Opinion
Civil Action 3:21-CV-00532
05-05-2022
PATRICIA ANN SNYDER, Plaintiff, v. KILOLO KIZAKAZI,[1] Defendant.
MANNION, J.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK, Chief United States Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Patricia Ann Snyder (“Snyder”) brings this action under sections 205 and 1631 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3) (incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) by reference), for judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”) denying her application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. (Doc. 1). For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Commissioner's decision be AFFIRMED.
I. Background and Procedural History
On September 17, 2018, Snyder protectively filed applications for Title II disability insurance benefits and Title XVI supplemental security income, claiming disability beginning December 29, 2017. (Doc. 14-5, at 2, 9). The Social Security Administration initially denied both applications on February 19, 2019. (Doc. 14-4, at 2). On March 30, 2019, Snyder filed a request for a hearing, which Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Scott M. Staller held on February 19, 2020. (Doc. 14-2, at 38). In a written opinion dated March 9, 2020, the ALJ determined that Snyder “has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from December 29, 2017, through the date of this decision,” and therefore not entitled to benefits under Titles II or XVI. (Doc. 14-2, at 15). On January 27, 2021, the Appeals Council denied Snyder's request for review. (Doc. 14-2, at 2).
On March 23, 2021, Snyder filed the instant complaint. (Doc. 1). The Commissioner responded on August 12, 2021, providing an answer and the requisite transcripts from Chapman's disability proceedings. (Doc. 13; Doc. 14). The parties then filed their respective briefs, with Snyder raising two bases for reversal or remand. (Doc. 16; Doc. 17; Doc. 18).
II. Standards of Review
To receive benefits under Titles II or XVI of the Social Security Act, a claimant must demonstrate an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A); 1382c(a)(3)(A). To satisfy this requirement, a claimant must have a severe physical or mental impairment that makes it impossible to do his or her previous work or any other substantial gainful activity that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a), 416.905. Additionally, to be eligible to receive benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, a claimant must be insured for disability insurance benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(a); 20 C.F.R. § 404.131.
A “physical or mental impairment” is defined as an impairment resulting from “anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382c(a)(3)(d).
A. Administrative Review
In evaluating whether a claimant is disabled, the “Social Security Administration, working through ALJs, decides whether a claimant is disabled by following a now familiar five-step analysis.” Hess v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 200-01 (3d Cir. 2019). The “burden of proof is on the claimant at all steps except step five, where the burden is on the Commissioner of Social Security.” Hess, 931 F.3d at 201; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(a)(1), 416.912(a)(1). Thus, if the claimant establishes an inability to do past relevant work at step four, the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five to show that jobs exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant could perform consistent with his or her residual functional capacity, age, education, and past work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(a)(1), 416.912(a)(1).
B. Judicial Review
The Court's review of a determination denying an application for benefits is limited “to considering whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence.” Katz v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., No. 19-1268, 2019 WL 6998150, at *1 (3d Cir. Dec. 20, 2019). Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
A single piece of evidence is not substantial if the ALJ ignores countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a conflict created by such evidence. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993). In an adequately developed factual record, substantial evidence may be “something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the ALJ's decision] from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). “In determining if the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence the court must scrutinize the record as a whole.” Leslie v. Barnhart, 304 F.Supp.2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003).
The question before the Court, therefore, is not whether Snyder was disabled, but whether the Commissioner's determination that Snyder was not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law. See Arnold v. Colvin, No. 3:12-CV-02417, 2014 WL 940205, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2014) (“[I]t has been held that an ALJ's errors of law denote a lack of substantial evidence.”); Burton v. Schweiker, 512 F.Supp. 913, 914 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (“The [Commissioner]'s determination as to the status of a claim requires the correct application of the law to the facts.”); see also Wright v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the scope of review on legal matters is plenary). If “the ALJ's findings of fact . . . are supported by substantial evidence in the record,” the Court is bound by those findings. Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000).
III. The ALJ's Decision
In his written decision, the ALJ determined that Snyder “has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from December 29, 2017, through the date of this decision.” (Doc. 14-2, at 30). The ALJ reached this conclusion after proceeding through the five-step sequential analysis required by the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). At the outset, the ALJ determined that Chapman meet the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through March 31, 2023. (Doc. 14-2, at 21).
