Opinion
05-03-1889
SOMERS et al. v. CRESSE et al.
J.J. Crandall, for motion. E. B. Learning, opposed.
On motion to amend decree.
J.J. Crandall, for motion. E. B. Learning, opposed.
BIRD, V. C. The complainants are creditors of the defendant company, and in their bill allege that the defendant Cresse was indebted to the said company, and prayed that the amount of that indebtedness might be ascertained, and applied to the payment of such indebtedness. To the bill first filed the said company filed an answer and a cross-bill. But the complainants filed an amended bill, and to this the defendant company filed an answer only, admitting all of the material allegations of the bill. By these admissions the defendant company practically joined hands with the complainants; and the co-operation of effort, upon the hearing, made it unmistakably manifest that both the defendant company and the complainants were laboring together understandingly, with the view of accomplishing the same result; that is, to establish an indebtedness on the part of the defendant Cresse to the defendant company. After a very full and elaborate hearing and discussion, the court decided that the bill had not been sustained,1 and a decree dismissing the bill was entered. This was appealed from by both the complainants and the defendant company. The defendant company did not perfect its appeal, and that of the complainants was dismissed. The defendant company asked for a rehearing of the case; but this was denied it, for the obvious reason that it was not in court, except by answer, having no cross-bill upon which to found any prayer for relief. After these things the defendant company asks to have the decree dismissing the said bill modified, by adding thereto the words, "without prejudice;" saying, in effect, that it is the desire of the defendant company to file a new bill in its own behalf. It will be seen at once that, if this had any significance at all, it is that the defendant desires an opportunity to try this cause again. If this be not so, then there can be no necessity for the asking; for, if the proposed new proceedings rest upon new matter,—a new cause of action,—then the decree sought to be modified will not be a bar. But, if it be the aim of the defendant company to secure a rehearing, then, most plainly, the decree ought not to be modified, for the reason that there has been a very full investigation of the case upon its merits. As a general rule, every party to a cause, whether complainant or defendant, is obliged to rest satisfied with one opportunity to be heard, than which nothing is better settled. Indeed, the very object of bringing every person before the court who has any interest in the subject-matter of the controversy is that all the conflicting rights may be ascertained and determined in one suit, and thereby avoid a multiplicity of suits, with all its attendant uncertainties, inconveniences, and costs; and all parties are bound, for it is well settled that persons who are interested in the subject-matter of a suit may well be so represented in that suit as to be bound by the final decree, though not parties to the record, as effectually as though they were. After Lyon v. Stanford, 42 N. J. Eq. 411, 7 Atl. Rep. 869, this will not be controverted. See, also, Plumb v. Good now, 123 U. S. 560, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 216; Castle v. Noyes. 14 N. Y. 329, 332. II in such case a person be bound by the record, then, as certainly so, one who is a party, and has taken an active part in the conduct of the case. Thompson v. Roberts, 24 How. 241.
But it may be that there are cases more directly in point, as that of Cottingham v. Shrewsbury, 3 Hare, 627. In this case it was held that the court will try a controversy between co-defendants, if it be necessary, and the defendants will be bound. Now, it seems to me quite impossible to conceive of a stronger illustration of this rule than is to be found in the case under consideration. The complainants were in pursuit of the property and assets of the defendant company, which they claimed were in the hands of the defendant Cresse. It was not only the plain duty of the defendant company to surrender its property and assets in payment of its just debts, all of which it acknowledged, but it actually joined with the complainants, both by its answer and the production of proofs, in the effort to establish the charge that such property and assets were in the hands of Cresse. Certainly, upon every principle, the company was equally interested with the complainants, and ought to be as certainly bound by the results of the proceedings, under the light of the foregoing authorities. Chamley v. Dunsany, 2 Schoales & L. 709; Farquharson v. Seton, 5 Russ. 62; Montgomery v. Vicory, 11 N. E. Rep. 38.
These considerations have been presented and authorities given for the sole purpose ofascertaining the true relation of the defendant company to these proceedings, and not for the purpose of prejudicing its rights in any future controversy; and I am led to the conclusion that it is as much bound by the former proceeding as the complainants, and that it is no more entitled to the favor asked for than the complainants would be. Evidently, it will not be contended that, after the full and exhaustive hearing had in this case, the complainants would be permitted to take a decree dismissing their bill, "without prejudice." The motion will be denied, with costs.