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finding plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liquidated damages premature because liability had not been determined under the FLSA
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Case No. CV-01-244-S-BLW.
February 4, 2005
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
INTRODUCTION
Pending before the Court are Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Statute of Limitations (Docket No. 193), Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Docket No. 223), Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Willfulness (Docket No. 269), and Defendant's Motions to Strike Plaintiffs' Statements of Material Facts (Docket Nos. 242, 266). The Court heard oral argument on October 21, 2004, and the motions are now at issue. For the reasons stated below, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Statute of Limitations, deny Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, deny Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Willfulness, and deny Defendant's Motions to Strike Plaintiffs' Statements of Material Facts.
FACTS
Plaintiffs bring this action under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 200 et seq., and applicable Idaho law. The individually-named Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and a class of others similarly situated. Additional Plaintiffs consented to join this action under the FLSA's collective action procedures. 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 256. The putative class consists of individuals employed as inside sales representatives with Defendant Micron Electronics, Inc. ("Micron") for various periods of time between June 1, 1998 and May 31, 2001.
The FLSA requires employers to pay overtime wages for work performed in excess of forty hours per week at a rate equal to one and one-half times the employee's regular rate. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a). Micron paid Plaintiffs a base hourly rate and a commission based upon their sales volume. Micron's sales representatives typically work an eight-hour shift with an unpaid one-hour lunch break. Micron has a stated policy of paying overtime wages to sales representatives for hours worked in excess of forty hours per week.
Plaintiffs claim that they regularly arrive at work earlier than their scheduled start times, stay at work past their scheduled end times, and frequently work through their lunch hour. Plaintiffs allege that Micron failed to compensate them for their overtime hours. Plaintiffs further allege that Micron induced them to work off-the-clock, allowed managers to alter employee timecards, failed to calculate overtime pay properly, discouraged employees from keeping accurate time records, warned employees that they could not record more than forty hours per week, and suppressed wage claims.
Micron filed motions for partial summary judgment on the issues of: (1) the applicable statute of limitations, and (2) willfulness. Plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment on the issues of: (1) their entitlement to liquidated damages under the FLSA, (2) willfulness, and (3) their entitlement to treble damages for a portion of their unpaid overtime wages under Idaho law.
GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARDS
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to each moving party, and drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor, the Court must determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Each moving party bears the "initial burden of identifying for the court the portions of the materials on file that it believes demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact." T .W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). If the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to "set forth, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, ' specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)). On a motion for summary judgment, this Court may not weigh the evidence, but may only determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 410 (9th Cir. 1996).
ANALYSIS
I. Defendant's Motions to Strike Plaintiffs' Statements of Material Facts At the outset, the Court will consider Defendant's Motions to Strike Plaintiffs' Statements of Material Facts (Docket Nos. 242, 266) so that the record for deciding the partial summary judgment motions is clear. Micron moves to strike on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiffs' Statement of Material Facts (Docket No. 220) is overlong, (2) the deposition transcripts accompanying Plaintiffs' statements of material facts are inadmissible because they were not properly authenticated, and (3) the attached deposition excerpts are inadmissible under FED. R. EVID. 106 and 403, and FED. R. CIV. P. 32(a)(4) because they are misleading and taken out of context. The Court will deny Micron's motions to strike for the following reasons.
Plaintiffs remedied Micron's first ground of contention when they sought and obtained leave to file an overlength statement of material facts. See Order of Oct. 15, 2004 (Docket No. 296). As for Micron's second argument, although the deposition transcripts accompanying the Affidavits of William H. Thomas (Docket Nos. 221, 226) were not properly authenticated, the attached deposition testimony had been previously submitted and properly authenticated. Finally, the Court does not find that the attached deposition testimony is inadmissible under FED. R. EVID. 106 or 403, or under FED. R. CIV. P. 32(a)(4). Most of the deposition transcripts were submitted in their entirety with the Omnibus Tollefson Affidavit (Docket No. 272). The remaining depositions are not misleading or incomplete so as to require that they be stricken. Thus, the Court will deny Micron's Motions to Strike Plaintiffs' Statements of Material Facts.
