Opinion
No. 0-823 / 10-1011.
Filed January 20, 2011.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Sean W. McPartland, Judge.
The State appeals the district court's grant of a prisoner's postconviction relief application. AFFIRMED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, William A. Hill, Assistant Attorney General, and Jerry Vander Sanden, County Attorney, for appellant State.
Philip B. Mears of Mears Law Office, Iowa City, for appellee.
Heard by SACKETT, C.J., and VOGEL and VAITHESWARAN, JJ. TABOR, J., takes no part.
We must decide whether Michael Sisco was obligated to participate in a "community-based correctional program" prescribed by statute. The issue was raised by Sisco in a postconviction relief application. The facts giving rise to the issue are undisputed. Those facts are as follows.
"Community-based correctional program" is defined as
correctional programs and services, including but not limited to [a program] . . . designed to supervise and assist individuals . . . who are on probation or parole in lieu of or as a result of a sentence of incarceration imposed upon conviction of any of these offenses, or who are contracted to the district department for supervision and housing while on work release.
Iowa Code § 905.1(2) (2009).
Sisco was sentenced to indeterminate prison terms of no more than ten years for second-degree robbery and no more than five years for going armed with intent. The sentences were to be served consecutively. The Iowa Department of Corrections later notified Sisco that if he was released on parole or work release, he would have to serve one year in a residential facility administered by a judicial district department of correctional services, pursuant to the authority of Iowa Code section 905.11 (2009).
Sisco filed an application for postconviction relief contending this requirement did not apply to him. The district court agreed with Sisco, concluding he was "not subject to the one-year residential facility requirement of Iowa Code section 905.11." The State appealed.
Iowa Code section 905.11 provides:
A person who is serving a sentence under section 902.12, the maximum term of which exceeds ten years, and who is released on parole or work release shall reside in a residential facility operated by the district department for a period of not less than one year.
The cross-referenced provision, section 902.12, prescribes mandatory minimum sentences for certain crimes. The listed crimes include second-degree robbery but not going armed with intent. Iowa Code § 902.12. Second-degree robbery carries a prison term not exceeding ten years. See id. §§ 711.3, 902.9(4), 902.12(5).
The State concedes the maximum sentence for second-degree robbery does not exceed ten years, but argues the two sentences Sisco was ordered to serve consecutively may be aggregated to arrive at a "maximum term" of fifteen years. We need go no further than the express statutory language of section 905.11 to conclude otherwise.
Section 905.11 plainly and unambiguously states that a one-year stay at a residential facility is only required of a person who is serving "a sentence under section 902.12," the maximum term of which "exceeds" ten years. See State v. Anderson, 782 N.W.2d 155, 158 (Iowa 2010) (stating when a statute is plain and its meaning clear, courts are not permitted to search for meaning beyond its express terms). The only sentence Sisco was serving under section 902.12 was his second-degree robbery sentence. Because this sentence did not exceed ten years, section 905.11 did not apply and the State could not require Sisco to spend one year in a residential facility.
In reaching this conclusion, we have considered the State's argument that another code provision, section 901.8, supports its reading of section 905.11. That provision states: "Except as otherwise provided in section 903A.7, if consecutive sentences are specified in the order of commitment, the several terms shall be construed as one continuous term of imprisonment." This language does not assist the State because there is no cross-reference to section 901.8 in section 905.11 and no mention of "one continuous term of imprisonment." Additionally, the State's argument would require us to read out the words actually used in section 905.11 — "a sentence under section 902.12." We are not at liberty to do so. See State v. Truesdell, 679 N.W.2d 611, 617 (Iowa 2004) ("We apply statutes as written by our legislature. . . .").
We have also considered Popejoy v. State, 727 N.W.2d 383 (Iowa Ct. App. 2006), an opinion cited by the State in support of its reading of section 905.11. That opinion is inapposite, as it addressed a different statute containing different language. Notably, that statute, unlike section 905.11, was found to be ambiguous. See Popejoy, 727 N.W.2d at 386-87 (interpreting Iowa Code section 709.8 and concluding "as applied to cases involving concurrent sentences the phrase `the original term of confinement' means the entire term for which a person is sentenced to prison, including not only any sentence(s) for lascivious acts with a child but also any unrelated concurrent sentence(s)").
We conclude the district court did not err in finding section 905.11 inapplicable. For that reason we affirm the grant of Sisco's application for postconviction relief.