Opinion
2:23-cv-03507-RMG-MGB
08-03-2023
Zedrick Maurice Smalls, Plaintiff, v. State of South Carolina, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Zedrick Maurice Smalls (“Plaintiff”), a state pretrial detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a violation of his right to a speedy trial. (See Dkt. No. 1.) Under Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review this case and submit findings and recommendations to the assigned United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that this action be summarily dismissed.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is currently being detained at the Sheriff Al Cannon Detention Center on several criminal charges pending before the Berkeley County Court of General Sessions. More specifically, state court records suggest that Plaintiff was arrested on June 14, 2021, for criminal sexual conduct with a minor of the second and third degrees.(See Case Nos. 2021A0810300802, -803, -804, -805, -806.) On October 21, 2021, Plaintiff's initial public defender filed a motion for speedy trial in his criminal proceedings; unfortunately, defense counsel was apparently hospitalized at some point thereafter and died in November 2022. (Dkt. No. 1 at 9.) Plaintiff has since been appointed a new public defender, who recently filed and won a motion to set bond on Plaintiff's behalf on July 28, 2023.
The undersigned takes judicial notice of the records filed in Plaintiff's underlying state criminal proceedings. See https://www.sccourts.org/caseSearch/ (limiting search to Berkeley County) (last visited August 2, 2023); see also Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970) (explaining that a federal court may take judicial notice of the contents of its own records, as well as those records of other courts); Tisdale v. South Carolina Highway Patrol, No. 0:09-cv-1009-HFF-PJG, 2009 WL 1491409, at *1 n.1 (D.S.C. May 27, 2009), aff'd, 347 Fed.Appx. 965 (4th Cir. Aug. 27, 2009) (noting that the court may also take judicial notice of factual information located in postings on government websites).
Plaintiff now brings the instant Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the State of South Carolina has violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial based on the delay in his criminal proceedings. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5-6.) Indeed, the Complaint-although somewhat incoherent-appears to argue that there was an “unnecessary delay . . . in presenting a charge against [Plaintiff] to a grand jury and bringing [him] as a defendant to trial in a reasonable time.” (Id.) Based on this delay, Plaintiff seems to suggest that his criminal case should be “dismissed.” (Id. at 6.) This is the extent of Plaintiff's Complaint.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
To protect against possible abuses, the court must dismiss any prisoner complaints, or portions of complaints, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also § 1915A(b). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte “at any time” under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989). The United States Supreme Court has explained that the statute “is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits.” Id. at 326.
As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” as required under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” See id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This plausibility determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. When “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations,” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a Pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim under Rule 8(a)(2). See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 39091 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P., for “all civil actions”). The Fourth Circuit has explained that “though pro se litigants cannot, of course, be expected to frame legal issues with the clarity and precision ideally evident in the work of those trained in law, neither can district courts be required to conjure up and decide issues never fairly presented to them.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1276 (4th Cir. 1985).
DISCUSSION
As stated above, the Complaint alleges a violation of Plaintiff's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on an apparent delay in his criminal proceedings before the Berkeley County Court of General Sessions. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5-6.) A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim to relief under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Plaintiff's Sixth Amendment claim fails under § 1983 for several reasons.
At the outset, “[i]t is well settled that the State of South Carolina is not considered a ‘person' subject to suit” for purposes of § 1983. Henry v. Warden of Greenville Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. 8:22-cv-4380-RMG-JDA, 2023 WL 2541891, at *7 (D.S.C. Jan. 5, 2023), adopted, 2023 WL 2540448 (D.S.C. Mar. 16, 2023), aff'd, No. 23-6339, 2023 WL 3676791 (4th Cir. May 26, 2023); see also Ackbar v. South Carolina, No. 4:17-cv-1019-RMG-TER, 2017 WL 2348460, at *2 (D.S.C. May 17, 2017), adopted, 2017 WL 2364302 (D.S.C. May 30, 2017). Nevertheless, allowing Plaintiff to amend the defendants named in his Complaint would be futile because his claims are also barred under the Younger abstention doctrine.
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the United States Supreme Court held that federal courts should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances. See id. at 43-44; see also Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996). Specifically, the Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44. From Younger and its progeny, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: “(1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).
