Opinion
No. 4:01-CV-32.
March 26, 2002
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Shirley Smartt brings the present action as the next friend of her son, Jesse Smartt, now deceased. She brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-5-101, and Tennessee state law, seeking damages for the alleged violation of her son's constitutional rights and resulting death. Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment. For the following reasons, that motion (Court File No. 12) shall be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The motion shall be GRANTED with respect to plaintiff's claim for hedonic damages and her state law wrongful death claims against Meeks and Womack individually, to the extent that the claims are based on negligence. Plaintiff concedes that she cannot maintain those claims. The motion shall be DENIED with respect to plaintiff's claims against all defendants in their individual and official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; her wrongful death claim based upon negligence against defendant Grundy County; and her wrongful death claim against all defendants to the extent the claims are based upon intentional assault and battery.
I. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts contained in the record and all inferences that can be drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); National Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis Inc., 253 F.3d 900, 907 (6th Cir. 2001). The Court cannot weigh the evidence or determine the truth of any matter in dispute. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To refute such a showing, the non-moving party must present some significant, probative evidence indicating the necessity of a trial for resolving a material, factual dispute. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; McLean v. Ontario, Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000). The Court's role is limited to determining whether the case contains sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 249; National Satellite Sports, 253 F.3d at 907.
II. Facts
For purposes of ruling on the present motion, the Court accepts the following facts as true. Additional facts will be discussed at relevant points in the Court's analysis below.
On April 13, 2000, Jesse Smartt, the decedent, was driving a stolen 1989 pickup truck. The truck had been stolen from Nelson and Nancy Milliken earlier that day. Chris Fults of the Grundy County Sheriff's Department spotted the vehicle being driven on Northcutt Cove Road. He reported this sighting to the sheriff's department.
After receiving Fults' report, Sheriff Robert Meeks, a Deputy Hale, and Deputy Dennis Womack proceeded to Big Pond Road near Altamont, Tennessee. After identifying the stolen pickup truck, which was being driven by Jesse Smartt, Meeks and Hale gave chase.
Womack contends that soon after the chase commenced, he noticed the vehicle heading straight toward him. He proceeded to set up a roadblock at the bottom of Northcutt Cove Road, a dead-end gravel road. After reaching the area where he chose to set us his roadblock, Womack pulled his police cruiser onto the right-hand, northbound shoulder of the road. He turned the vehicle so it was facing on-bound traffic in the direction from which Jesse Smartt would approach. After so positioning his vehicle, Womack exited with his shotgun in his hand. The roadblock was setup in a "dead spot" that precluded radio contact with other officers or superiors.
As Jesse Smartt, who was still driving the stolen pickup truck, approached, Womack ran toward the rear of his parked vehicle. Smartt lightly struck Womack's vehicle on the driver's side door and continued to drive past the police car. After hearing the sound of impact, Womack raised his rifle and shot through the back window of the stolen pickup truck. Womack's shot hit Jesse Smartt in the shoulder and head, and Smartt died. The shot was fired from a distance of forty to sixty feet. At the time the decedent was shot and killed, he was driving down a dead end gravel road with no way out. Plaintiff presents proof that Womack was in no physical danger after the pickup truck had passed him and at the time he fired the shot that killed Jesse Smartt.
III. Analysis
A. Representational Capacity
Defendants first argue that plaintiff Shirley Smartt cannot bring this lawsuit for the violation of her son's constitutional rights. They contend that because the constitutional rights that were allegedly violated belong to Jesse Smartt, his mother does not having standing to bring this lawsuit. Defendants are incorrect.
As a general rule, claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are "personal action[s] cognizable only by the party whose civil rights are violated." Jaco v. Bloechle, 739 F.2d 239, 242 (6th Cir. 1984); see also Claybrook v. Birchwell, 199 F.3d 350, 357 (6th Cir. 2000). Under most circumstances, individuals cannot assert claims based on violations of a family member's constitutional rights. See, e.g., Soto v. Flores, 103 F.3d 1056 (1st Cir. 1997); Rivera v. Medina, 963 F. Supp. 78 (D. Peurto Rico 1997); Pierzynowski v. Police Dept. City of Detroit, 941 F. Supp. 633 (E.D.Mich. 1996). Generally, in those cases, the individual whose rights were allegedly violated has the sole cause of action under § 1983.
