Opinion
Case No.: 2:13-CV-00557-RDP
07-21-2017
WILLIE B. SMITH, III, Petitioner, v. JEFFERSON S. DUNN, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections, Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the court on the court's March 29, 2017 order (Doc. # 47), which reopened this action for the sole purpose of considering the effect of Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017) on the Atkins issue presented in this case. (See Doc. # 46 at 1-2). The issues raised in the court's order are fully briefed. (Docs. # 55, 56).
I. Background
Petitioner filed this § 2254 action alleging that his conviction and sentence were secured in violation of his rights under the Constitution. (See Doc. # 1). Among other grounds for relief, Petitioner claimed that he is intellectually disabled, and as such, ineligible for the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. # 1-1 at ¶¶ 108-134). The court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Final Judgment on March 28, 2017, which denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus and dismissed the petition with prejudice. (See Docs. # 45, 46). The court granted Petitioner a certificate of appealability on the issue of whether the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals unreasonably applied Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), in holding that Petitioner failed to prove that he was intellectually disabled, and, thus, ineligible for the death penalty. (Doc. # 46 at 1-2).
On March 29, 2017, the court reopened this action for the purpose of considering the effect of Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 197 L. Ed. 2d 416 (2017). (Doc. # 47). The court directed the parties to answer five questions in their briefing of the issue:
1. Whether Moore's holding(s) constitute "clearly established Federal law" that must be applied by this court when reviewing whether the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals issued a decision contrary to clearly established law or unreasonably applying clearly established law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Cf. Kilgore v. Sec'y, Florida Dep't of Corr., 805 F.3d 1301, 1310-12 (11th Cir. 2015) (concluding that Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014), established a new obligation on state courts in making intellectual disability determinations that was not clearly established by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002));(Id. at 1-2). II. The Moore Opinion
2. Whether Moore announced a new rule of constitutional law that must be applied retroactively to this case, pursuant to Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). Cf. Kilgore, 805 F.3d at 1312-15 (concluding that Hall's holding did not fall under a Teague exception to non-retroactivity);
3. Whether the Alabama courts unreasonably applied clearly established federal law or issued a decision contrary to clearly established federal law by failing to apply an adjustment to Smith's credible IQ score to account for the test's standard error;
4. Whether the Alabama courts unreasonably applied clearly established federal law or issued a decision contrary to clearly established federal law by considering Smith's adaptive strengths when examining whether he had sufficient adaptive deficits to be deemed intellectually disabled; and
5. Whether the Alabama courts unreasonably applied clearly established federal law or issued a decision contrary to clearly established federal law by failing to identify a clinical medical standard that they used to determine intellectual disability, such as those located in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders or the clinical manual issued by the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities.
In Moore, the Supreme Court vacated the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1044. Moore had challenged his death sentence on the ground that he was intellectually disabled and therefore exempt from execution. Id. While the state habeas court determined that Moore qualified as intellectually disabled, the Texas appellate court declined to adopt the judgment recommended by the state habeas court. Id. The appellate court reasoned that the evidentiary factors announced in Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1 (2004) "weigh[ed] heavily" against upsetting Moore's death sentence. Id. (citing Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 526 (2015)). While the state habeas court consulted current medical diagnostic standards in making its recommendation, the appellate court reaffirmed Briseno as binding precedent on intellectual disability issues in Texas capital cases. Id. at 1046 (citing Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 7).
Under Texas law, the CCA, not the court of first instance, is the "ultimate factfinder" in habeas proceedings. Moore, 137 S.Ct. at 1044 n.2.
Employing Briseno, the Texas appellate court discounted the lower end of the standard-error range associated with Moore's IQ scores, and determined that he had failed to prove significantly subaverage intellectual functioning. Id., at 1047 (citing Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 514-19). The appellate court then reasoned that even if Moore had proven that he suffers from significantly sub-average general intellectual functioning, he failed to prove "significant and related limitations in adaptive functioning." Id. (citing Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 520). The appellate court credited Moore's adaptive strengths as more illustrative of his intellectual functioning than his adaptive weaknesses, and noted that the Briseno factors "weigh[ed] heavily" against finding that Moore's adaptive deficits were related to his intellectual functioning deficits. Id. (citing Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 488-89, 522-27).
However, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and found that the state appellate court's adherence to superseded medical standards and its reliance on Briseno did not comply with either the Eighth Amendment or the Court's precedents. Id. at 1053. The Court held that the state appellate court's conclusion that Moore's IQ scores established that he was not intellectually disabled was irreconcilable with its decision in Hall. Id. at 1049 (citing Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2000 (2014)). Hall instructs that courts must account for an IQ test's "standard error of measurement," which the appellate court did not do. Id.
The court stated that "Moore's score of 74, adjusted for the standard error of measurement, yields a range of 69 to 70, as the State's retained expert acknowledged. Because the lower end of Moore's score range falls at or below 70, the appellate court was required to consider Moore's adaptive functioning. Moore, 137 S.Ct. at 1049 (internal citations omitted).
The Court then held that the "[appellate court's] consideration of Moore's adaptive functioning also deviated from prevailing clinical standards and from the older clinical standards the court claimed to apply." Id. at 1050. Specifically, the Court faulted the Texas appellate court for overemphasizing Moore's perceived adaptive strengths, when the medical community focuses the adaptive-functioning inquiry on adaptive deficits. Id. Moreover, the Court faulted the appellate court for departing from clinical practice by improperly weighing Moore's past traumatic experiences and requiring Moore to show that his adaptive deficits were not related to "a personality disorder." Id. at 1051 (citing Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 488, 526).
In its analysis, the Supreme Court condemned the use of the Briseno factors. Id. The Briseno court defined its objective as identifying the "consensus of Texas citizens" on who "should be exempted from the death penalty," reasoning that individuals with "mild" intellectual disability might be treated differently under clinical standards than under Texas' capital system. Id. (citing Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 6). However, the Court noted that those with "[m]ild levels of intellectual disability, although they may fall outside Texas citizens' consensus, nevertheless remain intellectual disabilities." Id. Moreover, the Supreme Court recognized that no other state legislature approved the use of the Briseno factors, and Texas itself does not follow Briseno in contexts other than the death penalty. Id. at 1052.
The Court noted that Briseno questions such as, "Did those who knew the person best during the developmental stage... think he was mentally retarded at that time, and, if so, act in accordance with that determination?" demonstrate the [appellate court's] improper emphasis on lay perceptions of intellectual disability, as opposed to medical and clinical standards. Moore, 137 S.Ct. at 1051-52.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that:
By rejecting the habeas court's application of medical guidance and clinging to the standard it laid out in Briseno, including the wholly nonclinical Briseno factors, the CCA failed adequately to inform itself of the "medical community's diagnostic framework," Hall, 572 U.S., at — - —, 134 S.Ct., at 2000. Because Briseno pervasively infected the CCA's analysis, the decision of that court cannot stand.Id. at 1053.
III. Analysis
After careful review, the court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to relief.
A. Moore Does Not Constitute Clearly Established Federal Law Which Governed at the Time the State Court Rendered its Decision.
Under § 2254(d)(1), federal courts must uphold a state court decision unless it is "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). "'[C]learly established Federal law' under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003) (emphasis added). Moreover, "[t]he Supreme Court has repeatedly held that only the actual holdings of its decisions can 'clearly establish []' federal law for § 2254(d)(1) purposes," and an opinion that merely "interprets" or "refines" a prior opinion does not constitute clearly established law under § 2254(d)(1). Kilgore, 805 F.3d at 1310-11 (citing Loggins v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1204, 122 (11th Cir. 2011)).
Petitioner concedes that Moore cannot be considered "clearly established Federal law" at the time the Alabama courts heard Smith's case. (Doc. # 56 at 15). Indeed, Moore's holding was not set forth on the date which the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals issued its decision. Smith v. State, 112 So. 3d 1108, 1116 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012).
To be clear, Petitioner's concession comes with two caveats. First, Petitioner "respectfully disagrees with the decision in Kilgore, but recognizes Kilgore is the controlling legal authority in the Eleventh Circuit." (Doc. # 56 at 14). Second, the Supreme Court recently granted certiorari, vacated judgment and remanded two cases back to the Fifth Circuit "for consideration in light of Moore." Martinez v. Davis, 581 U.S. ___ (2017) (No. 15-7974); Henderson v. Davis, 581 U.S. ___ (2017) (No. 16-6445). Petitioner contends that the court should consider Moore as clearly established law to the extent that the two remands (referenced above) might be construed as a finding that Moore constituted clearly established federal law as of May 25, 2012. (Doc. # 56 at15 n. 2).