A. Step One
At step one of the five-step analysis, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is engaging in substantial gainful activity (“SGA”). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If a claimant is engaging in SGA, the claimant is not disabled, regardless of age, education, or work experience. SGA is defined as work activity requiring significant physical or mental activity and resulting in pay or profit. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). In making this determination, the ALJ must consider only the earnings of the claimant. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1574, 416.974. Here, the ALJ determined that Snyder “has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 29, 2017, the alleged onset date.” (Doc. 14-2, at 21). Thus, the ALJ's analysis proceeded to step two.
B. Step Two
At step two, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a medically determinable impairment, or combination of impairments, that is severe and meets the 12-month duration requirement. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the ALJ determines that the claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limits his or her “physical or mental ability to do basic work activities,” the ALJ will find that the claimant does not have a severe impairment and is therefore not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If a claimant establishes a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the ALJ analysis continues to the third step.
Here, the ALJ concluded that Snyder had the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, obesity, asthma, and irritable bowel syndrome. (Doc. 14-2, at 21). In addition, the ALJ concluded that Snyder had the following non-severe impairments: gastroesophageal reflux disease, migraines, hypothyroidism, iron deficiency, ankle pain, depression, anxiety disorder, and personality disorder. (Doc. 14-2, at 21).
C. Step Three
At step three, the ALJ must determine whether an impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals the medical equivalent of an impairment listed in the version of 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 that was in effect on the date of the ALJ's decision. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). The sections in this appendix are commonly referred to as “listings.” If the ALJ determines that the claimant's impairments meet these listings, then the claimant is considered disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d).
The ALJ determined that none of Snyder's impairments, considered individually or in combination, meet or equal the severity of a listed impairment. (Doc. 12-2, at 17). The ALJ considered the listings under sections 1.04 (disorders of the spine), 3.03 (asthma), and 5.06 (inflammatory bowel disease). (Doc. 14-2, at 23).
D. Residual Functional Capacity
Between steps three and four, the ALJ determines the claimant's residual functional capacity (“RFC”), crafted upon consideration of the evidence presented. At this intermediate step, the ALJ considers “all [the claimant's] symptoms . . . and the extent to which [the claimant's] symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a), 416.929(a). This involves a two-step inquiry where the ALJ must (1) determine whether an underlying medically determinable mental impairment or impairments could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant's symptoms and, if so, (2) evaluate the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the claimant's symptoms to determine the extent to which they limit the claimant's functional limitations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(b)-(c), 416.929(b)-(c).
Here, the ALJ found that while Snyder's medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause her alleged symptoms, her statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms were not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record. (Doc. 14-2, at 24). The ALJ concluded that Snyder has the RFC “to perform less than the full range of sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a),” subject to the following non-exertional limitations:
[Snyder] can occasionally climb. She can frequently balance, stoop, kneel, crouch or crawl. [Snyder] can never be exposed to unprotected heights. She can occasionally be exposed to dust, fumes, gases, odors, poor ventilation, other pulmonary irritants, humidity and wetness.(Doc. 14-2, at 23).
E. Step Four
Having assessed a claimant's RFC, step four requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant has the RFC to perform the requirements of his or her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). A finding that the claimant can still perform past relevant work requires a determination that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). Past relevant work is defined as work that the claimant has done within the past 15 years, that was substantial gainful activity, and that lasted long enough for the claimant to learn how to do it. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(b), 416.960(b). “If the claimant can perform his [or her] past relevant work despite his [or her] limitations, he [or she] is not disabled.” Hess, 931 F.3d at 202 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv)); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv).
Here, the ALJ determined that through the date last insured, Snyder is unable to perform any past relevant work as a dental assistant. (Doc. 14-2, at 28). Thus, the ALJ proceeded to step five of the sequential analysis.
F. Step Five
At step five of the sequential analysis process, the ALJ considers the claimant's age, education, and work experience to see if a claimant can make the adjustment to other work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). These factors are not considered when evaluating a claimant's ability to perform past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(b)(3), 416.960(b)(3). If a claimant can adjust to other work, he or she will not be considered disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). Here, considering Snyder's age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ determined that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Snyder can perform. (Doc. 14-2, at 30). In making this determination, the ALJ relied on the expertise of the vocational expert, who testified that Weaver could perform the requirements of occupations such as an optical goods final assembler, carding machine operator, and food and beverage order clerk, which are occupations with open positions ranging from 20,000 to 83,000 nationally. (Doc. 14-2, at 30).
Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Snyder was not disabled during the relevant period and denied her application for benefits. (Doc. 14-2, at 30).
IV. Discussion
On appeal, Snyder advances two bases to argue that the decision of the ALJ is not supported by substantial evidence. (Doc. 16, at 1). First, Snyder asserts that the ALJ failed to properly weigh the opinion of treating physician Jeffrey Backenstoes, D.O. (“Dr. Backenstoes”). (Doc. 16, at 7). Second, Snyder asserts that the ALJ's multiple errors with symptom evaluation compel reversal. (Doc. 16, at 10). In response, the Commissioner maintains that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence and reflects a proper application of the law and regulations. (Doc. 17, at 1).
A. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's evaluation of Dr. Backenstoes.
Snyder contends that the ALJ's finding that the opinion of Dr. Backenstoes was “not persuasive” was not supported by substantial evidence. (Doc. 16, at 7). snyder asserts that the opinion of Dr. Backenstoes is supported by the treatment notes. (Doc. 16, at 9). Next, snyder argues that if the ALJ needed to know the basis of Dr. Backenstoes' opinion, the ALJ should have contacted Dr. Backenstoes or snyder's counsel to obtain a clarification. (Doc. 16, at 9; Doc. 18, at 2). in opposition, the commissioner avers that the ALJ thoroughly assessed the persuasiveness of the medical opinion of Dr. Backenstoes against the record as a while and explained how the factors of supportability and consistency were considered. (Doc. 17, at 11). Further, the commissioner argues that the ALJ was not required to recontact Dr. Backenstoes upon finding that his opinion was unsupported by the record. (Doc. 17, at 13).
The undersigned finds the ALJ considered substantial evidence in assessing the persuasiveness of Dr. Backenstoes' opinion. As this matter involves a claim filed after March 27, 2017, the new regulatory framework governing the evaluation of medical opinions applies to the ALJ's evaluation of the medical opinions in the record. See Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed.Reg. 5844 (Jan. 18, 2017) (technical errors corrected by 82 Fed.Reg. 15,132-01 (Mar. 27, 2017)); see also 82 Fed.Reg. 15263 (March 27, 2017); 82 Fed.Reg. 16869 (corrective notice) (explaining that SSR 96-2p and 965p do not apply to newly filed or pending claims after March 27, 2017). Under the new regulations, rather than assigning weight to medical opinions, the Commissioner will articulate “how persuasive” he or she finds the medical opinions. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b), 416.920c(b). The Commissioner's consideration of medical opinions is guided by the following factors: supportability; consistency; relationship with the claimant (including the length of the treatment relationship, the frequency of examinations, the purpose of the treatment relationship, the extent of the treatment relationship, and the examining relationship); specialization of the medical source; and any other factors that tend to support or contradict the opinion. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c), 416.920c(c). The most important of these factors is the “supportability” of the opinion and the “consistency” of the opinion. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2).
The ALJ must explain how he or she considered the “supportability” and “consistency” of a medical source's opinion. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2). Generally, the ALJ may, but is not required to, explain his or her consideration of the other factors, but if there are two equally persuasive medical opinions about the same issue that are not exactly the same, then the ALJ must explain how he or she considered the other factors. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(3), 416.920c(b)(3). To facilitate judicial review, the ALJ's decision must be accompanied by “a clear and satisfactory explication of the basis on which it rests” and the ALJ must indicate which evidence was accepted, which evidence was rejected, and the reasons for rejecting certain evidence. Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704, 706-707 (3d Cir. 1981). An ALJ need not undertake an exhaustive discussion of all the evidence or “use particular language or adhere to a particular format in conducting his analysis.” Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2004); see Hur v. Barnhart, 94 Fed.Appx. 130, 133 (3d Cir. 2004) (“There is no requirement that the ALJ discuss in his opinion every tidbit of evidence included in the record.”). However, an ALJ must ensure “sufficient development of the record and explanation of findings to permit meaningful review.” Jones, 364 F.3d at 505; see, e.g., Rivera v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 164 Fed.Appx. 260, 262 (3d Cir. 2006) (“The only requirement is that, reading the ALJ's decision as a whole, there must be sufficient development of the record and explanation of findings.”).
