Opinion
EP-00-CA-150-DB.
April 12, 2001.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
On this day, the Court considered Defendant The Hoover Company's "Motion for Summary Judgment," filed in the above-captioned cause on September 14, 2000. Plaintiff Alfredo Smith filed a Response to Defendant's motion on September 26, 2000. Thereafter, Defendant filed a Reply to Plaintiff's Response on October 10, 2000.
On November 21, 2000, the Court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order reserving ruling on Defendant's summary judgment motion and staying this cause pending review by the Texas Supreme Court of two highly relevant Texas Court of Appeals decisions. The Texas Supreme Court has since published its review of those cases in Lawrence v. CDB Services, Inc., Nos. 00-0142 and 00-0201, 2001 WL 299542 (Tex. March 29, 2001). Consequently, the Court issued an Order lifting the stay and giving the Parties an opportunity to file supplemental briefs regarding the Lawrence decision's impact on Defendant's summary judgment motion. Defendant filed such a supplemental brief on April 4, 2001. Plaintiff did not.
After due consideration, the Court is of the opinion that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted for the reasons that follow.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Alfredo Smith began working for Defendant The Hoover Company ("Hoover" or "Defendant") in 1997. On March 25, 1999, Plaintiff allegedly injured his back while loading pallets onto a conveyor belt. Although he allegedly felt a pinch or shock in his lower back, Plaintiff did not report the incident to Hoover personnel or seek medical attention until four or five days later.
Hoover does not carry workers' compensation insurance. Instead, Hoover offers an "Occupational Injury Benefit Program" Hoover calls the "HELP Plan." As its Summary Plan Description states, the HELP Plan "is an Employee welfare benefit plan voluntarily offered to Employees of The Hoover Company;" "[s]imilar to how workers' compensation works, in exchange for no-fault benefits[,] Employees agree to give up their common law right to bring a lawsuit for negligence against Hoover for Occupational Accidents, exposures, Injuries and Diseases." Employees who take advantage of the HELP Plan receive medical benefits and ninety percent of lost wages resulting from injuries suffered during the course and scope of employment.
Pursuant to Texas Labor Code § 406.002, an employer may elect not to provide workers' compensation insurance to its employees. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.002 (Vernon 1996). In so doing, an employer subjects itself to suits by injured employees under common law, modified to strip the employer of certain common law defenses. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.033 (Vernon 1996). Such employers are generally referred to as "nonsubscribers" or "non-subscribing employers."
In order to participate in the HELP Plan, among other requirements, an employee must sign a written waiver. Plaintiff signed a waiver on August 19, 1997, which set forth, in pertinent part, the following:
By signing below I will become a Participant in the Hoover El Paso "HELP Plan" Occupational Benefit Program, which will provide various "no-fault" disability-related benefits to eligible Employees that sustain an Occupational Injury or Disease. . . .
I understand that full HELP Plan benefits are only available to Employees who sign this Waiver, and that all matters relating to the HELP Plan are governed by federal law under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). In exchange for "no-fault" HELP Plan benefits, I hereby agree to waive the claims and lawsuits identified herein that I (or my beneficiaries, estate or heirs) may have in the future against the Hoover Company. . . .
I agree this Waiver and all legal actions related to HELP Plan shall be solely construed and controlled by ERISA and brought under federal law, to include but not limited to actions involving or relating to my receipt or denial of HELP Plan benefits, my seeking or claiming benefits and/or my sustaining an Injury, Disease or condition, or exercising my legal rights. . . .
By signing below I waive any and all claims against Hoover for all types of common law negligence (except gross negligence causing death) that arise out of or are related to all Injuries, Diseases, death and damages sustained by me in the course and scope of my employment by Hoover. My remedies will therefore be limited to: (a) receiving "no-fault" Injury benefits from the HELP Plan, (b) HELP Plan's appeal process, and, after exhausting appeal, (c) the right to sue under ERISA for benefits or my ERISA rights, as I hereby waive my right to bring any type of lawsuit under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act and for all types of negligence under common law, unless gross negligence causes death.
I acknowledge that I am executing this document voluntarily and without duress from any person; that no representation by any person acting on behalf of Hoover has influenced or induced the execution of this document; that I have received and carefully read and understood the contents of this document and the Summary Plan Description which explains the details about these benefits and HELP Plan's requirements; that I have signed this document as my own free act, being fully sane, sober and competent to do so, that I am not under the influence of any substance nor under any mental incapacity that would affect me at the time of signing, and that I am aware of the consequences and benefits of signing this document. . . .
