Opinion
No. 2:03-CV-313 PS.
February 25, 2005
MEMORANDUM, OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Susan Skopelja was terminated from her job as an account manager due in part to her alleged inability to properly service her accounts. She then filed this lawsuit against her former employer, Defendant Steel Warehouse of Burns Harbor, Inc. ("Steel Warehouse"), alleging sex and age discrimination and harassment, and the matter is before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Steel Warehouse [Doc. 15]. Because Skopelja failed to establish that she was discriminated against based on her sex or age, Steel Warehouse's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
BACKGROUND
Steel Warehouse is a family-owned company headquartered in South Bend, Indiana that processes and delivers production-ready steel to customers in various industries. (Lerman Aff. at 1.) On April 8, 2002, 47-year-old Skopelja was hired by Jim Lerman and Todd Wright as an "Inside Sales Representative," or "Account Manager," at one of Steel Warehouse's branch facilities in Portage, Indiana. (Skopelja Dep. at 56, Lerman Aff. at 1.)
As an Account Manager, Skopelja was responsible for maintaining and expanding Steel Warehouse's customer base, entering and tracking orders using the company's computer system (known as "Reflections"), and addressing all concerns of current and potential customers. (Wright Aff. at 2.) Skoplelja's immediate supervisor was Todd Wright, but she also worked with the following employees at the Portage facility: Randy Bolen (Transportation Manager); David Burge (Material Manager); Rachel Gonzalez (Account Manager); Tammi Jaeger (Inventory/Receiving); and Leslie Reese (Office Coordinator). ( Id. at 3.) Additionally, Skopelja interacted with various Outside Sales Representatives, including Todd Stahl, Bill Wirtz, and Glen Gardberg. (Skopelja Aff. ¶ 4.)
When Skopelja joined Steel Warehouse, she spent two to three weeks training with Kevin Futa, the Account Manager whom she was hired to replace. (Skopelja Dep. at 89-91.) Futa showed Skopelja how to use the Reflections system and instructed her on the day-to-day responsibilities of an Account Manager. ( Id. at 89.) She also received two days of training in the Reflections system at Steel Warehouse's South Bend facility. Despite this extensive training, Skopelja continued to grapple with the Reflections system — an integral part of her job — admitting she was "afraid of their system [Reflections]" and that she often had to seek help from Rachel Gonzalez, the only other Account Manager at the Portage facility. ( Id. at 104, 174.)
Skopelja testified in her deposition that she received three weeks training from Futa but submitted an affidavit saying it was 12 days.
Skopelja struggled as well in other areas of her work with Steel Warehouse. For instance, she was disciplined by Todd Wright for her continual lack of organization and messy work area. ( Id. at 174.) Although Skopelja knew that Todd Wright and several other coworkers disliked her practice of adding notes to customer files, she continued to do so anyway. (Skopelja Aff. at 2. See also Skopelja Dep. at 115-17.) Though one of her primary job duties was to enter orders into the company's computerized "traffic schedule," Skopelja admits she failed to enter an important order into the computer system on June 7, 2002. (Skopelja Dep. at 138-39; see also Wright Aff. at 3.) Finally, Skopelja did not interact well with customers and coworkers. (Wright Aff. at 3.)
Skopelja contends that her performance at Steel Warehouse was good but that she was subjected to constant harassment on the job because of her age and sex. (Compl. at 2.) In particular, Skopelja maintains that several of her coworkers — including Todd Wright, Randy Bolen, Todd Stahl, and Armando Canul — often treated her rudely at work. According to Skopelja, they talked down to her; used crass language in her presence; screamed at her over the telephone; and withheld material information she needed to effectively perform her job. (Skopelja Dep. at 235-41.) Skopelja reported outside sales representative Todd Stahl's behavior to Todd Wright, her supervisor, who suggested it would behoove her to personally address the matter with Stahl. ( Id. at 243.)
Once, when Skopelja left work early to drive her son to the doctor, Todd Wright told her that "yeah, well, [her son] better be fucking dying the next time [she took] off work to take [her] son to the doctor. How old is he?" ( Id. at 204.) Skopelja relayed this statement to Jim Lerman, President of Steel Warehouse in Burns Harbor, who conceded that Wright "shouldn't have said that." ( Id. at 203.) Skopelja alleges that customers treated her in a similar matter, "totally berating [her] on the phone, yelling at [her], [and] screaming at [her]" in various instances. ( Id. at 235, 245.)
To bolster her argument that she performed well at work, Skopelja maintains that she eventually mastered the Reflections system and indicates she was able to manage both Rachel Gonzalez's and her own accounts when Rachel was absent from work. ( Id. at 253.) Skopelja also disputes that she had difficulty interacting with customers and coworkers, pointing to several e-mails that she received from coworkers between July 17, 2002 and August 1, 2002 that affirmed she was performing well at work. (Plaintiff's Reply at 4.)
On June 26, 2002, Todd Wright gave Skopelja a "Written Notice of Possible Job Termination," warning her that she would be terminated in 30 days unless she (1) improved her attitude towards coworkers and clients; (2) became proficient with the Reflections system; and (3) improved her organizational and time-allocation skills. (Skopelja Dep. at 166; Wright Aff. at 3.) During this probationary period, Skopelja and Wright met several times to discuss her progress. (Skopelja Dep. at 157; Wright Aff. at 3.) At the final meeting Wright informed Skopelja that he had seen improvement, but that she still needed to improve in all three areas. (Skopelja Aff. ¶ 20.) Wright did not give Skopelja any suggestions for improvement.
According to Wright, Skopelja's job performance continued to be inadequate. For example, on one occasion after the July counseling sessions, Skopelja entered an order into the computer incorrectly causing the wrong shipment of steel to be loaded on a truck. This error necessitated the truck driver having to load and unload the steel twice to get the correct shipment on board. (Wright Aff. ¶ 25). For her part, Skopelja says that she has no recollection of that event. (Skopelja Aff. ¶ 21).
In August 2002, Todd Wright and Jim Lerman decided to terminate Skopelja's employment with Steel Warehouse as soon as they could find a replacement for her. (Wright Aff. ¶ 26.) Lerman and Wright found two possible replacements for Skopelja, but both turned down Steel Warehouse's offer. Thereafter, on October 2, 2002, even though they had not yet found a replacement for Skopelja, Lerman and Wright fired her because of poor performance. ( Id. ¶ 27.)
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment carries the initial burden of demonstrating an absence of evidence to support the position of the non-moving party. Doe v. R.R. Donnelley Sons Co., 42 F.3d 439, 433 (7th Cir. 1994). The non-moving party must then set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). A genuine dispute about a material fact exists only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).
In making this determination, the Court must draw every reasonable inference from the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Haefling v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 169 F.3d 494, 497 (7th Cir. 1999). The non-moving party must support its contentions with admissible evidence and may not rest upon mere allegations in the pleadings or conclusory statements in affidavits. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment against a party who fails to establish the existence of an element essential to its case on which the party will bear the burden of proof at trial.
II. Title VII Claims
A. Sexual Harassment Based Upon Hostile Work Environment
Skopelja claims she was sexually harassed during the period she was employed by Steel Warehouse because she was treated rudely by various coworkers and customers. To prevail on a claim of sexual harassment, Skopelja must prove that: (1) she was subjected to unwelcome sexual advances or other verbal or physical conduct that was sexual in nature; (2) the conduct was severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment; (3) the conduct was directed at her because of her sex; and (4) there is a basis for employer liability. Rhodes v. Ill. Dep't of Transp., 359 F.3d 498, 505 (7th Cir. 2004). Skopelja's hostile work environment claims based upon sexual harassment fail as a matter of law because she fails to satisfy any of the requirements of proof.
Skopelja complains that she was treated rudely by various Steel Warehouse employees when they yelled at her over the phone, used crass language, and generally disregarded her feelings. In many of these alleged instances, Skopelja asserts that her coworkers and supervisors spoke to her in a way in which "they would not talk to guy[s] because they'd probably get popped in the mouth," as when Todd Wright told Skopleja that "[her son] better be fucking dying the next time [she] take off work to take [her] son to the doctor." (Skopelja Dep. at 204, 245.) Skopelja also complains that male coworkers such as Randy Bolen and Todd Wright sexually harassed her by "constantly holding back information," or acting superior ("the male dominating superiority thing that . . . you know, smacking my desk stuff and telling me this isn't . . . tolerable"). ( Id. at 238, 241). Skopelja felt the treatment she received at work made it a "nasty, nasty way to have to do business every day." ( Id. at 238.) If one believes Skopelja, which we must at this stage of the case, it certainly sounds like Steel Warehouse was a lousy place to work. The problem for Skopelja, however, is that none of the conduct about which she complains was sexual in nature or directed at her because of her sex. See Haugerud v. Amery Sch. Dist., 259 F.3d 678, 692 (7th Cir. 2001) (the inquiry "turns on whether the alleged harassment occurred because of the sex of the complainant").
Moreover, Skopelja has not proven that the conduct was severe or pervasive enough to constitute actionable sexual harassment. For workplace conduct to create a hostile work environment that is legally actionable under Title VII, the harassment "must be sufficiently severe or pervasive `to alter the conditions of [the plaintiff's] employment and create an abusive environment.'" Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (citation omitted); see also Rogers v. City of Chi., 320 F.3d 748, 752 (7th Cir. 2003) (standard of workplace hostility that violates Title VII is one that is "hellish"). In regard to whether the relevant conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive, Skopelja must also prove the alleged conduct was objectively hostile. See Kriescher v. Fox Hills Golf Resort Conf. Ctr. et al., 384 F.3d 912, 915 (7th Cir. 2004).
Determining whether workplace conduct is objectively hostile is not an easy task, but in doing so, the Court must consider the totality of the circumstances, including the "frequency and severity of the conduct, whether it is threatening and/or humiliating or merely offensive, and whether the harassment unreasonably interferes with an employee's work." Wyninger v. New Venture Gear, Inc. 361 F.3d 965, 975-976 (7th Cir. 2004). As the Seventh Circuit has indicated, "many employees have to put up with some amount of rude, arrogant, or boorish behavior at work." Patton v. Indianapolis Pub. Sch. Bd., 276 F. 3d 334, 339 (7th Cir. 2002). See also McKenzie v. Milwaukee County 381 F. 3d 619, 625 (holding that "standoffish," "unfriendly," and "unapproachable" treatment by plaintiff's supervisor did not constitute an objectively hostile work environment); Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[Title VII] is not designed to purge the workplace of vulgarity").
The rude behavior of Skopelja's coworkers and customers is certainly disconcerting and undoubtedly made Skopelja uncomfortable and upset from time to time. However, the conduct was not severe or pervasive enough to sufficiently alter her workplace, and is therefore not the type of conduct meant to be prohibited under Title VII. Indeed, Skopelja herself concedes the alleged conduct was not severe, admitting that as the "middleman," or in this case, "middlewoman," it is not uncommon to occasionally interact with a disgruntled outside sales representative or customer: "Larry [a customer], he just was . . . a rude and very unfriendly individual to work with, but . . . some of that just goes along with the job. It goes with the territory. It's not the first, and it's not the last, you know." (Skopelja Dep. at 86.) Because Skopelja has failed to show that she was harassed because of her sex and because the harassment she was subjected to was not severe, pervasive or objectively hostile, summary judgment is proper on Skopelja's hostile work environment claim.
B. Sex Discrimination
Skopelja further alleges that she was wrongfully terminated by Steel Warehouse because of her sex. Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to "fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privilege of employment because of such individual's. . . . sex." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Skopelja may prove she was discriminated against because of her sex either by offering direct evidence of discrimination or by using the indirect, burden-shifting method established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See also Hildebrandt v. Ill. Dep't of Natural Res., 347 F.3d 1014, 1029 (7th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Skopelja readily acknowledges that she has no direct evidence of sex discrimination. (Response at 1.) The Court will thus analyze her sex discrimination claim using the indirect, burden-shifting framework.
Under the McDonnell Douglas method, to assert a prima facie case of sex discrimination for wrongful termination, Skopelja must demonstrate that (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she was performing her job satisfactorily, (3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) at least one similarly situated employee, not in her protected class, was treated more favorably. Wyninger, 361 F. 3d at 978.
It is undisputed that Skopelja is a member of a protected class and that she suffered an adverse employment action when she was fired. However, Skopelja cannot point to a similarly situated male employee who was treated more favorably.
Although there is no set standard for determining whether two employees are similarly situated, courts often require plaintiffs to demonstrate that both employees were subjected to the same standards, had the same supervisor, and engaged in similar conduct. McDonald v. Vill. of Winnetka, 371 F.3d 992, 1002-03 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp, 219 F.3d 612, 617 (7th Cir. 2002)). Skopelja claims that her supervisor, Todd Wright, treated the following employees more favorably than herself: Dave Burge (Material Manager), Randy Bolen (Transportation Manager), Tammi Jaeger (Receptionist) and Leslie Reese (Receptionist). Not only are two of these employees female, which does nothing to help Skopelja's prima facie case, but the other two — Dave Burge and Randy Bolen — are supervisors who work for Steel Warehouse in different capacities and do not have the same job requirements as Skopelja. (Skopelja's Stat't of Genuine Issues at ¶ 6; Wright Aff. at 3.) In fact, the only other Account Manager supervised by Todd Wright was Rachel Gonzalez, another woman. (Skopelja Dep. at 57.) Skopelja therefore fails to meet the similarly situated prong.
Even if the Court were to assume for purposes of this motion that Skopelja had come forth with evidence sufficient for a prima facie case, summary judgment is still proper for another reason: Steel Warehouse has presented a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for Skopelja's termination and she has not demonstrated that this reason was pretext for a discriminatory animus. See, e.g., Chiaramonte v. Fashion Bed Group, Inc., a Div. of Leggett Platt, Inc., 129 F. 3d 391, 398 (7th Cir. 1997) ("because we find that [defendant] has met its burden of articulating legitimate reasons for the discharge, we will proceed directly to whether Plaintiff has presented evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact with regard to pretext."); E.E.O.C. v. Our Lady of the Resurrection Med. Ctr., 77 F.3d 145, 149 (7th Cir. 1996) (court may advance to an ultimate issue in a summary judgment analysis and consider the discrimination question notwithstanding a dispute over a fact necessary for a prima facie case).
Under the McDonnell Douglas test, to defeat Steel Warehouse's motion for summary judgment, Skopelja must demonstrate that Steel Warehouse's given reason for her termination was pretext for a discriminatory animus. Krchnavy v. Limagrain Genetics Corp., 294 F.3d 871, 876 (7th Cir. 2002). In this case, Skopelja has presented no evidence to suggest that Steel Warehouse's non-discriminatory reason was pretext.
As this Circuit has often stated, the court does not "sit as a super personnel department to review an employer's business decisions." Ransom v. CSC Consulting, Inc., 217 F.3d 467, 471 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting McCoy v. WGN Cont'l Broad. Co., 957 F.2d 368, 373 (7th Cir. 1992)). Moreover, "it is no business of a court in a discrimination case to decide whether an employer demands `too much' of its workers." Coco v. Elmwood Care, Inc., 128 F.3d 1177, 1179-80 (7th Cir. 1997). It is not even the court's concern that an employer may be wrong about its employee's performance. Instead, the question for the court is whether the employer's proffered reason was pretextual, meaning it was a lie and not merely a mistake. Wolf v. Buss (America) Inc., 77 F.3d 914, 919 (7th Cir. 1996).
In this case, Steel Warehouse terminated Skopelja due to a number of documented performance issues. She admittedly had difficulty with the Reflections computer program, an essential part of her work. (Skopelja Dep. at 105.) She interacted poorly with coworkers and customers and knowingly continued her habit of adding notes to customer files even after she had been asked to stop doing so. She was reprimanded by Todd Wright for having a messy work area. But perhaps most importantly, Skopelja understood that even after her 30 day probationary period, Todd Wright was not satisfied with her work.
Skopelja attempts to show pretext by highlighting four e-mails she received from Todd Stahl and Bill Wirtz, both outside sales representatives, during her 30-day probationary period which stated, in part:
1. "Thank you for the help . . . we are getting this account off the ground with good responses. Thanks for all the help, keep up to good work." E-mail from Todd Stahl dated July 17, 2002. (Ex. 8.)
2. "Thanks for the help — you are doing a good job. Keep up the informing." E-mail from Todd Stahl dated July 22, 2002. (Ex. 12.)
3. "I appreciate your efforts!" E-mail from Bill Wirtz dated July 26, 2002. (Ex. 14.)
4. "Keep up the good communication with Transfer and the rest." E-mail from Bill Wirtz dated August 1, 2002. (Ex. 17.)
However positively these e-mails might reflect upon Skopelja's performance, none of them were written by Todd Wright, Skopelja's supervisor. Todd Wright was responsible for hiring, monitoring, and firing Skopelja. While Skopelja (and others with whom she worked) might disagree with her termination, this is not evidence that the reasons advanced by Wright for her discharge were "phony." Mills v. First Federal Sav. Loan Ass'n of Belvidere, 83 F.3d 833, 845 (7th Cir. 1996). Moreover, as the Seventh Circuit has held, where an employee is hired and fired by the same decisionmaker in a "relatively short time span," a presumption of nondiscrimination arises. Chiaramonte, 129 F. 3d at 399.
Because Skopelja failed to identify similarly situated male employees who were treated better, she has failed to meet her prima facie case. Moreover, there is no evidence that the reason given for her termination was pretext. Accordingly, Steel Warehouse's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted with regard to Skopelja's sex discrimination claim.
III. ADEA Claims
A. Hostile Work Environment
Skopelja claims she was exposed to a hostile work environment not only because of her sex, but also because of her age. To survive summary judgment on a hostile work environment claim based upon age, Skopelja must show that (1) she was subjected to unwelcome harassment based upon her age, (2) the harassment was so severe or pervasive that it altered the conditions of her work environment, and (3) there is some basis for employer liability. See Kriescher, 384 F.3d 912, 915 (7th Cir. 2004). Skopelja's hostile work environment claim fails because she cannot prove the alleged unwelcome conduct was based upon her age or that it was severe or pervasive enough to sufficiently alter her daily work environment.
First, Skopelja offers no evidence even suggesting that she was harassed because of her age. Skopelja complains that she was harassed "for being on time, for being organized, for matriculating into a Master Program at Purdue University, [and for] not being one of the young set that included Todd Wright." (Skopelja Aff. ¶ 23.) Specifically, Skopelja claims that several times, Todd Wright complained that "[her] memory's not what [he'd] like it to be" when she asked repeated questions. (Skopelja Dep. at 198.) She also maintains that Randy Bolen and Todd Wright indirectly criticized her memory in numerous instances when they asked her to stop adding notes to the customer files. ( Id. at 115.) Skopelja asserts that her reluctancy to join in the other employees' childish endeavors (e.g., chasing each other around the office with spiders) is proof that she "just didn't belong there, and . . . they truly wanted [her] gone [because she] made them uneasy, uncomfortable." ( Id. at 250.)
However, Skopelja offers no evidence that any of the above conduct was even remotely related to her age. Indeed, she admitted several times at her deposition that no one at Steel Warehouse ever so much as referenced her age:
Q. Stop right there. Did he say to you, you're old?
A. No.
Q. No mention of your age, correct?
A. Not that I recall, no. No.
( Id. at 198.) Todd Wright and others might have criticized Skopelja's job performance, but it is clear from the record that these criticisms were not directed at her because of her age. Furthermore, Skopelja has provided no evidence supporting her belief that Todd Wright made his comments regarding her memory because of her age. See Halloway v. Milwaukee County, 180 F. 3d 820, 827-828 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding there was insufficient evidence to determine that defendant's repeated references to plaintiff's retirement were age-based); Young v. Will County Dep't of Pub. Aid, 882 F. 2d 290; 291, 293 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that defendant's criticism that plaintiff's work habits were too slow had nothing to do with plaintiff's age, but only her work performance) (emphasis added). Put simply, Skopelja has failed to show that she suffered any adverse treatment at Steel Warehouse because of her age.
