Opinion
No. 14-08-00507-CV
Opinion filed December 22, 2009.
On Appeal from the 113th District Court, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 2007-52209.
Panel consists of Justices SEYMORE, BROWN, and SULLIVAN.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this ad valorem property-tax case, appellants, Skylane West Ltd., Houston Skylane One LLC a/k/a Skylane West Ltd., and Skylane West Apartments, As The Property Owners and The Property Owners, appeal the trial court's order granting the plea to the jurisdiction filed by appellee, Harris County Appraisal District ("HCAD"), and dismissing appellants suit without prejudice. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Skylane West Ltd. protested HCAD's appraisal of the value of certain property for tax year 2007. The Appraisal Review Board of Harris County Appraisal District ("the Board") issued an order, determining the appraisal was incorrect and reducing the value. Skylane West Ltd. sued HCAD to appeal the Board's order, claiming, among other contentions, that the property was excessively and unequally appraised. Skylane West Ltd's name on the petition was followed by the language, "as the Property Owners and the Property Owners." Although Skylane West Ltd. filed the protest and subsequent suit for judicial review, it had conveyed the property to Houston Skylane One LLC in 2004. Subsequently, a first amended petition was filed listing both Skylane West Ltd. and Houston Skylane One LLC as plaintiffs.
HCAD then filed a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting both plaintiffs lacked standing to sue because Skylane West Ltd. was not the property owner and Houston Skylane One LLC, the true property owner, did not file a protest from which to seek judicial review. Appellants filed a document containing their response to the plea to the jurisdiction and a motion to substitute the "true name of the Plaintiffs" pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 28. On the same day, appellants filed a second amended petition, also referencing substitution under Rule 28 and listing Skylane West Ltd., Houston Skylane One LLC a/k/a Skylane West Ltd., and Skylane West Apartments as plaintiffs. In both amended petitions, again, the plaintiffs names were followed by the language, Aas the Property Owners and the Property Owners." On May 19, 2008, the trial court signed an AOrder of Dismissal," granting the plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing the suit without prejudice for want of jurisdiction.
In their live petition and notice of appeal, appellants also named the Board as a defendant and an appellee. Because the record does not reflect that the Board appeared in the suit and it was not a necessary party under the circumstances of this case, we consider HCAD as the only appellee properly before this court. See BACM 2002 PB2 Westpark Dr. LP v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 14-08-00493-CV, 2009 WL 2145922, at *1 n. 1 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Jun 21, 2009, no pet. h.) (mem op.) (concluding HCAD was the only appellee properly before our court under identical circumstances).
II. ANALYSIS
In their sole issue, appellants contend the trial court erred by granting HCAD's plea to the jurisdiction because they had standing to file suit.
A. Standard of Review
As a component of subject-matter jurisdiction, standing cannot be waived. Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 445-46 (Tex. 1993). If a party has no standing, a trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case. Id. at 444-45. A trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction may be challenged by filing a plea to the jurisdiction. See Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). A defendant may prevail on a plea to the jurisdiction by demonstrating that, regardless of merit, an incurable jurisdictional defect remains on the face of the pleadings which deprives the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction. Harris County Appraisal Dist. v. O'Conner Assocs., 267 S.W.3d 413, 416 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.). In determining a plea to the jurisdiction, a trial court may consider the pleadings and any evidence pertinent to the jurisdictional inquiry. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist., 34 S.W.3d at 554-55.
We review a trial court's ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction de novo. See Tex. Dep't of Parks Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). We construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the pleader and look to the pleader's intent to determine whether the facts alleged affirmatively demonstrate the trial court's jurisdiction to hear the cause. See id. B. Lack of Standing
Chapter 41 of the Texas Property Tax Code prescribes administrative procedures through which a property owner may protest an ad valorem tax assessment by an appraisal district. See Tex. Tax Code Ann. §§ 41.41B.71 (Vernon 2008 Supp. 2009). Chapter 42 governs judicial review of an appraisal review board's resolution of the protest. See Tex. Tax Code Ann. §§ 42.01B.29 (Vernon 2008 Supp. 2009). To appeal a determination by the Board, a party is required to file a petition for judicial review with the district court within certain time limits. Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 42.21(a). If a party does not timely appeal to the district court, the Board's determination becomes final and any appeal is barred. See id; BACM 2002 PB2 Westpark Dr. LP v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 14-08-00493-CV, 2009 WL 2145922, at *5 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Jun 21, 2009, no pet. h.) (mem op.) (citing Cameron Appraisal Dist. v. Rourk, 194 S.W.3d 501, 502 (Tex. 2006)).
