Opinion
Civil Action No. 19-399
06-28-2019
DONALD T. SMITH, Plaintiff, v. MARK MANSOUR; MAGISTERIAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 10; WESTMORELAND COUNTY; CITY OF GREENSBURG, Defendants.
Judge David Stewart Cercone/Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. RECOMMENDATION
It is respectfully recommended that this action be dismissed before the Complaint is served pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act because the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
II. REPORT
Donald T. Smith ("Plaintiff") is a prisoner, currently incarcerated in the Westmoreland County Prison. Plaintiff has submitted for filing a completed form Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights (Prisoner Complaint) (the "Complaint"), claiming that Defendants violated the United States Constitution during the course of his criminal proceedings before Magisterial District Judge Mark Mansour.
In the Complaint, Plaintiff names Judge Mansour as a defendant along with Magisterial District Court No. 10, Westmoreland County and the City of Greensburg. Because Judge Mansour is entitled to absolute judicial immunity, the Complaint should be dismissed as to him for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Furthermore, because the Complaint makes no specific factual allegations against the remaining three Defendants, the Complaint should likewise be dismissed against the remaining three Defendants for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The complete factual allegations of the Complaint are as follows:
On September 29, 2017, I appeared in front of Magisterial District Judge Mark Mansour for a Preliminary Hearing at 9:00 AM.ECF No. 6 at 7. The Complaint alleges that the foregoing conduct violated Plaintiff's Sixth Amendment rights and that he brings this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 3. By way of relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages for mental anguish, mental distress and emotional distress. He also "specifically ask[s] that the Courts make it mandatory that anyone with mental health history be appointed counsel so that they cannot be taking [sic] advantage of." Id. at 10.
Upon arriving at the Preliminary Hearing[,] I asked Judge Mansour for a postpone[e]ment so that I can obtain a private attorney. He refused.
I explained to Judge Mansour that I needed a little more time to pay off a [sic] attorney to represent me and due to the fact that I didn't have all the money at once, I needed more time to pay my attorney. Judge Mansour told me that I was already granted one postpone[e]ment and that I either waive my Preliminary Hearing or represent myself.
I explained that I did not want to waive my hearing and that I was mentally incapable of representing myself due to mental health issues. And again I asked for a postpone[e]ment.
After about 10 minutes of Judge Mansour and the District Attorney trying to talk me into waiving my hearing, and me refusing, I was forced to represent myself. Before this hearing started I asked for a public defender, Judge Mansour refused. He told me I had enough time to obtain one and he proceeded with the hearing.
At the end of the hearing, I ask[ed] Judge Mansour did he put him refusing me a postponement on record, and he said "it should be."
B. APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES
In the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), Congress adopted major changes affecting civil rights actions brought by prisoners, in an effort to curb the increasing number of frivolous and harassing lawsuits brought by persons in custody. The PLRA permits courts to screen complaints filed by prisoners and dismiss them before they are served if the complaints fail to state a claim or are frivolous or malicious. See Santana v. United States, 98 F.3d 752, 755 (3d Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff is a prisoner who has been granted IFP status and/or because Plaintiff sues government employees, the screening provisions of the PLRA apply. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A ("[t]he court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity."). See also 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) ("[n]otwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid [by a prisoner granted IFP status], the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that - (A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or (B) the action or appeal - (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.").
In performing the Court's mandated function of sua sponte review of complaints under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e), to determine if they fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a federal district court applies the same standard applied to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See, e.g., Brodzki v. Tribune Co., 481 F. App'x 705 (3d Cir. 2012) (applying Rule 12(b)(6) standard to claim dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Courteau v. United States, 287 F. App'x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) ("the legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to § 1915A is identical to the legal standard employed in ruling on 12(b)(6) motions").
As the United States Supreme Court explained in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), a complaint may properly be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6) if it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570 (rejecting the traditional 12(b)(6) standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). Under this standard, the court must, as a general rule, accept as true all factual allegations of the complaint and all reasonable inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 944 (3d Cir. 1985). In addition to the complaint, courts may consider matters of public record and other matters of which a court may take judicial notice, court orders, and exhibits attached to the complaint when adjudicating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1385 n.2 (3d Cir. 1994), abrogation on other grounds recognized in, Rotkiske v. Klemm, 890 F.3d 422, 428 (3d Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 18-328, 2019 WL 886893 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2019). Moreover, under the 12(b)(6) standard, a "court need not . . . accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit." Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001), amended by, 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001). The court need not accept inferences drawn by plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
The question to be resolved is: whether, taking the factual allegations of the complaint, which are not contradicted by the exhibits and matters of which judicial notice may be had, and taking all reasonable inferences to be drawn from those uncontradicted factual allegations of the complaint, are the "factual allegations . . . enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true even if doubtful in fact[.]" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Or put another way, a complaint may be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570.
Furthermore, because Plaintiff is pro se, courts accord an even more liberal reading of the complaint, employing less stringent standards when considering pro se pleadings than when judging the work product of an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
C. DISCUSSION
1. Judge Mansour has absolute judicial immunity.
It is clear from the factual allegations of the Complaint that Judge Mansour is entitled to absolute judicial immunity.
The doctrine of judicial immunity bars civil suits against judicial officers who are acting in their judicial capacity, i.e., whose challenged actions are taken in the course of their judicial activities and whose actions are not lacking jurisdiction. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991) (per curiam). In determining whether the challenged act is a "judicial act," the court asks two questions: (1) is the act a function normally performed by a judge and (2) did the party aggrieved by the challenged act deal with the judge in his judicial capacity. Id. at 12. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978) ("The relevant cases demonstrate that the factors determining whether an act by a judge is a 'judicial' one relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity."). Moreover, the doctrine of judicial immunity renders a judge not only immune from damages but also immune from suit. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11 ("judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages.").
It is clear from reading the allegations of the Complaint quoted above that both prongs of Mireles are satisfied in that the acts about which Plaintiff complains concerning Judge Mansour were functions normally performed by a judge and Plaintiff clearly was dealing with Judge Mansour in his judicial capacity. Accordingly, Judge Mansour is a judicial officer entitled to the benefits of the doctrine of judicial immunity. See, e.g., Fox v. Lee, 99 F. Supp.2d 573 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (applying doctrine of judicial immunity to district justice/magistrate).
Furthermore, because Plaintiff brought his cause of action against a judicial officer pursuant to Section 1983 for his role in holding a preliminary hearing and denying a postponement and denying appointed counsel, and because state court judicial officers are not proper party defendants under Section 1983 for their adjudicatory actions, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under Section 1983. See, e.g., In re Justices of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 695 F.2d 17, 22-23 (1st Cir. 1982) ("§ 1983 does not provide relief against judges acting purely in their adjudicative capacity, any more than, say, a typical state's libel law imposes liability on a postal carrier or telephone company for simply conveying a libelous message. Just as a dismissal for failure to state a claim would be proper in the latter case, so is it in the former. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).") (citations omitted); Georgevich v. Strauss, 772 F.2d 1078, 1087 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing In re Justices approvingly). Accord Brandon E. ex rel. Listenbee v. Reynolds, 201 F.3d 194, (3d Cir. 2000) ("although in Georgevich [where the judges there were essentially acting as a parole board] we held the judges amenable to suit under § 1983, our decision nevertheless recognized the impropriety of such suits where the judge acted as an adjudicator rather than an enforcer or administrator of a statute. Turning to the present case, the facts reveal that the plaintiffs are suing judges who are neutral adjudicators [determining under a statute, whether juveniles should be involuntarily committed to drug treatment] and not enforcers or administrators.").
Accordingly, the Complaint should be dismissed as against Judge Mansour for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
2. The Remaining Defendants should be dismissed as well.
Plaintiff makes no specific factual allegations against the remaining three Defendants. It appears however, that Plaintiff seeks to hold these three Defendants liable based on some perceived employment or supervisory relationship between them and Judge Mansour. However, under Section 1983, there is no liability based upon the doctrine of respondeat superior. "Respondeat superior is a doctrine of vicarious liability based upon public policy [and] the notion that the person who benefits by the acts of the servant must pay for wrongs committed by the servant; the one held liable as master need not be at fault in any way." McClelland v. Facteau, 610 F.2d 693, 695 (10th Cir. 1979).
In order to establish liability under Section 1983, there must be "personal involvement" in the constitutional tort by the defendant. See, e.g., Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) ("A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior."). Hence, the only way a defendant can be liable under Section 1983 is based upon facts showing that the defendant was personally involved in depriving the civil rights of the plaintiff, i.e., personally engaged in wrongdoing. "Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual [contemporaneous] knowledge and acquiescence." Id. Accord Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) ("Her amended complaint likewise does not contain even a remote suggestion that Attorney General Fisher had contemporaneous, personal knowledge of her transfer and acquiesced in it."). But see Bayer v. Monroe County Children & Youth Services, 577 F.3d 186, 191 n. 5 (3d Cir. 2009) (calling into doubt the continuing viability of mere knowledge and acquiescence as being sufficient to impose liability, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Iqbal).
In order to hold liable a municipal entity, such as Westmoreland County or the City of Greensburg, the municipal entity itself must have committed a constitutional tort, it cannot be held liable solely on the basis of respondeat superior. See, e.g., Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978). Instead, Monell and subsequent cases, have required a plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a municipality to identify a municipal "policy" or "custom" that caused the plaintiff's injury. Id. Locating a "policy" ensures that a municipality is held liable only for those deprivations resulting from the decisions of its duly constituted legislative body or of those officials whose acts may fairly be said to be those of the municipality. Board of County Com'rs of Bryan County, Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-404 (1997).
The Complaint, in the instant case, is utterly devoid of any allegation of custom or policy. Accordingly, the Complaint should be dismissed as against Westmoreland County and the City of Greensburg.
The same reasoning of there being no respondeat superior liability under Section 1983 would apply to Magisterial District Court No. 10, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to hold such entity liable based solely on some kind of assumed employment relationship between it and Judge Mansour and assuming that Magisterial District Court No. 10 even has the capacity to be sued.
3. Plaintiff may attempt to cure any deficiencies in objections.
To the extent that Plaintiff feels he can attempt to allege any additional facts that could cure the deficiencies noted in this Report and Recommendation, he may do so in his Objections, if he chooses to file any. Coulter v. Ramsden, 510 F. App'x 100, 104 (3d Cir. 2013) ("Last, a formal amendment to the complaint was unnecessary, because the objections Coulter filed on July 27, 2012 served the same purpose as an amendment in that Coulter used them to cure the defects in her complaint. See generally Urrutia v. Harrisburg County Police Dept., 91 F.3d 451, 454 (3d Cir. 1996) (if amendment will cure defects in complaint, it must be permitted). After Coulter clarified her cause of action, it then was clear that a formal amendment would be futile, see Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002), because of the insufficient factual assertion of the existence of a conspiratorial agreement.").
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that this action should be dismissed before being served because the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties are permitted to file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may file their response to the objections within fourteen (14) days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.D.2. Date: June 28, 2019
Respectfully submitted,
/s/_________
MAUREEN P. KELLY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE cc: The Honorable David Stewart Cercone
United States District Judge
DONALD T. SMITH
33685
WESTMORELAND COUNTY PRISON
3000 SOUTH GRANDE BLVD
GREENSBURG, PA 15601