Opinion
Civil Action No. 0:05-2260-MBS-BM.
May 11, 2006
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This action was filed by the Petitioner, pro se, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner, an inmate with the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), seeks a "re-designation" of his place of confinement to a place closer to his home.
The Respondent filed a motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment on October 14, 2005. As the Petitioner is proceedingpro se, a Roseboro order was entered by the Court on October 17, 2005, advising Petitioner of the importance of a dispositive motion and of the need for him to file an adequate response. Petitioner was specifically advised that if he failed to adequately respond, the Respondent's motion may be granted, thereby ending his case. Petitioner thereafter filed a response to the motion on October 25, 2005, together with a supplement on October 31, 2005. Respondent's motion is now before the Court for disposition.
This case was automatically referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for all pretrial proceedings pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c) and (e), D.S.C. The Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment. As this is a dispositive motion, this Report and Recommendation is entered for review by the Court.
Discussion
Petitioner is serving a life sentence following a conviction for murder in the United States District Court for the District of Montana. See Respondent's Exhibit 1. Because the offense occurred prior to November 1, 1987, however, Petitioner is eligible for parole, and has a presumptive parole date of April 26, 2008. See Respondent's Exhibit 2. Petitioner is currently incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Edgefield, South Carolina, and seeks a transfer to a more "appropriate facility" closer to his home community. Petitioner argues that the Respondent has abused his discretion by refusing to do so; specifically, by violating his "lawful entitlement to release preparation arrangements and programs", and by housing him "in a facility not consistent with [his] low security classification. . . .". Petitioner also argues that, by maintaining him in a medium security facility even though he is a low security inmate, he is more likely to be involved in a physical altercation with another inmate, which could effect his parole eligibility.Respondent concedes that this action is properly before the Court under § 2241; see In re Vail, 115 F.3d 1192, 1194, n. 5 (4th Cir. 1997) [attacks on the execution of a sentence are properly raised in a § 2241 petition]; and that the proper district in which to bring this action is the district of his confinement, in this case the District of South Carolina. United States v. Miller, 871 F.2d 488, 490 (4th Cir. 1989);Chatman-Bey v. Thornburgh, 864 F.2d 804, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Respondent also concedes that Petitioner exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing this action; see 28 C.F.R. § 542.10, et. seq.; see also Respondent's Exhibit 3; and that this Petition is therefore properly before this Court. Nevertheless, Respondent argues that Plaintiff's claim for relief is without merit, and should be dismissed. After careful consideration of the arguments and exhibits presented, the undersigned is constrained to agree.
The decision on where to designate an inmate's place of imprisonment rests with the BOP. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). Pursuant to this authority, the BOP is authorized to place inmates in "any available penal or correctional facility that meets minimum standards of health and habitability established by the [BOP]. . . . that the [BOP] determines to be appropriate and suitable. . . .".Id. In making this decision, the BOP considers such factors as the resources of the facility, the nature and circumstances of the inmate's offense and the history and characteristics of the inmate, recommendations or statements by the sentencing court, and any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. Id. Consistent with this authority, the BOP has established guidelines for assigning custody classifications.See Respondent's Exhibit 4. Under these guidelines, prison officials consider several criteria when making designation decisions, including the severity of the inmate's current offense, any history of escapes or escape attempts, expected length of incarceration, types of prior commitments, and other criteria. Id.
Pursuant to the applicable criteria and guidelines, Petitioner is classified as a low security inmate with an applied management variable of "greatest severity" due to the fact that he is serving time for murder. See Respondent's Exhibit 4, Chp. 7, p. 9; Appx.B, p. 1; see also Respondent's Exhibit 5. In response to Petitioner's administrative remedy request for transfer, he was advised that he had been transferred from a high security facility to a medium security facility (FCI Edgefield) due to his positive institutional conduct, but that due to population pressures within the Western and South Central Regions (where Petitioner wishes to be transferred) he was currently over 500 miles from his release residence. Petitioner was further advised that after completion of eighteen (18) months "clear conduct", he would be considered for transfer. See Petitioner's Exhibit, "Request for Administrative Remedy", Response dated May 16, 2005. See also, Petitioner's Exhibit, Response dated June 9, 2005.
Respondent's response of May 16, 2005 notes that the "objective of the Security Designation System is to place each inmate in the lowest security level facility for which the inmate qualifies, normally within 500 miles of the inmate's release residence, while maintaining population balance throughout the Bureau. . . .". See Petitioner's Exhibit, "Request for Administrative Remedy", Response dated May 16, 2005.