However, Sixth Circuit precedent establishes that the representative of an estate may pursue a § 1983 claim on behalf of the decedent. Claybrook, 199 F.3d at 357; Jaco, 739 F.2d at 241. The estate representative may, in his or her representational capacity, seek compensatory damages for alleged violations of the decedent's constitutional rights that caused the decedent's death. Claybrook, 199 F.3d at 357. The type of damages available are determined by looking to the law of the forum state. 42 U.S.C. § 1988; Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 587 (1978); Alexander v. Beale St. Blues Co., 108 F. Supp.2d 934, 951 (W.D.Tenn. 1999). Under Tennessee law, a decedent's representative can recover actual damages to the deceased and the pecuniary value of the life of the deceased. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-5-113; see also Alexander, 108 F. Supp.2d at 951.
Permitting a family member to sue for the the decedent's loss of constitutional rights is consistent with both the deterrent and protective purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Jaco v. Bloechle, 739 F.2d 239, 244-45 (6th Cir. 1984). Absent such a cause of action, government officials would be free to violate an individual's civil rights if the violation was severe enough to cause death. In the present case, only Jesse Smartt's representative is available to protest the alleged constitutional violations that caused Smartt's death. Shirley Smartt properly asserts a § 1983 claim on her deceased son's behalf.
B. Municipal and Official Capacity Liability
Defendants next argue that neither Grundy County nor any individual defendant in his official capacity can be liable for Jesse Smartt's death under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Governmental entities and officers sued in their official capacities may be liable for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, a city is not responsible for its employees' actions on the mere basis of either respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 693 (1978). Rather, municipalities are liable for constitutional violations which occur pursuant to a policy or custom of the municipality or its agents. Id. at 694; Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1345 (6th Cir. 1994). Defendants assert that plaintiff cannot demonstrate the existence of such a policy or custom.
The Supreme Court has clearly held that inadequate training may serve as a policy or custom that supports a municipality's § 1983 liability. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387 (1989). Inadequate training provides the basis for § 1983 liability where "the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact." City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388. Plaintiff has provided the Court with sufficient proof to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Grundy County's failure to train its officers amounted to deliberate indifference.
As the Supreme Court stated in City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. at 390, "city policymakers know to a moral certainty that their police officers will be required to arrest fleeing felons." Officers are armed for that task. However, plaintiff provides the Court with deposition testimony of defendants Womack and Meeks indicating that neither of them knew or were trained about the proper legal standard for the use of deadly force. Deputy Womack testified that the use of deadly force is appropriate when valuable personal property is in danger. (Womack depo. p. 13). He further stated that this belief was consistent with his in-service training. (Id. at 13-14). Similarly, Sheriff Meeks explained during his deposition that personal property could appropriately be protected with deadly force. (Meeks depo. p. 6). He further stated that he had not discussed the appropriate use of deadly force with his officers. (Id. at 7). Tennessee law clearly provides that deadly force is not appropriate to protect personal property. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-11-611, 39-11-614(c); State v. Clifton, 880 S.W.2d 737, 743-44 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1994). The statements of Womack and Meeks might support a finding that Grundy County is liable for a failure to train that amounted to deliberate indifference.
C. Qualified Immunity
Defendants next contend that plaintiff's § 1983 claims against Womack and Meeks in their individual capacities must be dismissed. Womack and Meeks assert they are entitled to qualified immunity. That affirmative defense shields government officers who perform discretionary functions from liability where "their conduct does not violate clearly established . . . constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Scott v. Clay County, 205 F.3d 867, 873 n. 9 (6th Cir. 2000); see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Shooting a fleeing car thief when the officer was not in physical danger, if proven, would violate clearly established law of which a reasonable person should have known.
D. Hedonic Damages
Plaintiff concedes that she cannot recover hedonic damages in this lawsuit. Alexander v. Beale St. Blues Co., 108 F. Supp. 3d 934, 950 (W.D.Tenn. 1999); Spencer v. A-1 Crane Serv., Inc., 80 S.W.2d 938, 943-44 (Tenn. 1994).
E. Wrongful Death Claims
Plaintiff also asserts claims under the Tennessee wrongful death statute. She concedes that she cannot maintain wrongful death claims based upon negligence against Womack and Meeks, although she can maintain such a claim against Grundy County. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-30-310(b). Despite defendants' contentions, plaintiff also can maintain wrongful death claims based on intentional assault and battery. See Limbaugh v. Coffee Med. Ctr., 59 S.W.3d 73, 83-84 (Tenn. 2001).
An order shall enter.