Opinion
Civil No. 97-778 (JRT/RLE).
July 16, 2004
Madge S Thorsen, KELLY BERENS, Minneapolis, MN, for plaintiff.
Daniel W McDonald, MERCHANT GOULD, Minneapolis, MN, for defendant.
ORDER
In March of 1997, plaintiff Snap Edge Corporation ("Snap Edge") commenced this action alleging patent infringement. Shortly thereafter, the parties informed the Court that they were negotiating a settlement. The Court entered a judgment of dismissal on June 30, 1997 in which the Court retained jurisdiction for 45 days to "permit any party to move to reopen the action, for good cause shown, or to submit and file a stipulated form of final judgment, or to seek enforcement of the settlement terms." (Order of Dismissal [Docket No. 5].)
On August 15, 1997, pursuant to a request by the parties, the Court extended its jurisdiction for 14 additional days to "allow the parties more time to finalize the terms of their written agreement." (Amended Order of Dismissal [Docket No. 7].)
On September 4, 1997, the parties signed a "Stipulation and Proposed Order for Consent Decree." This document was filed on September 8, 1997 [Docket No. 8] and was signed by representatives for both parties. The Stipulation and Proposed Order for Consent Decree was not signed by this Court, or any judicial officer. The Court did not issue any Order adopting or incorporating by reference the Stipulation and Proposed Order.
The Court's jurisdiction over this dispute expired, at the latest, on September 1, 1997. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a); see also Charles Allen Wright Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice Procedure § 1162 (4th ed.) (discussing computation of time). As of that date, the Court had not incorporated the terms of any settlement agreement, and had not expressly retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement beyond the fourteen days noted in the Amended Order of Dismissal. The Court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 4:20 Communications, Inc., v. The Paradigm Co., 336 F.3d 775, 778 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that district court lacked jurisdiction months after the dismissal because the district court had not incorporated the terms of the settlement and had retained jurisdiction for only ninety days) (citing Kokkonen V. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994)).
The Court reaches this date by excluding the date the Order was signed (Friday, August 15, 1997) and beginning computation on Monday, August 18. Including weekends, because the time period was more than 11 days, the 14th day would be September 1, 1997.
Although this Court has no subject matter jurisdiction over what has become, in effect, a contract dispute, Snap Edge is not without recourse. Snap Edge is free to pursue its claim in any court that would have jurisdiction over its breach of contract claim. See 4:20 Communications, 336 F.3d at 778.
The former attorney for the defendant, Daniel W. McDonald, has notified the Court that he no longer represents defendant, and his attempts to contact defendant regarding this matter have proven unsuccessful. However, as the Court has no jurisdiction over this matter and the matter remains closed, the Court denies as moot Daniel W. McDonald's motion for permission to withdraw as counsel.
ORDER
Based on the entire file and proceeding herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff's request to reopen the file and for entry of judgment [Docket 9] is DENIED.
2. Daniel W. McDonald's Motion for Permission to Withdraw [Docket No. 14] is DENIED AS MOOT.