Petitioner presents an array of arguments as to why he should be transferred without delay, including the danger that he will be involved in an infraction with another prisoner, his need to re-establish a support network of family and social contacts in the community in which he may be paroled, and that other inmates have been transferred without regard to an eighteen month "clear conduct" requirement. In his responses to the Respondent's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, Petitioner additionally argues that Respondent has raised arguments in its motion for why Petitioner's request for transfer was refused which were not presented during the administrative process, and that he has therefore been denied due process because he was not afforded an opportunity to address those matters. However, none of these arguments entitle Petitioner to relief. The decision of where an inmate should be placed within the prison system is within the discretion of the BOP, and that decision should not be disturbed by the courts absent an abuse of that discretion. Marchesani v. McCune, 531 F.2d 459, 461-462 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 846 (1976); James v. Reno, 39 F.Supp.2d 37, 42 (D.D.C. 1999). Nothing in the exhibits filed with the Court, including Petitioner's own exhibits, show that the BOP abused its discretion with respect to Petitioner's designation at FCI Edgefield. Petitioner's conviction for murder plainly places him within the "greatest severity" management variable under the BOP's guidelines, a fact that Petitioner does not (and indeed cannot) dispute. Further, even if the Court were to accept Petitioner's argument that only the reason(s) set forth in the administrative responses of May 16, 2005 and June 9, 2005 should be considered by this Court, Petitioner has presented no evidence to show that it was an abuse of discretion for his request for transfer to be denied based on "population pressures" within the BOP, or for the BOP to wait to reconsider his request until after he had completed eighteen months clear conduct. See also, Attachment A to Petitioner's Petition [Informal Resolution Form, bearing notation: "denied transfer due to [inmate] arriving at [FCI Edgield] on 12/8/04 and population concerns throughout the BOP"].
Petitioner himself concedes in his filings that he has no legal right to a particular classification or rehabilitative program, and that he has no protected liberty interest in placement in a particular facility. See also Olin v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 244-248 (1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976);Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88, n. 9 (1976). Petitioner has also failed to meet his burden of showing that the BOP abused its discretion in this case. Therefore, his claim is without merit.James, 39 F.Supp.2d at 42 ["courts will generally not second guess defendants' decisions in classifying Plaintiff or selecting his place of confinement"]; Marchesani, 531 F.2d at 461-462 [prison security classifications "lie within the sound discretion" of the agency]; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539, 540-541, n. 23 (1979) [courts should defer to the judgment of prison administrators unless there is substantial evidence in the record justifying the overturning of those decisions].
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Respondent's motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment be granted, and that this Petition be dismissed.
The parties are referred to the Notice Page attached hereto.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation The Serious Consequences of a Failure to Do So
The parties are hereby notified that any objections to the attached Report and Recommendation (or Order and Recommendation) must be filed within ten (10) days of the date of its filing. 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). The time calculation of this ten-day period excludes weekends and holidays and provides for an additional three days for filing by mail. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6. Based thereon, this Report and Recommendation, any objections thereto, and the case file will be delivered to a United States District Judge fourteen (14) days after this Report and Recommendation is filed. Advance Coating Technology, Inc. v. LEP Chemical, Ltd., 142 F.R.D. 91, 94 n. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). A magistrate judge makes only a recommendation, and the authority to make a final determination in this case rests with the United States District Judge. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-271 (1976); and Estrada v. Witkowski, 816 F. Supp. 408, 410 (D.S.C. 1993).During the ten-day period, but not thereafter, a party must file with the Clerk of Court specific, written objections to the Report and Recommendation, if he wishes the United States District Judge to consider any objections. Any written objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. Failure to file written objections shall constitute a waiver of a party's right to further judicial review, including appellate review, if the recommendation is accepted by the United States District Judge. See United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 94 n. 4 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, Schronce v. United States, 467 U.S. 1208 (1984); and Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 845-47 nn. 1-3 (4th Cir. 1985). Moreover, if a party files specific objections to a portion of a magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation, but does not file specific objections to other portions of the Report and Recommendation, that party waives appellate review of the portions of the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation to which he did not object. In other words, a party's failure to object to one issue in a magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation precludes that party from subsequently raising that issue on appeal, even if objections are filed on other issues. Howard v. Secretary of HHS, 932 F.2d 505, 508-509 (6th Cir. 1991). See also Praylow v. Martin, 761 F.2d 179, 180 n. 1 (4th Cir.) (party precluded from raising on appeal factual issue to which it did not object in the district court), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1009 (1985). In Howard, supra, the Court stated that general, non-specific objections are not sufficient:
A general objection to the entirety of the [magistrate judge's] report has the same effects as would a failure to object. The district court's attention is not focused on any specific issues for review, thereby making the initial reference to the [magistrate judge] useless. * * * This duplication of time and effort wastes judicial resources rather than saving them, and runs contrary to the purposes of the Magistrates Act. * * * We would hardly countenance an appellant's brief simply objecting to the district court's determination without explaining the source of the error.Accord Lockert v. Faulkner, 843 F.2d 1015, 1017-19 (7th Cir. 1988), where the Court held that the appellant, who proceeded pro se in the district court, was barred from raising issues on appeal that he did not specifically raise in his objections to the district court:
Just as a complaint stating only 'I complain' states no claim, an objection stating only 'I object' preserves no issue for review. * * * A district judge should not have to guess what arguments an objecting party depends on when reviewing a [magistrate judge's] report.See also Branch v. Martin, 886 F.2d 1043, 1046 (8th Cir. 1989) ("no de novo review if objections are untimely or general"), which involved a pro se litigant; and Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 7 n. 1 (3rd. Cir. 1984) ("plaintiff's objections lacked the specificity to trigger de novo review"). This notice, hereby, apprises the parties of the consequences of a failure to file specific, written objections. See Wright, supra,; and Small v. Secretary of HHS, 892 F.2d 15, 16 (2nd Cir. 1989). Filing by mail pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 5 may be accomplished by mailing addressed as follows:
Larry W. Propes, Clerk United States District Court 901 Richland Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201