On February 18, 2020, Dr. Backenstoes, Snyder's primary care provider, completed an RFC questionnaire and a mental impairment questionnaire. (Doc. 14-7, at 731, 737). In the RFC questionnaire, Dr. Backenstoes indicated that Snyder is incapable of even “low stress” jobs and noted that Snyder's diagnoses include respiratory failure, asthma, migraines, and lumbar degenerative disc disease. (Doc. 14-7, at 731). Dr. Backenstoes opined that Snyder can walk less than a block, sit ten to fifteen minutes and less than two hours total, stand five to ten minutes, and stand/walk less than two hours total in an eight-hour workday. (Doc. 147, at 732-33). Dr. Backenstoes further opined that Snyder must walk around two to three minutes every ten to fifteen minutes; shift positions from sitting, standing, and walking; needs several five to ten minute breaks per hour; cannot do prolonged sitting; and can rarely lift and carry less than ten pounds. (Doc. 14-7, at 733). Dr. Backenstoes noted that Snyder can occasionally move her head; rarely climb stairs; never twist, stoop, bend, crouch, squat, and climb ladders; handle 10% of the time, finger 25% of the time, and reach less than 5% of the time; and be absent more than four days per month. (Doc. 14-7, at 733-34). Dr. Backenstoes concluded that “[t]he combination of her physical limitations and her psychological limitations would make it extremely difficult to find any sort of gainful employment.” (Doc. 14-7, at 734).
As Snyder does not argue that the ALJ erred in considering the opinion of Dr. Backenstoes with respect to her mental limitations, those arguments are considered waived and not proper for consideration by this Court. See Harris v. Dow Chemical Co., 586 Fed.Appx. 843, 846 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that an argument is waived and abandoned if briefly mentioned in the summary of the argument, but not otherwise briefed); Karchnak v. SwataraTwp., No. 07-CV-1405, 2009 WL 2139280, at *21 (M.D. Pa. July 10, 2009) (“A party waives an issues if it fails to brief it in its opening brief; the same is true for a party who merely makes a passing reference to an issue without elaboration.”) (citing Gorum v. Sessions, 561 F.3d 179, 185 n.4 (3d Cir. 2009)).
In this case, the ALJ's evaluation comported with the new regulatory scheme and was based on substantial evidence. (Doc. 14-2, at 26-27). “Nothing in the Social Security Act or governing regulations requires the ALJ to obtain matching “opinion” evidence in order to fashion a claimant's RFC.” Myers v. Berryhill, 373 F.Supp.3d 528, 538 (M.D. Pa. 2019). “[T]he ALJ is responsible for making an RFC determination ... and he is not required to seek a separate expert medical opinion.” Mays v. Barnhart, 78 Fed.Appx. 808, 813 (3d Cir. 2003); see Butler v. Colvin, 3:15-CV-1923, 2016 WL 2756268, at *13 n.6 (M.D. Pa. May 12, 2016) (rejecting the argument that a medical opinion is required to craft an RFC). “There is no legal requirement that a physician have made the particular findings that an ALJ adopts in the course of determining an RFC.” Titterington v. Barnhart, 174 Fed.Appx. 6, 11 (3d Cir. 2006). An ALJ “is not precluded from reaching RFC determinations without outside medical expert review of each fact incorporated into the decision.” Chandler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 362 (3d Cir. 2011). The ALJ is expressly not required to “seek outside expert assistance.” Chandler, 667 F.3d at 362 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1546(c), 404.1527(d), and SSR 96-5p).
