Opinion
No. CV 04 4000547
July 30, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
FACTS
The plaintiff, Deborah Skerritt, commenced this action on June 4, 2004. She alleges she was sexually abused as a child by Morris Schatz, her uncle. Skerritt brings her claim for damages against the defendant, Ralph Marcarelli, executor of the estate of Evelyn Schatz, under General Statutes § 45a-368, which governs the liability of beneficiaries for claims against the estate of a decedent. Evelyn Schatz was the sole beneficiary of the estate of her husband, Morris Schatz.
The case was scheduled to be tried on March 25, 2008. The parties agreed to bifurcate the trial by deciding first whether a statute of limitations defense bars a finding of liability and damages, and second, if the statute of limitations defense does not bar a finding of liability and damages, to address the issue of damages. The parties briefed and argued the first issue at a hearing held April 7, 2008.
The parties have filed a stipulation of facts. Skerritt was born on March 10, 1963, and reached the age of majority on March 10, 1981. In 1967, Morris Schatz allegedly sexually abused her. She never forgot this alleged abuse and in 1990, at age 27, reported it to her mother and Christine Lidz (a therapist).
Stipulation of Facts.
1. Plaintiff's date of birth is March 10, 1963.
2. Morris Schatz died on August 23, 2001.
3. Ralph Marcarelli was the duly appointed Executor of the Estate of Morris Schatz and has made final distribution from said Estate of all assets known to him.
4. Evelyn Schatz was the sole beneficiary of the Estate of Morris Schatz and received a distribution of assets from his Estate.
5. Evelyn Schatz died on April 11, 2003.
6. Ralph Marcarelli is the duly appointed Executor of the Estate of Evelyn Schatz.
7. Plaintiff duly presented her claim against the Estate of Evelyn Schatz to the Defendant as Executor on April 27, 2004.
8. Said claim against the Estate of Evelyn Schatz was rejected by the Executor on May 10, 2004.
9. The Writ, Summons and Complaint in this action were personally delivered to State Marshal John Burgarella on June 3, 2004.
10. The Defendant was served with said Writ, Summons and Complaint on June 4, 2004.
11. Plaintiff filed with the probate court a Notice of Claim in the Estate of Morris Schatz on April 27, 2004 though the Estate had already been fully administered before the Notice was filed. Said Notice was
also mailed on said date by certified mail to Mr. Marcarelli's attorney, Thomas Daly, and received by him.
12. Appended hereto are certified copies of the following documents on file in the New Haven Probate Court: With regard to Estate of Morris Schatz:
a) Inventory by R. Marcarelli
b) Administration Acct by R. Marcarelli
c) Decree re Administration Account and Distribution (J. Keyes)
d) Notice of Claim against Estate of Morris Schatz
With regard to Estate of Evelyn Schatz:
e) Regular Inventory
f) Notice of Claim against Estate of Evelyn Schatz
g) Newspaper Notice to Creditors and Return
h) Notice of Decree Admitting Will
i) Claimant's Petition to Establish Reserve
j) Order by Judge M. Brandt
13. The plaintiff reached the age of eighteen on March 10, 1981.
14. Since 1967, the plaintiff has never forgotten the alleged sexual abuse by Morris Schatz.
15. In the year 1990, the plaintiff reported to her mother the alleged sexual abuse by Morris Schatz.
16. In the year 1990, the plaintiff reported to Christine Lidz the alleged sexual abuse by Morris Schatz.
17. Prior to his death, plaintiff presented no claim and filed no lawsuit against Morris Schatz as a result of the alleged sexual abuse in 1967. 18. Within the two (2) year period between August 23, 2001 and August 23, 2003, plaintiff presented no claim and filed no lawsuit against the
Estate of Morris Schatz as a result of the alleged sexual abuse in 1967.
19. Prior to her death, plaintiff presented no claim and filed no lawsuit against Evelyn Schatz as a result of the alleged sexual abuse by Morris Schatz in 1967.
Morris Schatz died on August 23, 2001. Marcarelli was the duly appointed executor of Morris Schatz's estate and made final distribution from the estate all assets known to him. The sole asset inventoried was real property at 1255 Chapel Street, New Haven, Connecticut. Evelyn Schatz, was the sole beneficiary of her husband's estate and received a distribution from his estate. She died on April 11, 2003. Marcarelli is also the duly appointed executor of Evelyn Schatz's estate.
