Opinion
Civil No. SA-03-CA-1118-XR.
August 10, 2005
ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend Final Judgment (docket no. 112).
This case was tried to a jury February 22 through February 25, 2005 on Plaintiff's workers' compensation retaliation and slander claims. The jury returned a verdict finding that Defendant Lowe's discharged Plaintiff because she filed a workers' compensation claim in good faith and that Defendant committed slander against Smith. The jury awarded $187,084 in economic damages and $125,000 in noneconomic damages for the workers' compensation claim, but did not award punitive damages. For the slander claim, the jury awarded $100,000 in economic damages, $200,000 in noneconomic damages, and $1 in nominal damages, and awarded punitive damages in the amount of $4,000,000.00.
In its Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Judgment, the Court concluded that the cap on exemplary damages in Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 41.008 should be applied and resulted in an exemplary damages award of $400,000.00.
Accordingly, the Court ordered that Plaintiff recover from Defendant Lowe's Home Centers, Inc.: (1) the sum of $355,085.00 in compensatory damages, plus prejudgment interest at the rate of 5.5% on that amount, computed as simple interest, beginning November 7, 2003; (2) an additional $257,000.00 in compensatory future damages; and (3) the sum of $400,000.00 in exemplary damages. Further, the Court awarded postjudgment interest at the rate of 3.33%.
Defendant then filed its Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, Remittitur, and in the alternative, Motion for New Trial (docket no. 103). Lowe's argued that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law for the following reasons: (1) Smith's evidence of worker's compensation retaliation is insufficient; (2) the evidence of slander is legally insufficient; (3) the evidence in support of exemplary damages is insufficient; (4) the evidence in support of the jury's compensatory damages is legally insufficient; and (5) the Court erred in admitting into evidence Plaintiff's exhibit number 6.
On June 29, 2005, the Court entered an Order granting, in part, and denying, in part, that Renewed Motion. The Court agreed that Plaintiff failed to present evidence of any lost earning capacity to support the $100,000 award made regarding the slander claim. Lowe's now argues that given this Order the amount of exemplary damages available to Plaintiff must be recalculated. Rather than receiving an award of $400,000 in exemplary damages (reduced from the original jury award of $4 million), Lowe's argues that Plaintiff may only receive an exemplary damages award of $200,000.
Analysis
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 41.008 provides:
(a) In an action in which a claimant seeks recovery of damages, the trier of fact shall determine the amount of economic damages separately from the amount of other compensatory damages.
(b) Exemplary damages awarded against a defendant may not exceed an amount equal to the greater of:
(1)(A) two times the amount of economic damages; plus (B) an amount equal to any noneconomic damages found by the jury, not to exceed $750,000; or
(2) $200,000.
Defendant asserts that Plaintiff's exemplary damages are capped at $200,000. Defendant calculates this amount as follows: (2 × $0 economic damages) + $200,000 noneconomic damages.
The jury in this case was instructed that special (economic) damages "may include lost past and future income and loss of earning capacity." Although the Court has concluded that there was no evidence to support an award for any loss of earning capacity, there was evidence to support an award for lost past and future income. In fact for the worker's compensation retaliation claim, the jury awarded $30,084 in lost earnings and employee benefits in the past and $157,000 for lost earnings and employee benefits in the future.
Plaintiff is not entitled to an award of $100,000 for these lost wages and benefits under a slander theory and an award of $187,084 under a worker's compensation retaliation theory. That would be a double recovery. The question that remains is should Plaintiff now have the exemplary damages yet further reduced. The Court does not believe so.
Despite the lack of earning capacity evidence, there still remains evidence of economic damages. To avoid the double recovery the $100,000 could have just as easily been taken from the $187,084 worker's compensation award. To reward Defendant with an additional $200,000 reduction in damages due to the Court's elimination of $100,000 in damages to prevent double recovery would unfairly punish the Plaintiff. It would further do harm to the intent of the jury's verdict. Because the $100,000 double recovery could have been deducted from the workers' compensation damages instead of the slander damages and because some evidence exists to support the $100,000 in economic damages awarded for the slander claim, it is proper to include the $100,000 in calculating Plaintiff's exemplary damages under the cap.
In addition, Defendant argues that the Court's June 29 Order also orders a remittitur of $200,000: $100,000 (future mental anguish awarded under the retaliation claim) and $100,000 (lost earning capacity awarded under the slander claim). Defendant asserts that where a trial court enters a remittitur of damages the Plaintiff must be given the option of (1) accepting the remittitur or (2) exercising the right to a new trial. Plaintiff responds that the Court did not order any remittitur, but rather merely found that there was no evidence to support an award for future mental anguish and lost earning capacity. The Court agrees with Plaintiff. When a damage award is excessive or so large as to appear contrary to right reason, remittitur is the appropriate remedy. Laxton v. Gap Inc. 333 F.3d 572, 586 (5th Cir. 2003). This Court did not find Plaintiff's damage award excessive, it found that there was no evidence to support an award. The Court did not order any remittitur.
Defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend Final Judgment (docket no. 112) is DENIED.