local area of operation, local power of appointment, and specific empowerment to act as a state agent, a provision unnecessary if the [HAL] made the Authority a Commonwealth agency in the first instance. The Court concluded that the language of the [HAL] failed to resolve the issue. But insofar as the legislative intent in vesting exclusive original jurisdiction of actions against the Commonwealth in this Court was to provide a judicial forum for uniform resolution of questions of statewide impact, the Authority's local impact argued in favor of common pleas jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court held that original jurisdiction resided in common pleas to decide T & R Painting's contract action against the Authority.Greene, 856 A.2d at 221.
Based upon this reasoning, the courts have held that housing authority appeals proceed directly to the common pleas courts, consistent with the Local Agency Law. Moreover, without expressly analyzing whether a housing authority is a local versus Commonwealth agency, this Court has applied Section 754 of the Local Agency Law to housing authority appeals. See Cain v. Allegheny Cnty. Hous. Auth., 986 A.2d 947 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009). Thus, the trial court here properly exercised jurisdiction over this case under Section 754 of the Local Agency Law.
Recently, in Harris v. Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 124 C.D. 2012, filed November 2, 2012), this Court applied Section 754 of the Local Agency Law (relating to evidence and cross-examination) to a housing authority appeal. In Bennett v. Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 228 C.D. 2012, filed October 2, 2012), this Court specifically stated that Section 754 of the Local Agency Law "applies to public housing authorities." Section 414 of this Court's Internal Operating Procedures authorizes the citation of unreported panel decisions issued after January 15, 2008, for their persuasive value, but not as binding precedent. 210 Pa.Code §69.414.
The crux of the Songs' argument is that, had this matter been decided under Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, they would have had the opportunity to file briefs and have argument heard prior to the trial court's decision. However, that is not the case. Even if the trial court applied Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law or Section 754 of the Local Agency Law, the result would have been the same. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law states:
The court shall hear the appeal without a jury on the record certified by the Commonwealth agency. After hearing, the court shall affirm the adjudication unless it shall find that the adjudication is in violation of the constitutional rights of the appellant, or is not in accordance with law, or that the provisions of Subchapter A of Chapter 5 (relating to practice and procedure of Commonwealth agencies) have been violated in the proceedings before the agency, or that any finding of fact made by the agency and necessary to support its adjudication is not supported by substantial evidence. If the adjudication is not affirmed, the court may enter any order authorized by 42 Pa.C.S. § 706 (relating to disposition of appeals).(Emphasis added). Section 754(b) of the Local Agency Law likewise provides:
In the event a full and complete record of the proceedings before the local agency was made, the court shall hear the appeal without a jury on the record certified by the agency. After hearing the court shall affirm the adjudication unless it shall find that the adjudication is in violation of the constitutional rights of the appellant, or is not in accordance with law, or that the provisions of Subchapter B of Chapter 5 (relating to practice and procedure of local agencies) have been violated in the proceedings before the agency, or that any finding of fact made by the agency and necessary to support its adjudication is not supported by substantial evidence. If the adjudication is not affirmed, the court may enter any order authorized by 42 Pa.C.S. § 706 (relating to disposition of appeals).(Emphasis added). Neither provision expressly affords the parties an opportunity to brief and argue their appeals to a trial court.
Accordingly, the Songs' argument that Section 506 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. §506, in conjunction with Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, entitled them to brief and argue their appeal to the trial court is without merit. Section 506 of the Administrative Agency Law indeed states: "All parties shall be afforded opportunity to submit briefs prior to adjudication by a Commonwealth agency. Oral argument upon substantial issues may be heard by the agency." However, Section 506 of the Administrative Agency Law applies to the practice and procedures before the Commonwealth agency, not appeals. Thus, whether the trial court applied Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law or Section 754 of the Local Agency Law, the result would have been the same.
The Songs next argue that the trial court erred by failing to find that the hearing officer was not impartial, as required by Section 966.55 of the HUD Regulations, 24 C.F.R. § 966.55, because she had been involved in numerous meetings with the Songs before the hearing and, prior to the grievance hearing, assisted in the decision to terminate them from the program. This Court must disagree.
