Opinion
CIVIL NO. 1:14-CV-01329
07-17-2017
AMANDA SMITH, Plaintiff, v. SNYDER COUNTY PRISON, et al., Defendants.
(Judge Kane) ()
I. Introduction.
The plaintiff, Amanda Smith ("Smith"), commenced this civil rights action, pursuant to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by filing a complaint (doc. 1), followed by an amended complaint (doc. 5). At the core of her amended complaint, Smith alleges that, during her incarceration at the Snyder County Prison, she was treated differently from the other inmates at that prison because she is transgender. In connection with these allegations, Smith raises an Eighth Amendment claim for cruel and unusual punishment, a Fourteenth Amendment claim for denial of equal protection, and a Monell claim against the following defendants: (1) Snyder County; (2) Ruth Rush, who, at all times relevant to the amended complaint, was employed as the Warden at Snyder County Prison (hereinafter, "Warden Rush" or "Rush"); (3) Shawn Cooper, who, at all times relevant to the amended complaint, was employed as the Deputy Warden at the Snyder County Prison ("Deputy Warden Cooper" or "Cooper"); and (4) the Snyder County Prison Board. After answering the amended complaint, and following an extended period of discovery, the defendants filed a collective motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The defendants' motion, which has been fully briefed, is ripe for the Court's disposition. For the reasons that follow, we recommend granting their motion in its entirety.
Although Smith also raises these claims against "John and/or Jane Doe Defendants," who were allegedly "employed as corrections officers and other prison officials, including medical staff," doc. 5 at ¶ 5, she has neither identified these defendants, nor effectuated service upon them. Thus, as discussed more fully below, the "John and/or Jane Doe Defendants" should be dismissed from this action pursuant to Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m).
II. Material Facts.
Pursuant to the Local Rules for the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, the defendants, as the party moving for summary judgment, have submitted "a separate, short and concise statement of the material facts, in numbered paragraphs, as to which [they] contend[ that] there is no genuine issue to be tried." M.D. Pa. L.R. 56.1. Smith, as the non-moving party, has also submitted "a separate, short and concise statement of the material facts, responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in [the defendants' statement], as to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be tried." Id. The undisputed material facts, as culled from the parties' statements, are as follows.
A. Background.
Smith was incarcerated at the Snyder County Prison from August 5, 2013, until August 8, 2013. Doc. 46 at ¶ 1; doc. 51 at ¶ 1. During the time of Smith's incarceration, Rush served as the Warden of the Snyder County Prison. Doc. 46 at ¶ 2; doc. 51 at ¶ 2. In May of 2014, Warden Rush retired from that position. Doc. 46 at ¶ 2; doc. 51 at ¶ 2. Similarly, during the time of Smith's incarceration, Cooper served as the Deputy Warden of the Snyder County Prison. Doc. 46 at ¶ 3; doc. 51 at ¶ 3. Upon Rush's retirement in 2014, however, Cooper assumed the position of Warden. Doc. 46 at ¶ 3; doc. 51 at ¶ 3.
B. The Restricted Housing Unit at the Snyder County Prison.
The Snyder County Prison has a restricted housing unit, which consists of separate male and female units. Doc. 46 at ¶¶ 5, 6; doc. 51 at ¶¶ 5, 6. Inmates can be placed in the single cells of those units for a number of reasons, including medical, disciplinary, and administrative reasons, as well as for protective custody. Doc. 46 at ¶ 5; doc. 51 at ¶ 5. Apart from segregation for disciplinary reasons, inmates placed in the restricted housing unit are provided with equal access to hygiene, recreation, visitation, and educational programs in the prison. Doc. 46 at ¶ 12; doc. 51 at ¶ 12.
None of the evidence to which Smith cites directly refutes the defendants' factual assertion that inmates in the restricted housing unit—apart from those who are placed there for disciplinary reasons—have equal access to hygiene, recreation, visitation, and educational programs. Rather, Smith's evidence only evinces her complaints of sleeping on a thin mattress, having freezing air blow on her, being denied Ibuprofen, not having shoes that fit her, and not seeing guards for hours at a time. See doc. 51 at ¶ 12.
When inmates are placed in the restricted housing unit, they receive a written form titled, "Notice of Administrative Segregation," which states the reason for the inmate's placement. Doc. 46 at ¶ 7; doc. 51 at ¶ 7. The decision to remove an inmate from the restricted housing unit is made on a case-by-case basis. Doc. 46 at ¶ 13; doc. 51 at ¶ 13. But, generally speaking, the decision to keep an inmate in the restricted housing unit or to remove him or her therefrom is made 72 hours after the inmate's placement. Doc. 46 at ¶ 13; doc. 51 at ¶ 13.
Since the Snyder County Prison does not have an infirmary, inmates may be placed in the restricted housing unit for medical reasons so that the correctional officers can more closely observe those inmates. Doc. 46 at ¶ 8; doc. 51 at ¶ 8. The parties argue whether inmates, who are on a medical detox, are placed in the restricted housing unit at the Snyder County Prison for such closer observation. The defendants have submitted the deposition testimony of Warden Rush, who testified that male and female inmates at the Snyder County Prison have been placed in the restricted housing unit for closer observation when they are going through detox. Doc. 46 at ¶¶ 9, 10 (citing doc. 46-2 at 9 (dep. 33:13-34:11)). The defendants have also submitted Warden Rush's affidavit, where she reiterates this testimony. See doc. 46 at ¶¶ 9, 10 (citing doc. 46-1 at ¶¶ 13-15). And, attached to her affidavit are a number of documents, titled "R.H.U Inmate Restrictions," which establish that other inmates at the Snyder County Prison have been placed in the RHU while on a "detox watch" or "coming down" off of drugs and alcohol. See, e.g., doc. 46-1 at 19, 20, 23, 24, 25.
In response, Smith has submitted the deposition testimony of Kathy Paul ("Paul"), the former Health Services Administrator at PrimeCare Medical, Inc. ("PrimeCare") for Snyder County Prison, who testified that Smith was on an opiate detox, a detox for which placement in the restricted housing unit was not necessary. Doc. 51 at ¶¶ 9, 10 (citing doc. 46-5 at 5 (dep. 17:19-22)). Smith has also submitted the deposition testimony of Lauren Edgell, a former L.P.N at PrimeCare for the Snyder County Prison (hereinafter, "Edgell"), who testified that the mere fact an inmate is placed on opiate detox does not automatically require that the inmate be placed in segregation. See doc. 51 at ¶¶ 9, 10 (citing doc. 46-4 at 6 (dep. 21:11-15)); see also doc. 46-4 at 2 (dep. 7:5-22) (Edgell testifying at her deposition that when she worked for PrimeCare at the Snyder County Prison, her job position at that time was an L.P.N).
Since approximately 2006, well before Smith's incarceration in 2013, Snyder County has contracted with PrimeCare to provide medical care to inmates at the Snyder County Prison. Doc. 46 at ¶ 4; doc. 51 at ¶ 4.
Although the parties disagree as to whether inmates, who are on a medical detox, are placed, or need to be placed, in the restricted housing unit, they do not dispute the following fact: even though PrimeCare may advise as to the need for medical observation in the restricted housing unit, the ultimate decision to place an inmate in, or remove an inmate from, the restricted housing unit lies solely within the discretion of the prison administration. Doc. 46 at ¶ 11; doc. 51 at ¶ 11; see also doc. 46-5 at 5 (dep. 19:22-24) (Paul testifying that it was not her recommendation to place Smith in segregation).
C. Smith's Intake, Initial Classification, and Medical Screening.
Smith arrived at the Snyder County Prison on August 5, 2013. Doc. 46 at ¶ 14; doc. 51 at ¶ 14. Although she was a Union County prisoner, the Union County Prison cannot accommodate female inmates, and as a result, Smith was transferred to the Snyder County Prison. Doc. 46 at ¶ 15; doc. 51 at ¶ 15. Smith was sent with a transfer information sheet, which stated that "SHE USED TO BE A MALE[,]" and that her "[s]ex change [was] complete [in] 1998." Doc. 51 at ¶ 15 (quoting doc. 51-2 at 1). Upon her arrival at the Snyder County Prison, Smith was housed in the E Wing, which is the female housing wing of the prison. Doc. 46 at ¶ 16; doc. 51 at ¶ 16. Smith admits that she was originally placed in the E Wing with other female inmates. Doc. 46 at ¶ 17; doc. 51 at ¶ 17.
During the intake process at the Snyder County Prison, the inmates are subject to a medical screening, which is conducted by a PrimeCare employee, and the inmates are also apprised of their ability to seek medical care while incarcerated. Doc. 46 at ¶ 18; doc. 51 at ¶ 18. During Smith's medical screening, it was revealed that she was taking a Percocet (a prescription narcotic) four times a day. Doc. 46 at ¶ 19; doc. 51 at ¶ 19. Smith testified that she recalls discussing her opiate medication with the medical official performing her intake evaluation, and further, that the official explained to Smith that although she would be provided with pain medication, she was not permitted to use opiates while incarcerated at prison. Doc. 46 at ¶ 20; doc. 51 at ¶ 20. Smith knew that the prohibition on opiate use was prison-wide and that other inmates at the prison were also barred from taking opiate medication while incarcerated. Doc. 46 at ¶ 21; doc. 51 at ¶ 21.
When the PrimeCare employee, who was completing Smith's evaluation, learned of Smith's daily narcotic use, she contacted a PrimeCare physician's assistant who instructed the PrimeCare employee to place Smith on an opiate detox protocol. Doc. 46 at ¶ 22; doc. 51 at ¶ 22. Despite this undisputed fact, Paul, the Health Services Administrator, did not know why Smith was on an opiate detox because that detox is meant for inmates who have opiates in their system when they enter the prison, not inmates who are on prescription medication like Oxycodone. Doc. 51 at ¶ 22 (citing doc. 46-5 at 3 (dep. 10:23-11:9)). Nevertheless, the parties do not dispute that the decision to place an inmate on opiate detox is made by a PrimeCare physician or doctor, not a Snyder County Prison official. Doc. 46 at ¶ 23; doc. 51 at ¶ 23.
As part of her opiate detox protocol, Smith was placed on a 30-minute detox watch (doc. 46 at ¶ 24; doc. 51 at ¶ 24) and a prescription drug regimen, which included Tylenol III, a narcotic pain medicine (doc. 46 at ¶ 25; doc. 51 at ¶ 25). Smith admits that she received medications, including pain medicine, during incarceration. Doc. 46 at ¶ 26; doc. 51 at ¶ 26. Smith was also placed on bottom bunk status, which is part of standard PrimeCare detox policy. Doc. 46 at ¶ 27; doc. 51 at ¶ 27. In fact, the entire medical protocol concerning opiate detox is the policy of PrimeCare, not the Snyder County Prison. Doc. 46 at ¶ 28; doc. 51 at ¶ 28.
D. Smith's Medical Issues and Transfer to the Restricted Housing Unit.
On August 6, 2013, the day after Smith arrived at the Snyder County Prison, she experienced a medical incident while finishing breakfast with other female inmates in the E Wing of the prison. Doc. 46 at ¶ 29; doc. 51 at ¶ 29. More specifically, Smith, after complaining of dizziness, fell down, and another inmate attempted to help Smith to her bed. Doc. 46 at ¶ 30; doc. 51 at ¶ 30. Correctional Officer Frampton issued a medical emergency code and the on-duty prison nurse responded and evaluated Smith "without further incident." Doc. 46 at ¶ 31; doc. 51 at ¶ 31. Smith admits that she was promptly tended to and assessed by medical staff following this incident. Doc. 46 at ¶ 32; doc. 51 at ¶ 32.
Established Snyder County Prison policy authorizes the placement of an inmate in the restricted housing unit for the purpose of administrative segregation brought about by the need for medical observation. Doc. 46 at ¶ 37; doc. 51 at ¶ 37. Within thirty minutes after her falling incident, Smith was transferred to D Block, which is the female restricted housing unit at the Snyder County Prison. Doc. 46 at ¶¶ 38, 39; doc. 51 at ¶¶ 38, 39. Smith testified that she was transferred to the restricted housing unit by a male who identified himself as the Deputy Warden and that this Deputy Warden explained to her that she was being transferred for medical reasons. Doc. 46 at ¶ 40; doc. 51 at ¶ 40. The Deputy Warden also handed Smith documentation, specifying that her transfer was brought about due to medical reasons. Doc. 46 at ¶ 41; doc. 51 at ¶ 41.
Smith also testified, however, that, at that time, she did not know to where she was being transferred. Doc. 46 at ¶ 40; doc. 51 at ¶ 40.
In support of these facts, the defendants have submitted the deposition testimony of Deputy Warden Cooper for the proposition that because Smith was already on the 30-minute opiate detox watch and was exhibiting additional medical problems (i.e., dizziness and falling episodes), Smith was transferred to the female restricted housing unit for closer medical observation. Doc. 46 at ¶ 33 (citing doc. 46-3 at 21 (dep. 21:11-22:12 and 30:6-31:1)). Smith, however, points to the testimony of Paul and Edgell, who—as previously noted—were medical employees of PrimeCare at the time, for the proposition that placement in the restricted housing unit for opiate detox was not necessary. See doc. 51 at ¶ 33 (citing, inter alia, doc. 51 at ¶ 9 (citing doc. 46-5 at 5 (dep. 17:19-22) and doc. 46-4 at 6 (dep. 21:11-15))).
Although it is possible, however, for an inmate to go through detox in general population, a detoxing inmate is generally placed in the restricted housing unit for one-on-one observation when the inmate exhibits additional medical difficulties. Doc. 46 at ¶ 34; doc. 51 at ¶ 34. Indeed, other male and female inmates going through detox have been placed in the restricted housing unit for closer medical observation when they have exhibited other medical issues during the course of detox. Doc. 46 at ¶ 35; see also doc. 46-2 at 9 (dep. 33:21-34:11) (setting forth Warden Rush's deposition testimony that an inmate, whether male or female, who is on detox, would be placed in the restricted housing unit if he or she is "having problems . . . with the detoxing[,]" prison officials were having to call "codes" or having to "take [the inmate] to the hospital."). Placement in the restricted housing unit allows prison officials to more closely observe an inmate with such medical problems. Doc. 46 at ¶ 36; see also doc. 46-2 at 9 (dep. 33:13-20 and 36:15-37:8) (setting forth Warden Rush's deposition testimony that an inmate's placement in the restricted housing unit permits prison officials to more closely observe that inmate). Smith testified during her deposition, however, that the common area of the restricted housing unit—which is comprised of a table, television, and showers—could not be observed from the hallway because the glass windows were blocked with papers and bulletin boards. Doc. 51 at ¶ 36 (citing doc. 46-7 at 89 (dep. 89:4-24)). She also testified that there were instances where she did not see any guards for hours at a time, and that even though the door to "come and go" in the common area had a small glass window in it, which could be seen through, Smith could not be seen through that window if she was sitting at the table in the common area. See doc. 51 at ¶ 36 (citing doc. 46-7 at 89-90 (dep. 89:25-90:15)). Finally, she offered evidence that, although there were cameras in the RHU that were monitored by the "main control officer," that officer was also responsible for overseeing all of the other cameras in the prison, including those in all of the housing units, the hallways, the recreation yards, and the intake yard, and further, that this officer had other responsibilities in addition to watching the cameras. Doc. 51 at ¶ 36 (citing doc. 46-9 at 7-9 (dep. 7:20-9:3)).
Smith does not offer evidence that specifically refutes these facts. Although Smith testified at her deposition that she knew a woman in general population, who was going through a heroin withdrawal but who was never placed in segregation, Smith did not testify, or otherwise offer any other evidence in support thereof, that this same woman had similar additional medical difficulties, including for instance, passing out. See doc. 51 at ¶ 34; see also doc. 46-7 at 112-13. In fact, when the defendants' counsel asked Smith to identify the "troubles" that this other female inmate was having, Smith did not identify any additional "troubles;" she only testified that the woman had experienced a "[h]eroine withdrawal." Doc. 46-7 at 113 (dep. 112:18-113:4). And, finally, Smith admitted during her deposition that she has no knowledge as to whether transgender inmates who have passed out in the Snyder County Prison were transferred to the restricted housing unit for observation or whether they remained in general population. Doc. 46 at ¶ 63; doc. 51 at ¶ 63.
In connection with all of these facts, the defendants have also submitted the deposition testimony of Deputy Warden Cooper that, at the time he placed Smith in the female restricted housing unit, he had no knowledge of the fact that Smith was transgender. Doc. 46 at ¶ 42. Smith does not dispute this testimony; instead, she points to other portions of his deposition testimony. More specifically, she points to the portion, where Deputy Warden Cooper stated that he was, nevertheless, generally aware of the fact that a female prisoner, who had undergone a sex change, had been transferred from Union County Prison to Snyder County Prison. Doc. 51 at ¶ 42 (citing doc. 46-3 at 48 (dep. 48:16-22)). She also points to the portion, where Deputy Warden Cooper stated that he eventually became aware of the fact that the individual he formerly knew as "Andy Smith" was now inmate "Amanda Smith." Doc. 51 at ¶ 42 (citing doc. 46-3 at 53 (dep. 53:16-20)). As explained by Deputy Warden Cooper, he knew Andy Smith's family since he was about 12 years old; he and Andy played little league together; and they went to the same high school. Doc. 51 at ¶ 42 (citing doc. 46-3 at 53-54 (dep. 53:21-54:1)). Per Deputy Warden Cooper, however, this fact did not register with him until after he had already placed Smith in the female restricted housing unit. See doc. 46-3 at 49 (dep. 49:3-6) (testifying that he did not know that Smith was transgender when he transferred her to the restrictive housing unit on August 6, 2013); id. at 54 (dep. 54:5-21) (testifying that this did not register with him until after Smith had her medical incident and was taken to the hospital for an evaluation, because it was at that point in time that he looked at her central file and realized, given the family information in that file, that Amanda Smith was the Andy Smith he knew in the '70s back in Lewisburg).
As discussed below, Smith was taken to the hospital on August 7, 2013. See doc. 46 at ¶ 52; doc. 51 at ¶ 52.
The defendants similarly submit the testimony of Warden Rush for the same proposition—that, at the time Smith was placed in the restricted housing unit, Warden Rush was not aware of the fact that Smith had undergone a sex reassignment surgery. Doc. 46 at ¶ 42; Doc. 46-2 at 5 (dep. 19:3-7). At Warden Rush's deposition, the following exchange occurred:
[Smith's Counsel] Q: Have - - were you ever made aware of the fact that [Smith] had undergone a sex reassignment surgery?Doc. 46-2 at 5 (dep. 19).
[Warden Rush] A: I was, but I think it was after she had gone to the hospital.
Smith contends that this testimony "is not that clear, as [Warden Rush] thought it could have been after [Smith] went to the hospital." Doc. 51 at ¶ 43.
E. Smith's Continued Medical Care and Hospitalization.
The defendants assert that, pursuant to the 30-minute opiate detox watch ordered by PrimeCare, Smith was observed by prison staff every thirty minutes to monitor her medical condition. Doc. 46 at ¶ 44; see also doc. 46-1 at 5, ¶ 19. In support, they attach copies of the "Thirty Minute (30 min.) Watch Sheet[s]," evincing the detox watch of Smith. Doc. 46-1 at 27-32. In response, Smith points to her deposition testimony, which we previously recounted: that there were instances where she would not see any guards for hours at a time; the common area of the restricted housing unit could not be observed from the hallway; and the main control officer who monitored the cameras in the restricted housing unit, had other responsibilities in addition to watching the cameras. Doc. 51 at ¶¶ 44, 36.
As part of Smith's course of medical care, she was prescribed Tylenol III, a prescription narcotic pain reliever that she received on a daily basis while incarcerated at the Snyder County Prison. Doc. 46 at ¶ 45; doc. 51 at ¶ 45. Smith also received other prescription medications to treat her various medical conditions while incarcerated at the prison, including Visitaril, Phenergan, and Zantac. Doc. 46 at ¶ 46; doc. 51 at ¶ 46. Smith admits that she received medication and was evaluated by medical staff each day, including while she was housed in the restricted housing unit. Doc. 46 at ¶ 47; doc. 51 at ¶ 47. Any decision concerning the dosage of Smith's pain medication was made by a PrimeCare physician; prison officials had no control over the dosage of Smith's pain medication prescription. Doc. 46 at ¶ 48; doc. 51 at ¶ 48. In addition to the 30-minute detox watch and prescription drug regimen, Smith was also monitored for withdrawal symptoms by PrimeCare medical staff at least once per day while incarcerated at the Snyder County Prison. Doc. 46 at ¶ 49; doc. 51 at ¶ 49. Smith received medical care everyday while incarcerated at the Snyder County Prison, which included the administration of prescription medications to treat Smith's medical conditions. Doc. 46 at ¶ 50; doc. 51 at ¶ 50.
On August 7, 2013, when Smith experienced another falling incident during a medical evaluation by a PrimeCare medical staff member (doc. 46 at ¶ 51; doc. 51 at ¶ 51), she was transported to the emergency room of Evangelical Community Hospital for additional medical care (doc. 46 at ¶ 52; doc. 51 at ¶ 52). At the hospital, Smith was diagnosed as experiencing hyperventilation, narcotics withdrawal, and back pain. Doc. 46 at ¶ 53; doc. 51 at ¶ 53. The medical professional treating Smith determined, however, that her overall condition was "good," and Smith was discharged from the hospital and returned to the custody of the Snyder County Prison. Doc. 46 at ¶ 54; doc. 51 at ¶ 54.
With respect to the conditions of the restricted housing unit, the defendants have submitted evidence that the temperature of the restricted housing unit is the same as the other cell blocks because the temperature is all controlled by one unit. Doc. 46 at ¶ 55 (citing doc. 46-2 at 9 (dep. 34:12-20)). Smith, however, testified at her deposition that general population was "warmer." Doc. 51 at ¶ 55 (citing doc. 46-7 at 113 (dep. 113:23-25)). The defendants also submitted evidence that Smith, while in the restricted housing unit, did not request Edgell to provide her with an extra mattress or extra blanket for her bunk. Doc. 46 at ¶ 56 (citing doc. 46-4 at 8 (dep. 31:13-18)). Based on this evidence, the defendants submit that Smith, while in the restricted housing unit, did not complain to Edgell about the conditions thereof. Id. at ¶ 57 (citing doc. 46-4 at 8 (dep. 31:13-18)). Smith, however, testified at her deposition, that: generally speaking, she "was never given shoes that fit [her]" (doc. 46-7 at 73 (dep. 73:17-19)); she was only given a "thin, inch thick mattress" to put on a cement slab to sleep on (id. at 93 (dep. 93:9-10)); she was denied Ibuprofen (id. at 110 (dep. 110:15-16)); and she told "the nurses" that "the blower" in the restricted housing unit "blows freezing cold air" (id. at 93 (dep. 93:5-7)).
F. Smith's Release From the Snyder County Prison.
Smith was released from the Snyder County Prison on August 8, 2013, approximately 72 hours after her initial arrival to the prison. Doc. 46 at ¶ 58; doc. 51 at ¶ 58. The parties dispute whether Smith's status as a transgender inmate had any impact on the way prison officials treated her during her brief incarceration. The defendants have submitted the deposition testimony of Deputy Warden Cooper that Smith's status, as a transgender individual, did not impact any decision he made concerning Smith's incarceration at the prison. Doc. 46 at ¶ 59. During his deposition, Deputy Warden Cooper testified that the reason he sent Smith to the restricted housing unit was, "[he was] certain[,] probably because of the opiate detox that she was going through." Doc. 46-3 at 22 (dep. 22:3-5). Deputy Warden Cooper further testified that it was "[m]ore than likely" that there was a discussion between the medical department and the prison administration. Id. at 22 (dep. 22:10-12). Similarly, the defendants have submitted the deposition testimony of Warden Rush, where she testified that she had no recollection of being involved in the decision to place Smith in the restricted housing unit. Doc. 46 at ¶ 60; doc. 51 at ¶ 60.
III. Legal Standards.
The defendants have moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). "Through summary adjudication the court may dispose of those claims that do not present a 'genuine dispute as to any material fact' and for which a jury trial would be an empty and unnecessary formality." Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, 811 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1091 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)).
The moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). With respect to an issue on which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof, the moving party may discharge that burden by "'showing'—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 325.
Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleading; rather, the nonmoving party must show a genuine dispute by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials" or "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). If the nonmoving party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial," summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Summary judgment is also appropriate if the nonmoving party provides merely colorable, conclusory, or speculative evidence. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). There must be more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the nonmoving party and more than some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Id. at 252. "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
The substantive law identifies which facts are material, and "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute about a material fact is genuine only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis that would allow a reasonable fact finder to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. at 248-49. When "faced with a summary judgment motion, the court must view the facts 'in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.'" N.A.A.C.P. v. N. Hudson Reg'l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 475 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)).
At the summary judgment stage, the judge's function is not to weigh the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter; rather it is to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. The proper inquiry of the court "is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial—whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Id. at 250.
Summary judgment is warranted, after adequate time for discovery, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. "Under such circumstances, 'there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.'" Anderson v. CONRAIL, 297 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). "[S]ummary judgment is essentially 'put up or shut up' time for the non-moving party: the non-moving party must rebut the motion with facts in the record and cannot rest solely on assertions made in the pleadings, legal memoranda, or oral argument." Berckeley Inv. Group, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006).
IV. Discussion.
A. The "John and/or Jane Doe Defendants" Should be Dismissed.
As an initial matter, it is recommended that the "John and/or Jane Doe Defendants" be dismissed pursuant to Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 4(m) provides that "[i]f a defendant is not served within [120] days after the complaint is filed, the court - on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff - must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time. But[,] if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, [then] the court must extend the time for service for an appropriate period." FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m).
Effective December 1, 2015, Rule 4(m) was amended to reduce the time for service of process from 120 days to 90 days. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m) advisory comm. note (2015 Amendment) (explaining that the amendment was intended to "reduce delay at the beginning of litigation."). Smith's amended complaint was filed on September 12, 2014, well before the December 2015 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure took effect. Thus, the most just and practicable course of action is for the Court to apply the 120-day time period in deciding whether to dismiss the "John and/or Jane Doe Defendants." See Order ¶¶ 1-2 (U.S. Apr. 29, 2015) (amending, among other rules, FED. R. CIV. P. 4), available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/frcv15(update)_1823.pdf (Apr. 29, 2015) ("[T]he foregoing amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shall take effect on December 1, 2015, and shall govern in all proceedings in civil cases thereafter commenced and, insofar as just and practicable, all proceedings then pending.").
Here, more than 120 days have elapsed since Smith filed her amended complaint, asserting claims against the unnamed "John and/or Jane Doe Defendants." See doc. 5 at ¶ 5. Smith, however, has not made progress in identifying or serving these defendants. She has also not shown good cause for her failure to do so. Thus, it is recommended that the "John and/or Jane Doe Defendants" be dismissed from this action pursuant to Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
B. Eighth Amendment Claims.
In Count I of the amended complaint, Smith alleges an Eighth Amendment claim for cruel and unusual punishment based on allegations that the defendants knew of her medical needs, yet failed to provide her with adequate medical care to treat those needs. See doc. 5 at ¶¶ 28-33. Similarly, in Count II, Smith alleges an Eighth Amendment claim for denial of medical care based, once again, on allegations that the defendants knew of her medical needs, yet failed to provide her with adequate medical care to treat those needs. See id. at ¶¶ 34-38. As the defendants have explained in their brief in support of their motion for summary judgment, however, these two counts are one and the same. See doc. 45 at 6-7. Smith has acknowledged as much. See doc. 52 at 3 (explaining that Count II, her denial of medical care claim, should be considered as part of Count I, her cruel and unusual punishment claim). Thus, Counts I and II of the amended complaint will be addressed together as an Eighth Amendment claim for cruel and unusual punishment based on the defendants' alleged deliberate indifference to Smith's serious medical needs. See generally Ham v. Greer, 269 F. App'x 149, 151 (3d Cir. 2008) ("The Eighth Amendment's prohibition on 'cruel and unusual punishments' proscribes deliberate indifference to prisoners' serious medical needs." (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976))).
1. Eighth Amendment Medical Care Claim.
"An inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103. In order for a plaintiff to allege a viable Eighth Amendment medical care claim, he must allege facts from which it can reasonably be inferred that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Id. at 104; see also Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 637 (3d Cir. 1995) ("Failure to provide medical care to a person in custody can rise to the level of a constitutional violation under § 1983 only if that failure rises to the level of deliberate indifference to that person's serious medical needs."). This is a two-part inquiry: "a plaintiff must make (1) a subjective showing that 'the defendants were deliberately indifferent to [his or her] medical needs' and (2) an objective showing that 'those needs were serious.'" Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999)).
A medical need is serious if it "has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment" or if it "is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Pace v. Fauver, 479 F. Supp. 456, 458 (D.N.J. 1979), aff'd, 649 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1981) (table)). Additionally, "if 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' results as a consequence of denial or delay in the provision of adequate medical care, the medical need is of the serious nature contemplated by the eighth amendment." Id. (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103). Further, "where denial or delay causes an inmate to suffer a life-long handicap or permanent loss, the medical need is considered serious." Id.
Deliberate indifference is a subjective standard. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 840 (1994). "To act with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is to recklessly disregard a substantial risk of serious harm." Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 330 (3d Cir. 2009). To act with deliberate indifference, the prison official must have known of the substantial risk of serious harm and must have disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. "[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Id.
The mere misdiagnosis of a condition or medical need, or negligent treatment provided for a condition, is not actionable as a constitutional claim because medical malpractice is not a constitutional violation. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835 (holding that "deliberate indifference describes a state of mind more blameworthy than negligence"); Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004) ("Allegations of medical malpractice are not sufficient to establish a Constitutional violation."); Singletary v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 192 n.2 (3d Cir. 2002) (claims of medical malpractice, absent evidence of a culpable state of mind, do not constitute deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment). Instead, deliberate indifference represents a much higher standard, one that requires "obduracy and wantonness, which has been likened to conduct that includes recklessness or a conscious disregard of a serious risk." Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)).
"Indeed, prison authorities are accorded considerable latitude in the diagnosis and treatment of prisoners." Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). And courts will "disavow any attempt to second guess the propriety or adequacy of a particular course of treatment . . . (which) remains a question of sound professional judgment." Spencer v. Courtier, 552 F. App'x 121, 124 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979)). "Mere disagreement as to the proper medical treatment does not support an Eighth Amendment claim." Caldwell v. Luzerne Cnty. Corr. Facility Mgmt. Employees, 732 F. Supp. 2d 458, 472 (M.D. Pa. 2010).
Thus,"[w]here a prisoner has received some amount of medical treatment, it is difficult to establish deliberate indifference, because prison officials are afforded considerable latitude in the diagnosis and treatment of prisoners." Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 228 (3d Cir. 2017). "Nonetheless, there are circumstances in which some care is provided yet it is insufficient to satisfy constitutional requirements." Id.
The Third Circuit has found deliberate indifference where a prison official: "(1) knows of a prisoner's need for medical treatment but intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary medical treatment based on a non-medical reason; or (3) prevents a prisoner from receiving needed or recommended medical treatment." Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). The Third Circuit has also held that "[n]eedless suffering resulting from the denial of simple medical care, which does not serve any penological purpose, . . . violates the Eighth Amendment." Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 266 (3d Cir. 2003). "For instance, prison officials may not, with deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of the inmate, opt for 'an easier and less efficacious treatment' of the inmate's condition." Palakovic, 854 F.3d at 228 (quoting West v. Keve, 571 F.2d 158, 162 (3d Cir. 1978). "Nor may 'prison authorities deny reasonable requests for medical treatment . . . [when] such denial exposes the inmate to undue suffering or the threat of tangible residual injury.'" Id. (quoting Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Institutional Inmates, 834 F.2d at 346). Thus, "[a] 'failure to provide adequate care . . . [that] was deliberate, and motivated by non-medical factors' is actionable under the Eighth Amendment, but 'inadequate care [that] was a result of an error in medical judgment' is not." Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 337 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Durmer, 991 F.2d at 69).
"[T]here is a critical distinction 'between cases where the complaint alleges a complete denial of medical care and those alleging inadequate medical treatment.'" Pearson, 850 F.3d at 535 (quoting United States ex. rel. Walker v. Fayette Cty., 599 F.2d 573, 575 n.2 (3d Cir. 1979)). "Because 'mere disagreement as to the proper medical treatment' does not 'support a claim of an eighth amendment violation,' when medical care is provided, we presume that the treatment of a prisoner is proper absent evidence that it violates professional standards of care." Id. (quoting Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst., 834 F.2d at 346). And "there are two very distinct subcomponents to the deliberate indifference prong of an adequacy of care claim." Id. at 536. "The first is the adequacy of the medical care—an objective inquiry where expert testimony could be helpful to the jury." Id. "The second is the individual defendant's state of mind—a subjective inquiry that can be proven circumstantially without expert testimony." Id. But a claim that medical care was delayed or denied completely "must be approached differently than an adequacy of care claim." Id. at 537. "Unlike the deliberate indifference prong of an adequacy of care claim (which involves both an objective and subjective inquiry), the deliberate indifference prong of a delay or denial of medical treatment claim involves only one subjective inquiry—since there is no presumption that the defendant acted properly, it lacks the objective, propriety of medical treatment, prong of an adequacy of care claim." Id. "All that is needed is for the surrounding circumstances to be sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find that the delay or denial was motivated by non-medical factors." Id.
Further, a nonmedical prison official is not deliberately indifferent simply because he or she failed to respond to a prisoner's medical complaints when the prisoner was already being treated by a prison doctor. Durmer, 991 F.2d at 69. "Absent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-medical prison official . . . will not be chargeable with the Eighth Amendment scienter requirement of deliberate indifference." Spruill, 372 F.3d at 236. "[T]he same division of labor concerns that underlie that rule apply when a nurse knows that a prisoner is under a physician's care and has no reason to believe that the doctor is mistreating the prisoner." Pearson, 850 F.3d at 540 n.4. "Given that it is the physician with the ultimate authority to diagnose and prescribe treatment for the prisoner, a nurse who knows that the prisoner is under a physician's care is certainly 'justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands,' id. so long as the nurse has no discernable basis to question the physician's medical judgment." Id. (quoting Spruill, 372 F.3d at 236).
In this case, Smith alleges that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to her "multiple physical conditions which cause her pain[.]" See doc. 52 at 4. Smith, however, has neither identified, nor fully articulated the contours of these conditions. We presume, nevertheless, that she is referring to the conditions she mentioned during her deposition—specifically, "[f]ibromyalgia, rheumatoid arthritis, herniated discs, back surgery . . . [irritable bowel syndrome] and depression." See doc. 51 at ¶ 29 (citing doc. 46-7 at 16 (dep. 16:8-24)). Even assuming that these conditions constitute serious medical needs, we conclude that Smith has failed to submit any evidence demonstrating that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to such needs. And, in light of Smith's failure to do so, we observe the undisputed record, which illustrates that from the time Smith was transferred to Snyder County Prison up until the time she was released therefrom, she was provided with continuous medical care, including medical evaluations, various prescription medications, and even a hospitalization.
More specifically, the undisputed record reflects that upon her arrival to the Snyder County Prison on August 5, 2013, Smith received a medical screening from a PrimeCare employee, during which Smith was placed on a prescription drug regimen, specifically, Tylenol III, and on an opiate detox protocol. The following day, after Smith complained of dizziness and fell, Correctional Officer Frampton issued a medical emergency code, and the on-duty prison nurse responded and evaluated Smith. Smith acknowledges that she was promptly tended to and evaluated by medical staff following this incident. And then, on the following day, Smith fell for a second time and, as a result, was transported to the Evangelical Community Hospital, where she was diagnosed with experiencing hyperventilation, narcotics withdrawal, and back pain. The medical professional treating Smith ultimately determined that Smith's overall condition was good, and consequently, Smith was discharged from the hospital and returned to the Snyder County Prison. And, the following day, approximately 72 hours after she had initially arrived at the prison, Smith was released therefrom.
Although Smith normally takes Percocet four times a day outside of prison, she understood that there was a prohibition on such opiate medication while inside the Snyder County Prison and that this prohibition applied to the other inmates as well.
In addition, the undisputed record reflects, by Smith's own admissions, that during her three-day-incarceration at the Snyder County Prison, she received Tylenol III on a daily basis, as well as other prescription medications to treat her various medical conditions, including Visitaril, Phenergan, and Zantac, and that she was evaluated by medical staff each day of her incarceration.
Apart from this undisputed record, however, we understand the notion that it is difficult for prisoners to establish deliberate indifference when they have received some amount of medical treatment because prison officials are afforded considerable latitude in the treatment of prisoners. See Palakovic, 854 F.3d at 227; see also United States ex rel. Walker v. Fayette County, 599 F.2d 573, 575 n.2 (3d Cir. 1979) ("Where a prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law." (quoted case and quotation marks omitted)). Nevertheless, such prisoners can demonstrate that, while they were provided with some treatment, that treatment was insufficient to satisfy constitutional standards. See Palakovic, 854 F.3d at 227 (explaining, for instance, that prison officials may not, with deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of an inmate opt for less efficacious treatment; deny reasonable requests for medical treatment when such a denial will expose the inmate to undue suffering or the threat of actual, residual injury; or intentionally refuse to provide medical care, when there is knowledge of the need for such care).
Smith, presumably, endeavors to make such a showing by alleging that the defendants intentionally refused to provide her with care, delayed her medical treatment for non-medical reasons, and denied her reasonable requests for such medical treatment. Smith, however, has not submitted any concrete evidence that would support these vague and conclusory allegations or that would otherwise raise the inference that any prison official acted with deliberate indifference to her "physical conditions." Although Smith testified at her deposition that she requested and was denied Ibuprofen, we conclude that this testimony does not create a genuine issue of material fact. In particular, because the undisputed record shows that Smith was prescribed Tylenol III—a prescription narcotic pain reliever, which she admits to taking on a daily basis at the Snyder County Prison, along with several other prescription medications for her conditions—Smith's testimony regarding the Ibuprofren merely evinces a disagreement over the type of medication that she was receiving. It does not, however, suggest deliberate indifference on the part of the defendants. See Pearson, 850 F.3d at 535 (explaining that mere disagreement as to the proper medical treatment does not support an Eighth Amendment violation). In the same vein, to the extent Smith is arguing discontent with the fact that she was prescribed Tylenol III, instead of Percocet, the opiate-based narcotic that she regularly took outside of the prison, we conclude the same—that her argument merely evinces a disagreement in her medical treatment, and nothing more. Thus, for all of these reasons, we conclude that no reasonable trier of fact could find that any of the defendants were deliberately indifferent to Smith's medical needs.
Smith further alleges that deliberate indifference can also be found in the defendants' decision to place her in the restricted housing unit. We address this allegation below, when considering her purported conditions of confinement claim.
2. Eighth Amendment Conditions of Confinement and Failure to Protect Claims.
To the extent Smith is endeavoring to allege that her claim for cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment is also based on allegations of unconstitutional conditions of confinement at the Snyder County Prison, as well as the defendants' failure to protect her while incarcerated there, we plainly reject such endeavors. While Smith broadly alleges that the defendants failed to take reasonable measures to guarantee her safety and that her placement in the restricted housing unit constitute "conditions" involving the wanton infliction of pain, we agree with the defendants that these bare-bones allegations did not sufficiently place the defendants on notice that Smith intended to pursue a conditions of confinement claim or a failure to protect claim, especially since the allegations in the amended complaint all relate to her medical care (or lack thereof) at the prison. See doc. 5 at ¶¶ 28-33 (alleging that: the defendants were aware of her medical needs; the defendants failed to provide her with adequate medical care as it related to those needs; and the defendants' deliberate indifference to her medical needs constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (instructing that Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dictates that the pleading "give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." (quoted case and quotation marks omitted)). Thus, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on these claims.
In an abundance of judicial caution, however, even if Smith sufficiently pleaded both a conditions of confinement claim and a failure to protect claim, we would still find that the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on these claims.
Notably, because Smith's Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement and failure to protect claims were not sufficiently pleaded in the amended complaint, it is difficult to ascertain the underlying factual allegations for each claim since they are conflated with Smith's Eighth Amendment medical care claim.
a. Conditions of Confinement Claim.
"The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons . . . but neither does it permit inhumane ones, and it is now settled that the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment[.]" Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (quoted case and quotation marks omitted). An Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim has both an objective and a subjective component. As to the objective component, the Eighth Amendment is violated only when an inmate is deprived of "the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). "[O]nly extreme deprivations are adequate to satisfy the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim regarding conditions of confinement." Tsosie v. Dunbar, 3:10-CV-2104, 2012 WL 1191642, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 10, 2012), aff'd, 504 F. App'x 75 (3d Cir. 2012). And, as to the subjective component, the question is whether the prison official acted with deliberate indifference to the inmate's health or safety. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). "[A] prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847. "[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Id.
Here, Smith centers her conditions of confinement claim on her solitary confinement in the restricted housing unit at the Snyder County Prison. See doc. 52 at 3. More specifically, she alleges that while she was confined in the restricted housing unit, she did not have contact with anyone for hours at a time; the actual unit she was confined in was cold and had hard surfaces; she slept on a thin mattress; and she did not have shoes that fit her. See id. As set forth below, however, these allegations do not satisfy the objective component of the Eighth Amendment.
It is well-settled that a prisoner's placement in solitary confinement does not, in itself, violate the Constitution. See Johnson v. Wetzel, 209 F. Supp. 3d 766, 777 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (citing Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 364 (3d Cir. 1992), superseded on other grounds by statute, Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997 et. seq., as recognized in Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 71 n.7 (3d Cir. 2000)). And, while the duration of confinement cannot be ignored in determining whether the disputed conditions withstand constitutional scrutiny (Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686 (1978)), it is undisputed that Smith only spent a total of three days at the Snyder County Prison and even less time in the restricted housing unit thereof.
Moreover, the challenged conditions of the restricted housing unit, whether considered alone or in combination, are not sufficiently serious, such that any prison official's act or omission can be said to have resulted in either a denial of life's basic needs or a substantial risk of serious harm to Smith. Indeed, Smith has not depicted a situation where the defendants failed to provide her with basic human necessities, including food, water, shelter, clothing, or exercise, or that they knew of, and were deliberately indifferent to, an intolerable risk of serious harm to her.
Thus, while the thin mattress, cold air, tight-fitting shoes, and lack of social interaction may have been uncomfortable or even unpleasant for the very brief period of time that Smith was confined in the restricted housing unit, we conclude that these conditions pass constitutional muster. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347 ("But conditions that cannot be said to be cruel and unusual under contemporary standards are not unconstitutional. To the extent that such conditions are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society."); Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8-9 (instructing that only "extreme deprivations" are sufficient to make out a conditions of confinement claim"). Consequently, we conclude that no reasonable trier of fact could find that the conditions under which Smith was confined violate the strictures of the Eighth Amendment.
b. Failure to Protect Claim.
In order to succeed on a failure to protect claim under the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) that he or she was "incarcerated under conditions posing 'a substantial risk of serious harm[;]'" and (2) that the prison officials involved operated with deliberate indifference to that risk. Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742, 746 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 and citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838). A substantial risk of serious harm is "'not ordinarily . . . shown by pointing to a single incident or isolated incidents[; it may, however,] be established by much less than proof of a reign of violence and terror.'" Riley v. Jeffes, 777 F.2d 143, 147 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting Shrader v. White, 761 F.2d 975, 978 (4th Cir. 1985)). And, in order to determine whether a prison official acted with deliberate indifference, courts consider whether that official consciously knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to the prisoner's health or safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Not only must the prison official be "aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists," but the official "must also draw the inference." Id.
Here, the precise nature of Smith's failure to protect claim is entirely unclear as there are neither sufficient allegations, nor evidence, identifying a purported risk of serious harm. And, in the absence thereof, we reiterate our previously stated conclusions: that the conditions of the restricted housing unit at the Snyder County Prison were not constitutionally infirm; and that Smith, while incarcerated there, was provided with continuous medical attention and care. Thus, we conclude that no reasonable trier of fact could find that Smith was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm to her. Consequently, we also recommend granting summary judgment for the defendants on Smith's Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim.
C. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Claim.
In Count III of the amended complaint, Smith alleges a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim based on allegations that, because she was a transgender individual, who underwent a sex reassignment procedure, the defendants treated her differently from other similarly situated prisoners who were not transgender. See doc. 5 at ¶¶ 39-41. In support, Smith claims that on the basis of her transgender status, she was placed in the restricted housing unit and denied adequate medical care. See id. at ¶ 42.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment directs that all similarly situated individuals be treated alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). Two independent legal theories exist upon which a plaintiff may predicate an equal protection claim: the traditional theory and the class-of-one theory. The traditional theory protects a plaintiff from discriminatory treatment based on membership in a protected class such as race. See, e.g., id.; McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964). To assert a protected-class claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he or she is a member of a protected class and (2) the government treated similarly situated individuals outside of the protected class differently. See Oliveira v. Twp. of Irvington, 41 F. App'x 555, 559 (3d Cir. 2005) (observing that a prima facie case under the Equal Protection Clause requires plaintiffs to prove membership in "a protected class and that they received different treatment than that received by other similarly-situated individuals"). Under this theory, a plaintiff "must prove the existence of purposeful discrimination" by the defendants. Keenan v. City of Phila., 983 F.2d 459, 465 (3d Cir. 1992).
Under the class-of-one theory, however, a plaintiff may advance an equal protection claim absent membership in a protected class if the plaintiff shows that the defendants engaged in irrational and intentional differential treatment of him when compared with similarly situated individuals. See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). This theory allows a plaintiff to assert an equal protection claim regardless of protected class when the government irrationally treats the plaintiff differently from similarly situated individuals. Id. at 564; Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 239 (3d Cir. 2006). To prevail on a class-of-one claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the defendants treated him differently from others similarly situated; (2) the defendants did so intentionally; and, (3) there was no rational basis for the difference in treatment. Hill, 455 F.3d at 239.
Here, the defendants argue that there is doubt in the case law as to whether transgender individuals are recognized as a suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause. See doc. 45 at 15. The defendants further argue that, Smith's status as a member of a protected class notwithstanding, they are entitled to summary judgment because there is no evidence that Smith was treated differently from other similarly situated individuals. Id. at 15-20.
Smith does not address whether her equal protection claim is predicated on the class-of-one theory or the traditional theory. Regardless, her claim fails under both theories.
Regarding Smith's class-of-one theory, we conclude that the evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable to Smith, is insufficient to support her claim and withstand summary judgment. In particular, Smith has failed to establish that she was treated differently from any similarly situated, non-transgender inmate. In light of her failure to do so, the defendants have pointed to the undisputed record, which is immersed with evidence that other prisoners at the Snyder County Prison, both male and female, were placed in the restricted housing unit for closer observation while on detox protocols, including a drug withdrawal protocol. See doc. 46-1 at 4, ¶ 14; see also doc. 46-1 at 19, 20, 23, 24, 25.
Although Smith contends that she should not have been placed on opiate detox protocol, this contention is unpersuasive. As the undisputed record shows, it was a physician's assistant from PrimeCare who placed Smith on the opiate detox protocol, not the defendants. Doc. 46 at ¶ 22; doc. 51 at ¶ 22. Moreover, when Smith was transported to the hospital on August 7, 2013, she was diagnosed with suffering from a narcotics withdrawal, thereby reinforcing the decision of PrimeCare's physician assistant to place Smith on such a detox protocol in the first place. Doc. 46 at ¶ 53; doc. 51 at ¶ 53.
She was also diagnosed with hyperventilation and back pain.
Smith's contention that an inmate's transfer to the restricted housing unit is not necessary for detox is as equally unpersuasive. The mere fact that a PrimeCare employee opined that placement in the restricted housing unit for opiate detox is unnecessary, does not change the undisputed material facts that: Snyder County Prison policy authorizes the prison administration, not a PrimeCare employee, to place an inmate in the restricted housing unit for medical reasons; and that other inmates at the prison have also been placed in the restricted housing unit for a detox watch, especially where, as here, they exhibit additional medical difficulties while detoxing. Moreover, although Smith asserts that there is no evidence that she was observed more closely in the restricted housing unit than she would have otherwise been observed in general population, we conclude that her assertion does not track with the documentary evidence of record. In particular, the defendants have produced the "Thirty Minute (30 min.) Watch Sheet[s]," which show that Smith was continuously observed while she was confined in the restricted housing unit. Doc. 46-1 at 27-32. And, in any event, we fail to see how this contention contradicts the undisputed material fact that other inmates were, in fact, placed in the restricted housing unit for the purpose of a detox watch.
Finally, even though Smith contends that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Deputy Warden Cooper knew of her transgender status and whether he treated her differently because of that status, the undisputed record establishes that Smith's transgender status did not impact any decision Deputy Warden Cooper made. The undisputed record also establishes that at the time Deputy Warden Cooper transferred Smith to the restricted housing unit, he did not know that she was a transgender individual. In fact, it was not until after he transferred Smith to the restricted housing unit that he became aware of this fact.
2. Traditional Theory.
With respect to the traditional theory, we need not reach the thorny issue of whether transgender individuals are recognized as a suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause since this claim is more easily disposed of on the basis that Smith has not shown that she was treated differently from other similarly situated individuals. To the contrary, the undisputed record shows that Smith was treated no differently than the other inmates who were also detoxing and placed in the restricted housing unit for closer observation.
D. Monell Claim.
In Count IV of the amended complaint, Smith asserts a Monell claim based on allegations that the defendants "created and/or followed a policy, practice, or custom," which allowed non-medical staff to segregate an inmate for medical reasons (doc. 5 at ¶¶ 45-47) and which allowed both non-medical and medical staff to refuse to provide adequate medical care to inmates with known medical conditions. See id. at ¶ 48. Smith also asserts, inter alia, that the defendants failed to train and supervise prison staff on how to provide appropriate care and custody to transgender inmates, and further, that the defendants maintained an inadequate policy and procedure with respect to such training. Id. at ¶¶ 50-51, 53.
While a municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 for the acts of its employees under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability, it may be held liable if the plaintiff can "identify a municipal 'policy' or 'custom' that caused the plaintiff's injury." Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan County, Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692, 694 (1978)). A municipal policy "is made when a 'decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action' issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict." Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990)). And, a municipal custom is a practice that is "so permanent and well settled as to virtually constitute law." Beck, 89 F.3d at 971 (quoting Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1480) (internal quotation marks omitted). A municipal custom need not be "formally approved by an appropriate decisionmaker," but it must be "so widespread as to have the force of law." Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 584 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 404) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In limited circumstances, however, a municipality may also be held liable for constitutional violations that result from inadequate training or supervision of its employees if that failure amounts to deliberate indifference. Thomas v. Cumberland Cnty., 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014) "'[D]eliberate indifference' is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action." Brown, 520 U.S. at 410. Although the plaintiff must ordinarily show "[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations" in order to prove deliberate indifference in the failure to train context (Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011)), the Supreme Court has also suggested that a single incident may sustain deliberate indifference when "the need to train officers . . . can be said to be 'so obvious,'" that the failure to do so would predictably lead to recurrent violations of constitutional rights. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 n.10 (1989). Moreover, "'the identified deficiency in [the municipality's] training program must be closely related to the ultimate injury;' or in other words, the deficiency in training [must have] actually caused the constitutional violation." Thomas, 749 F.3d at 222 (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 391).
Here, the defendants argue that the evidence does not establish the existence of an underlying constitutional violation and, in the absence thereof, they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Smith's Monell claim. Doc. 45 at 22. Even if we find that a genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to any of Smith's underlying constitutional claims, the defendants contend that Smith's Monell claim would still be meritless because Smith has proffered no evidence to establish that any Snyder County Prison policy, practice, or custom was a causal factor in her alleged harm. Id.
Smith, as discussed above, has not demonstrated that the defendants violated her constitutional rights. Thus, in the absence of an underlying constitutional violation, Smith's Monell claims fail as a matter of law. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) ("But this was an action for damages, and neither [Monell], nor any other of our cases authorizes the award of damages against a municipal corporation based on the actions of one of its officers when in fact the jury has concluded that the officer inflicted no constitutional harm. If a person has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police officer, the fact that the departmental regulations might have authorized the use of constitutionally excessive force is quite beside the point."); Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 314 (3d Cir. 2006) ("[I]n order for municipal liability to exist, there must still be a violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights." (citation omitted)); Mulholland v. Gov't Cty. of Berks, Pa., 706 F.3d 227, 238 n.15 (3d Cir. 2013) ("It is well-settled that, if there is no violation in the first place, there can be no derivative municipal claim." (citing Heller, 475 U.S. at 799 for the proposition that "if a municipal employee 'inflicted no constitutional injury . . . , it is inconceivable that [the municipality] could be liable") (alterations in original)).
Even if Smith could establish an underlying constitutional violation, her Monell claims would still fail. Apart from her broad allegations in the amended complaint, Smith has neither identified a policy, nor specified the precise contours thereof. And, although Smith alleges that the Snyder County Prison Board "and/or" Warden Rush are the policymakers for the Snyder County Prison, she has failed to establish that there is a sufficient link between those policymakers and the unidentified policy. See McTernan v. City of York, PA, 564 F.3d 636, 658-59 (3d Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff, who is seeking to impose liability on a municipality via a municipal policy, must identify the relevant policy, specify what exactly the policy entails, and show a link between that challenged policy and a municipal decisionmaker such that the imposition of municipal liability is warranted); Wood v. Williams, 568 F. App'x 100, 105 (3d Cir. 2014) (finding no municipal liability on a theory of failure to train or supervise, where there were no allegations showing, among other things, any particular policy or how that policy allowed the claimed constitutional violation to occur, nor were there allegations identifying the policymaker or a decisionmaker). Such deficiencies make it impossible for us to ensure that the Snyder County Prison and its Prison Board are being "held liable only for those deprivations resulting from the decisions of its duly constituted legislative body or of those officials whose acts may fairly be said to be those of the municipality." Brown, 520 U.S. at 403-04 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694) (emphasis added).
To the extent that Smith's claims are based on a municipal "custom," her claims also fail. Even though Smith broadly alleges that the Snyder County Prison and its Board have unlawful customs, neither the amended complaint, nor the summary judgment record establishes a custom of similar constitutional violations by: non-medical staff to segregate inmates for medical reasons; both non-medical and medical staff to refuse to provide adequate medical care to inmates with known medical conditions; or untrained or unsupervised staff at the prison. Indeed, there is no reference to any other person whose rights were similarly violated because of these alleged customs.
Thus, we conclude that no reasonable trier of fact could find that a municipal "policy" or "custom" was the moving force behind Smith's alleged harm. See generally Brown, 520 U.S. at 404 ("As [the Supreme Court's] § 1983 municipal liability jurisprudence illustrates[,] it is not enough for a § 1983 plaintiff merely to identify conduct properly attributable to the municipality. The plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the 'moving force' behind the injury alleged." (emphasis in original)).
V. Recommendation.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the defendants' pending motion (doc. 44) for summary judgment be GRANTED in its entirety.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within
fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 17th day of July , 2017 .
S/ Susan E . Schwab
Susan E. Schwab
United States Chief Magistrate Judge