Opinion
A-14116
10-30-2024
RONALD SMITH, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Appearances: Elizabeth D. Friedman, Law Office of Elizabeth D. Friedman, Prineville, Oregon, under contract with the Office of Public Advocacy, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Diane L. Wendlandt, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the Superior Court, First Judicial District, Juneau, Trial Court No. 1JU-00-00105 CR, Jude Pate, Judge.
Appearances: Elizabeth D. Friedman, Law Office of Elizabeth D. Friedman, Prineville, Oregon, under contract with the Office of Public Advocacy, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Diane L. Wendlandt, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Harbison, Judges.
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
Following a retrial, a jury found Ronald Smith guilty of second-degree murder, first-degree robbery, and first-degree assault. At sentencing, the superior court imposed consecutive sentences of 50 years to serve for the second-degree murder conviction, 20 years to serve for the first-degree robbery conviction, and 15 years to serve for the first-degree assault conviction, resulting in a composite sentence of 85 years to serve. We affirmed Smith's convictions and sentence on direct appeal.
AS 11.41.110(a)(3), AS 11.41.500(a)(3), and AS 11.41.200(a)(1), respectively.
Smith v. State, 2009 WL 1039834, at *1 (Alaska App. Apr. 15, 2009) (unpublished).
Smith later filed an application for post-conviction relief, arguing, inter alia, that his double jeopardy rights had been violated because the first-degree robbery and first-degree assault verdicts should have merged. The superior court converted this post-conviction relief claim into a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Alaska Criminal Rule 35(a). The superior court subsequently granted the motion, merging the assault and robbery counts into a single conviction for first-degree robbery.
The superior court then held a resentencing hearing. At the hearing, the court re-imposed 50 years to serve for the murder conviction and 20 years to serve for the robbery conviction, resulting in a composite sentence of 70 years to serve. Smith now appeals.
On appeal, Smith argues that his procedural due process rights were violated at the resentencing because the superior court referenced Smith's ongoing litigation efforts to overturn his convictions when evaluating the genuineness of Smith's expression of remorse. Smith argues that the court's references to his ongoing postconviction relief litigation indicate that the court was penalizing Smith for exercising his constitutional right to pursue such litigation.
We do not interpret the court's comments as Smith does. In its comments, the court expressly recognized Smith's right to pursue the additional post-conviction relief litigation, and the court did not penalize Smith for exercising that right. Rather, the court was only noting the discrepancy between Smith's expression of remorse at the resentencing and the factual positions Smith had taken both at trial and in his postconviction relief litigation about the events that led to his convictions. We thus reject this claim of error.
Smith also argues that the superior court erred because it did not revisit the trial court's "worst offender" finding from the original sentencing. But the superior court was not required to do so. This matter had already been litigated on appeal, and this Court had determined that the record supported the superior court's finding that Smith was a "worst offender." Decisions on issues decided in an earlier appeal "become the law of the case and should not be reconsidered on remand or in a subsequent appeal except where there exist exceptional circumstances presenting a clear error constituting a manifest injustice." The requisite exceptional circumstances are absent here. We therefore see no error in the superior court not revisiting this issue.
Id. at *4.
Downs v. State, 349 P.3d 189, 190 (Alaska App. 2015) (quoting Beal v. Beal, 209 P.3d 1012, 1016-17 (Alaska 2009)).
Smith additionally argues that the superior court erred in failing to consider his potential for rehabilitation. But a review of the record demonstrates that the superior court did consider Smith's potential for rehabilitation. The court considered letters of support submitted by Smith's family and friends, evidence of Smith's rehabilitation efforts in prison, and support letters from correctional officers. The court simply reached the conclusion that other Chaney factors were more important(although the court did reduce Smith's sentence from 85 years to 70 years to serve).
See LaLonde v. State, 614 P.2d 808, 811 (Alaska 1980) ("It is within the discretion of the sentencing judge to assign priorities among the Chaney factors." (citing Asitonia v. State, 508 P.2d 1023, 1026 (Alaska 1973)).
Smith's underlying argument appears to be that his sentence is excessive in light of his improved prospects for rehabilitation. When we review an excessive sentence claim, we independently examine the record to determine whether the sentence is clearly mistaken. The "clearly mistaken" standard contemplates that different "reasonable judges, confronted with identical facts, can and will differ on what constitutes an appropriate sentence[,]" and that a reviewing court will not modify a sentence that falls within "a permissible range of reasonable sentences." We previously upheld the 85-year sentence originally imposed as not clearly mistaken. Having independently reviewed the sentencing record at the resentencing, we likewise conclude that the 70-year sentence imposed here is not clearly mistaken.
McClain v. State, 519 P.2d 811, 813-14 (Alaska 1974).
Erickson v. State, 950 P.2d 580, 586 (Alaska App. 1997) (citing State v. Wentz, 805 P.2d 962, 965 (Alaska 1991)).
Smith, 2009 WL 1039834, at *4.
Lastly, Smith argues that the felony-murder doctrine is unjust and notes that other states have abandoned it. But as the State points out, this is an argument for the legislature, not the courts.
See Dancer v. State, 715 P.2d 1174, 1176 (Alaska App. 1986) ("Policy arguments advocating changes to constitutional legislation must be addressed to the legislature, not the courts.").
As part of this claim, Smith also argues that there is an unjustified sentencing disparity between his co-defendant's sentence (70 years with 25 suspended) and his own sentence - 70 years to serve. Smith argues that his sentence should be lower than his co-defendant's sentence because it was his co-defendant, not Smith, who struck the fatal blow to the victim.
However, the resentencing judge found that Smith's criminal history "calls for a significant sentence." And the original sentencing judge compared Smith's criminal history with his co-defendant's criminal history and determined that the difference between them was "substantial justification for a difference in the sentences." In addition, the resentencing judge found that, although Smith had not struck the fatal blow, his conduct in bringing a shotgun to the scene and assaulting one of the victims made him equally culpable and had "set everything up for [the fatal blow] to happen." Given these findings, we reject this claim.
The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.