In evaluating the opinion of Dr. Backenstoes, the ALJ determined its persuasiveness by considering both the consistency and supportability of the opinion. Regarding supportability, the ALJ explained that the opinion is unsupported by Dr. Backenstoes' treatment notes that “largely show [Snyder] is in no apparent distress with normal respiration rate, lungs clear to auscultation, positive bowel sounds, soft and nontender abdomen, no abdominal bruits, full motor strength, normal muscle tone, normal coordination, intact reflexes, no crackles, nor rales, no rhonchi, no wheezes, no clubbing, no cyanosis, and no edema.” (Doc. 14-2, at 26-27). Further, the ALJ reasoned that Dr. Backenstoes RFC questionnaire is unsupported because it is a “checklist with minimal explanation.” (Doc. 142, at 27). Additionally, the ALJ articulated why the opinion of Dr. Backenstoes was not consistent with the record. The ALJ noted that Dr. Backenstoes' statement is inconsistent with Snyder's activities of daily living, which include babysitting her grandsons, completing personal care activities, preparing simple meals, and shopping in stores. (Doc. 14-2, at 27).
Thus, the ALJ's evaluation of the medical opinion of Dr. Backenstoes comported with the Social Security Regulations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2). The ALJ is not required to explain additional factors. To the extent Snyder asks the Court to re-weigh the record evidence or make new factual findings, the Court may not invade the ALJ's province as a finder of fact in disability proceedings, for “our inquiry is not whether an alternate conclusion would have been reached, but whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ's decision.” See Daub v. Colvin, No. 3:15-CV-1066, 2015 WL 8013037, at *9 (M.D. Pa Dec. 7, 2015). Accordingly, the undersigned finds that the ALJ's evaluation of Dr. Backenstoes' opinion is supported by substantial evidence.
B. Substantive evidence supports the ALJ's evaluation of Snyder's
SUBJECTIVE STATEMENTS.
Snyder argues that the ALJ committed multiple errors in evaluating her subjective symptom allegations. (Doc. 16, at 10). First, Snyder asserts that the ALJ erroneously disregarded her testimony of severe pain merely for being unsupported by objective medical evidence. (Doc. 16, at 10). Second, Snyder argues that the ALJ erred in considering her activities of daily living because “the ability to care for children, alone, does not inherently indicate that a claimant possesses the ability to perform on a regular and continuing basis in a work-setting.” (Doc. 16, at 11; Doc. 18, at 3). in response, the Commissioner submits that the ALJ properly followed the required two-step process and thoroughly reviewed the medical evidence before determining that Snyder's allegations of limitations were not supported by the record. (Doc. 17, at 16). Next, the Commissioner asserts that the ALJ properly referenced Snyder's activities of daily living in discounting her subjective symptoms allegations. (Doc. 17, at 16).
The ALJ properly applied the new set of Social Security Regulations for evaluating medical evidence that eliminates the hierarchy of medical opinions and states that an ALJ will not defer to any medical opinions, even those from treating sources. (Doc. 14-2, at 2526); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a). Standing alone, a claimant's allegation of a symptom is not enough to establish an impairment or disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a), 416.920(a); Prokopick v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 272 Fed.Appx. 196, 199 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Under the regulations, an ALJ may not base a finding of disability solely on a claimant's statements about disabling pain”). An ALJ is permitted to reject a claimant's subjective testimony as long as he or she provides sufficient reasons for doing so. Prokopick, 272 Fed.Appx. at 199 (citing Schaudeck v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 1999), and SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186.).
When evaluating a claimant's subjective allegations, the ALJ utilizes a two-step process. SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 119029. First, the ALJ must determine whether there is a medically determinable impairment that can be shown by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, which could reasonably be expected to produce the symptoms alleged. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b). An individual will not be found to be “disabled based on alleged symptoms alone.” See SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 119029, at *4 (explaining that “[i]f there is no medically determinable impairment, or if there is a medically determinable impairment, but the impairment(s) could not reasonably be expected to produce the individual's symptoms” those symptoms will not be found to affect the claimant's “ability to perform work-related activities”).
Once the ALJ has found that a medically determinable impairment is established, the ALJ then evaluates the claimant's allegations about the intensity, persistence, or functionally limiting effects of her symptoms against the evidence of record. SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *4. This evaluation requires the ALJ to “examine the entire record, including the objective medical evidence,” the plaintiff's testimony, and any other relevant evidence. SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *4. On March 28, 2016, SSR 96-7p, which provided guidance on assessing the credibility of a claimant's subjective symptoms, was rescinded and superseded by SSR 16-3p, which instructs adjudicators when “determining whether an individual is disabled” to “consider all of the individual's symptoms, including pain, and the extent to which the symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical and other evidence in the individual's record.” SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 119029, at *2.
The undersigned finds that the ALJ's analysis of Snyder's subjective symptom allegations is supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ outlined the two-step process he must follow, listed Snyder's alleged symptoms, and found that “[l]ongitudinal treatment notes do not support [Snyder]'s allegations.” (Doc. 14-2, at 24). The ALJ explained that her treatment notes generally show Snyder “is in no acute distress with normal range of motion, full strength, normal muscle tone, intact sensation, intact reflexes, normal coordination, no cyanosis, and no edema.” (Doc. 14-2, at 24). Specifically, the ALJ discussed an internal medicine consultative examination from February 2019 and a lumbar spine X-ray from July 2019. (Doc. 14-2, at 24). Upon fully reviewing the medical evidence from the relevant period and “[a]fter careful consideration of the evidence,” the ALJ concluded that Snyder's “medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, [Snyder]'s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” (Doc. 14-2, at 24). The ALJ discussed and explained his consideration of Snyder's subjective allegations within the decision. (Doc. 14-2, at 24-25). The ALJ accommodated for Snyder's severe impairments, took into consideration the limitations and the effects each would have upon Snyder's functioning, and ultimately tailored the RFC to reflect the medical evidence of record. (Doc. 14-2, at 24-25).
Additionally, the ALJ appropriately considered Snyder's activities of daily living. (Doc. 14-2, at 25). As this Court has stated: “[I]t is permissible for such activities to be used to assess a claimant's [subjective allegations] in light of any true contradiction between his or her alleged severity of symptoms and the claimant's activities.” Durden v. Colvin, 191 F.Supp.3d 429, 442 (M.D. Pa. 2016). However, an ALJ may not reject testimony about the intensity, persistence, or limiting effects of a symptom solely because it is not substantiated by objective evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3). Instead, the ALJ must evaluate the extent to which any unsubstantiated symptoms can be credited based on various factors, including the claimant's daily activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3); see Turby v. Barnhart, 54 Fed.Appx. 118, 121 n.1 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Although certainly ‘[d]isability does not mean that a claimant must vegetate in a dark room excluded from all forms of human and social activity,' it is nonetheless appropriate for the ALJ to consider ‘the number and type of activities' in which the claimant engages.”)(citations omitted).
Snyder submitted a function report stating that she babysits her grandsons, which including picking one up from kindergarten, making lunch, and sitting to read, color, and play games. (Doc. 14-6, at 34-35). Snyder also reported that she can prepare her own meals, clean, iron, fold laundry, drive, shop in stores, and handle personal care activities. (Doc. 14-6, at 3537). Considering Snyder's subjective symptom allegation in relation to her activities of daily living, the ALJ concluded that Snyder's activities of daily living suggest that she is able to “perform light work; frequently balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl; occasionally climb; and never be exposed to unprotected heights.” (Doc. 14-2, at 25). The ALJ demonstrated his consideration of Snyder's subjective allegations repeatedly throughout the decision. (Doc. 142, at 24-25, 28).
Snyder argues that the ALJ erroneously cited her ability to babysit her grandsons to discredit her. (Doc. 16, at 12). However, the Third Circuit has recognized that childcare may be considered by an ALJ as one type of daily activity that may show a claimant is not as limited as alleged. See Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 555 (3d Cir. 2005) (ALJ reasonably considered claimant's ability to care for children); Stoddard v. Berryhill, No. 3:16-CV-1591, 2017 WL 930611, at *16 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2017) (ALJ reasonably considered claimant's ability to care for husband and grandchildren). Regardless, again, consistent with the controlling regulations, the ALJ appropriately considered the medical evidence of record and Snyder's activities of daily living as one factor in evaluating her subjective symptom allegations. Accordingly, the ALJ's analysis of Snyder's subjective symptom allegation is supported by substantial evidence.
V. Recommendation
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that the Commissioner's decision be AFFIRMED , and that judgment be entered in favor of the Commissioner and against Snyder. It is further recommended that the Clerk of Court be directed to CLOSE this case.
NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated May 5, 2022. Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.