II. FLSA Statute of Limitations
Under the FLSA, an action to recover unpaid overtime compensation must be "commenced within two years after the cause of action accrued . . ., except that a cause of action arising out of a willful violation may be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrued." 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). Micron seeks partial summary judgment on the issue of whether a two-year or three-year statute of limitations applies to Plaintiffs' FLSA claims. The determination of which statute of limitations applies requires the Court to determine whether Micron willfully violated the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). "The determination of willfulness is a mixed question of law and fact." Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). In the instant case, a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether Micron's conduct was willful. Nonetheless, the Court can decide on summary judgment the issues related to the statute of limitations that do not depend upon the willfulness inquiry. The Court concludes that: (1) the accrual date of Plaintiffs' cause of action is the date Micron issued the paychecks in question, (2) Plaintiffs' FLSA action commenced as to each individual when each Plaintiff filed a consent to join in the collective action, and (3) equitable tolling does not apply. Thus, because the statute of limitations will be at most three years, certain Plaintiffs must be dismissed and the claims of the remaining Plaintiffs must be limited.
A. Willfulness
To establish a willful violation, Plaintiffs must show that Micron knew its conduct violated the FLSA or showed reckless disregard for whether its actions complied with the FLSA. McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133 (1988). Mere negligence does not suffice to establish willfulness. Id. at 133, 135.
Although Plaintiffs move for partial summary judgment on the issue of willfulness, they fail to set forth any evidence to support their argument. Plaintiffs rely merely on "the lack of facts discovered to date which in any way would demonstrate that [Micron] did anything but flagrantly ignore the FLSA's requirement to pay its sales representatives overtime." Pls.' Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Partial Summ. J. at 6. Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to carry their initial burden of "identifying for the court the portions of the materials on file that [they] believe demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact." T .W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630. Accordingly, the Court must deny Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the issue of willfulness.
In opposing Micron's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Willfulness, Plaintiffs did not submit a statement of material facts as Local Rule 7.1(c)(2) requires. Thus, Micron's statement of facts regarding willfulness is undisputed. Plaintiffs, however, rely on the Affidavit of Daniel E. Williams (Docket No. 288) and the attached deposition testimony of several employees to argue that the widespread nature of Micron's FLSA violations, involving different supervisors and multiple employees across different departments, shows willfulness. Plaintiffs also rely on other affidavits and attached deposition testimony that were previously filed.
Micron asks the Court to strike the Williams' Affidavit and the attached deposition excerpts for improper authentication under FED. R. EVID. 901. See Def.'s Reply in Supp. of Cross-Motion for Partial Summ. J. Re: Willfulness (Docket No. 295) at 4-5 . The Court finds, however, that most of the depositions attached to the Williams' Affidavit, were already properly part of the record. See Omnibus Tollefson Aff. (Docket No. 272); Hancock Aff. (Docket No. 202); Thomas Aff. (Docket No. 259). Thus, only the attached deposition testimony of Alan Claflin, Hector Dimas, Shelly Dyer, Robert McCarter, and Charles K. McGuire, Jr. must be stricken.
The Court finds that the testimony properly made a part of the record raises a question of fact regarding Micron's willfulness. Many Micron employees testified that Micron did not always authorize overtime, knew that employees were working unrecorded overtime hours, and indicated that employees should work off the clock. See, e.g., Ex. 1 to Thomas Aff. (Docket No. 226) (Masteller Dep. at 24); Ex. 2 to Thomas Aff. (Docket No. 226) (Clevenger Dep. at 65); Ex. 3 to Thomas Aff. (Docket No. 226) (Craig Dep. at 143); Ex. 4 to Thomas Aff. (Docket No. 226) (Garcia Dep. at 71); Ex. 12 to Thomas Aff. (Docket No. 226) (Saari Dep. at 55-56); Ex. 14 to Thomas Aff. (Docket No. 226) (Ferrara Dep. at 28); Ex. 16 to Thomas Aff. (Docket No. 226) (Thom Aff. at 52-53); Ex. 18 to Thomas Aff. (Docket No. 226) (DeRouen Dep. at 62); Ex. A to Thomas Aff. (Docket No. 221) (Moffett Dep. at 71-72, 74-75); Ex. D to Thomas Aff. (Docket No. 221) (McGeorge Dep. at 21-23); Ex. E to Thomas Aff. (Docket No. 221) (Clevenger Dep. at 65); Ex. H to Williams Aff. (Docket No. 288) (Larscheid Dep. at 33); Ex. M to Williams Aff. (Docket No. 288) (Smith Dep. at 245-46). The evidence, however, also shows that some employees worked off the clock of their own volition because they treated their sales territory like their own business and wanted to receive increased commissions. See, e.g., Ex. N to Williams Aff. (Docket No. 288) (Hope Aff. at 4); Ex O to Williams Aff. (Docket No. 288) (Thom Aff. at 34). Therefore, the Court cannot determine on summary judgment whether Micron acted willfully, and thus cannot determine whether a two-year or three-year statute of limitations applies to Plaintiffs' FLSA claims. Accordingly, the Court must deny in part Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Statute of Limitations on the issue of whether a two-year or three-year statute of limitations applies and deny Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Willfulness. The Court now turns to the issues related to the statute of limitations that do not depend upon a finding of willfulness.