Atkins held that the execution of intellectually disabled offenders is categorically prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Notably, Atkins did not define intellectual disability, nor did it direct the states on how to define intellectual disability, nor, finally, did it provide the range of IQ scores that could be indicative of intellectual disability. Rather, Atkins expressly left it to the states to develop "appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction" on executing the intellectually disabled.Kilgore, 805 F.3d at 1311 (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317). By contrast, the Court's holding in Moore addressed Texas' standards for how to define intellectual disability. At most, Moore's holding can be construed as an application of Hall v. Florida, 134 S.Ct. 1986 (2014). See Moore, 137 S.Ct. at 1044 ("As we instructed in Hall, adjudications of intellectual disability should be 'informed by the views of medical experts.'"); Id. at 1049 ("The [appellate court's] conclusion that Moore's IQ scores established that he is not intellectually disabled is irreconcilable with Hall."). However, this Circuit has held that Hall was not clearly established by Atkins. Kilgore, 805 F.3d at 1311. And Hall was not decided until after the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals entered the relevant decision in this case. Accordingly, Moore does not constitute clearly established federal law which governed at the time the state court rendered its decision.
B. Moore Did Not Announce a New Rule of Constitutional Law that Must Be Applied Retroactively
A petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief when he relies on a "new rule" of federal law, unless certain exceptions are met. Kilgore, 805 F.3d at 1312 (citing Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527 (1997)). "[A] case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final." Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989). New substantive rules generally apply retroactively. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004). And "'watershed rules of criminal procedure' implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding" apply retroactively. Id. (citing Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990)).
Here, Petitioner argues that Moore announced a new substantive rule which should apply retroactively. "Substantive rules include 'rules forbidding criminal punishment of certain primary conduct,' as well as 'rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.'" Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 728, 193 L. Ed. 2d 599 (2016) (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989); Teague, 489 U.S. at 307). Petitioner contends that Moore should apply retroactively because "the same person engaging in the same conduct is no longer subject to" the punishment at issue. Welch v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 1257, 1265 (2016). The court disagrees.
First, Kilgore's analysis regarding the retroactivity of Hall is instructive here:
Since Hall's holding undeniably is "new," we turn to Kilgore's claim that it meets the first Teague exception—that it prohibits the imposition of a certain type of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense. Applying this exception, the Supreme Court has said that a rule prohibiting "the execution of [intellectually disabled] persons ... would be applicable to defendants on collateral review" because "a new rule placing a certain class of individuals beyond the State's power to punish by death is analogous to a new rule placing certain conduct beyond the State's power to punish at all." Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989). Thus, when Atkins later
held that "an exclusion for the [intellectually disabled] is appropriate," 536 U.S. at 319, 122 S.Ct. 2242, we recognized that Atkins established a new rule of constitutional law. We concluded that "the new constitutional rule abstractly described in Penry and formally articulated in Atkins is retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review." In re Holladay, 331 F.3d at 1173.Kilgore, 805 F.3d at 1314. Kilgore's analysis of Hall applies equally here. In Moore, the Supreme Court dealt with the "procedural requirement[s]" associated with the Texas appellate court's determination of a petitioner's disability - it did not expand the class of individuals protected by Atkins. As with Hall, Moore did not guarantee relief for a new class of individuals not previously protected by Atkins. To the contrary, Moore condemned the particular procedure and analysis used by the Texas appellate court, and held that courts must account for a test's "standard error of measurement" and make intellectual disability determinations which are informed by the medical community's diagnostic framework. Moore, 137 S.Ct. at 1048-53.
But the same result does not hold true for Hall, which merely provides new procedures for ensuring that states follow the rule enunciated in Atkins. As we held in In re Henry, Hall did not expand the class of individuals protected by Atkins's prohibition. In re Henry, 757 F.3d at 1161. Rather, Hall created a procedural requirement that those with IQ test scores within the test's standard of error would have the opportunity to otherwise show intellectual disability. Hall guaranteed only a chance to present evidence, not ultimate relief. Therefore, as we recognized in In re Henry, Penry in no way dictated that the rule announced in Hall is retroactive to cases on collateral review. See id.
Second, to the extent that Moore is viewed as an application of Hall, it cannot apply retroactively. As addressed above, the Court, in Moore, cited Hall in support of its holdings. See id. at 1044 ("As we instructed in Hall, adjudications of intellectual disability should be 'informed by the views of medical experts.'"); Id. at 1049 ("The [appellate court's] conclusion that Moore's IQ scores established that he is not intellectually disabled is irreconcilable with Hall."). And, this Circuit has already held that Hall does not apply retroactively. Kilgore, 805 F.3d at 1316.
