Opinion
C.A. No. N13C-03-252 FWW
03-07-2016
BARRY SMITH and CORRINA SMITH, Plaintiffs, v. PAUL J. RENZI MASONRY, d/b/a RENZI MASONRY and DEWSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., a Delaware Corporation Defendants.
Timothy A. Dillon, Esquire, McCann & Wall, LLC, 300 Delaware Ave., Suite 805, Wilmington, Delaware 19801, Attorney for Plaintiffs. Kevin J. Connors, Esquire, Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, Nemours Building, 1007 N. Orange St., Suite 600, P.O. Box 8888, Wilmington, Delaware, 19899, Attorney for Defendant Paul J. Renzi Masonry d/b/a Renzi Masonry.
Upon Defendant Paul J. Renzi Masonry d/b/a Renzi Masonry's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in the Alternative, for New Trial or Remittitur
DENIED.
ORDER Timothy A. Dillon, Esquire, McCann & Wall, LLC, 300 Delaware Ave., Suite 805, Wilmington, Delaware 19801, Attorney for Plaintiffs. Kevin J. Connors, Esquire, Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, Nemours Building, 1007 N. Orange St., Suite 600, P.O. Box 8888, Wilmington, Delaware, 19899, Attorney for Defendant Paul J. Renzi Masonry d/b/a Renzi Masonry. WHARTON, J.
This 7th day of March, 2016, upon consideration of Defendant Paul J. Renzi Masonry d/b/a Renzi Masonry's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in the Alternative, for New Trial or Remittitur, the Plaintiff's Response and Defendant's Reply, it appears to the Court that:
(1) A jury trial was held in this case from January 4, 2016 through January 13, 2016. The jury found that Paul J. Renzi Masonry d/b/a Renzi Masonry ("Renzi") was negligent and that Renzi's negligence was a proximate cause of Barry Smith's injuries. The jury also found that Dewson Construction was negligent but its negligence was not a proximate cause of Barry Smith's injuries. The jury awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $640,000 to Barry Smith and $80,000 to Corrina Smith for loss of consortium.
D.I. 139.
D.I. 140.
(2) On January 28, 2016, Renzi filed the Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in the Alternative, for New Trial or Remittitur. On February 25, 2016, Renzi withdrew the portion of the Motion regarding Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. Defendant argues that: 1) uncontroverted testimony establishes that the board was nailed into place by Renzi Masonry; 2) the evidence presented at trial establishes that the board could not have struck Plaintiff; 3) the jury's findings with regard to negligence are against the weight of the evidence; 4) the jury's verdict absolving Dewson Construction of liability is inconsistent with the jury's verdict that Renzi is negligent; 5) the jury's verdict is against the weight of the evidence because the evidence does not establish that Plaintiff suffered a herniated disc at the C5-6 level of his neck; and 6) the jury's award to Plaintiffs was excessive. Plaintiffs assert that the Motion "must be denied as it seeks to have the Court decide issues of disputed fact and witness credibility which have already been decided by a jury after a careful consideration of the evidence and the application of the law as provided by the Court."
See Def.'s Reply Br., D.I. 150, at 1.
Pl.'s Resp. Br., D.I. 145, all.
(3) Super. Ct. Civ. R. 59(a) provides that "[a] new trial may be granted as to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues in an action in which there has been a trial for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in the Superior Court." "Every analysis of a motion for a new trial must begin with the presumption that the jury verdict is correct." A new trial should not be granted "unless 'the evidence preponderates so heavily against the jury verdict that a reasonable jury could not have reached the result' or the Court is convinced that the jury disregarded applicable rules of law, or where the jury's verdict is tainted by legal error committed by the Court during the trial."
Smith v. Lawson, 2006 WL 258310, at *6 (Del. Super. Jan. 23, 2006) (citing Mills v. Telenczak, 345 A.2d 424, 426 (Del. Super. 1975)).
Mitchell v. Haldar, 2004 WL 1790121, at * 3 (Del. Super. Aug. 4, 2004) (quoting Storey v. Camper, 401 A.2d 458, 465 (Del.1977)).
(4) The Court finds that the jury's verdict is reasonable based upon the evidence presented. There was evidence from which the jury could conclude that Renzi was responsible for securing the board in place and that the board was not securely nailed into place because the board fell from the window. There was testimony that the board struck Barry Smith in the back of the neck when it fell and that Barry Smith suffered an injury because of the impact of the falling board. Although Defendant presented evidence that contradicts Plaintiffs' version of the events, the jury is free to choose which version is more credible. Therefore, the jury's verdict is not against the weight of the evidence.
(5) Additionally, the jury's verdict that Dewson Construction is negligent but that the negligence was not a proximate cause of Barry Smith's injuries is not against the weight of the evidence. The testimony from Plaintiffs' liability expert was that Dewson should have inspected the premises in the morning when work was beginning and in the afternoon while work was ending for the day around 2:30 p.m. Paul Renzi testified that the board was placed in the window between 10:00 a.m. and 10:30 a.m. on the day of the incident. Barry Smith testified that the incident occurred between 12:30 p.m. and 1:30 p.m. Based upon the timeline, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that the board could have been placed in the window after the morning inspection should have been performed and the board fell and hit Barry Smith before the afternoon inspection should have been performed. Therefore, Dewson's failure to inspect the jobsite, while negligent, had no effect on the injuries sustained by Barry Smith.
(6) Absent exceptional circumstances, the Court gives deference to a jury's award of damages. The Court may adjust the jury's damages award where it is "clear that the award is so grossly out of proportion to the injuries suffered, as to shock the court's conscience and sense of justice." "Remittitur is required only when the award of damages is so excessive that it must have been based on passion, prejudice or misconduct, rather than on objective consideration of evidence presented at trial."
Babra v. Boston Scientific Corp., 2015 WL 6336151, at *9 (Del. Super. Oct. 9, 2015).
Mitchell, 2004 WL 1790121, at *3.
Babra, 2015 WL 6336151, at *9. --------
(7) At trial, Plaintiffs' economic expert testified that, based upon Barry Smith's life expectancy, Barry Smith will suffer a loss of earnings and incur future medical costs in the amount of $1,626,338.00. In addition, any award was subject to a workers' compensation lien in the amount of $284,671.28. Additionally, the jury awarded Barry Smith $640,000 which is less than the damages identified by Plaintiffs' economic expert. Therefore, the Court finds that the damages award does not shock the Court's conscious. Likewise, based upon Corrina Smith's testimony regarding the hardships she has endured due to the incident, the jury's award of $80,000 to Corrina Smith or loss of consortium does not shock the Court's conscious.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in the Alternative, for New Trial or Remittitur is hereby DENIED.
/s/_________
Ferris W. Wharton, Judge