The Court recognizes that Section 966.55(b)(1) of the HUD Regulations requires: "A grievance hearing shall be conducted by an impartial person . . . appointed by the PHA, other than a person who made or approved the PHA action under review or a subordinate of such person." 24 C.F.R. § 966.55(b)(1). However, Section 966.55 of the HUD Regulations does not apply here. Those regulations expressly pertain to public housing lease and grievance procedure regulations. Section 5.100 of the HUD Regulations defines "public housing" as "housing assisted under the 1937 Act, other than under Section 8." 24 C.F.R. § 5.100 (emphasis added). Because the Program at issue involves Section 8, Section 966.55 of the HUD Regulations is inapplicable.
Section 982.555(e)(4)(i) of the HUD Regulations, which is expressly applicable to Program hearings, provides: "The hearing may be conducted by any person . . . designated by the [HAIC], other than a person who made or approved the decision under review or a subordinate of this person." 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(e)(4)(i). Although Franks was in attendance at the informal meetings and presided at the grievance hearing, the record evidence supports that Hall alone made the determination to terminate the Songs from the Program, and it was not until Franks officially presided at the Songs' formal hearing that she rendered a decision. There is no record evidence that Franks preliminarily made or approved the decision to terminate, or was Hall's subordinate; thus, there was no violation of Section 982.555(e)(4)(i) of the HUD Regulations.
The Songs next argue that the trial court erred when it failed to address the Songs' objection to the hearing officer's bias in favor of the HAIC. They specifically contend Section 966.56 of the HUD Regulations, 24 C.F.R. § 966.56, requires that complainants be afforded a fair hearing by providing due process including the right to present evidence and arguments in support of their complaint, to controvert evidence relied upon by the HAIC and to confront and cross-examine all of the HAIC's witnesses. However, the Songs have waived this issue.
In their Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, the Songs averred in paragraph 2.d.: "The [trial court] committed an error of law and/or an abuse of discretion by failing to address the [Songs'] objection regarding the hearing officer's appearance of bias in favor of the [HAIC]." R.R. at 6a (emphasis added). The Songs asserted this issue in the Statement of Questions Involved. See Song Br. at 7. In its Argument, however, the Songs re-state the issue as follows: "The Trial Court committed an error of law and/or an abuse of discretion by failing to address the [Songs'] objection regarding the hearing officer's ability to be cross-examined by the [Songs]." Song Br. at 16 (emphasis added). Thereafter, their discussion centered upon the requirement in Section 966.56 of the HUD Regulations that guaranteed the Songs the opportunity to cross-examine all witnesses, including Franks who, while the hearing officer, also participated in previous meetings between them and the HAIC.
According to the record, during the April 18, 2012 hearing, the Songs' counsel, Charles Himmelreich (Himmelreich) objected to Franks presiding on the basis that she was not impartial because she heard the case at a hearing prior to the trial court's remand and found against the Songs. Himmelreich lamented that since Franks was "present at the prior hearing," she could corroborate or verify whether the Songs requested an interpreter at that time, thus he was "entitled to cross[-]examine [her]," but recognized that he could not "cross[-]examine [his] Hearing Officer[.]" C.R., Notes of Testimony, April 18, 2012 (N.T.) at 61-62.
It is clear from the record that Himmelreich's objection was to Franks' impartiality. In its 1925(a) Opinion, the trial court specifically addressed the Songs' bias claim. Himmelreich did not lodge a specific objection to his inability to cross-examine Franks. Because the issue of Franks' cross-examination was not raised in their Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, and appears for the first time in the Summary of Argument and Argument portions of their brief, the issue was waived. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii). Notwithstanding, since Section 966.56 of the HUD Regulations does not apply to Program hearings, their argument is without merit. And, as previously discussed, even applying Section 982.555(e)(4) of the HUD Regulations, the Songs could not prevail.
Section 966.56(b)(4) of the HUD Regulations requires that complainants are afforded fair hearings at which they are entitled "to confront and cross-examine all witnesses upon whose testimony or information the [HAIC] . . . relies." 24 C.F.R. § 966.56(b)(4).