B. Accrual of Cause of Action
FLSA regulations provide that "[a] cause of action under the Fair Labor Standards Act for . . . unpaid overtime compensation . . . 'accrues' when the employer fails to pay the required compensation for any workweek at the regular payday for the period in which the workweek ends." 29 C.F.R. § 790.21(b). The Ninth Circuit has not directly addressed the issue of when a cause of action for unpaid overtime under the FLSA accrues. However, in the context of an employer's failure to pay any wages, the court has held that a cause of action accrues on the day the employee's paycheck would normally issue. See Biggs v. Wilson, 1 F.3d 1537, 1540 (9th Cir. 1993). In so holding, the Biggs court relied upon Beebe v. United States, 640 F.2d 1283, 1293 (Ct.Cl. 1981), which held that a separate cause of action for unpaid overtime wages accrues each payday that overtime wages are not paid. Other circuits have also concluded that the FLSA statute of limitations begins to run upon the issuance of each individual paycheck that allegedly violates the FLSA. See Knight v. Columbus, 19 F.3d 579, 581 (11th Cir. 1994); Halferty v. Pulse Drug Co., 821 F.2d 261, 271, modified on other grounds, 826 F.2d 2 (5th Cir. 1987). Plaintiffs provide no authority for their position that the statute of limitations should begin to run from the date of the filing of the complaint. Thus, the Court concludes, on the basis of the FLSA regulations and persuasive case law, that Plaintiffs' claims under the FLSA accrued when Micron issued each allegedly unlawful individual paycheck.
C. Commencement of Cause of Action
In a collective action under the FLSA, an action commences with respect to an individual claimant when the claimant opts in to the lawsuit by filing a consent with the court. 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 256; 29 C.F.R. § 790.21(b). A claimant, including a plaintiff named in the complaint, must file a written consent for the Court to find that the individual has commenced an action. 29 U.S.C. § 256. Courts have held that the statute of limitations stops running on named plaintiffs and later opt-in claimants on the day the notice of consent is filed, and that written consents do not relate back to the date of the filing of the complaint. See Grayson v. K Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1106 (11th Cir. 1996); O'Connell v. Champion Int'l Corp., 812 F.2d 393, 394 (8th Cir. 1987); Gjurovich v. Emmanuel's Marketplace, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 2d 101, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Wertheim v. Arizona, Civ. No. 92-453, 1993 WL 603552, at *5 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 1993); Songu-Mbriwa v. Davis Mem'l Goodwill Indus., 144 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1992); Kuhn v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 487 F. Supp. 974, 975-76 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd, 745 F,2d 47 (3d Cir. 1984). Because the FLSA expressly provides that in a collective action, the filing of a consent is required to commence an action, the Court concludes that the statute of limitations ran until the filing of each Plaintiffs' consent to join in the collective FLSA action.
While the filing of a Rule 23 class action under FED. R. CIV. P. 23 would stop the running of the statute of limitations for all potential class members, see Am. Pipe Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 552 (1974), Plaintiffs are not bringing a Rule 23 action. The instant action is collective in nature, but is brought under the collective action procedures of the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The Second Amended Complaint does not mention Rule 23 and Plaintiffs have expressly disclaimed the applicability of Rule 23. Pls.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Conditional Certification (Docket No. 76) at 6; Pls.' Reply to Resp. to Mot. for Conditional Certification (Docket No. 144) at 7.