Skerritt sued neither Morris Schatz nor Evelyn Schatz prior to their
deaths. Skerritt presented her claim against Evelyn Schatz's Estate on April 27, 2004. The claim against Evelyn Schatz's estate was rejected on May 10, 2004. Skerritt then commenced this suit against the representative of the estate on June 4, 2004.
Skerritt also filed a notice of claim in the estate of Morris Schatz with the probate court on the same date, though that estate had already been fully administered. A copy of the notice was also sent on the same date by certified mail to Marcarelli's attorney, Thomas Daly.
Within the time frames described above, the legislature amended § 52-577d. Prior to May 23, 2002 this statute prescribed a statute of limitations that allowed a person alleging sexual abuse to bring an action within seventeen years of the date that the person reached the age of majority. After May 23, 2002 § 52-577d allowed a person alleging sexual abuse to bring an action within thirty years of the date that the person reached the age of majority. Thus the plaintiff's right to bring a claim against her uncle expired on March 10, 1998 when she turned thirty five. When the statute was amended the plaintiff's right to bring a claim was revived and she had the right to bring a claim against her uncle until March 10, 2011.
DISCUSSION
The plaintiff argues that her claim for damages has been filed in a timely manner. She argues that § 52-577d is a more specific statute than the statute limiting the time for bring claims against beneficiaries of a decedent's estate § 45a-375. She further argues that her claim arises after the death of Morris Schatz and therefore § 45a-375(d) rather than § 45a-375(c) sets the time within which claims must be asserted.
The court must first determine whether Skerritt's claim arose before or after the death of Morris Schatz. Section 45a-375 offers two statutes of limitations — one for claims that arose before the death of the decedent and those that arose after the death of the decedent. Section 45a-375(c) provides that for claims that arose before the death of the decedent, the statute of limitations expires "(1) two years from the date of the decedent's death or (2) the date upon which the statute of limitations applicable to such claim . . . would otherwise have expired, whichever shall first occur." Section 45a-375(d) applies to claims that arose after the death of the decedent and it states the statute of limitations expires "(1) two years from the date the claim arose or (2) the date upon which the statute of limitations applicable to such claim . . . would otherwise have expired, whichever shall first occur."
Marcarelli maintains that the plaintiff's claim arose before the death of Morris Schatz, and consequently, the statute of limitations would have expired on August 23, 2003, two years after his death. Skerritt, on the other hand, argues that her claim arose after Morris Schatz's death with the 2002 amendment to § 52-577d and the statute would run on May
22, 2004.
Under the prior version of § 52-577d, Skerritt lost the ability to bring suit on March 10, 1998. The May 23, 2002 amendment to the statute extended the statute of limitations from seventeen years after a victim reaches the age of majority to thirty years after a victim reaches the age of majority. Thus the amendment extended the statute of limitations for Skerritt to March 10, 2011. Skerritt characterizes this revival of the viability of her claim as giving her a claim arising on May 23, 2002, and argues her action, commenced on June 4, 2004, is not time barred.
The statute of limitations would have expired on May 23, 2004, but her notice to the executor of the estate of Evelyn Schatz served to toll the statute of limitations for thirteen days, pursuant to ?45a-375(b), which provides in relevant part: "The running of any limitation period applicable to the claim of any person, shall, provided such claim was presented to the fiduciary prior to expiration of the applicable period of limitations, be suspended from the time of presentation of such claim until such claim has been rejected, in whole or in part . . . provided upon such rejection, such person may commence suit . . ." Because she filed her notice on April 27, 2004-prior to expiration of applicable period of limitations-and did not receive rejection until May 10, 2004, the statute of limitations was suspended for thirteen days and would not expire until June 6, 2004. Therefore her suit, commenced June 4, 2004, is not time barred.
"In Connecticut, a cause of action accrues when a plaintiff suffers actionable harm . . . Actionable harm occurs when the plaintiff discovers or should discover, through the exercise of reasonable care, that he or she has been injured and that the defendant's conduct caused such injury." Champagne v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 212 Conn. 509, 521, 562 A.2d 1100 (1989). "The focus is on the plaintiff's knowledge of facts, rather than on discovery of applicable legal theories." Catz v. Rubenstein, 201 Conn. 39, 47, 513 A.2d 98 (1986). Skerritt's cause of action arose, therefore, in 1967 when Morris Schatz allegedly sexually abused her. The statute of limitations began to run when she reached the age of majority in 1981. "Section 52-577d is not an accrual statute. The limitation period is measured from a specific event, the attainment of the age of majority." Rosado v. Bridgeport Rom. Cath. Diocese, No. CV93-030 20 72S (Sep. 15, 1997).
The stipulation of facts establishes that the plaintiff claims she was abused in 1967, that she was aware of the abuse in 1990, within the shorter statute of limitations and while her uncle was alive. In 70 Water Street Associates v. Harris Gans Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 00 0180713 (March 7, 2005, Lewis, J.) (38 Conn. L. Rptr. 810), the court was confronted with a similar situation. An amendment to General Statutes § 52-577c, adding damage caused by petroleum contamination to actionable harm, was ruled to be applied retroactively; the statute of limitations ran from time petroleum contamination was discovered, not when the statute was amended to include that harm. The court finds that the "actionable harm" in this case allegedly occurred in 1967. The amendment to the statute of limitations that allowed an additional thirteen years to assert a claim of sexual abuse did not create a new cause of action but rather merely lengthened the time in which to assert such a claim. The plaintiff's claim arose before the death of Morris Shatz, not after. Therefore, the statute of limitations set forth in § 45a-375(c) controls.
Having resolved which subsection of § 45a-375 applies in this situation, the court must address whether the statute of limitations of § 45a-375(c) or the statute of limitations in § 52-577d is the operative statute of limitations.
Section 45a-375 provides in relevant part, "(c) . . . no claim may be presented and no suit on such claim may be commenced against the fiduciary, the estate of the decedent, or any creditor or beneficiary of such estate but within (1) two years from the date of the decedent's death or (2) the date upon which the statute of limitations applicable to such claim . . . would otherwise have expired, whichever shall first occur." Section 52-577d states in relevant part, "[N]o action to recover damages for personal injury to a minor, including emotional distress, caused by sexual abuse, sexual exploitation or sexual assault may be brought by such person later than thirty years from the date such person attains the age of majority."
When faced with the task of reconciling two seemingly conflicting statutes, "we are guided by the principle that the legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law . . . Accordingly, [i]f two statutes appear to be in conflict but can be construed as consistent with each other, then the court should give effect to both." Spears v. Garcia, 263 Conn. 22, 32, 818 A.2d 37 (2003). "The process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. In seeking to determine that meaning, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter." Commissioner of Social Services v. Smith, 265 Conn. 723, 734, 830 A.2d 228 (2003). "It is a well-recognized rule of statutory construction that the legislature is presumed to know all the existing statutes, the judicial interpretation of them, and the effect that its action or nonaction will have on them . . . [I]t is always presumed to have intended that effect which its action or non-action produces." (Citations omitted, internal quotation marks omitted.) Enquist v. General Datacom, 218 Conn. 19, 34, 587 A.2d 1029 (1991).
One prior Superior Court decision, Doe v. Shimkus, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 03 0822147 (March 19, 2004, Wagner, J.T.R.), (36 Conn. L. Rptr. 711), examined the relationship
between the two statutes. In Shimkus, the plaintiff sought damages from the defendant administrator of the estate of a decedent who had engaged in unwanted sexual contact with the plaintiff when the plaintiff was a minor. The defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that the action was barred by the statute of limitations set forth in § 45a-375, since the action was commenced three plus years after the decedent's death. The plaintiff argued that the applicable statute of limitations was that set forth in § 52-577d under which he would have had until his forty-eighth birthday to commence his action. The court found that § 45a-375's time limitation controlled over that of § 52-577d and granted summary judgment.