Section 982.555(e)(5) of the HUD Regulations states: "The [HAIC] and the family must be given the opportunity to present evidence, and may question any witnesses. Evidence may be considered without regard to admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable to judicial proceedings." 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(e)(5).
The Songs finally argue that the trial court erred by finding the HAIC established they failed to report all of their income and that there was a sufficient basis to terminate them from the Program. Again, this Court disagrees.
The [Program] provides rental assistance to low-income families to help them 'in obtaining a decent place to live' and to 'promot[e] economically mixed housing.' Section 8(a) of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a). Under the [Program], which is funded by the federal government and administered by local public housing authorities, tenants sign a lease and pay a portion of their income toward rent, and the remainder of the rent is paid by the public housing authorities. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o).Hous. Auth. of City of Pittsburgh v. Van Osdol, 40 A.3d 209, 211 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012).
Section 982.552(c)(1)(i) of the HUD Regulations, 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(1)(i), authorizes local housing authorities like the HAIC to terminate the Program's benefits if a participant violates any of its obligations. Section 982.551(b)(2) of the HUD Regulations states: "The family must supply any information requested by the [public housing agency] PHA or HUD for use in a regularly[-]scheduled reexamination or interim reexamination of family income and composition in accordance with HUD requirements." 24 C.F.R. § 982.551(b)(2).
The record evidence in this case establishes that Section 4.B.1 of the Voucher Z. Song executed to participate in the HAIC's Program expressly notified him: "The family must: 1. Supply any information that the PHA or HUD determines to be necessary including evidence of . . . information for use in a regularly[-]scheduled reexamination or interim reexamination of family income . . . ." C.R. Item 1 Ex. B at 3.
Hall processed the Songs' 2011 recertification for the HAIC. As part of the process, on July 20, 2011, the Songs submitted a Resident Information Checklist, stating that a member of the household had a PNC checking account, and that Y. Song was a part-time IUP student. R.R. at 18a. Y. Song also certified that the Songs had the following monthly expenses:
| Rent | $105.00 |
| Telephone | $ 95.00 |
| Toiletries | $ 10.00 |
| Internet | $ 20.00 |
| Credit Cards | $200.00 |
| Food | $ 30.00 |
|---|---|
| $460.00 |
By September 20, 2011, letter, Z. Song explained that their income had changed because Y. Song was a full-time student and was no longer working a part-time job. He explained that, contrary to Hall's calculations, his annual income was expected to be only approximately $4,758.00 (similar to 2010). R.R. at 19a. Although IUP originally indicated that Y. Song was not registered for the fall of 2011 (because she graduated in the spring of 2011), Hall later learned that she was a graduate student who was now conducting research. There was no record of how her tuition was paid.
Hall ran a credit report and requested Y. Song to provide documentation relative to how her tuition was paid. The credit report reflected that Y. Song made regular credit card payments. The Songs also provided Hall a PNC online credit card statement. Hall requested Y. Song's last six bank statements. The Songs provided six months of credit card statements (March 24, 2011-September 20, 2011). R.R. at 25a-30a. By a December 4, 2011, letter, Jiang stated that she had been paying Y. Song's IUP tuition. Hall also received verification that, as of December 21, 2011, Z. Song's gross wages from the Humane Society were $7,359.58.
The parties repeatedly refer to Z. Song's $7,877.00 income. However, the only proof of his income in this record consists of his paystubs which reflect that he earned $7,359.58 through December 21, 2011.
From the documentation she gathered, Hall calculated a monthly average of the Songs' expenses, multiplied it by twelve, and came up with an average annual total of $10,343.00. Because their reported income in 2011 was only $7,877.00, Hall determined there was household income that was not being reported because the Songs' income and expenses did not add up.
