Opinion
No. C-846
Decided February 22, 1977. Rehearing denied March 7, 1977.
Certiorari to review memorandum opinion issued by court of appeals in Commissioner Mrs. Armando Sisneros v. Woodward Governor Company, No. 75-133, involving the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act of 1957 (sections 24-34-301, et seq., C.R.S. 1973). The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court which held that the complaint by the commission against the employer was not authorized by the statute.
Affirmed
1. CIVIL RIGHTS — Commission — Complaint — Unfair Employment Practices — Claim — Aggrieved Person. Section 24-34-307, C.R.S. 1973, does not authorize the Colorado Civil Rights Commission to file a complaint against any employer for engaging in alleged discriminatory or unfair employment practices, when the complaint is not premised on claim of an aggrieved person or persons.
2. Complaint — Statute — Authorized — Specific Person — Aggrieved — Discriminatory Practices. Statute, section 24-34-307, C.R.S. 1973 — which provides that a person aggrieved by discriminatory employment practice may file a complaint and that the Civil Rights Commission or a commissioner may file a complaint "in like manner" — authorizes Commission complaints only in those instances where a specific person or persons have been aggrieved by the alleged discriminatory practices.
Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals
J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Jean E. Dubofsky, Deputy, Edward G. Donovan, Solicitor General, Mary J. Mullarkey, First Assistant, Timothy R. Arnold, Special Assistant, for petitioner.
Bradley, Campbell Carney, Earl K. Madsen; Riffenburgh, Nelson and Porter, Maurice O. Nelson, for respondent.
We granted certiorari to review the unpublished memorandum opinion of the court of appeals in Commissioner Mrs. Armando Sisneros v. Woodward Governor Company, No. 75-133, which was issued only to the parties on October 9, 1975. This case has important significance to the Colorado Civil Rights Commission in its enforcement of the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act of 1957 (sections 24-34-301, et seq., C.R.S. 1973).
[1] The issue is whether section 24-34-307, C.R.S. 1973 authorizes the commission, or any member of the commission, to file a complaint against any employer for engaging in alleged discriminatory or unfair employment practices, when the complaint is not premised on the claim of an aggrieved person or persons. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court which held that such a complaint is not authorized. We affirm.
This action was commenced in the trial court to enforce an administrative subpoena issued by the Colorado Civil Rights Commission against the respondent Woodward Governor Company (employer). The Commission issued the subpoena to produce certain employment records in preparation for an administrative hearing upon an amended complaint brought by Commissioner Sisneros. This complaint alleged that the employer was violating the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act by engaging in certain employment practices which discriminated on the basis of race and sex.
District Court of Larimer County, Honorable Conrad L. Ball, Judge.
Pursuant to section 24-34-307(1), C.R.S. 1973.
The complaint principally asserted that discrimination occurred because the proportion of females and Spanish surnamed individuals in the employer's work force was far below the proportion of these individuals in the labor forces in the counties where the employer did business. The complaint then recited several practices that it claimed could have been responsible for such a low representation of minorities.
It alleged that the employer denied notice of job openings to minorities because of its failure to use referral organizations that specialize in recruiting these groups and because of its practice of hiring people who are either walk-ins or referrals by its current employees. The complaint also stated that the employer did not have any written descriptions of job openings, which encouraged subjective evaluations of the applicant's abilities, and that it used biased tests for evaluating applicants. The complaint next alleged that the employer's maternity leave policies and dress code had unfairly discriminated against women. Finally, it averred that the employment application form, which inquired into the applicant's marital status, number of children, education, height, and financial difficulties, screened out otherwise qualified minority applicants. The complaint, however, did not allege that anyone had ever been in fact injured by any of the foregoing acts of the employer.
On the basis of this complaint, the commission requested the employer to produce its records concerning is affirmative action plan, its job descriptions, its employment tests, its pregnancy leave policy, its list of employees, and a listing of employee terminations for the years 1969 thru 1972. The company refused to comply with this request.
The commission then petitioned the trial court to issue a subpoena duces tecum, which the court is authorized to do in a "proper case." The trial court denied this petition and ruled that the allegations of the complaint did not present a "proper case" for the trial court to intercede.
Section 24-34-305(1)(e)(I), C.R.S. 1973.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of this petition. The court of appeals deemed its decision in Colorado v. Adolph Coors Corp., 29 Colo. App. 240, 486 P.2d 43 (1971), to be controlling, since it interpreted that case as requiring that a commissioner's complaint allege that a particular individual or individuals in fact suffered from the discriminatory acts specified in the complaint.
The petitioner argues that the court of appeals misconstrued the Coors decision as requiring allegations of a specific aggrieved person when in fact the decision required only that the alleged discriminatory practices be specific in nature. The thrust of petitioner's argument is that a commissioner is empowered to file a complaint against systematic discriminatory practices that are not necessarily related to a particular job applicant or employee.
We agree with the court of appeals in ruling that the commissioner's complaint did not present a "proper case" and that the trial court in its judgment properly denied the petition of the commission for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum. We, however, base our decision on the mandates of the statute governing the filing of complaints before the commission.
Section 24-34-307, C.R.S. 1973, states:
"Complaint — hearing — procedure. (1) Any person claiming to be aggrieved by a discriminatory or unfair employment practice may by himself or his attorney-at-law, make, sign and file with the commission a verified written complaint in duplicate which shall state the name and address of the person, employer, employment agency, labor organization, joint apprenticeship committee, or vocational school alleged to have committed the discriminatory or unfair employment practice complained of and which shall set forth the particulars thereof and contain such other information as may be required by the commission. The commission, a commissioner, or the attorney general may in like manner make, sign, and file such complaint. (Emphasis added.)
[2] This statute does not state that the commission may make, sign and file "its" complaint, but rather only that it can " in like manner, make, sign and file such complaint." "Such" and "in like manner" can only reasonably refer to the complaint of a person claiming to be aggrieved as stated in this provision of the statute. This statutory provision authorizes a commission complaint only in those instances where a specific person or persons have been aggrieved by the alleged discriminatory practices charged.
The result in the Coors case is consistent with our foregoing interpretation of the statute. In Coors, the court of appeals held that a commissioner's complaint was inadequate because it only summarily alleged that Coors engaged in discriminatory employment practices and that Coors had not hired on a basis that was proportional to the percentage of minorities in the overall labor market. The court of appeals stated:
"Even in its entirety, the complaint cannot represent more than an assertion that, in theory, the respondent, Coors, may have violated the provisions of the Colorado Antidiscrimination Act of 1957. There is nothing within the amended complaint which points to any particular action or omission to act on the part of Coors which would represent a discriminatory or unfair practice under the Act. As stated, the Act requires complaint violations which are indicative that a particular violation or violations of the Act has or have in fact occurred. Generalities and indefinite, uncertain charges of the type found in the amended claim cannot form the basis for any legal proceedings. . . ."
The principal rationale used by the court of appeals in Coors was that the complaint did not provide sufficient notice to Coors of the charges against it so that Coors could defend itself. It did not specifically discuss the issue addressed in the instant case, namely, section 24-34-307(1) permits a commissioner's complaint which does not allege an aggrieved individual. We do not construe Coors as inferentially permitting a complaint without allegations of an aggrieved person.
We accordingly affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE PRINGLE and MR. JUSTICE CARRIGAN dissent.