In the instant case, the first criterion is met because Plaintiff's criminal proceedings are clearly ongoing. The second criterion is also met, as the Supreme Court has explained that “States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief.” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). Finally, the third criterion is satisfied because Plaintiff can address his claims in his pending criminal proceedings. Gilliam, 75 F.3d at 904 (noting that “ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights”) (referencing Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975)). Because Plaintiff's case meets all three criteria for abstention under Younger, federal relief is available under § 1983 only if “special circumstances” justify the provision of federal review. Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 224-26 (5th Cir. 1987).
Plaintiff's Complaint does not reflect the type of extreme misconduct or extraordinary circumstances that would warrant federal interference in a pending state criminal case. While “special circumstances” lacks any precise, technical meaning, courts have essentially looked to whether procedures exist which would protect a plaintiff's constitutional rights without pretrial intervention; thus, where a threat to the plaintiff's rights may be remedied by an assertion of an appropriate defense in state court, no special circumstance is shown. See Askins v. Dir. of Florence Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 9:20-cv-2846-DCC-MHC, 2020 WL 7001015, at *2 (D.S.C. Sept. 3, 2020) (referencing Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 449 (3d Cir. 1975)), adopted, 2020 WL 6110960 (D.S.C. Oct. 16, 2020). Further, where the right may be adequately preserved by orderly post-trial relief, special circumstances are likewise nonexistent. Id.; see also Victoria v. Bodiford, No. 8:21-cv-1836-JMC, 2021 WL 3726707, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 20, 2021) (“If Petitioner has the opportunity to raise his constitutional arguments within the state court proceedings and appeal adverse determinations within the state court system, this court is bound by Younger to abstain from granting Petitioner the relief he requests.”).
Here, Plaintiff has been appointed defense counsel and can raise his speedy trial claims in his underlying criminal case. See, e.g., Bennekin v. Baugh, No. 4:14-cv-4004, 2014 WL 6909017, at *3 (D.S.C. Dec. 8, 2014) (finding that plaintiff was not foreclosed from raising delayed indictment claim and having it ruled on “by the state court judge in his on-going state criminal prosecution”); Holmes v. Grant, No. 4:22-cv-3459-MGL-TER, 2022 WL 19331394, at *1-2 (D.S.C. Nov. 2, 2022) (finding no extraordinary circumstances where petitioner argued that his criminal proceedings were not being conducted in a timely manner), adopted, 2023 WL 2717362 (D.S.C. Mar. 30, 2023); Westpoint v. Al Cannon, No. 9:17-cv-2137-RMG-BM, 2017 WL 5004812, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 6, 2017) (dismissing federal action pursuant to Younger because detainee was able to raise claims of procedural delay during state court proceedings), adopted, 2017 WL 5027497 (D.S.C. Oct. 30, 2017); Nat'l Home Ins. Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n of Com. of Va., 838 F.Supp. 1104, 1119 (E.D. Va. 1993) (noting that “[m]ere delay . . . in pending state court proceedings” does not demonstrate the extraordinary circumstances or “irreparable injury” that precludes abstention under Younger). Because Plaintiff can pursue his constitutional claims in state court, he cannot demonstrate “special circumstances,” or show that he has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied his requested relief. The undersigned therefore finds that Plaintiff is precluded from federal relief at this time.
To be sure, Plaintiff's specific request for relief-the dismissal of his criminal charges and, implicitly, his release from State custody-is unavailable under § 1983 in any event. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (stating that “habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983”); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-88 (1973) (explaining a challenge to the duration of confinement is within the core of habeas corpus). Accordingly, Plaintiff's Complaint does not state an actionable claim to relief under § 1983.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the undersigned is of the opinion that Plaintiff cannot cure the defects identified above by amending his Complaint. See Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392 of United Food and Commercial Workers Int'l Union, 10 F.3d 1064 (4th Cir. 1993). The undersigned therefore RECOMMENDS that the Court decline to give Plaintiff leave to amend his Complaint and DISMISS this action against Defendant without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Charleston, South Carolina
The parties' attention is directed to an important notice on the following page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).