The findings that (1) Moore's holding was not clearly established law at the time of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals' ruling, and (2) Moore can be viewed as an application of Hall are not contradictory. As addressed above, Hall was decided after the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals rendered its operative decision.
Finally, Moore did not announce a "watershed" rule which would fall under Teague's second exception to non-retroactivity. "To fall within this exception, a new rule must meet two requirements: Infringement of the rule must seriously diminish the likelihood of obtaining an accurate conviction, and the rule must alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding." Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656,665 (2001) (quotation and emphasis omitted). This exception "is so tight that very few new rules will ever squeeze through it." Howard v. United States, 374 F.3d 1068, 1080 (11th Cir. 2004). As our Circuit has recognized, "[t]he presentation of evidence by a defendant seeking to establish intellectual disability does not meet this standard." Kilgore, 805 F.3d at 1314. Accordingly, Moore does not meet any of the Teague exceptions to non-retroactivity, and does not apply retroactively in this case.
Petitioner does not argue that Moore announced a "watershed" procedural rule. (See generally Doc. # 56). However, having found that any new rule announced by Moore is procedural rather than substantive, the court addresses the second Teague exception. --------
C. The Alabama Courts Did Not Unreasonably Apply Clearly Established Federal Law or Issued a Decision Contrary to Clearly Established Federal Law
Because Moore was not clearly established federal law at the time the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals entered its decision, and because Moore does not apply retroactively, the state courts did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law in failing to consider "margin of error" when examining Petitioner's IQ score. As addressed in the court's March 28, 2017 opinion, Atkins does not prohibit such a determination, and only when Hall was decided did federal law "change[] course" by requiring states to recognize a margin of error when assessing IQ scores. (Doc. # 45 at 56 (citing Kilgore, 805 F.3d at 1311)). While Moore cited Hall for the premise that the Texas appellate court erred by failing to account for the IQ test's standard error of measurement, Moore, 137 S.Ct. at 1049, federal law imposed no such obligation on the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals at the time it rendered its decision. Accordingly, Moore provides no relief to Petitioner with respect to the state court's determination not to account for standard error of measurement.
Similarly, the state court did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law by considering Petitioner's adaptive strengths when examining whether he had sufficient adaptive deficits. In Moore, the Court faulted the lower court for "overemphasiz[ing] Moore's perceived adaptive strengths." Moore, 137 S.Ct. at 1050. The Court noted that "the medical community focuses the adaptive-functioning inquiry on adaptive deficits," and referenced Hall for the proposition that the intellectual-disability determination must be "informed by the medical community's diagnostic framework. Id. at 1048, 1050. However, as addressed above, the Alabama courts were not bound by this holding at the time they heard Petitioner's case, and the holding is not retroactive.
Moreover, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals' holding is distinguishable from the situation presented in Moore. Moore did not condemn any reference to adaptive strengths included in the intellectual-disability analysis, and instead only noted the medical community's emphasis on deficits in adaptive functioning and cautioned against overemphasis of perceived adaptive strengths. Here, the parties presented the state courts with conflicting test scores regarding Petitioner's adaptive functioning. (State Court Record, Vol. 34, Tab-74 at 7-9). In light of this conflicting evidence, it was reasonable for the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals to look to Petitioner's demonstrated adaptive abilities (or lack thereof) to reconcile the test scores and determine which ones were credible. Such a determination does not run afoul of Moore.
Finally, the state court did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law by failing to identify the clinical medical standard used to determine intellectual disability. As addressed above, Moore was not clearly established federal law at the time of the Alabama courts' decisions, and does not apply retroactively in this case. Moreover, Moore imposes no specific requirement that courts identify the clinical medical standard that they apply - it simply requires that a court's determination must be "informed by the medical community's diagnostic framework." Moore, 137 S.Ct. at 1048 (quoting Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 2000). Indeed, the Briseno factors addressed in Moore were in many ways unique. The factors sought to identify the "consensus of Texas citizens" on who "should be exempted from the death penalty." Id. at 1051 (citing Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 6). The Alabama courts did not operate under such a standard, and even if Moore applied to analysis of this case (and, to be sure, it does not) the court cannot say that state courts unreasonably applied clearly established federal law.
IV. Conclusion
Smith's petition, which the court reopened for limited consideration, is due to be denied. A separate order will be entered.
DONE and ORDERED this July 21, 2017.
/s/_________
R. DAVID PROCTOR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE