Opinion
Case No. 04-2197-GTV.
March 11, 2005
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Charles A. Smith brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) and D. Kan. Rule 83.7, seeking judicial review of the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") to deny his applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. Plaintiff claims that he has a breathing impairment, chronic sinusitis, fatigue, dizziness from medications and essential hypertension controlled by medications, as well as depression. He has a high school education and his past work experience includes employment as an assembly worker, maintenance worker, personnel specialist, and personnel assistant.
This appeal focuses on the Commissioner's determination that Plaintiff's impairments are not disabling. Plaintiff contends that the Commissioner misapplied the doctrine of res judicata, made an improper credibility determination, and asked the vocational expert inaccurate and incomplete hypothetical questions. For the reasons set forth below, the court affirms in part, reverses in part, and remands the case for additional analysis.
I. Procedural Background
Plaintiff originally filed applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits on July 8, 1992. These claims were denied, and Plaintiff did not appeal the decision. He then filed new applications on September 28, 1993 and May 4, 1995, which also were denied and not appealed. Plaintiff thereafter filed new applications on January 10, 1996. These applications were denied both initially and upon reconsideration. At Plaintiff's request, an administrative law judge ("ALJ") held a hearing. On October 30, 1997, the ALJ rendered a decision in which she determined that Plaintiff was not under a "disability" as defined by the Social Security Act. After the ALJ's unfavorable decision, Plaintiff requested review by the Appeals Council, who vacated the decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. Pursuant to the remand order, two additional administrative hearings were held in 2000. On September 20, 2001, the ALJ again rendered an unfavorable decision. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, rendering the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner.
II. Standard of Review
The Commissioner's findings are binding on this court if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Dixon v. Heckler, 811 F.2d 506, 508 (10th Cir. 1987). The court's review is limited to determining whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the Commissioner properly applied relevant legal standards. Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421, 1425 (10th Cir. 1996) (citingCastellano v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 26 F.3d 1027, 1028 (10th Cir. 1994)). "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."Castellano, 26 F.3d at 1028 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ or the Commissioner.Hamilton v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 961 F.2d 1495, 1500 (10th Cir. 1992).
III. The ALJ's Findings
1. Claimant met the special earnings requirement of the Act on May 25, 1991, the date he stated he became unable to work, but continued to do so only through June 30, 1997.
2. Claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity at any time since May 25, 1991.
3. Medical evidence on file establishes that claimant, between December 16, 1993 and August 29, 2000 was status post chemical exposure causing an asthmatic condition; had essential hypertension and dysthymia, which did not constitute a severe mental impairment, but from August 30, 2000 through the date of this decision, claimant, in addition, has had possible PTSD and dysthmia, which has resulted in no restriction in activities of daily living, mild to moderate difficulty in social functioning, limiting claimant to work that does not involve working with the public, mild to moderate concentration difficulties, limiting claimant to simple, repetitive tasks and no extended periods of decompensation and no C criteria, but he does not have an impairment or combination of impairments listed in, or medically equal to one listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4 for reasons specifically set forth in the Rational section of this decision.
4. Claimant's testimony as to the severity of his impairments and attending symptoms is found to be no more than partially credible for the reasons specifically set forth in the Rationale section of this decision.
5. Between December 16, 1993 and August 29, 2000, claimant was capable of performing his past relevant work as a personnel specialist, but from and after August 30, 2000, claimant could perform work such as photocopy machine operator, surveillance systems monitor and electronics assembler.
6. Claimant has at all times been defined as a "younger" individual.
7. Claimant has a high school education.
8. Based on an exertional capacity for a range of light or sedentary work, and claimant's age, education and work experience, Section 404.1569 and the framework of Rules 202.21 and 201.28, Tables No. 2 and 1, Appendix 2, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4 indicate that a conclusion of not disabled is appropriate.
9. Although claimant has had some non-exertional limitations from and after August 30, 2000, using the above-cited rules as a framework for decision making, there are a significant number of jobs in the economy that he can nonetheless perform, the numbers and identities of which were specifically set forth by the vocational expert at the time of claimant's supplemental hearings.
10. The applications filed on July 8, 1992 and September 28, 1993 are final and cannot be reopened for the reasons specifically set forth in the Background section of this decision.
11. Claimant has not been under a "disability" as defined in the Social Security Act, as amended, at any time through the date of this decision.
IV. Discussion
The origins of this case began in 1991. At that time, Plaintiff was exposed to chemicals at his workplace and developed difficulty breathing. He began seeking medical attention on a regular basis for asthma and sinus difficulties — his mother testified that Plaintiff had been to the emergency room hundreds of times. He never returned to work, and has reported and testified that he does virtually nothing on a typical day at home but take his medication. In December 1993, he was diagnosed with dysthymia, or mild depression, and on August 30, 2000, his mental condition was thought to be possible post traumatic stress disorder and dysthymic disorder.A. Res Judicata
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred in failing to reopen the applications he made in 1992 and 1993. Plaintiff submits that new evidence became available after the ALJ's decisions, which shows that in the twelve-month period between June 29, 1992 and June 28, 1993, Plaintiff was treated with inhalation therapy on six occasions for asthma exacerbation or episodes of bronchitis, thus meeting the requirements of Listing of Impairment 3.03B. The ALJ rejected Plaintiff's argument, stating that "[t]he prior file is no longer available from 1993, so what evidence was before the Administration cannot now be determined. This is unfortunate, but the undersigned holds that fact alone is not sufficient reason to justify reopening and revising old claims which claimant failed to appeal not once, but on two separate occasions in 1992 and 1993." The ALJ applied the doctrine of res judicata through December 15, 1993. Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ's reasoning unfairly placed the burden of proof on Plaintiff to fully develop the record, when that duty properly lies with the agency. See Fowler v. California, 596 F.2d 600, 604 (3d Cir. 1979); Pace v. Shalala, 893 F. Supp. 19, 20-21 (D. Kan. 1995); High v. Heckler, 608 F. Supp. 1058, 1061 (W.D. Mo. 1985).Social Security regulations provide that upon a finding of good cause, an ALJ may reopen a determination if the application is filed more than twelve months after, but within four years of the date of the initial determination. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.988; 416.1488 (within two years). The ALJ will find that good cause exists if new and material evidence is furnished. Id. §§ 404.989; 416.1489. Whether to reopen the determination is discretionary.Brown v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 1194, 1196 (10th Cir. 1990). Absent a colorable constitutional claim or a de facto reopening, an ALJ's refusal to reopen a claim is not a final decision subject to judicial review. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 107-09 (1977) (constitutional claim); Brown, 912 F.2d at 1196 ( de facto reopening); Taylor for Peck v. Heckler, 738 F.2d 1112, 1115 (10th Cir. 1984) ( de facto reopening).
[A]n interpretation that would allow a claimant judicial review simply by filing and being denied a petition to reopen his claim would frustrate the congressional purpose, plainly evidenced in § 205(g) [( 42 U.S.C. § 405(g))], to impose a 60-day limitation upon judicial review of the Secretary's final decision on the initial claim for benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.951 (1976). Congress' determination so to limit judicial review to the original decision denying benefits is a policy choice obviously designed to forestall repetitive or belated litigation of stale eligibility claims. Our duty, of course, is to respect that choice.Califano, 430 U.S. at 109.
Plaintiff does not argue that he presents a constitutional claim for review or that the ALJ in fact reopened his case. Rather, Plaintiff argues that the Commissioner has misinterpreted his argument, and that cases such as Califano, Brown, andTaylor are not applicable. According to Plaintiff, he is arguing that "the ALJ misapplied the doctrine of res judicata by failing to properly consider the new and material evidence presented in support of Plaintiff's request to reopen the prior adverse determinations." Plaintiff cites the Social Security Administration's Hearings, Appeals, and Litigation Law Manual ("HALLEX"), which states:
For res judicata to apply to any particular issue, the same material facts must be involved; i.e., the prior claim represented the same material facts pertinent to the particular issue. The term "same material" facts means, in effect, that no "new and material" evidence has been submitted since the last adjudication on the prior claim. If the claimant submits new and material evidence in connection with the current claim, the facts are not the same and res judicata would not apply.
HALLEX I-2-4-40, Res Judicata (Oct. 30, 1990). Plaintiff argues that the Commissioner "sidesteps the issue of the ALJ's failure to properly evaluate the new and material evidence presented by Plaintiff in support of his claim. The new and material evidence offered by Plaintiff required the ALJ to find good cause for reopening the prior adverse determinations."
The court does not approve of the manner in which the ALJ handled Plaintiff's request to reopen his earlier claims. But the court also fails to see how Plaintiff's argument that the ALJ misapplied the doctrine of res judicata is reviewable. Essentially, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to evaluate whether the record included new and material evidence, and that because the record did include new and material evidence, res judicata was not applicable. But to accept Plaintiff's argument, the court would have to review the ALJ's decision that she could not determine whether the evidence was new and material, which the court lacks jurisdiction to do. In any event, even if the ALJ had found that the evidence was new and material, she would not have been obligated to reopen Plaintiff's earlier cases. The regulations state that determinations may be reopened — not that they must be reopened — upon a finding of new and material evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.988; 416.1488. The decision whether to reopen a case is discretionary, and this court lacks jurisdiction to review the decision.
B. Credibility Determination
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ erred in finding Plaintiff's testimony not credible. The ALJ based her credibility determination largely on her assessment — an assessment reached after extensive and persuasive analysis — that Plaintiff faked psychotic symptoms when he was being evaluated by two Social Security Administrative consultative psychologists. She stated that "[t]his casts serious doubt on his entire credibility, particularly regarding his mental symptoms." For the following reasons, the court determines that the ALJ failed to explain her reasons fully for discounting Plaintiff's credibility.
Because the ALJ is "`optimally positioned to observe and assess witness credibility,'" Adams v. Chater, 93 F.3d 712, 715 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Casias v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 933 F.2d 799, 801 (10th Cir. 1991)), the court "may overturn such a credibility determination only when there is a conspicuous absence of credible evidence to support it," Patterson v. Apfel, 62 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1217 (D. Kan. 1999) (citing Trimiar v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1326, 1329 (10th Cir. 1992)). Credibility determinations made by the ALJ are generally treated as binding upon review. Talley v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 585, 587 (10th Cir. 1990). A "`formalistic factor-by-factor recitation of the evidence'" is not required, but the ALJ must set forth the specific evidence on which he relies. White v. Barnhart, 287 F.3d 903, 909 (10th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
When evaluating the credibility of a claimant's complaints of disabling pain, the ALJ should ask the following questions: "(1) whether [the] [c]laimant established a pain-producing impairment by objective medical evidence; (2) if so, whether there is a "loose nexus" between the proven impairment and [the] [c]laimant's subjective allegations of pain; and (3) if so, whether, considering all the evidence, both objective and subjective, [the] [c]laimant's pain is in fact disabling."Musgrave v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1371, 1376 (10th Cir. 1992) (citing Luna v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 161, 163-64 (10th Cir. 1987)). In deciding whether the claimant's pain is disabling, the ALJ should consider the following factors, which are "not exhaustive," but "merely illustrative":
the levels of medication and their effectiveness, the extensiveness of the attempts (medical or nonmedical) to obtain relief, the frequency of medical contacts, the nature of daily activities, subjective measures of credibility that are peculiarly within the judgment of the ALJ, the motivation of and relationship between the claimant and other witnesses, and the consistency or compatibility of nonmedical testimony with objective medical evidence.Huston v. Bowen, 838 F.2d 1125, 1132, 1133 n. 7 (10th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). "There is not a talismanic requirement that each factor listed in [Huston] be addressed, but that case sets out generally the kinds of factors that should ordinarily be considered." Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1490 (10th Cir. 1993).
Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ erred in her credibility analysis in the following ways: (1) she failed to analyze the duration, frequency, and intensity of Plaintiff's symptoms, precipitating and aggravating factors, his medications, treatment, his daily activities as they related to his credibility, and/or his persistent attempts to find relief; (2) she found that Plaintiff did not make consistent complaints of medication side effects, when in fact Plaintiff consistently reported to his medical providers headaches and dizziness; (3) she stated that Plaintiff had a "rather sporadic work record," when in fact he was in the service from 1978 through 1984 and from 1987 through 1991, the year he was injured; (4) she ignored or discounted evidence of a severe mental impairment — i.e., two consultative examiners found Plaintiff to be psychotic, although one of them thought it possible that Plaintiff was malingering; (5) she mentioned Plaintiff's Global Assessment Functioning ("GAF") score of 55 on August 30, 2000, but failed to note that his treating physician had assigned a GAF score of 50, indicating severe symptoms, on November 15, 1999, May 16, 2000, and August 21, 2000; (6) she failed to give consideration to the combined effect of Plaintiff's depression/anxiety on his pulmonary conditions; and (7) she did not consider Plaintiff's mother's testimony in determining Plaintiff's credibility. The court will discuss each of Plaintiff's arguments in order.
1. Discussion of Huston Factors
As noted previously, one of the Huston factors is the consistency of nonmedical testimony with objective medical evidence. 838 F.2d at 1132. The ALJ spent considerable time discussing the objective medical evidence of Plaintiff's condition. Indeed, Plaintiff's treatment history and medication list is lengthy. The court will not recount all of his treatment or attempts to find relief here. He regularly presented to the emergency room and the Veterans Administration ("VA") hospital with complaints of sinus infection and breathing problems. But of particular noteworthiness to both the ALJ and the court is the fact that none of Plaintiff's physicians have offered the opinion that Plaintiff is or was disabled. "To establish disabling pain without the explicit confirmation of treating physicians may be difficult. Nonetheless, the claimant is entitled to have his nonmedical objective and subjective testimony of pain evaluated by the ALJ and weighed alongside the medical evidence." Id. at 1131.
In both January and December 1993, Plaintiff saw Dr. Barkman, who stated that Plaintiff could return to work as long as he avoided chemicals. In 1994, Dr. Zimmerman recommended that Plaintiff should avoid working in environments with exposure to dust, fumes, odors, poor ventilation, or gases, and that Plaintiff should lift no more than fifty pounds on an occasional basis and twenty-five pounds on a frequent basis. In 1995, a VA physician stated that Plaintiff's asthma would limit his ability to perform certain jobs requiring physical work. In September 1995, Plaintiff was seen at the VA, and requested a letter stating either he could return to work or that he was disabled. The doctor's note states, "Will not write a letter. Patient has adequate spirometry his Disability Rating will suffice [sic]. This patient should not work in environments with Isocyanates."
Despite the ALJ's thorough analysis of the objective medical evidence, she did not specifically analyze several of the factors listed in Huston v. Bowen that are supported by the record. She did not discuss Plaintiff's persistent attempts to find relief. The record is replete with examples of Plaintiff visiting the emergency room or VA hospital to seek breathing treatment. And the record contains a seven-plus page list of medications that Plaintiff was prescribed between December 1993 and May 2000. In addition, the ALJ did not discuss Plaintiff's lack of daily activities as they related to his credibility. The evidence indicates that Plaintiff did nothing around the house but read the paper occasionally. His lack of activity, when he previously was active in sports, supports his claim of a disabling condition.
The ALJ did, however discuss, one factor that she was in a unique position to observe: she discussed Plaintiff's appearance and mannerisms at both hearings. According to the ALJ, at the first hearing, which was focused primarily on his physical condition, Plaintiff coughed rarely and cleared his throat at times, but appeared to understand and respond to all questions without difficulty. At the second hearing, which was to focus on new evidence of his mental condition, Plaintiff wrung his hands and moved in his chair while looking around as if he were agitated, but he did not cough. He remained mostly calm while testifying. "The opportunity to observe the demeanor of a witness, evaluating what is said in the light of how it is said, and considering how it fits with the rest of the evidence gathered before the person who is conducting the hearing, is invaluable, and should not be discarded lightly." Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 755 (10th Cir. 1988).
The ALJ explained her credibility analysis thoroughly in two areas: the objective medical evidence and Plaintiff's psychotic presentation on two occasions. But there are several other factors she should have considered in assessing his credibility. While she was not required to discuss every Huston factor, the court determines that she failed to discuss several material factors in this case. On remand, the ALJ should specifically discuss Plaintiff's extensive treatment history, his medication regimen, and his lack of daily activities as it relates to her credibility analysis.
2. Side Effects of Medication
In discussing the side effects of Plaintiff's medication, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff did not make consistent complaints of adverse side effects, and also noted that no physician altered Plaintiff's medication regimen in response to significant side effects. Plaintiff testified that he did complain of side effects to his doctors — specifically, dizziness and light headaches. Many of the complaints Plaintiff cites were made before December 16, 1993. The record also contains evidence that Plaintiff reported dizziness and headaches when undergoing disability evaluations, which the court considers markedly different from reporting such symptoms to his treating physicians. He was actually treated for dizziness and shortness of breath in August and November 1996, but in November 1996, his left ear was found to have fluid, seemingly explaining the symptoms. In February of 1999, he complained of headaches, but there is no mention of the headaches being a side effect of medication; at the time, Plaintiff had a sinus infection.
The court has been unable to locate other persistent complaints of side effects. Like the ALJ, the court finds it telling that no physician changed Plaintiff's medication in response to complaints. The ALJ's observation is supported by substantial evidence in the record.
3. Work History
Although Plaintiff may have been in the service for the years noted, his earnings history shows minimal income. Prior to 1988, he never earned more than $10,000 a year. In 1984, he had no earnings, and he only earned $584.64 in 1983. See Yeates v. Barnhart, 187 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1333 (D. Kan. 2002) (observing that the claimant had earned less than $2,000 per year since 1967). During the years 1978 through 1991, he did not meet the earnings threshold to be considered engaged in "substantial gainful activity" for five years. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.974. But the court is not convinced that Plaintiff's earnings record warrants labeling Plaintiff's work history as "sporadic." See Frost v. Barnhart, No. 02-4106-JAR, 2004 WL 2058264, at *6 (D. Kan. Sept. 9, 2004) ("While [the claimant's] earnings may have declined or vacillated, his earnings record does not demonstrate a lack of motivation to work."); Falk v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 282 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1218 (D. Kan. 2003) (holding that the ALJ's description of the claimant's work history as "sporadic" was inaccurate when the claimant had only one year in twenty-five with no earnings). Plaintiff's mother testified that he had worked since he was eight years old, and his record shows only one year in fourteen where he had no earnings. The court determines that the ALJ's observation that his work history was "sporadic" is not supported by substantial evidence.
4. Evidence of Psychosis
Although Plaintiff presented with psychotic symptoms to the Social Security's consultative examiners, the symptoms were inconsistent with his presentation to all other medical personnel, particularly to other mental health providers. His reports of experiencing hallucinations and hearing voices that were command in nature were also inconsistent with numerous statements made to doctors and under oath. He had previously been diagnosed with situational depression, anxiety disorder, and insomnia. In 1995, he was diagnosed with dysthymic disorder. Suddenly, he appeared psychotic and reported that he had been hearing voices since 1991. The ALJ meticulously explained why Plaintiff's psychotic presentation on two occasions was not credible. The court determines that the ALJ's analysis on this point is supported by substantial evidence.5. GAF Ratings
Next, the ALJ noted with respect to Plaintiff's claimed mental disability that Plaintiff was assigned a GAF rating of 55, which indicates moderate symptoms or moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 34 (4th ed. 2000). But at least twice, Plaintiff was assigned a GAF score of 50, which indicates serious symptoms or serious impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning. Although the ALJ is not required to discuss all evidence in the record, the court finds it inequitable for the ALJ to mention the 55 score without mentioning the previous lower scores. On remand, the ALJ should consider the impact, if any, of the lower GAF scores on her credibility assessment.
6. Combination of Impairments
When a claimant presents with multiple alleged impairments, the ALJ "must consider the combined effects of impairments that may not be severe individually, but which in combination may constitute a severe medical disability." Hargis v. Sullivan, 945 F.2d 1482, 1491 (10th Cir. 1991); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523. Here, the ALJ addressed Plaintiff's impairments individually, but discussed both physical and mental impairments in her opinion and in her hypothetical questions to the vocational expert. After reviewing the record as a whole, the court is convinced that the ALJ properly considered the cumulative effect of Plaintiff's impairments.7. Credibility of Plaintiff's Mother
Finally, the fact that the ALJ did not specifically discuss findings regarding the credibility of Plaintiff's mother's testimony does not warrant remand. Failure to discuss the testimony of other witnesses may not be grounds for remand when the testimony is largely cumulative of that of the claimant, as it was here. See Standlee v. Barnhart, No. 04-2143, 2005 WL 256560, at *3 (10th Cir. Feb. 3, 2005) (citing Adams v. Chater, 93 F.3d 712, 715 (10th Cir. 1996) ("We decline claimant's invitation to adopt a rule requiring an ALJ to make specific written finding of each witness's credibility. . . ."); Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009-10 (10th Cir. 1996) ("The record must demonstrate that the ALJ considered all of the evidence, but an ALJ is not required to discuss every piece of evidence.")).
C. Residual Functional Capacity
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ's residual functional capacity ("RFC") findings were not supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff maintains that the RFC findings did not account for all of Plaintiff's impairments and limitations, and that the ALJ relied on the vocational expert's answers to hypothetical questions that did not convey all of Plaintiff's limitations.
A plaintiff's RFC, or "residual functional capacity," is what he or she can do despite his or her limitations. Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). The ALJ is responsible for making a RFC determination, and he must link his findings to substantial evidence in the record and explain his decision. Social Security Ruling 96-8p provides guidance on what the RFC should include:
The RFC assessment must include a narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific medical facts (e.g., laboratory findings) and nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily activities, observations). In assessing RFC, the adjudicator must discuss the individual's ability to perform sustained work activities in an ordinary work setting on a regular and continuing basis (i.e., 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule), and describe the maximum amount of each work-related activity the individual can perform based on the evidence available in the case record. The adjudicator must also explain how any material inconsistencies or ambiguities in the evidence in the case record were considered and resolved. A failure to first make a function-by-function assessment of the claimant's limitations or restrictions could result in the adjudicator overlooking some of the claimant's limitations or restrictions.
Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *7.
Plaintiff's RFC is necessarily linked to the ALJ's credibility findings. Because those findings may be subject to revision on remand, the court will not make a determination of the appropriateness of the ALJ's RFC findings here.
The court does note, however, that the ALJ failed to include several of Plaintiff's claimed physical limitations in her hypothetical questions to the vocational expert without specifically explaining in her credibility analysis why she disbelieved that Plaintiff had those limitations. She merely stated that she found Plaintiff's claims partially credible, without discerning what was credible, what was not, and why. Specifically, on remand, the ALJ should offer reasons why she finds that Plaintiff does not need to use a nebulizer breathing machine on a regular basis, why he would not have to miss up to three days a month of work due to doctor visits or asthma exacerbation, and why he was capable of leaving his home unaccompanied.
IT IS, THEREFORE, BY THE COURT ORDERED that the Commissioner's decision is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The Commissioner should engage in additional credibility analysis, and based on that analysis, revise the RFC analysis and/or findings if necessary.
Copies or notice of this order shall be transmitted to counsel of record. The case is closed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.