Opinion
4:21-CV-00168-CDL-MSH
03-11-2022
TREVIS TYRELL SISTRUNK, Petitioner, v. Sheriff GREG COUNTRYMAN, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
STEPHEN HYLES, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pending before the Court is Respondent's motion to dismiss Petitioner Trevis Sistrunk's petition and recast petition for habeas relief (ECF Nos. 9, 1, 4). For the reasons stated below, it is recommended that Respondent's motion be granted and Sistrunk's applications for habeas corpus relief be dismissed.
BACKGROUND
Sistrunk is a pretrial detainee being held at the Muscogee County, Georgia Jail. Recast Pet. 1, ECF No. 4. He is charged with criminal damage to property in the second degree. Pet. 1, ECF No. 1. The Court received Sistrunk's original petition for habeas relief (ECF No. 1) on September 23, 2021, and his recast petition (ECF No. 4) on November 18, 2021. Petitioner claims his detention is illegal. Pet. 1. He contends that he has filed “several” motions for a speedy trial pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-7-170 and that he should be “discharged and acquitted” due to the State of Georgia's failure to try him within the “time limit.” Recast Pet. 2. He complains of “inaction” on the part of the Respondent and the state court. Id. He also raises various issues related to the conditions of his confinement, including denial of medical and dental care and torture. Pet. 3; Recast Pet. 2. Respondent moved to dismiss Sistrunk's petition on January 28, 2022 (ECF No. 9). Sistrunk timely responded (ECF No. 12), and Respondent's motion is ripe for review.
To the extent Sistrunk seeks release from custody based on his conditions of confinement, the Court recommends these claims be dismissed because they are not cognizable in this habeas action. See Vaz v. Skinner, 634 Fed.Appx. 778, 781 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (“Petitioner's § 2241 petition is not the appropriate vehicle for raising an inadequate medical care claim, as such a claim challenges the conditions of confinement, not the fact or duration of that confinement.”); see also A.S.M. v. Warden, Stewart Cnty. Det. Ctr., 467 F.Supp.3d 1341, 1348 (M.D. Ga. 2020) (concluding that the Court does not have jurisdiction to consider habeas corpus claim based on presence of Covid-19 at Stewart Detention Center).
DISCUSSION
Respondent moves to dismiss Sistrunk's application for failure to exhaust his available state remedies. Resp't's Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss 3-5, ECF No. 9-1. Because the Court agrees that Sistrunk fails to show he exhausted his available state remedies, the Court recommends that Respondent's motion be granted.
As a pretrial detainee, Sistrunk's application for habeas relief is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2241, as opposed to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which applies to post-conviction applications. Hughes v. Att'y Gen. of Fla., 377 F.3d 1258, 1261 (11th Cir. 2004). Unlike the explicit exhaustion requirement set forth in § 2254(b)(1)(A), there is no equivalent provision in § 2241 requiring a petitioner to exhaust available state remedies prior to filing an application for federal habeas relief. Nevertheless, “a body of case law has developed” applying the exhaustion requirement to petitions brought under § 2241. Estimar v. Edward, No. 18-CV-61838-BLOOM/White, 2018 WL 4519295, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 2018) (collecting cases), recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 4510252 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2018). “The exhaustion doctrine of [§ 2241] was judicially crafted on federalism grounds to protect the state courts' opportunity to confront and resolve initially any constitutional issues arising within their jurisdiction and also to limit federal interference in the state adjudicatory process.” Id. (citing Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 490-91 (1973)).