At the hearing, although Z. Song testified that he was not aware that he had to report all of his income, his only income was from his employment with the Humane Society. Y. Song testified that she was completing her research at IUP to fulfill her graduate requirements, so she did not need to register for fall 2011. Her tuition was paid by her aunt directly to IUP, with the understanding that she would repay her with 25% of each future paycheck until it was paid back. The last of her tuition payments was made in the spring of 2011. Y. Song testified that after she left her part-time job, her father gave her a check for $200.00 per month which she deposited into her PNC account order to pay her credit cards. When she bought things for him, or when she did not have enough money to pay her bill, he would give her more. She had no other income. She testified that the submitted credit card statements reflect her purchases, with the exception of three made for other people (Yao Wang - $408.19 Coach bag and $687.90 auto fee; Qiaoqi Chen - $111.29 Coach bag), who repaid her in cash that she applied to her credit card.
Y. Song did not supply copies of her PNC bank account statements.
Jiang testified that she paid Y. Song's tuition directly to IUP via the Internet, with the verbal understanding that Y. Song would give Jiang 25% of her future paychecks until the entire sum is repaid. She never gave Y. Song money directly. She did not pay any of Y. Song's expenses or any of Z. Song's bills. Based upon the foregoing evidence, Franks concluded:
[I]t has been adequately established that the financial support is a loan that will be repaid. However, the
household income is verified to be only $7,877 annually with credit card payments being made annually of $10,342.80. Therefore, there was not enough evidence to establish how the credit card payments are being made. Thus, not verifying household income.C.R. Item 6. On appeal, the trial court concluded that "the record is clear that unexplained income existed. The hearing officer reviewed the evidence and determined that income was not accurately verified to the [HAIC]. This constitutes grounds for termination from the [P]rogram." R.R. at 4a.
The documentation supplied by the Songs relative to their 2011 reexamination process reflected that their expenses exceeded their income. It is undisputed that, with the exception of the IUP tuition loan, the Songs' only income was Z. Song's average pay of $605.92 per month ($7,877.00/26 = $302.96 biweekly pay x 2 = $605.92 average monthly pay). It is also undisputed that the Songs reported $460.00 in regular monthly expenses.
However, according to the credit card statements the Songs supplied to the HAIC to verify their other expenses, during the six months between March 24, 2011 and September 20, 2011, there were $3,808.00 in charges, an average of $634.67 per month ($3,808.00/6 months). Credit card payments made during relevant period totaled $3,557.68, which was an average monthly payment of $592.95 ($3,557.68/6 months). Adding the average monthly credit card payment ($592.95) to the other $240.00 in reported monthly expenses (rent $105.00, telephone $95.00, toiletries $10.00 and food $30.00), the Songs' average monthly expenses totaled $832.95, which far exceeded their originally-reported $460.00 in monthly expenses, and their $605.92 reported monthly income.
$460.00 less the $20.00 for Internet and $200.00 in credit card payments already accounted for in the credit card statements = $240.00.
This translates to annual expenses totaling $9,995.40, which exceeds the Songs' $7,877.00 annual income. This Court is unable to exactly recreate Hall's $10,343.00 annual expense calculation. However, the evidence nevertheless establishes that the Songs' expenses far exceeded their reported income.
Even taking into account the entire $1,207.38 Y. Song claimed to have placed on her credit card and then was repaid by friends, the charges for the six-month period would total $2,600.62 ($3,808.00 - $1,207.38), or an average of $433.44 per month. Credit card payments would total $2,350.30 ($3,557.68 - $1,207.38), or an average of $391.72. Adding the average monthly credit card payment ($391.72) to the other $240.00 in reported monthly expenses, the Songs' average monthly expenses totaled $631.72, which still exceeded their originally-reported $460.00 in monthly expenses, and their $605.92 reported monthly income.
The friends' charges do not appear in the credit card statements supplied, and only the payment of $408.19 (the only recorded non-online payment) is evident. See R.R. at 28a. --------
Despite the deficit between their income and expenses, the Songs managed to pay their expenses, but were unable to state or demonstrate how. Based upon the record evidence, the HAIC established that the Songs failed to report all of their income. So, the trial court did not commit an error of law or abuse its discretion by affirming the HAIC's determination that the Songs failed to report all of their income, providing the HAIC with a sufficient basis to terminate them from the Program.
For all of the above reasons, the trial court's order is affirmed.
/s/_________
BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge
ORDER
AND NOW, this 6th day of May, 2013, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Indiana County in the above-captioned matter is affirmed.
/s/_________
BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge