Opinion
FSTCV106003928S.
12-03-2012
Rebecca SMITH v. PFS FITNESS, LLC.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
GENUARIO, J.
This action was brought by summons and complaint returnable to the Stamford Superior Court on March 23, 2010 alleging that the plaintiff was terminated from her employment by the defendant on May 14, 2008. The plaintiff alleged that at the time of her discharge she " suffered from a disability within the meaning of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act" and that her " disability was a factor that made a difference in the defendant's decision to terminate her employment in violation of Conn. Gen.Stat. § 46a-60 et seq." The plaintiff further alleged that as a result the plaintiff suffered " both economic and emotional harm."
The case was tried to a jury and on June 29, 2012 the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in amount of $242,641. The jury's verdict was articulated as economic damages of $172,641 and non-economic damages of $70,000. The plaintiff now moves for an award of reasonable attorneys fees, prejudgment interest, postjudgment interest and costs.
Prejudgment Interest
In Thames Talent, LTD v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, 265 Conn. 127 (2003) our Supreme Court stated " [b]ecause it would be contrary to the fundamental purpose of our laws against workplace discrimination to deprive a person victimized by such discrimination of the true value of the money to which he or she lawfully is entitled, we conclude that prejudgment interest is a proper component of an award of back pay under § 46a-86(b)." Thames Talent, LTD at 143. While C.G.S. § 46a-86(b) deals with the remedies that may be ordered by a hearing officer pursuant to a proceeding before the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities there seems to be no reason that the court should not apply this rationale to the same substantive allegations that a plaintiff pursues in a judicial proceeding. This is particularly true since C.G.S. § 46a-104 specifically says that the court may grant " such legal and equitable relief which it deems appropriate." Moreover, C.G.S. § 37-3a provides for interest at the rate of 10% a year and no more. Finally, Thames Talent, LTD in footnote 23 notes that federal courts have determined that prejudgment interest is an element of complete compensation in cases brought under Title 7 of the United States Code. Thames Talent, LTD at 143 footnote 23. Multiple Connecticut cases have held that federal precedent provides guidance in enforcing and applying Connecticut's state antidiscrimination statutes. See e.g. Levy v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, Conn. 96, 103 (1996); Ezikovich v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, 57 Conn.App. 767, 774 (2000).
Both the plaintiff and the defendant cite cases that set forth a two-part process that the trial court must undergo in determining whether or not to exercise its discretion to award prejudgment interest pursuant to § 37-3a. Under C.G.S. § 37-3a the court must determine (1) whether the party against whom the interest is sought has wrongfully detained money that was due the other party; and (2) the date upon which the wrongful detention began in order to determine the time from which interest should be calculated. Advanced Financial Services, Inc. v. Associated Appraisal Services, 79 Conn.App. 22, 31 (2003); Malony v. PCRE, LLC, 68 Conn.App. 727, 755 (2002). While the defendant argues that the money was not wrongfully detained because there was a good faith dispute over whether the money was due, this is simply the defendants seeking to retry the case. The jury has resolved this issue. In its answers to interrogatories the jury responded affirmatively to the question, " Do you find that the plaintiff proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff's disability was a motivating factor in the defendant's decision to terminate the plaintiff's complaint?"
The jury having so found the court concludes that the withholding of her compensation was wrongful. With regard to the second determination the court concludes that the withholding began when the compensation would have otherwise been paid. The court has reviewed the plaintiff's methodology in calculating the interest based upon interest beginning at each anniversary date of the plaintiff's termination for sums due during the prior year. The court finds the methodology reasonable and indeed conservative. The court will adopt the methodology, but not the rate suggested by the plaintiff. The plaintiff used the maximum rate allowed pursuant to C.G.S. § 37-3a of 10% per annum. The court observes that the market interest rates whether evidenced by residential mortgage rates, treasury bill rates, commercial lines of credit, or the prime rate are considerably lower than 10% and have been since the plaintiff's termination. The court has given due consideration to those various measures of market interest rates as well as the conservative method of calculating those rates suggested by the plaintiff and will award prejudgment interest at the rate of 5% per annum for an award of $17,057 in prejudgment interest.
Attorneys Fees
Pursuant to C.G.S. § 46a-60 the court may award attorneys fees.
Since the jury has found that the plaintiff's disability was a motivating factor in the defendant's decision to terminate the plaintiff's employment the court will award reasonable attorneys fees consistent with C.G.S. § 46a-60. The plaintiff and her attorneys entered into a fee agreement dated January 21, 2009. The court has reviewed the agreement as well as the affidavits setting forth payments made by the plaintiff to her attorneys. The court finds that pursuant to the agreement the attorneys are entitled to be paid by the plaintiff an amount equal to one-third of the gross amount recovered.
While the defendant argues that the agreement does not allow for the one-third contingency fee unless the case is resolved by settlement as opposed to jury verdict and that pursuant to the agreement the attorneys fees should be calculated at 50% of their normal hourly rate, the court simply does not find the defendant's interpretation of the agreement credible. The court finds that pursuant to the agreement the plaintiff's attorneys fees should be calculated as follows: A verdict of $242,641 plus allowable interest of $17,057 equals a gross recovery of $259,698. This calculation would result in a one-third attorneys fee of $86,566.
The plaintiff however, argues that the court should award the attorneys fees based upon the amount of hours that have been spent multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. The plaintiff claims that the award of attorneys fees should be $107,562.50. The court will decline the plaintiff's invitation to award attorneys fees in excess of that to which they are contractually entitled.
Our Supreme Court has stated that " the trial court should not depart from a reasonable fee agreement in the absence of a persuasive demonstration that enforcing the agreement would result in substantial unfairness to the defendant." Schoonmaker v. Lawrence Brunoli, Inc., 265 Conn. 210 at 270 quoting Sorrentino v. All Seasons Services, Inc., 245 Conn. 756, 776 (1998). The court finds that the fee agreement dated January 21, 2009 between the plaintiff and her attorneys to be reasonable both from the perspective of the parties on January 21, 2009 as well as in its application to the case at bar given the ultimate verdict. In making this determination, the court has considered the affidavit submitted by plaintiff's counsel concerning the actual amount of time spent on the case, the experience of plaintiff's counsel and reasonable hourly rates. The court will not deviate from that to which the plaintiff is entitled pursuant to this agreement. The court awards attorneys fees of $86,556.
Postjudgment Interest
For all the reasons set forth in the Section on Prejudgment Interest the court orders that Postjudgment interest will run on the plaintiff's total damage award from the date of the final judgment until the date the defendant pays the judgment at the rate of 5% per annum.
Court Costs
Finally, the court has reviewed the plaintiff's request for costs and awards costs in the amount of $2,316.34 for the court entry fee, marshal's fee, jury docket fee, and deposition transcripts.
In summary the court awards prejudgment interest of $17,057; attorneys fees in the amount of $86,556; court costs in the amount $2,316.34. The court further orders that postjudgment interest will run at 5% per annum as set forth herein.