In order to exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must submit his claims to the applicable state courts to allow “one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process.” O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). Further, “[b]ecause ordinary appellate procedure in Georgia authorizes habeas review in the Georgia Supreme Court, a petitioner must avail himself of that procedure before [a district court] will deem all state remedies to be exhausted.” Jackson v. Walker, 206 Fed.Appx. 967, 968 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (citing Pope v. Rich, 358 F.3d 852, 854 (11th Cir. 2004)); see also O.C.G.A. §§ 9-14-1, 914-22 (providing a state habeas remedy and appeal to Georgia Supreme Court). “[Sistrunk] bears the burden of proving that he has exhausted available state remedies, and retains the burden to prove all facts relevant to the exhaustion requirement.” Blanton v. Prine, No. 7:13-CV-165-HL, 2014 WL 4199780, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 22, 2014).
Here, Sistrunk fails to meet his burden of showing that he exhausted his available state remedies. While he asserts that he filed motions for speedy trial and for dismissal, he does not allege he obtained rulings on these motions or appealed their denials. Recast Pet. 2. His original petition-filed on the standard § 2254 form-is incomplete, and on the portion asking if he appealed, he wrote “NA.” Pet. 2. When asked if he sought review by a higher state court, he checks “yes” but does not provide any docket information and refers only to writing letters to the Respondent and state court. Id. at 3. The Court ordered Sistrunk to recast his petition on the standard § 2241 form, but his recast petition is also incomplete. In the portion of the form asking if he appealed, he does not check either the “yes” or “no” box. Recast Pet. 2. Neither the original nor recast petition mention pursuing a state habeas remedy.
In order to evade the exhaustion requirement, Sistrunk must demonstrate that there is an “absence of an available state corrective process” or “circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect [his] rights.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B). He does not present any facts showing the state processes are inadequate to address his claims. In addition to a state habeas petition, there are other remedies Sistrunk could pursue in the Georgia courts. For example, to the extent he complains that the trial court has not ruled on his motions, Sistrunk could seek a writ of mandamus. See O.C.G.A. § 9-6-20 (providing that “the writ of mandamus may issue to compel a due performance if there is no other specific legal remedy for the legal rights”). The Court does not suggest that his pursuit of this or any other state remedy would be successful, but these indeed constitute state remedies available to him. Nevertheless, until he allows the state courts an opportunity to resolve his claims, Sistrunk's application for federal habeas relief should be dismissed.
In his response, Sistrunk suggests that double jeopardy bars his current prosecution because the charges were previously dismissed for lack of prosecution. Pet'r's Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss 2, ECF No. 12. Again, however, the Georgia state courts have adequate mechanisms to address such arguments. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 16-1-8 (discussing when prosecution is barred due to former prosecution); State v. Fiorenzo, 325 Ga.App. 666 (2014) (addressing whether prosecution was barred on double jeopardy grounds where the former prosecution was dismissed for failure to prosecute).
If Sistrunk's state criminal case is still pending, then the doctrine set forth in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) could also be applicable. In Younger, the United States Supreme Court explained that federal courts must refrain from intervening with pending state criminal proceedings when the petitioner has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury. 401 U.S. at 43-44, 53. Abstention pursuant to Younger is required where (1) state judicial proceedings are pending; (2) the state proceedings involve important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford adequate opportunity to raise the constitutional issue. See, e.g., Newsome v. Broward Cnty. Pub. Defs., 304 Fed.Appx. 814, 816 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State. Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). “When a petitioner seeks federal habeas relief prior to a pending state criminal trial[, ] the petitioner must satisfy the Younger abstention hurdles before the federal court can grant such relief.” Hughes, 377 F.3d at 1262 (internal quotation marks omitted). Respondent, however, has not raised the Younger doctrine as grounds for dismissal.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that Respondent's motion to dismiss (ECF No. 9) be granted and Petitioner's applications for a writ of habeas corpus (ECF Nos. 1, 4) be dismissed. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), parties may serve and file written objections to this Recommendation, or seek an extension of time to file objections, within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy hereof. Any objection should be no longer than TWENTY (20) PAGES in length. See M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.4. The district judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the Recommendation to which objection is made. All other portions of the Recommendation may be reviewed for clear error.
The parties are hereby notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.”
SO RECOMMENDED.