As a general rule, only a property owner may protest tax liability before an appraisal-review board and seek judicial review of its determination. BACM 2002 PB2 Westpark Dr. LP, 2009 WL 2145922, at *3 (citing Tourneau Houston, Inc. v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 24 S.W.3d 907, 909 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.)); see Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 41.41(a) (providing "property owner" is entitled to protest before an appraisal review board certain actions, including determination of the appraised value, or unequal appraisal, of the owner's property); § 42.01(1)(A) (stating "property owner" is entitled to appeal via judicial review an order of the appraisal review board determining a protest by the property owner). Alternatively, a property owner may designate an agent to act on the property owners behalf for any purpose under the Property Tax Code, including filing a tax protest; Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 1.111 (Vernon Supp. 2009); or a lessee may protest on behalf of the property owner in certain circumstances. See id. § 41.413.
In this case, the record reflects that Skylane West Ltd. was the only entity who filed a protest before the Board and timely appealed the Board's determination. As HCAD proved relative to its plea to the jurisdiction, and appellants acknowledge, Skylane West Ltd. was no longer the property owner as of the tax year at issue because it had previously conveyed the property to Houston Skylane One LLC. Additionally, in their petition, appellants did not allege Skylane West Ltd. had a right to protest as agent or lessee of the property owner. Accordingly, Skylane West Ltd. lacked standing to protest before the Board or appeal its determination of the protest. See BACM 2002 PB2 Westpark Dr. LP, 2009 WL 2145922, at *3 (holding that party who had divested itself of property before relevant tax year and did not claim right to protest as agent or lessee lacked standing to pursue appeal from Boards determination of protest filed by the party); see also KM-Timbercreek, LLC v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., No. 01-08-00689-CV, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2009 WL 3321332, at *3 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 15, 2009, no pet. h.) (holding that party who no longer owned property as of tax year at issue and did not claim to be agent or lessee of owner lacked standing to protest before appraisal review board or seek judicial review of its determination).
Under the law in effect when appellants filed suit, a party was required to "file a petition for judicial review with the district court within 45 days after the party received notice that a final order has been entered from which an appeal may be had." Act of May 26, 1979, 66th Leg., R.S., ch. 841, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 2217, 2311 (amended 2009) (current version at Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 42.21(a) (Vernon Supp. 2009)). Section 42.21(a) was recently amended to change the filing deadline to sixty days. See Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 42.21(a). The amendment is applicable to any appeals pending as of the effective date of the bill. See id. This change in law does not affect the disposition of this case; under either deadline, Skylane West Ltd. timely filed its appeal, but Houston Skylane One LLC did not.
As HCAD also proved and appellants acknowledge, Houston Skylane One LLC acquired the property before the relevant tax year. However, the record reflects that Houston Skylane One LLC did not file a protest; instead, it first became involved in this dispute when named as a party in appellants first amended petition. Remedies for adjudication of property-tax protests are exclusive unless otherwise provided. See Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 42.09. A party's failure to comply with the procedures set forth in the Property Tax Code deprives a reviewing court of jurisdiction to hear the dispute. See BACM 2002 PB2 Westpark Dr. LP, 2009 WL 2145922, at *4 (citing Cameron Appraisal Dist., 194 S.W.3d at 502). Because Houston Skylane One LLC did not exercise its right to protest and the Board did not determine any protest by Houston Skylane One LLC, it lacked standing to appeal the Board's determination. See id. at *4 (holding property owner who acquired property before relevant tax year but did not file protest lacked standing to appeal Board's determination); KM-Timbercreek, LLC, 2009 WL 3321332, at *4 (same).
Appellants contend they nonetheless have standing to appeal the Board's determination by virtue of Property Tax Code section 42.21(e)(1) or Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 28.
1. Property Tax Code Section 42.21(e)(1)
Section 42.21(e)(1) provides in pertinent part that a timely-filed petition for judicial review may be subsequently amended to "correct or change the name of a party." Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 42.21(e)(1). Citing this provision, appellants contend that their amendment of the petition to reflect the correct property owner as Houston Skylane One LLC conferred subject-matter jurisdiction on the trial court. However, this argument presupposes that Houston Skylane One LLC was a party entitled to seek judicial review. As discussed above, because Houston Skylane One LLC did not exercise its right of protest as a property owner and the Board did not determine any protest by this entity, it was not a proper party to seek judicial review of the Board's determination. Accordingly, Houston Skylane One LLC lacked standing to appeal the Board's determination irrespective of any application of Section 42.21(e)(1). See BACM 2002 PB2 Westpark Dr. LP, 2009 WL 2145922, at *5 (rejecting identical argument by property owner who, citing Section 42.21(e)(1), claimed standing to appeal Board's determination because it was added as party in amended pleading although it did not file protest).
