Opinion
No. 429, 2003.
Submitted: December 23, 2003.
Decided: January 15, 2004.
Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for Sussex County, Cr. ID. No. 0301010494.
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, STEELE and JACOBS, Justices.
ORDER
This 15th day of January 2004, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties it appears to the Court that:
(1) The defendant, Thomas Smith, was charged with DUI and speeding after being stopped by Bethany Beach Police Officer Reynolds. Because Smith's arrest constituted his fourth DUI offense, the case was prosecuted as a felony. Smith pleaded guilty to a fourth-offense DUI and was sentenced to five years' imprisonment at Level V, suspended after eight months for Level III probation.
(2) Several months after Smith's guilty plea, a newspaper reported that Officer Reynolds was not a U.S. citizen. Smith then filed a Rule 61 motion, asking that the Superior Court vacate his conviction in light of the newly discovered evidence that Reynolds should not have been acting as a police officer in Delaware. The Superior Court denied the motion, ruling that Smith's guilty plea waived any right to challenge Reynolds' authority to effectuate his arrest. Smith appeals from the Superior Court's denial of his request for post-conviction relief. This Court reviews for abuse of discretion the Superior Court's denial of post-conviction relief. The Court reviews questions of law de novo.
Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996).
Id.
(3) The Superior Court did not abuse its discretion by denying Smith's request for post-conviction relief. By pleading guilty, Smith waived the right to challenge his arrest. A voluntary guilty plea waives a defendant's right to challenge any errors or defects before the plea, even those of constitutional dimension. In addition, "[a]n illegal arrest, without more, has never been viewed as a bar to subsequent prosecution, nor as a defense to a valid conviction."
See, e.g., Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 631 (Del. 1997) ("[T]he guilty plea constitutes a waiver of a trial on the charges and a waiver of the constitutional rights to which he or she would have been entitled to exercise at a trial."); Rodriguez v. State, No. 456, 2001, 2003 Del. LEXIS 212, at *2 (Del. Apr. 7, 2003) (ORDER) (stating that the defendant's guilty plea "eliminates his claim relating to events that occurred before the entry of the plea"); Lecates v. State, No. 478, 2002, 2003 Del. LEXIS 117, at *3 (Del. Mar. 4, 2003) (ORDER) ("A properly entered plea of guilty constitutes a waiver of all errors or defects occurring before the plea.").
See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1973) (holding that "a guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process," even where the defendant alleges that facts of which he was unaware at the time of his plea constituted a violation of his constitutional rights).
United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474 (1980).
(4) Smith attempts to argue that Reynolds' ineligibility to act as a police officer somehow deprived the Superior Court of jurisdiction of Smith's case. The sole exception to the rule that a guilty plea waivers all errors or defects preceding the plea is a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. An illegal arrest, however, does not impair a court's subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court therefore had jurisdiction to accept Smith's guilty plea. Smith's request for post-conviction relief was properly denied.
See Mumford v. State, No. 388, 1999, 2000 Del. LEXIS 145, at *3 (Del. Apr. 6, 2000) (ORDER) ("[A] properly entered plea of guilty, such as the plea entered here, constitutes a waiver of all errors or defects occurring before the plea, except a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.").
See Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952); State v. Korotki, 418 A.2d 1008, 1012 (Del.Super.Ct. 1980) ("The rule is generally recognized that if a defendant is physically before the Court on an accusatory pleading . . ., the invalidity of the original arrest is immaterial, even though properly raised, with respect to the jurisdiction of the Court to proceed with the case.").
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.