Opinion
Civ. 4:22-CV-1396
01-18-2024
DANA ELROY SMITH, et al., Plaintiffs, v. JOHN D. DECKER, et al., Defendants.
Munley Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Daryl F. Bloom United States Magistrate Judge
I. Statement of Facts and of the Case
This case comes before this Court for consideration of a motion to dismiss filed by several defendants-Pennsylvania State Troopers Decker, Williams, and Norton; the Pennsylvania State Police; and Kevin Ransom and Stacy Miller, who were employed by the State Correctional Institution at Dallas. (Doc. 64). The plaintiffs, Dana Smith and William Matthews, brought this action against a host of defendants arising out of their 2019 state criminal prosecution for solicitation to commit criminal homicide and criminal conspiracy, charges that were ultimately dismissed. (Doc. 51).
The amended complaint alleges that Smith and Matthews were charged by a criminal complaint on or around December 30, 2019, with solicitation to commit criminal homicide and criminal conspiracy. (Doc. 51 ¶ 13). These charges were brought by the Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) through Defendants Decker, Williams, and Norton (“Trooper Defendants”). (Id. ¶ 14). The amended complaint avers that the Trooper Defendants filed and continued to prosecute these charges knowing that they did not have a cooperating witness to testify against Smith and Matthews at a preliminary hearing. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 18, 41-42). It is further alleged that an unidentified PSP Trooper violated Smith's Fourth Amendment rights when he or she exceeded the parameters of a search warrant executed at Smith's residence. (Id. ¶¶ 38-39).
As to Defendants Ransom and Miller (“Correctional Defendants”)- the Superintendent and Deputy Superintendent of SCI Dallas, respectively-the amended complaint asserts that Matthews was incarcerated at SCI Dallas following the filing of the criminal charges. (Doc. 51 ¶ 29). Matthews asserts that he was placed in the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”) at SCI Dallas without any explanation for two months, which he contends violated his due process and Eighth Amendment rights. (Id. ¶¶ 29-30). Matthews was released from the RHU in February of 2020 by order of Magisterial District Judge Tupper. (Id. ¶ 31).
Judge Tupper is also a named defendant in this action. We have recommended that the claims against Judge Tupper be dismissed. (Doc. 94).
Thus, it appears that the plaintiffs have asserted claims under the Fourth and Eighth Amendments against the Trooper Defendants, alleging false arrest and malicious prosecution, as well as excessive bail. Further, as to the Correctional Defendants, Plaintiff Matthews has asserted claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, alleging claims of unlawful conditions of confinement and due process violations arising out of his confinement at SCI Dallas. Finally, as to PSP, the amended complaint appears to assert a theory of Monell liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that PSP failed to train and supervise its employees.
Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
These defendants have now filed the instant motion to dismiss, arguing that the claims against them fail as a matter of law. (Doc. 64). After consideration, we agree and recommend that the defendants' motion to dismiss be granted.
II. Discussion
A. Motion to Dismiss - Standard of Review
The defendant has filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b)(6) permits the court to dismiss a complaint if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Under federal pleading standards, a complaint must set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
In determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief under this pleading standard, a court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), and accept “all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them after construing them in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice”).
As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has aptly summarized:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Id. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” Id. at 1950. In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234-35. As the Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal, “[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.' ” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. This “plausibility” determination will be “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009).
Generally, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court relies on the complaint and its attached exhibits, as well as matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). A court can also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Additionally, if the complaint relies on the contents of a document not physically attached to the complaint but whose authenticity is not in dispute, the court may consider such document in its determination. See Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002). However, the court may not rely on any other part of the record when deciding a motion to dismiss. Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1261.
B. The Motion to Dismiss should be Granted.
As we have explained, the plaintiffs assert their claims against the Trooper Defendants under the Fourth and Eighth Amendments, alleging that they were falsely arrested and prosecuted, as well as subject to excessive bail. Plaintiff Matthews further asserts Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against the Correctional Defendants arising out of his confinement in the RHU at SCI Dallas. Finally, the plaintiffs assert a failure-to-train claim against PSP. After consideration, we conclude that these claims fail as a matter of law and should be dismissed.