Appellant also suggest that the suit filed by Skylane West Ltd. encompassed Houston Skylane One LLC as a plaintiff because it was "brought by and on behalf of the property owners." Again, this contention presupposes that Houston Skylane One LLC was a proper party to seek judicial review. Bringing suit "by and on behalf of the property owner" did not remedy the jurisdictional defect created by the fact that the actual property owner, Houston Skylane One LLC, did not file a protest. See id. (also rejecting identical argument).
2. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 28
Appellants also argue the trial court had jurisdiction because Houston Skylane One LLC was allowed to substitute as a party under Rule 28, which provides:
Any partnership, unincorporated association, private corporation, or individual doing business under an assumed name may sue or be sued in its partnership, assumed or common name for the purpose of enforcing for or against it a substantive right, but on motion by any party or on the court's own motion the true name may be substituted.
According to appellants, "Skylane West Ltd." serves as the common name for the property owner, Houston Skylane One LLC. Appellants apparently claim Houston Skylane One LLC exhausted its administrative remedies and timely appealed the Boards determination by filing a protest and a subsequent petition for review under its assumed name of "Skylane West Ltd."; thus, Houston Skylane One LLC may be substituted for Skylane West Ltd. in the pleadings under Rule 28.
Although appellants mention "substitution," the live petition still listed both Skylane West Ltd. and Houston Skylane One, LLC a/k/a Skylane West Ltd. as plaintiffs, and both entities seem to challenge the trial court's order. Nonetheless, we will consider the argument that Houston Skylane One LLC had standing to sue because it filed a protest and initially brought suit under its assumed name of ASkylane West Ltd.*
However, before use of a common name is adequate to justify substitution under Rule 28, a party must show it was in fact doing business under that common name. See BACM 2002 PB2 Westpark Dr. LP, 2009 WL 2145922, at *6 (citing Seidler v. Morgan, 277 S.W.3d 549, 553, 556 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2009, pet. denied); Howell v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Lubbock, Inc., 595 S.W.2d 208, 212 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e)). There is no evidence in the record that Houston Skylane One LLC was doing business as "Skylane West Ltd." Appellants contend HCADs own records reflected Skylane West Ltd. as the property owner. However, the appropriate inquiry is not whether HCAD referred to, or addressed, an entity by a particular name, but whether the entity actually did business under the common name. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 28; KM-Timbercreek, LLC, 2009 WL 3321332, at *6. There is no evidence Houston Skylane One LLC held itself out as "kylane West Ltd." or requested that HCAD refer to it by that name in the appraisal records. HCAD, by its actions alone, could not decide that Houston Skylane One LLC did business under the common name of "Skylane West Ltd."; only Houston Skylane One LLC could establish that it would operate its business under an assumed or common name. See KM-Timbercreek, LLC, 2009 WL 3321332, at *6-7 (rejecting argument that HCADs reference to an entity as property owner in its records relative to protest constituted evidence true property owner was doing business under assumed name of that entity).
Therefore, there is no evidence to warrant application of Rule 28. Cf., e.g., Sixth RMA Partners, L.P. v. Sibley, 111 S.W.3d 46, 52-53 (Tex. 2003) (involving party who presented "significant amount of evidence" it used assumed name). Consequently, appellants argument that Houston Skylane One LLC had standing pursuant to substitution under Rule 28 lacks merit. See BACM 2002 PB2 Westpark Dr. LP, 2009 WL 2145922, at *6-7 (rejecting identical argument by property owner that it could establish jurisdiction by substituting under Rule 28 for entity who filed protest and subsequent petition for judicial review because there was no evidence property owner was doing business under the name of the other entity).
Finally, in their brief, appellants do not present any argument specific to Skylane West Apartments although it was named as a plaintiff in the live petition and as an appellant in the notice of appeal and brief. Nevertheless, to the extent appellants challenge dismissal of this entitys suit, it lacked standing to sue because it did not allege it ever owned the property.
HCAD's plea to the jurisdiction was filed before Skylane West Apartments was added as a plaintiff and thus addressed the standing of only Skylane West Ltd. and Houston Skylane One LLC. However, the trial court properly dismissed Skylane West Apartments' suit because the trial court could consider lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, even sua sponte, at any time, and the amended petition was insufficient to show standing to sue. See Tex. Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 445-46.
III. CONCLUSION
In sum, the trial court properly concluded it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims of all appellants. Accordingly, we overrule appellants sole issue and affirm the trial court's Order of Dismissal.