I understand that: (a) my employment will continue at will whether I sign this form or not, (b) signing this document involves waiving the legal rights above for "no fault" benefits for Injury, damages, Disease or death, (c) I will have at least 21 days from receipt of this form to decide whether to sign, (d) if I do sign, I will have seven (7) days from the date I sign to revoke this Waiver if I do so in writing timely received by Hoover, and (e) if I do not sign, I will not be covered at all for Occupational Injuries or Diseases except for emergency medical treatment to stabilize my condition, such amount not to exceed $5,000.
Also, Participants must abide by all HELP Plan rules. One such rule requires the participant to report an injury through proper channels in a timely manner.
Plaintiff submitted an "Employee Incident Report and Claim Form" with respect to the alleged injury to his back. Hoover denied the claim as untimely based on a HELP Plan requirement that "[n]otice should be immediate or by no later than the end of the shift during which the Accident which is believed to cause (or may lead to) an Occupational Injury occurs, unless good cause for late notice is shown." Plaintiff did not appeal Hoover's denial of benefits for that injury.
Plaintiff commenced this lawsuit in the County Court at Law Number 7, El Paso County, Texas, on April 10, 2000, alleging through an Original Petition that Defendant's negligence injured Plaintiff. Defendant removed the action to this Court, alleging diversity jurisdiction.
The instant motion followed.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment should be granted only where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The party that moves for summary judgment bears an initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery on file, together with any affidavit, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L. Ed.2d 265 (1986). "If the moving party fails to meet this burden, the motion must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant's response." Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995). If the movant does meet this burden, however, the nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See, e.g., Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. "If the non-movant fails to meet this burden, then summary judgment is appropriate." Tubacex, 45 F.3d at 954.
When making a determination under Rule 56, factual questions and inferences are viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmovant. See Lemelle v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 18 F.3d 1268, 1272 (5th Cir. 1994). The party opposing a motion supported by evidence cannot discharge his burden by alleging mere legal conclusions. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Instead, the party must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. See id.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends that Plaintiff cannot recover as a matter of law because the waiver he signed precludes the instant lawsuit. Plaintiff counters that the waiver is void as a matter of law because it contravenes Texas public policy as set forth in the workers' compensation scheme. Plaintiff also argues that Defendant cannot avoid both the Workers' Compensation Act as a non-subscriber and common-law liability through the waiver unless the HELP Plan provides benefits equal to or greater than the Texas workers compensation scheme.
Defendant further contends that Plaintiff made an election of remedies by applying for and accepting benefits under the HELP Plan for injuries occurring both before and after the March 1999 back injury. Plaintiff does not address Defendant's election of remedies argument.
Through Lawrence, the Texas Supreme Court effectively decided this case. There, the essential facts were the same as here: an employee of a non-subscribing employer was injured, could not collect through the company's alternative welfare benefits plan, and had signed a thorough written waiver of his common-law right to sue the employer in order to participate in the employer's plan. See Lawrence, 2001 WL 299542, at *1-2. The plaintiffs in Lawrence argued that the Workers' Compensation Act expressly and implicitly prohibits such waivers, see id., at *3-5, and that the waivers are contrary to public policy. See id., at *6. After considering all of the arguments, the Texas Supreme Court concluded:
The Texas Workers' Compensation Act neither clearly prohibits nor clearly allows voluntary pre-injury employee elections to participate in nonsubscribing employers benefit plans in lieu of exercising common-law remedies. And whether or not such elections should be held void on the theory that they contravene the general statutory scheme and thus violate public policy is a decision that we believe, absent clear legislative guidance and in light of numerous competing public policy concerns, is better left to the Legislature. Accordingly, we decline to invalidate the petitioners' elections on public policy grounds and affirm the court of appeals' judgments.
Id., at *9.
Without recounting each and every argument made in Lawrence, Plaintiff here proffers the same reasons why this Court should ignore the waiver Plaintiff signed that the Texas Supreme Court rejected. Indeed, Plaintiff relies heavily on a case the Texas Supreme Court implicitly rejected, Reyes v. Storage Processors, Inc., 995 S.W.2d 722 (Tex.App. 1999) (holding waiver against public policy where employer's plan offered benefits substantially inferior to workers' compensation). See Lawrence, 2001 WL 299542, at *6 (rejecting Reyes by noting that "courts engaging in such a qualitative, plan-by-plan evaluation is ill-advised" and "deciding whether one set of benefits is substantially equivalent to another presents a number of practical concerns). Further, Plaintiff does not dispute that he signed the waiver, or that that document states that he thereby "waive[d] [his] right to bring any type of lawsuit . . . for all types of negligence under common law, unless gross negligence causes death." Plaintiff's Original Petition states a single negligence claim under Texas common law and does not relate to death. Because the waiver is valid, Plaintiff cannot bring such a claim. Consequently, after due consideration, the Court is of the opinion that Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and, therefore, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant The Hoover Company's "Motion for Summary Judgment" is GRANTED.