Opinion
Case No. A4-03-93, Docket Number: 11
October 1, 2003
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS
Summary: The Plaintiff filed suit against the Defendant, alleging violations of both ERISA and state law. The Defendant filed, and the Court granted, a motion for partial dismissal of the Plaintiff's state law claims on grounds that they were preempted by ERISA.
Before the Court is the Defendant's "Partial Motion to Dismiss" filed pursuant to Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This motion was filed on August 11, 2003. More than thirty (30) days has elapsed since the Defendant filed its motion. The Plaintiff has not filed a response. Under Local Rule 7.1(C) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Plaintiff's failure to file a response may be deemed an admission that the motion is well taken. In any event, for the reasons outlined below, the motion is granted.
I. BACKGROUND
The Plaintiff, Judy K. Slater is a resident of Ward County, North Dakota. The Defendant, Hartford Life, is a foreign corporation engaged in the business of insurance sales and coverage in North Dakota.
Slater participated in an employee welfare benefit plan sponsored by Slater's employer and insured by Hartford Life. Slater allegedly became disabled on July 20, 2001, and thereafter applied for benefits under the plan. Hartford Life denied Slater's application initially and on appeal. Slater responded by filing suit against Hartford Life in state court, asserting a claim for benefits under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et. seq. Additionally, Slater alleged:
[Hartford Life] delayed; made repetitive, cumulative, needless and unduly burdensome requests for information and medical records; and otherwise negligently, illegally, recklessly, maliciously and-or intentionally mishandled Plaintiff's disability claim thereby breaching its fiduciary, contractual and statutory duty to the Plaintiff.
[Hartford Life] breached its contractual, statutory, and fiduciary duties by negligently, maliciously, and/or intentionally failing to properly consider and by denying Plaintiff's disability claim on January 11, 2002, and subsequently during the appeal and review process.
On August 4, 2003, Hartford Life filed its Notice of Removal. On August 11, 2003, Hartford Life filed its answer to Slater's complaint as well as a motion to dismiss Slater's state law claims on grounds that such claims are preempted by ERISA's civil enforcement provision.
II. LEGAL DISCUSSION
When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must construe the complaint liberally and assume all factual allegations to be true. Fabisch v. University of Minnesota, 301 F.3d 797, 802 (8th Cir. 2002); Goss v. City of Little Rock, 90 F.3d 306, 308 (8th Cir. 1996). Dismissal will not be granted unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle her to relief. Fabisch v. University of Minnesota, 301 F.3d 797, 802.
See Howard v. Coventry Health Care, of Iowa, Inc., 293 F.3d 442, 446 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 324 (1997) (acknowledging that ERISA's preemption clause is "clearly expansive" and has a "broad scope")). Thus, ERISA preempts a wide range of claims for benefits arising under state law. See Howard v. Coventry Health Care, of Iowa, Inc., 293 F.3d 445-47(finding that ERISA preempted the plaintiff's claims for breach of contract, violation of public policy, and bad faith); Glenn v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 240 F.3d 679, 681 (8th Cir.) (holding that ERISA preempted the plaintiff's claims for breach of contract and bad faith); cert. denied, 534 U.S. 893 (2001); Thompson v. Gencare Health Systems, Inc., 202 F.3d 1072, 1073 (8th Cir. 2000) ("ERISA remedies preempt state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits under an ERISA plan"); Painter v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 436, 438-40 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding that ERISA preempted the plaintiff's state law claims against an insurer for alleged mishandling of her underlying claim for benefits); Robinson v. Linomaz, 58 F.3d 365, 368-70 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that ERISA preempted the plaintiff's claims for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and negligence).
A) RELIEF UNDER STATE LAW
Slater seeks relief under ERISA as well as state law. In addition to referencing ERISA, Slater's complaint alleges bad faith, fraud, negligence, and breach of contract — all of which constitute independent causes of action under state law. Hartford Life asserts, and the Court concurs, that the common thread running through all of Slater's claims appears to be that Hartford Life improperly processed her claim for benefits. Such claims must be dismissed as they are preempted by ERISA. Thompson v. Gencare Health Systems, Inc., 202 F.3d 1072, 1073 (8th Cir. 2000).
B) CLAIMS FOR ATTORNEYS FEES
In addition to seeking benefits under ERISA, Slater has asserted a claim for attorney fees under both ERISA and North Dakota law in her prayer for relief. Slater's state law claim for such fees would appear to conflict with the fee shifting provision contained in ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1); see also Allison v. Contintental Cas. Ins. Co., 953 F. Supp. 127, 129 (E.D. Va. 1996) (dismissing a state statutory claim for attorney fees because of a conflict with ERISA). Accordingly, Slater is precluded from asserting a claim for attorney fees under North Dakota law.
C) PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Paragraph X of Slater's complaint states:
In addition to the above-referenced damages Plaintiff may be entitled to amend her complaint to include a claim for punitive damages due to Defendant's bad faith and malicious, unfair, unscrupulous, and/or fraudulent conduct and by subsequent motion Plaintiff will request leave to amend her complaint to include a claim for punitive damages pursuant to North Dakota law. North Dakota law provides that a plaintiff seeking an award of punitive damages must first move to amend the complaint and make a sufficient evidentiary showing of entitlement.
See N.D. Cent. Code § 32-03.2-11.
Hartford Life asserts that Slater's claim for punitive damages is preempted by ERISA and, in any event, would be barred by state law.
Slater has yet to request leave to amend her complaint to include a claim for punitive damages. Accordingly, the Court need not address the propriety of any such claim for damages. The Court merely notes the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals admonishment in Howe v. Varity Corporation: "[O]nly equitable relief, as opposed to damages, is available under ERISA . . . and punitive damages are not, by any stretch of the imagination, equitable relief." 36 F.3d 746, 752 (8th Cir. 1994); see also Brant v. Principal Life and Disability Ins. Co., 6 Fed.Appx. 533, 535 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating that "under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), individual ERISA plan participants have no right of action for recovery of extra-contractual compensatory or punitive damages for breach of a fiduciary duty").
III. CONCLUSION
The Court expressly finds that Slater's state law claims are preempted by ERISA. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 8). Slater's claims are dismissed with prejudice, with the sole exception of her claim for benefits under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
IT IS SO ORDERED.