Summary
rejecting inmate's claim of being coerced into IFRP participation by threats of IFRP "refuse" penalties
Summary of this case from Williams v. FarriorOpinion
No. 99 Civ. 9072
September 25, 2000
OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner Guillermo Solis, pro se, brings this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Solis challenges the conditions of his confinement on the grounds (1) that the Bureau of Prisons has no authority to set up a repayment schedule for court-ordered fines through the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program, and (2) that his participation in the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program was coerced and should be deferred until such time as the district court amends its Commitment Order to establish its own payment schedule. For the reasons stated below, the petition is denied.
On July 15, 1997, Petitioner Solis was sentenced in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey on one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a) (1), and one count of possession of a handgun by a convicted felon pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(1). The district court ordered Solis to pay a $200 mandatory special assessment and a $2000 fine. The court also recommended, but did not require, that Solis participate in the Bureau of Prison's ("Bureau") Inmate Financial Responsibility Program ("IFRP"), see 28 C.F.R. § 545.10-545.11. Solis is presently serving a 126-month term of imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release.
On November 25, 1998, Solis agreed to participate in the IFRP at the Federal Correctional Institute at Otisville, New York, and signed an Inmate Financial Contract ("IFC") which required Solis to make quarterly payments toward his financial obligations. See Declaration of Herman Quay, dated November 9, 1999 ("Quay Decl.") at. ¶ 7. Solis subsequently signed four amended IFC's, adjusting quarterly payment obligations so to be commensurate with his institution earnings and resources. Id. On August 2, 1999, Solis filed this Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.
II
Solis first challenges the Bureau's authority to establish a schedule of installment payments for collection of his fine and special assessment. See Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, August 2, 1999, pp. 2-3 ("Petition"). Solis relies on a series of cases holding that sentencing courts may not impose a fine and then delegate the scheduling of its payment to the Bureau or other non-judicial entity. See United States v. Workman, 110 F.3d 915, 918 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that district court may not order the Bureau to set a fixed schedule for installment payments of fines through the IFRP); United States v. Mortimer, 94 F.3d 89, 90-91 (2d Cir. 1996) (rejecting sentencing court's order that "defendant shall participate in Bureau of Prison's [IFRP] and make restitution in accordance with the policies of that program");United States v. Porter, 41 F.3d 68, 71 (2d Cir. 1994) (rejecting judgment that delegated scheduling of partial payments of restitution to the probation office). These cases rest on the principle that courts cannot delegate a judicial function — such as setting a schedule for court imposed fines — to a non judicial entity. But that principle has no application where (as here) a district court imposes a fine and elects not to establish a schedule of payment, but instead makes payment of the fine due immediately. In such a case, the court delegates none of its functions or powers. See McGhee v. Clark, 166 F.3d 884, 886 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that it is permissible for the Bureau to administer collection through the IFRP where a sentencing court orders fine and special assessment due "in full immediately"); Chapedelaine v. Keller, No. 95 Civ. 1126, 1998 WL 357350 (N.D.N.Y. April 16, 1998) (same). Where that is the case, the Bureau may establish its own procedures (including participation in the IFRP) for collection of the court ordered fines and assessments. See, e.g., Johnpoll v. Thornburgh, 898 F.2d 849, 851 (2d Cir. 1990) ("The Bureau of Prisons has not exceeded its statutory authority, nor departed from its own regulations, by administering a program to collect court ordered civil judgments or fines."); McCarrol v. United States, 3:94 CR 240 (D. Conn. Feb. 18, 1998 memorandum order) ("[The IFRP] may be used to collect special assessments in accordance with the Attorney General's powers under 18 U.S.C. § 3612 (c)(1) and the federal regulations' guidelines for payment schedules under 28 C.F.R. § 545.11 (b)."), aff'd 166 F.3d 1202 (2d Cir. 1998) (Table).
The sentencing court in this case imposed a fine and special assessment, ordered that Solis pay both "immediately," and recommended (but did not mandate) that Solis participate in the IFRP to satisfy that obligation. See Quay Decl. at Attachment 1 (Judgment Order), pp. 1, 4. The sentencing court's judgment contains no delegations to the BOP. Consequently, the Workman line of authority has no application. Solis's challenge to the Bureau's authority accordingly fails.
III
Solis next claims that he was "coerce[d]" into participating in the IFRP and that future installment payments should thus be set aside or deferred. See Petition at 3. Solis argues that his participation was coerced because his refusal to so participate would have incurred "consequences" such as loss of housing privileges. See id. It is true that for inmates electing not to participate in the IFRP, the consequences of non-participation may be the loss of favorable housing privileges, non-assignment to work details outside the secure perimeter, or nonauthorization of a release gratuity. See Quay Decl. at ¶ 6. It is perfectly understandable that this arrangement, characterized by the government as "voluntar[y]," (Government's Memorandum of Law at 2), does not seem so to the prisoner. But it is within the Bureau's discretion to decide that a prisoner who does not choose to participate in a program designed to help him meet his obligations is not a good candidate for certain privileges or rehabilitation programs. The IFRP has been uniformly upheld against similar challenges, and the Second Circuit has found the regime "fully consistent with the Bureau of Prison's authorization, under the direction of the Attorney General, to provide for rehabilitation and reformation." Johnpoll, 898 F.2d at 851 (citation omitted).
Consequently, though Mr. Solis faces the loss of some privileges should he forego participation in the IFRP, those consequences do not fall under the scope of this Court's review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See, e.g., Santiago v. Superintendent of the Ossing Correctional Facility, 2000 WL 1277306 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2000) ("In conducting Habeas Review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.") (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975)).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.
SO ORDERED: