Opinion
No. 10-01-00282-CR.
Opinion delivered and filed March 10, 2004. DO NOT PUBLISH. [CRPM].
Appeal from the 87th District Court, Freestone County, Texas, Trial Court #00-0166-CR. Affirmed.
Ronald E. Harden, Law Office of Ronald E. Harden, Terrell, TX, for appellant/relator. Robert W. Gage, Freestone County District Attorney, Farifield, TX, for appellee/respondent.
Before Chief Justice GRAY, Justice VANCE, and Justice REYNA.
This case was submitted with former Chief Justice Davis on the panel, but he resigned effective August 4, 2003. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.1(c). Justice Reyna, who took the oath of office on January 5, 2004, participated in the decision of the court.
OPINION
A jury found Ricky Morgan Smith guilty of conspiring to manufacture methamphetamine, a controlled substance. After pleading true to two enhancement paragraphs, the trial court assessed Smith's punishment at 35 years in prison. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Smith and three other people were stopped in Freestone County, Texas after the pickup which Smith was driving almost collided, head-on, with a Sheriff's department vehicle. Smith did not own the pickup. Deanna Sillman, the front passenger, owned it. After it was stopped, and as the deputies approached the pickup, they noticed several items in the open bed that, together, would be some of the critical components for manufacturing methamphetamine. Smith was arrested on outstanding warrants.MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Prior to trial, Smith filed a Motion to Suppress. At a hearing, he claimed that the evidence seized as a result of the search of the pickup bed violated the United States and Texas Constitutions. The trial court found the search to be proper. On appeal, Smith contends in his first issue that the trial court erred in making this finding. The State contends that Smith has no standing to complain about the search of the pickup. We agree. Only defendants whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated may benefit from the suppression of evidence pursuant to the Exclusionary Rule. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134, 99 S.Ct. 421, 425, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978); Carroll v. State, 56 S.W.3d 644, 650 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, pet. ref'd). The defendant has the burden to establish standing to object to a search. State v. Klima, 934 S.W.2d 109, 110 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). We review standing de novo, as it is a question of law. State v. Allen, 53 S.W.3d 731, 732 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.); State v. Johnson, 896 S.W.2d 277, 285 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995), aff'd, 939 S.W.2d 586 (Tex.Crim. App. 1996). A nonowner driver of a vehicle has no standing to contest the search of the vehicle when the owner of the vehicle is present. See Allen, 53 S.W.3d at 732-733. Sillman testified at the motion to suppress hearing that the pickup was owned by her and that she allowed Smith to drive it. Sillman also testified that she was with Smith, riding in the front passenger seat, when the pickup was stopped and ultimately searched. Smith did not testify. No other evidence was presented as to Smith's potential standing to contest the search. Thus, Smith did not prove that he had standing to contest the search of Sillman's pickup. His first issue is overruled.INADEQUATE BRIEFING
In his second issue, Smith complains that:The trial court erred in denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress because the statements offered by the State were obtained in violation of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure art. 38.22 section (3)(a).It is unclear from the brief to what "statements" Smith is referring. It is clear, however, that the statements offered were not statements made by Smith. This complaint was not a subject of the hearing on Smith's motion to suppress. Thus, it is not preserved for our review. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. Additionally, Smith provides no authority for the proposition that an oral statement by a co-defendant must be electronically recorded to be admissible against another co-defendant. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 § 3(a)(1) (Vernon Pamp. 2004). Therefore, even if Smith had preserved this complaint, his inadequate briefing presents nothing for review. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1; see Walder v. State, 85 S.W.3d 824 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002, order). Smith then contends, in his third issue, the trial court erred in failing to enter an order pursuant to article 38.22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure regarding the voluntariness of the statements of Smith's co-defendants and in failing to instruct the jury not to consider such statements unless they were voluntarily made. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art 38.22 §§ 6, 7 (Vernon Pamp. 2004). Smith again presents nothing that would support the proposition that article 38.22 applies to the voluntariness of co-defendants' statements. His issue is inadequately briefed and presents nothing for review. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1; see Walder v. State, 85 S.W.3d 824 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002, order); see also McCarthy v. State, 65 S.W.3d 47, 49 n. 2 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001).