1. The Claims against the Trooper Defendants Should be Dismissed.
The plaintiffs first assert that the Trooper Defendants violated their Fourth and Eighth Amendment rights when these defendants filed criminal charges against them and continued to prosecute them, knowing that they did not have a witness to testify at a preliminary hearing. They also appear to allege that these defendants are responsible for the plaintiffs being held without bail while these charges were pending. For their part, the Trooper Defendants assert that they had probable cause to arrest the plaintiffs and charge them with the criminal complaint based on witness statements, although the witness ultimately failed to cooperate, resulting in the charges being dismissed.
We note that the plaintiffs have not responded to the defendants' arguments that they did, in fact, have probable cause to arrest and charge the plaintiffs. Nor have they responded to the defendants' arguments concerning the malicious prosecution claim. As the Third Circuit has noted, a district court has discretion to refuse to consider an argument that is waived by a plaintiff who “had ample opportunity to make [the] argument in response to defendants' motion to dismiss and failed to do so.” Dreibelbis v. Scholton, 274 Fed.Appx. 183, 185 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Confer v. Custom Eng'g Co., 952 F.2d 41, 44 (3d Cir. 1991); Laborers' Intern. Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Energy, 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994)); see also Graden v. Conexant Systems Inc., 496 F.3d 291, 296 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[F]ailing to raise an argument in one's opening brief waives it.”).
We note that while the plaintiffs initially filed this action pro se, they are now represented by counsel, who filed the amended complaint and the brief in opposition to the instant motion.
Here, the plaintiffs' brief in opposition fails to address any of the defendants' arguments with respect to the merits of these Fourth Amendment false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution claims. Instead, the plaintiffs appear to focus on the defense of sovereign immunity, which the defendants have not raised. (Doc. 77 at 4-5). Accordingly, we conclude that the plaintiffs have waived any argument against these claims, and thus, we recommend that these Fourth Amendment claims against the Trooper Defendants be dismissed without prejudice.
As to the plaintiffs' claim that the Trooper Defendants were responsible for the plaintiffs being held without bail, it is clear that these defendants, who were the law enforcement personnel assigned to the criminal case, were not responsible for setting the plaintiffs' bail. See James v. York Cnty. Police Dep't, 160 Fed.Appx. 126, 133 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Pa. R. Crim. P. 120) (“[I]n Pennsylvania, the district justice, not the police officers, set bail.”). In fact, the amended complaint asserts that MDJ Tupper was the individual who “refused to lower bail[.]” (Doc. 51 ¶ 22). There are no facts from which we could infer that the Trooper Defendants were in any way responsible for setting bail in the plaintiffs' state criminal case. Accordingly, any Eighth Amendment claims against these defendants should be dismissed. See Swope v. City of Pittsburgh, 90 F.Supp.3d 400, 412 (W.D. Pa. 2015) (dismissing the plaintiff's excessive bail claim where plaintiff could not show “absent pure speculation, that [the defendants] . . . had any influence whatsoever over the district justice's decision to set bail as he did.”).
2. The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment Claims against Ransom and Miller Should be Dismissed.
Plaintiff Matthews' claims against the Correctional Defendants arise out of his confinement in the RHU at SCI Dallas while the state criminal charges were pending. He asserts in a vague and conclusory fashion that he was placed in the RHU by these defendants and held there for two months without any explanation, which he contends constitutes a violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He alleges generally that he suffered mistreatment and harassment by the staff at SCI Dallas.
The Eighth Amendment protects inmates from “cruel and unusual punishment.” U.S. Const. amend. XIII. Prison officials have a duty to provide inmates with “adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.'” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)). To be liable for an Eighth Amendment violation, prison officials must have “a sufficiently culpable state of mind,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, which, in the prison context, is one of “‘deliberate indifference' to inmate health and safety.” Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
Matthews has failed to allege sufficient facts to support his Eighth Amendment claim. To state a conditions of confinement claim, a plaintiff must allege that he was denied “the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citations omitted). Here, the amended complaint simply asserts that Matthews was placed in the RHU for two months. It does not contain any allegations that Matthews was denied basic necessities such as food, water, and shelter. See e.g., Williams v. Armstrong, 566 Fed.Appx. 106, 109 (3d Cir. 2014) (no Eighth Amendment violation where inmate spent 112 days in the RHU and failed to allege a denial of necessities). Moreover, the Third Circuit has held that “[p]lacement in administrative segregation, by itself, is insufficient to constitute cruel and unusual punishment.” Young v. Ferguson, 830 Fed.Appx. 375, 376 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Gibson v. Lynch, 652 F.2d 348, 352 (3d Cir. 1981)). Accordingly, this Eighth Amendment claim against the Correctional Defendants fails as a matter of law.
As to Matthews' due process claim, the Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals from deprivations of “life, liberty or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. However, “[i]t is well-settled that placement in administrative confinement will generally not create a liberty interest.” Williams, 566 Fed.Appx. at 108 (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 22, 224 (3d Cir. 2000)). Instead, an inmate must allege that his placement in segregation constitutes an “atypical and significant hardship.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. Here, the amended complaint does not allege any facts specific to Matthews' conditions of confinement in the RHU at SCI Dallas. Rather, he merely alleges that he was placed in the RHU for two months without explanation. Courts in this circuit have held that longer periods of time in administrative confinement did not confer a liberty interest on an inmate. See e.g., Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 645 (3d Cir. 2002) (7 months in administrative confinement did not implicate a liberty interest); Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 706 (3d Cir. 1997) (confinement in the RHU for 15 months did not constitute an “atypical and significant hardship”).
Accordingly, given Matthews' conclusory and vague allegations regarding his placement in the RHU, we conclude that Matthews' due process claim fails as a matter of law and should be dismissed.
3. Any Claims Against the Pennsylvania State Police Should be Dismissed.
Finally, the plaintiffs assert a § 1983 claim against PSP, arguing that PSP failed to train its employees. However, we conclude that this claim is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
The Eleventh Amendment provides immunity to states and state agencies that are sued by citizens in federal court. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996). The Commonwealth's immunity exists as a matter of law unless that immunity is waived or abrogated by Congress. The Commonwealth has expressly invoked its Eleventh Amendment immunity under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b). Similarly, PSP is an agency of the Commonwealth, 71 P.S. § 732-102, and accordingly, is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from lawsuits in federal court. Atkin v. Johnson, 432 Fed.Appx. 47, 48 (3d Cir. 2011). This immunity is fatal to the plaintiffs' claims against this defendant.
In addition, the plaintiff may not bring a damages action pursuant to § 1983 against the state or its agencies. It is well established that a state and its agencies are not “persons” for purposes of § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Accordingly, all claims against PSP should be dismissed.
Moreover, even if we were to consider the plaintiffs' claim against PSP under a theory of Monell liability, this claim fails as a matter of law. A municipal entity may be liable for a constitutional violation under § 1983 if the violation was a direct result of the entity's policy, custom or practice. Monell, 436 U.S. at 695. However, an entity may not be held liable “solely because injuries were inflicted by its agents or employees.” Jiminez v. All American Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 249 (3d Cir. 2007). Rather, a plaintiff must demonstrate a “direct causal link” between the alleged constitutional violation and the municipal policy or custom. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). A plaintiff may show that either an official policy of the municipality was the moving force behind the violation, or that the municipality had an informal custom such that it operated as the municipality's policy. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986); Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. In either scenario, the plaintiff has the burden to show that the policy or custom was implemented or acquiesced in by a policymaker. Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990).
Further, in cases where a plaintiff is alleging a failure to train officers, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the “municipality's failure to train police officers . . . amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388. To establish such a claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate “contemporaneous knowledge of the offending incident or knowledge of a prior pattern of similar incidents,” coupled with “circumstances under which the supervisor's actions or inaction could be found to have communicated a message of approval to the offending subordinate.” Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 127 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Bonenberger v. Plymouth Twp., 132 F.3d 20, 25 (3d Cir. 1997)).
In the instant case, the amended complaint fails to assert factual averments to support a Monell theory of liability against PSP. There are no allegations in the amended complaint from which we could infer that PSP had a policy or practice that resulted in a violation of the plaintiffs' rights. Nor does the amended complaint allege that a policymaker in PSP had knowledge of the offending incident, i.e., the extended search, or of any prior pattern of similar conduct. Accordingly, any Monell failure-to-train claim against PSP fails as a matter of law and should be dismissed.
III. Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT the defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint (Doc. 64) be GRANTED.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.