D. Tolling of Statute of Limitations
Micron concedes that the relevant statute of limitations was tolled for 161 days between April 3, 2002 and September 11, 2002. Plaintiffs, however, contend that equitable tolling should further apply to toll the statute of limitations. Equitable tolling permits a plaintiff to toll the statute of limitations because of excusable neglect. Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 1995). Equitable tolling is not available to those who know the facts necessary to support their claim but fail to act. See Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984) ("One who fails to act diligently cannot invoke equitable principles to excuse that lack of diligence."). The Ninth Circuit's approach to equitable tolling focuses primarily on the plaintiff's failure to act because of excusable ignorance, while the doctrine of equitable estoppel focuses on the defendant's actions. Leong v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1117, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003); Supermail, 68 F.3d at 1207.
Plaintiffs argue that Micron's acts of encouraging employees to work offthe-clock, ignoring off-the-clock work, limiting the number of overtime hours that employees could record, and instilling in employees a fear of retaliation if they did record overtime hours warrant the application of equitable tolling. Plaintiffs' reliance on these facts is misplaced because equitable tolling focuses on a plaintiff's failure to act rather than the defendant's actions. Id. Plaintiffs also rely on the testimony of some employees who stated that they did not know how their wages were calculated. Assuming that this testimony is true, it does not explain why these employees did not know of the existence of a claim for unpaid overtime wages, regardless of how wages were calculated, or why other Plaintiffs failed to timely file their claims. As a result, the Court concludes that equitable tolling does not apply.
The parties do not dispute the dates of the issuance of the paychecks in question, or the dates of the filing of the consents. See Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe of Lake Traverse Indian Reservation N.D. S.D. v. United States, 895 F.2d 588, 591 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that when a statute of limitations issue requires a determination of when a claim accrues, dismissal is appropriate when the evidence is so clear that no genuine issue of material fact exists). Accordingly, the Court must grant in part Micron's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Statute of Limitations. Even though there is a question of fact regarding which statute of limitations applies, at most a three-year statute of limitations applies. Therefore, the Court must dismiss five claimants and temporally limit the remaining claims. See Second Aff. of Kira Dale Pfisterer in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. Re: Statutes of Limitation ¶¶ 2-3. The names of the dismissed claimants are listed below. After a jury determination regarding the issue of Micron's willfulness, the FLSA claims of additional Plaintiffs may need to be dismissed, and the remaining claims may need to be further limited.
Since the filing of Pfisterer's Second Affidavit, the Court has entered judgment in favor of three Plaintiffs and has dismissed several other Plaintiffs from this action. See Judgments (Docket Nos. 293, 294, 295); Order of Oct. 15, 2004 (Docket No. 296); Order of Nov. 16, 2004 (Docket No. 312). The Court has modified the list of Plaintiffs who must be dismissed accordingly.
II. Liquidated Damages Under the FLSA
Plaintiffs move for partial summary judgment on the issue of liquidated damages under the FLSA. The FLSA provides that "any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section 207 of this title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages . . . and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The plain language of 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) requires payment of liquidated damages only after a violation of the FLSA has been found. Thus, Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on liquidated damages is premature because Micron has not yet been found liable under the FLSA.
Additionally, partial summary judgment on liquidated damages is inappropriate because a question of fact exists regarding whether Micron acted in good faith even if it did violate the FLSA. If an employer shows that it acted in subjective good faith and had objectively reasonable grounds for believing its conduct did not violate the FLSA, the Court has discretion to eliminate or reduce the award of liquidated damages. 29 U.S.C. § 260; Bratt v. County of Los Angeles, 912 F.2d 1066, 1071 (9th Cir. 1990); 29 C.F.R. §§ 790.13-790.17. To show its good faith, Micron points to the existence and enforcement of its policies and procedures that required compliance with the FLSA regarding timekeeping and overtime. Micron contends that any isolated instances of noncompliance do not detract from its good faith. No party has moved for summary judgment on the issue of good faith. Thus, the issue of Micron's good faith remains to be resolved at trial.
A finding of willfulness would preclude a finding of good faith; however, absent a finding of willfulness, good faith involves a separate inquiry. See Chao v. A-One Med. Servs., Inc., 346 F.3d 908, 920 (9th Cir. 2003). In the instant case, because the Court has not found willfulness, the issue of good faith remains open.
Accordingly, the Court must deny Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on liquidated damages.
IV. Idaho Law Claims
A. Statute of Limitations
Micron argues that a six-month statute of limitations applies to limit Plaintiffs' recovery on their Idaho law claims. The Idaho Wage Claim Act provides that "in the event salary or wages have been paid to any employee and such employee claims additional salary, wages, penalties or liquidated damages, because of work done or services performed during his employment for the pay period covered by said payment, any action therefor shall be commenced within six (6) months from the accrual of the cause of action." Idaho Code § 45-614 (emphasis added). The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that a cause of action accrues under the Idaho Wage Claim Act "when an employee has a right to recover the salary or wages, etc., that are allegedly owed." Johnson v. Allied Stores Corp., 679 P.2d 640, 644 (Idaho 1984). When the payments at issue cover particular pay periods, the six-month statute of limitations applies. See Anderson v. Lee, 386 P.2d 54, 56 (Idaho 1963). Because Plaintiffs are claiming additional wages for hours worked in particular pay periods, the six-month statute of limitations applies.
An action is commenced under the Idaho Wage Claim Act when the plaintiff initiates a lawsuit or files a claim. See Johnson, 679 P.2d at 644-45; Callenders, Inc. v. Beckman, 814 P.2d 429, 434 (Idaho Ct.App. 1991). Unlike the FLSA, the Idaho Wage Claim Act does not require a named plaintiff to file a consent to commence an action. Thus, the named Plaintiffs commenced an action when they filed a complaint or were named in an amended complaint. The unnamed Plaintiffs commenced an action when they filed a consent to join in the instant action.
The dates of the issuance of the paychecks in question, the date of the filing of the Complaint and Amended Complaints, and the dates of the filing of the consents are not disputed. As discussed above, equitable tolling does not apply to toll the statute of limitations. Therefore, the Court must grant Micron's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Statute of Limitations on Plaintiffs' state law claims. Because a six-month statute of limitations applies, the Court must dismiss the state law claims of 32 claimants and temporally limit the state law claims of the remaining claimants. See Ex. A to Aff. of Kira Dale Pfisterer in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. Re: Statutes of Limitation. The names of the dismissed claimants are listed below.
Since the filing of Pfisterer's Affidavit, the Court has entered judgment in favor of three Plaintiffs and has dismissed several other Plaintiffs from this action. See Judgments (Docket Nos. 293, 294, 295); Order of Oct. 15, 2004 (Docket No. 296); Order of Nov. 16, 2004 (Docket No. 312). Additionally, Plaintiff Eric Fillmore opted out of this action. See Opt-Out Notice (Docket No. 334). The Court has modified the list of Plaintiffs who must be dismissed accordingly.
B. Damages
1. Treble damages
Even though Plaintiffs are no longer alleging a claim under Idaho Code § 44-1502(3) for failure to pay the minimum wage, Pls.' Resp. to Def.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. Re: Statute of Limitations (Docket No. 219) at 11, Plaintiffs claim they are entitled under the Idaho Wage Claim Act to treble damages for their unpaid overtime wages. Idaho law permits a plaintiff to assert a wage claim "to collect wages, penalties and liquidated damages provided by any law or pursuant to a contract of employment." Idaho Code § 45-614. The Idaho Wage Claim Act entitles a plaintiff to recover "the unpaid wages plus [liquidated damages]; or damages in the amount of three (3) times the unpaid wages found due and owing, whichever is greater." Idaho Code § 45-615(2). Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on treble damages, however, is premature because Micron has not yet been found liable for any unpaid wages. Accordingly, the Court must deny Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on treble damages under the Idaho Wage Claim Act.
Although Plaintiffs did not expressly state in their Second Amended Complaint that they were bringing claims under Idaho Code §§ 45-614, 45-615, Plaintiffs did generally refer to "applicable state laws." Second Am. Compl. ¶ 66. The Court must construe the pleadings so as to do "substantial justice." FED. R. CIV. P. 8(f). Thus, the Court will deem Plaintiffs to have alleged claims under Idaho Code §§ 45-614, 45-615.
2. Offset
In the event that the Court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to damages under Idaho law, Micron argues that any state law damages awarded must be offset by any recovery under the FLSA. The damages provision in the Idaho Wage Claim Act differs from the amount of recovery the FLSA authorizes. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) with Idaho Code § 45-615(2). The FLSA does not override federal and state legislation that does not contravene the FLSA. 29 C.F.R. § 778.5; see 29 U.S.C. § 218(a). The FLSA's "savings clause," 29 U.S.C. § 218(a), provides that:
No provision of this chapter or of any order thereunder shall excuse noncompliance with any Federal or State law or municipal ordinance establishing a minimum wage higher than the minimum wage established under this chapter or a maximum work week lower than the maximum workweek established under this chapter. . . .29 U.S.C. § 218(a); see also Williamson v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 208 F.3d 1144, 1151 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that the FLSA's savings clause is evidence that Congress did not intend to preempt the entire field). Courts have held, however, that an award of damages under state wage claim laws must be offset by the damages recovered under the FLSA to avoid double recovery. Webster v. Bechtel, Inc., 621 P.2d 890, 897 (Alaska 1980); see Bechtel Petroleum, Inc. v. Webster, 636 F. Supp. 486, 488-89 (N.D. Cal. 1984). In the context of recovery for prejudgment interest on a wage claim, the Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff cannot recover both prejudgment interest and liquidated damages under the FLSA. Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 715 (1945). Thus, although the FLSA does not preclude an additional award of damages under state law, it appears that permitting double recovery would be improper. Therefore, in the event that Micron is found liable under the FLSA and consequently under the Idaho Wage Claim Act, the Court will offset Plaintiffs' damages under state law by their recovery under the FLSA.
ORDER
In accordance with the Memorandum Decision set out above,
NOW WHEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
1. Defendant's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Daniel E. Williams is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. See Def.'s Reply in Supp. of Cross-Motion for Partial Summ. J. Re: Willfulness (Docket No. 295) at 4-5. The deposition testimonies of Alan Claflin, Hector Dimas, Shelly Dyer, Robert McCarter, and Charles K. McGuire, Jr., attached to the Williams' Affidavit (Docket No. 288) are STRICKEN; and
2. Defendant's Motions to Strike Plaintiff's Statements of Material Facts (Docket Nos. 242, 266) are DENIED; and
3. Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Docket No. 223) is DENIED; and
4. Defendant Micron Electronics, Inc.'s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Willfulness (Docket No. 269) is DENIED; and
5. Defendant Micron Electronics, Inc.'s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Statute of Limitations (Docket No. 193) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
The FLSA claims of the following claimants are hereby DISMISSED: (1) David L. Blair, (2) Jared Hodges, (3) Steven W. Tom, (4) Robert McCarter, (5) Thomas Robertson. The FLSA claims of the remaining claimants are limited to at most a three-year period.
The state law claims of the following claimants are hereby DISMISSED: (1) Laura Anderson, (2) David L. Blair, (3) Alan C. Claflin, (4) Jeffery P. Clevenger, (5) Rory Kip DeRouen, (6) Hector Dimas, (7) Shelly Dyer, (8) Alan Garcia, (9) James C. Gibson, (10)Jared Hodges, (11) Dale Hope, (12) Ryan Keen, (13) Michael Larscheid, (14) Jay S. Madison, (15)Chris McCullough, (16) Charles K. McGuire, (17)Deborah Monahan, (18) Chris Papero, (19) David A. Thom, (20) Steven W. Tom, (21)Marilyn J. Craig, (22) Rickey S. Ferrara, (23) Julie Gardner, (24) Matthew L. Hagman, (25) Jacqueline T. Hladun, (26) David R. Kestner, (27) Linda C. Lee, (28) Marvin L. Masteller, (29) Robert McCarter, (30) Thomas Robertson, and (31) Michelle Saari. The state law claims of the remaining Plaintiffs are limited to a six-month period.