Secondly, Skopelja has not proven that the alleged conduct of Todd Wright and others was severe or pervasive enough to constitute actionable workplace harassment. As with sexual harassment, the Court must consider the "frequency of the discriminatory conduct, it's severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating; or a mere offensive utterance. . . ." Bennington v. Caterpillar Inc., 275 F.3d 654, 660 (7th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted) (holding that absent more facts, the allegedly "rude" or "unfair" treatment plaintiff experienced did not constitute harassment). There are only a few passing references to Skopelja's memory and work performance in the record. Thus, the alleged conduct of Todd Wright and others was not "severe" or "pervasive" enough to qualify as harassment. In sum, Skopelja has not proved she was treated any differently because of her age or that the treatment she sustained was severe or pervasive. Accordingly, Skopelja's hostile work environment claim based on age fails as a matter of law.
B. Age Discrimination
Finally, Skopelja claims that she was fired because of her age. The ADEA prevents employers from "discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). Under the ADEA, an employee can defeat summary judgment utilizing the direct method of proof or the indirect, burden-shifting approach outlined in McDonnell Douglas. See Griffin v. Potter, 356 F.3d 824, 828 (7th Cir. 2004). As Skopela admits she has no direct evidence of age discrimination, she must proceed under the indirect method.
Under the indirect method, Skopelja must prove that she (1) is over 40 years old; (2) was meeting Steel Warehouse's legitimate job expectations; (3) suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) was treated less favorably than younger, similarly situated employees. Griffin, 356 F.3d at 828; Cerutti v. BASF Corp., 349 F.3d 1055, 1061 (7th Cir. 2003). In this case, Skopelja has failed to establish that she was treated less favorably than younger, similarly situated employees. Skopelja alleges that Rachel Gonzalez, the only other Account Manager at Steel Warehouse, was treated more favorably because coworkers "didn't pick on [Rachel]." (Skopelja Dep. at 236.) A plaintiff who asserts she was similarly situated to another employee must show she is similarly situated with respect to "performance, qualifications, and conduct." Radue, 219 F.3d at 617. Usually, this requires the plaintiff to prove that both employees had the same supervisor, were subjected to the same standards, and engaged in similar conduct "without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances as would distinguish their conduct or the employer's treatment of them." Id. at 618 (emphasis added).
Skopelja also alleges that Tammi Jaeger and Leslie Reese were similarly situated younger employees who were treated better than she was. Jaeger and Reese were plainly not similarly situated to Skopelja because they were both receptionists, not account managers like Skopelja.
Gonzalez was not similarly situated to Skopelja because she did not have the same performance problems on the job as Skopelja did. See, e.g., Fuka v. Thomson Consumer Elec., 82 F.3d 1397, 1405-06 (7th Cir. 1996) (employees in the same position as the plaintiff, but who have fewer performance problems, are not considered similarly situated with the plaintiff). Indeed, Skopelja admits that Gonzalez was more skilled in the Reflections computer program, so much so that Skopelja frequently consulted Gonzalez for help when she was having difficulties. (Skopelja Dep. at 104.) Therefore they are not similarly situated to one another, and Skopelja's claim of age discrimination must fail.
Finally, for the same reasons discussed above in the claim of sex discrimination, Skopelja cannot prove that Steel Warehouse's reasons for terminating her were a pretext for discrimination. In other words, she has offered no evidence that Steel Warehouse's reasons for terminating her were phony or unworthy of belief. See Wolf, 77 F.3d at 919.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 15] is hereby GRANTED. Defendant's Motion to Strike [Doc. 23] is hereby DENIED AS MOOT. The clerk shall ENTER FINAL JUDGMENT in favor of City of Steel Warehouse of Burns Harbor, Inc. stating that Susan Skopelja is entitled to no relief. The clerk shall treat this civil action as TERMINATED. All further settings in this action are hereby VACATED.