Opinion
1:23-CV-98-RAL
05-28-2024
TYLER SOLOMON, Plaintiff v. SCI FOREST SUPERINTENDENT IRWIN, et al., Defendants
RICHARD A. LANZILLO, CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
I. Recommendation
It is hereby recommended that this action be dismissed for failure to state a claim in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
II. Report
A. Background
Plaintiff Tyler Solomon, an inmate incarcerated at SCI-Forest, initiated this pro se civil rights action by filing a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No. 1. The Court granted his motion and instructed the Clerk to docket his complaint on October 23, 2023. ECF No. 8.
In his original pleading, Solomon alleged that he contracted tuberculosis after being “subjected to another inmate who had tuberculosis” while incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Forest. ECF No. 2 at 2. He alleged that the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections “failed to quarantine [the] inmate that had the communicable airborne disease tuberculosis.” Id. The lone Defendant identified in the complaint was the Superintendent of SCI-Forest, Superintendent Irwin. Id.
On October 31, 2023, the Court issued an Order advising Solomon that, to prevail on a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he must prove that a defendant, acting under color of state law, was personally involved in depriving him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. ECF No. 10. The Court noted that Solomon's original pleading failed to attribute any conduct to the lone Defendant, Superintendent Irwin, and explained that “a supervisor-defendant may only be liable for unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates if the supervisor either: (1) with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm; or (2) participated in violating the plaintiffs rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in the subordinate's unconstitutional conduct.” Id. (citing A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004)). Rather than recommend dismissal at that time, the Court offered Solomon an opportunity to file an amended complaint and provided the following instructions:
To the extent that Plaintiff believes that any individual DOC employee violated his constitutional rights, Plaintiff should endeavor to identify the individual or official responsible for the misconduct, name them as defendants, and explain how each was involved in the alleged violations of his civil rights. If possible, Plaintiffs description should include references to relevant dates, times, and locations, and should explain to the Court how each defendant's behavior, action, or inaction contributed to the alleged violation.Id.
Solomon filed his Amended Complaint on December 29, 2023. ECF No. 14. Despite the Court's instruction to identify and name the “individual DOC employee[s]” responsible for the alleged misconduct, Solomon's amended pleading names only Irvin and the “SCI Forest Medical Dept.” as Defendants. Id. He alleges that, on February 23, 2023, he was “informed that [he] had contracted tuberculosis by the medical department” and “told the only way to contract said disease would be to be in close contact with someone else who has active tuberculosis.” Id. at 1. He was not informed which other inmate had the disease. Id. He was then put on a “9 month treatment for the tuberculosis” with a medication called Isoniazid that “causes a lot of side effects that are traumatizing.” Id. He remained on that medication until November 23, 2023. Id. at 2.
It is well-established that “state prisons and their medical departments are not ‘persons' subject to liability under Section 1983.” Correa-Martinez v. Pereyra, 2021 WL 4490281, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 1, 2021) (citing Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973) (stating that a state prison medical department, as a state agency, is not a person under § 1983). See also Ruff v. Health Care Adm 'r, 441 Fed.Appx. 843, 845 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The District Court properly concluded that Ruff cannot sue SCICoal Township or the prison's medical department itself because these entities are not ‘persons' under § 1983.”). Accordingly, Solomon's claims against the SCI Forest Medical Department must be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Based on the foregoing, Solomon alleges, in conclusory fashion, that he contracted tuberculosis “because of medical dept's mistakes and the Superintendent's failure to make sure medical is doing their jobs properly.” Id. He states that, because he has not been tested “to see if the medications have worked,” he suffers from mental anguish and remains “constantly scared that the medication didn't work.” Id. He does not explicitly request any relief. Id.
In his original pleading, Solomon sought $10,000,000.00 for damages, mental anguish, and future medical expenses. ECF No. 9.
B. Standard of review
Because he is seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Plaintiff is subject to the screening provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Among other things, that statute requires the Court to dismiss any action in which the Court determines that the action is “frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Muchler v. Greenwald, 624 Fed.Appx. 794, 796-97 (3d Cir. 2015). A frivolous complaint is one which is either based upon an indisputably meritless legal theory (such as when a defendant enjoys immunity from suit) or based upon factual contentions which are clearly baseless (such as when the factual scenario described is fanciful or delusional). Neitzkev. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). The determination as to whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. D 'Agostino v. CECOM RDEC, 436 Fed.Appx. 70, 72 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999)).
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his allegations, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). Moreover, under the liberal pleading rules, during the initial stages of litigation, a district court should construe all allegations in a complaint in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1997).
C. Analysis
As this Court has previously advised Solomon, a successful § 1983 plaintiff must ultimately prove that a defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995). When his claims implicate multiple defendants, the plaintiff “must show that each and every defendant was ‘personally] involve[d]' in depriving him of his rights.” Kirk v. Roan, 2006 WL 2645154, at *3 (M.D. Pa. 2006) (quoting Evancho v. Fischer, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2006)). This means that each defendant must have played an “affirmative part” in the complained-of misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 667 (2009) (“In a § 1983 suit... [a]bsent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”).
These principles apply with equal force where the defendants are supervising prison officials. See, e.g., Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that liability for supervisory officials must still be based on “personal involvement in the alleged wrongs”); Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[L]iability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.”). Although a supervisor cannot encourage constitutional violations, “a supervising public official has [no] affirmative constitutional duty to supervise and discipline so as to prevent violations of constitutional rights by his or her subordinates.” Chinchello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 133 (3d Cir. 1986); Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1120 (3d Cir. 1990). Rather, a supervisor-defendant may only be liable for unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates if the supervisor either: (1) with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm; or (2) participated in violating the plaintiffs rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in the subordinate's unconstitutional conduct. AM. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004).
Moreover, while exposure to a serious contagious disease, such as tuberculosis, may give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim, a plaintiff must show that “he was actually exposed to the contagious disease” and that “the defendants were deliberately indifferent to this risk.” Bakhtiari v. Madrigal, 2019 WL 2084445, at *10 (M.D. Pa. May 13, 2019) (citing Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 157, 262 (3d Cir. 2003)). It is not enough for an inmate to simply state that he contracted a disease and, therefore, someone must have been at fault. Rather, he must allege specific facts giving rise to an inference that his illness stemmed from acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need. Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).
Solomon's allegations - in essence, that he contracted tuberculosis and received prompt treatment - fall short of these standards. Although he complains that the unknown inmate who exposed him to the disease should have been quarantined, there is nothing in his pleading to suggest that Irwin was aware of and disregarded any facts that put Solomon at risk of contracting the disease-for example, that Solomon was forced to share a cell with an inmate known to have tuberculosis or that inmates were not adequately screened for infectious diseases before entering general population. See, e.g., Joy v. Healthcare C.M.S., 534 F.Supp.2d 482 (D. Del. 2008) (inmate stated Eighth Amendment claim based on allegation that “inmates were not thoroughly screened for disease before going into general population”); Bolton v. Goord, 992 F.Supp. 604, 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (acknowledging that prisoner could state Eighth Amendment claim for confinement in same cell as inmate with serious contagious disease, such as tuberculosis). While Solomon was obviously exposed to tuberculosis at some point prior to his diagnosis, he has failed to plead that this exposure resulted from deliberate indifference on the part of any prison official.
Indeed, Solomon acknowledges that he received prompt and medically appropriate treatment for his illness once it was discovered. Although the side effects of his treatment may have been unpleasant, treating an infection in a medically-appropriate manner does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment.
Even if Solomon's allegations were generally sufficient to state a plausible claim, there is nothing in his pleading to suggest that Superintendent Irwin had any personal involvement in the alleged misconduct. As noted above, Solomon does not allege that Irwin knew of other inmates in the prison with tuberculosis or directed, participated in, or acquiesced to a course of conduct that exposed Solomon to the disease. Nor is there anything in Solomon's pleading to indicate that Irwin established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which led to the constitutional harm. Solomon's conclusory allegation that Irwin “fail[ed] to make sure medical [was] doing their jobs properly” is not enough to establish Irwin's direct personal involvement in a constitutional violation.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that this action be dismissed as legally frivolous and/or for failure to state a claim in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Moreover, considering the many deficiencies identified in this order, it is further recommended that leave to amend be denied as futile. However, said dismissal should be without prejudice to Plaintiffs' ability to reassert his claims against the appropriate parties in state court, if so desired.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties must seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the Objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of the Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Extensions of time will not be granted. Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).