Opinion
CASE NO. 09cv1511 BEN (PCL).
April 1, 2011
ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR FULL OR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND REMANDING REMAINING CLAIMS [Docket No. 42]
Defendants City of San Diego and Officer W.R. Doeden ("Defendants"), move for full or partial summary judgment (Docket No. 42). For the reasons set forth herein, Defendants' motion is GRANTED IN PART AND THE CASE IS REMANDED.
BACKGROUND
The following summary of facts is for context only. It does not constitute a formal finding of facts. This action arises from Officer Doeden's arrest of Harold Snowten III ("Plaintiff") on February 15, 2008. On the morning of February 15, 2008, Officer Doeden and his partner were dispatched to the home of Christine Thomas and her son Victor Mack ("Victims") in response to a 911 call. When the officers arrived, the Victims told them two men, one with a gun, forced their way into their home and a physical altercation followed. The Victims said the incident started as an argument between Mack and the two men in the front yard and when Mack went inside the house, the two suspects forced their way into the home. The Victims identified the suspects as Joseph Slaughter and Harold Snowten, and told the officers that the suspects lived at 644 S. 36th Street.Officer Doeden left the Victim's house and proceeded to 644 S. 36th Street. Sometime after Officer Doeden arrived at that house, Plaintiff walked up the driveway. Plaintiff alleges that Officer Doeden asked for his name, and he said he was "Harold Westly Snowten, the III." (Pl.'s Opp'n to Mot. [Docket No. 43] 2, Nov. 29, 2010). Plaintiff's appearance matched the physical description of suspect Harold Snowten provided by the Victims and his clothing matched the description provided. (Officer Doeden's Report [Docket No. 42-9] 2, Nov. 5, 2010). Plaintiff alleges that upon hearing his name, Officer Doeden asked him to step into the street and empty his pockets. (Pl.'s Opp'n 3). Plaintiff was verbally rude to the officer, but complied. Id. At that point, Plaintiff's family members, who were in the front yard, starting yelling: "he's not the guy." (Pl.'s Opp'n 2).
Plaintiff alleges he put his music player on the hood of the police car, took out his cellular phone and started typing a text. (Pl.'s Opp'n 3). Officer Doeden took the phone, and Plaintiff grabbed it back. Id. After that, Officer Doeden allegedly told Plaintiff he was under arrest, swept Plaintiff off of his feet, and handcuffed him on the ground. Id. After the arrest, police learned that the suspect they were looking for was Harlond Snowten IV, Plaintiff's younger brother.
Plaintiff initiated this action in state court. Defendants removed the case to this Court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction over the single federal claim for relief found in count six of the state complaint. On November 5, 2010, Defendants filed the motion currently before the Court. Plaintiff filed an opposition, and Defendants filed a reply. The Court finds the motion suitable for disposition without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1.
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment should be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). To establish a "genuine" issue of fact when opposing summary judgment, plaintiff "must produce at least some `significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint.'" T. W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290 (1968)).
In this case Plaintiff asserts a single federal claim for relief (for excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983) and several state law claims.
I. OFFICER DOEDEN IS ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
In count six, Plaintiff alleges Officer Doeden used excessive force during the arrest and thereby violated his Federal Constitutional rights. Plaintiff seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The claim is unavailing. Officer Doeden is entitled to qualified immunity as to the federal excessive force claim. "The central purpose of affording public officials qualified immunity from suit is to protect them `from undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability.'" Elder v. Holloway, 114 S. Ct. 1019, 1022 (1994) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982)), see also Pearson v. Callahan 129 S.Ct. 808, 815 (2009). In deciding whether qualified immunity exists the Supreme Court has laid out two questions: (1) whether the facts plaintiff has shown make out a constitutional violation; and, if so, (2) whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. Pearson, at 815-16. Courts can choose which question to consider first. Id. at 818. In deciding if a right in clearly established, the Ninth Circuit has found "[t]he dispositive query is `whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.'" Steinmetz v. City of Camas, 390 Fed. Appx. 655 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)), see also Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 910 (9th Cir. 2001).
The rule for use of force during an arrest is clearly established in the Ninth Circuit. The use of force must be balanced with the need for force. Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272 (9th Cir. 2001). This involves weighing the force used against the circumstances, including: (1) the severity of the crime; (2) whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others; (3) whether he was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight; and (4) any other exigent circumstances. Briley v. City of Hermosa Beach, No. CV 05-8127, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87571 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2008) (citing Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1280).
When ruling on a motion for summary judgment "[t]he facts must be viewed and inferences must be drawn in the manner most favorable to the non-moving party." Retail Clerks Union Local 648 v. Hub Pharmacy, Inc., 707 F.2d 1030, 1033 (9th 1983). Under Plaintiff's version of events, it would not have been clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful when faced with the situation Officer Doeden confronted. Officer Doeden was confronted with a man he believed had very recently forced his way into a home, either possessed a gun or was in the company of someone with a gun, and physically assaulted the residents. Plaintiff admits that he was rude and only reluctantly complied with the officers initial requests. However, Officer Doeden only used force after Plaintiff grabbed his cellular phone out of the officer's hands, an aggressive physical act towards the officer.
On its own this was enough to warrant some force. However, Plaintiff's family also contributed to the volatile situation. Family members, who were just steps away, began to scream and grew increasingly angry. Their intentions may have been to alert the officer of his mistake, but their aggressive behavior created a potential threat to the safety of the officers. A reasonable officer under the circumstances could have correctly believed the use of force was needed, therefore Officer Doeden is entitled to qualified immunity. Summary judgment on Plaintiff's federal excessive force claim is GRANTED.
II. STATE CLAIMS
This Court has granted summary judgment for the federal claim in this case. Once federal law claims have dropped out of a lawsuit, district courts have discretion to hear the remaining claims, dismiss, or remand to state court. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 349 (1988). When determining whether to remand, the court should consider "the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity." Id. at 350. "[I]t is generally preferable for a district court to remand remaining pendent claims to state court." Harrell v. 20th Century Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 203, 205 (9th Cir. 1991).
It is preferable to allow state courts to preside over claims that fall under their jurisdiction. State courts are experts at interpreting and applying state law, and are therefore a better venue for the remaining claims. Therefore, this Court exercises its discretion and REMANDS the remaining state law claims.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants' motion for full or partial summary judgment is GRANTED as to count six, the § 1983 claim, and the remaining claims are hereby REMANDED to state court.IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: March 30, 2011