In determining which statute of limitations to apply, the court (Wagner J.T.R.) looked to the purpose and legislative history of both statutes. Both statutes set time limitations within which a plaintiff can bring suit; these limitations are "designed to (1) prevent the unexpected enforcement of stale and fraudulent claims by allowing persons after the lapse of a reasonable time, to plan their affairs with a reasonable degree of certainty, free from the disruptive burden of protracted and unknown potential liability, and (2) to aid in the search for truth that may be impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents or otherwise." Deleo v. Nusbaum, 263 Conn. 588, 596, 821 A.2d 744 (2003).
The court stated that it found the purpose of the statute of limitations in § 45a-375 to be clear. "The legislative history reveals that its purpose is to protect the beneficiaries of estates from being held liable in the future." Doe v. Shimkus, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 03 0822147, citing 30 H.R. Proc., Pt. 22, 1987 Sess., p. 8135. "Limiting the period to bring claims to two years not only protects beneficiaries from suit, but also promotes the strong legislative policy of the probate code that favors the speedy administration of estates. See Matey v. Estate of Dember, 256 Conn. 456, 478, 774 A.2d 113 (2001)." Id.
Regarding the statute of limitations in § 52-577d, the legislature, recognizing that victims of abuse may take an extended period of time to bring an action because such victims may suppress memories of the abuse, intended to provide the long statute of limitations to allow them time to recall the traumatic offenses." Doe v. Shimkus, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 03 0822147, citing Todd M. v. Richard L., 44 Conn.Sup. 527, 534, 696 A.2d 1063 (1995) (commenting on 1991 extension of same statute of limitations from two to seventeen years). "In enacting the surrounding legislative scheme, which includes criminal
legislation, the legislature worked to achieve two goals by greatly extending the statute of limitations: (1) to provide victims with an opportunity to speak up, to talk about [the effects of the abuse], and to make sure that their voice and their concerns are heard, and (2) to prevent future acts of sexual abuse on new victims by allowing more time to prosecute offenders and alerting communities of a sexual predator's existence even long after such crime was committed." Id.
The court in Shimkus noted that what is lacking in the legislative history of § 52-577d is any indication whether the legislature intended the limitations period of § 52-577d to override that of § 45a-375. Id. The legislature, in discussing § 52-577e, which creates an unlimited statute of limitations for suits against criminally convicted sexual abusers, recognized that an unlimited statute of limitations would increase the likelihood that a defendant might be deceased by the time a plaintiff brought suit and that a plaintiff could file a claim against a decedent defendant's estate. See 45 H.R. Proc., Pt. 13, 2002 Sess., p. 4056. However, the legislature, like the resultant statute, was silent as to whether a plaintiff could bring suit after the statute of limitations of § 45a-375 had expired. In contrast, § 45a-375(c) is clear about its relationship with competing statutes of limitations — the phrase "whichever shall first occur" cuts short a longer competing statute of limitations.
Skerritt, like the plaintiff in Shimkus, argues that applying § 45a-375's statute of limitations would undermine the public policy behind § 52-577d's far longer statute of limitations. When faced with the task of reconciling two seemingly conflicting statutes, "we are guided by the principle that the legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law . . . Accordingly, [i]f two statutes appear to be in conflict but can be construed as consistent with each other, then the court should give effect to both." Spears v. Garcia, 263 Conn. 22, 32, 818 A.2d 37 (2003).
This court finds that these statutes can be read consistently. The language of the probate statute of limitations § 45a-375 directly recognizes the existence of other statutes of limitations that might possibly conflict with those it sets for claims against beneficiaries of estates. Further it provides direction to claimants and the courts on how to deal with such a situation. It directs that the controlling statute of limitations shall be "whichever shall first occur." There is no analogous language in § 52-577d. Thus even though § 52-577d would be construed as a more specific statute than § 45-375 the legislature's intent that the general statute controls is manifest. This conclusion is also supported by the analysis of the
Shimkus court which discussed the policy considerations explicit in the language of the statute and the legislative history or implicitly within the statutory scheme.
When the legislature enlarged the statute of limitations for sexual abuse victims in May of 2002 the plaintiff's claim was no longer stale and could have been filed on or before August 22, 2003. The plaintiff did not file her claim until long after that. Consequently the plaintiff's action is time barred.
Judgment enter in favor of the defendant.