Opinion
Civ. No. 99-0755. Section: "D" (4)
March 16, 2000.
Before the court is the "Motion for Summary Judgment" filed by Defendant, BellSouth Entertainment, Inc. (BellSouth). Plaintiff, Shawn P. Sirgo, filed a memorandum in opposition. The motion, set for hearing on Wednesday, March 15, 2000, is before the court on briefs, without oral argument.
Having reviewed the memoranda (and attachments) of counsel and the applicable law, the court finds that there are genuine issues of material fact, and Defendant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
I. Background
Plaintiff, a white male, worked for BellSouth as a sales manager over the direct sales team for approximately six months — from December 1997, until he was terminated by the company in June 1998. As sales manager, Plaintiff was responsible for hiring, firing, disciplining and for motivating his team to achieve and exceed sales objectives. He was also responsible for disseminating BellSouth policies and procedures to those employees he supervised.
One such policy was BellSouth's policy prohibiting employment discrimination of any kind.
Plaintiff's job performance for the period December 1, 1997 to December 31, 1997 was reviewed by his supervisor, Lee Harnick, in March 1998. Mr. Harnick gave Plaintiff a "3" out of a possible "5" indicating that Plaintiff "consistently [met] performance requirements of the objective". ( See Exhibit 8 attached to Plaintiff's Deposition).
In March 1998, Deborah Baker (Director of Human Resources for BellSouth) received a complaint from Edward Romero (Caucasian), a member of the direct sales team, regarding Plaintiff's (and Mr. Harnick's) failure to explain the compensation plan and failure to respond to and follow up on the team's questions. ( See Baker Affidavit, attached to Defendant's memorandum).
In June 1998, the entire direct sales team wrote a letter to the President of BellSouth regarding the lack of leadership and communication skills displayed by Plaintiff (and Mr. Harnick). In this letter, the team did not allege that Plaintiff had discriminated against them on the basis of their race. ( Id.).
In early June 1998, Ms. Baker and Karen Adams (Human Resource Manager) spoke with members of the team, interviewing Mr. Romero, Plaintiff and numerous team members, including people whom Plaintiff suggested to ensure a fair investigation. ( Id. and Adams Affidavit, attached to Defendant's memorandum). Plaintiff told Ms. Baker and Ms. Adams that he believed a salesman named Ben Jackson (African American) was alleging that Plaintiff uttered racial epithets in an attempt to set him up. ( Id.).
Ms. Baker and Ms. Adams admit that not all members of the team shared Mr. Jackson's opinions that Plaintiff had made racial epithets, but they contend that all team members who were interviewed, including those Plaintiff asked her to speak with, agreed that: (1) Plaintiff (and Mr. Harnick) were ineffective managers due to their failure to communicate policies and procedures, to be consistent, and to run productive sales meetings; and (2) employee morale was terrible as a result. ( Id.).
Plaintiff has submitted the Affidavit of Steve Guillot, who worked for BellSouth at the time of Plaintiff's firing and he has attested that:
During the night before I was to meet with Deborah Baker, I received a telephone call from a co-worker instructing me as to what I was to say to Ms. Baker. I knew that the other employees in the sales team had conspired to tell a single story about Shawn Sirgo that simply was not true. I told this to Ms. Baker when she met with me.
(Affidavit of Steve Guillot, attached to Plaintiff's memorandum).
However, Greg Wright and Kenneth Bryant, who are both African American, worked in direct sales for BellSouth at the time of Plaintiff's firing, and they have each attested that:
Karen Adams interviewed me and asked me about allegations of race discrimination. Adams did not ask me any questions about Sirgo's management skills or ability, and only asked me questions related to race comments Sirgo supposedly made. At no time did I tell Adams or anyone else in BellSouth's management that I though Sirgo was an ineffective manager or that Sirgo was responsible for problems with employee morale.
(Wright Affidavit and Bryant Affidavit, attached to Plaintiff's memorandum).
Following Ms. Baker's and Ms. Adams' interviews with members of the direct sales team, Defendant terminated Plaintiff (and Mr. Harnick) for inadequate job performance. (Baker, Adams and Daniel Affidavits, attached to Defendant's memorandum).
Defendant claims that after Plaintiff's termination, his responsibilities as sales manager were initially assumed by a white male, Lloyd Daniel (the General Manager for BellSouth), and in August 1998, another white male, John Batten, took over the responsibilities of sales manager. ( See Baker Affidavit). However, based on the Affidavit of a former BellSouth employee in direct sales, Plaintiff claims that his former duties were assumed by an African-American female, Cheryl Charles. ( See Affidavit of Steve Guillot, attached to plaintiff's memorandum as Exhibit B).
In its Reply Memorandum, Defendant states: "At his deposition, Mr. Daniel reiterated his statement contained in his affidavit that it was he who filled Plaintiff's responsibilities. Mr. Daniel also testified that Cheryl Charles was nothing more than a co-employee in the office and that any functions she performed were at his instruction and were for him." (Reply at 4).
However, Defendant failed to submit Mr. Daniel's deposition to the court. Nevertheless, even if Defendant had submitted Mr. Daniel's deposition to the court, such evidence would not eliminate a genuine issue of material fact created by the Affidavit of Steve Guillot regarding who assumed Plaintiff's duties after Plaintiff was fired. The court disagrees with Defendant's assertion made in its Reply Memorandum, that Mr. Guillot's Affidavit does not create a genuine issue of material fact. It is the function of the jury to assess the credibility of the witnesses and weigh the sufficiency of the their testimony on this issue.
Eventually the entire system of BellSouth's sale structure was changed from direct sales to a telemarketing system. Thus, Plaintiff's position of sales manager over direct sales was eliminated. Approximately six months after Plaintiff's termination, an African-American was hired into the new sales system to serve as sales manager. ( Id.).
Plaintiff ultimately filed this suit alleging race discrimination under federal and state law (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq, LSA-R.S. 23:331 and LSA-R.S. 51:2231). BellSouth now moves for summary judgment.
II. Legal Analysis
Plaintiff admits that there is no direct evidence of Defendant's discriminatory intent. In analyzing indirect evidence discrimination claims, the court first determines whether or not Plaintiff has satisfied his initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that:
(1) he is a member of a protected group;
(2) he was qualified for the job that he formerly held;
(3) he was discharged; and
(4) after his discharge, the position he held was filled by someone not within that protected class.McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-25, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Byrd v. Roadway Express, Inc., 687 F.2d 85, 86 (5th Cir. 1982).
However, the court recognizes that "no single formulation of the prima facie evidence test may fairly be expected to capture the many guises in which discrimination may appear." Byrd, 687 F.2d at 86. For example, "the single fact that a plaintiff is replaced by someone within the protected class does not negate the possibility that the discharge was motivated [by] discriminatory reasons." Nieto v. LH Packing Co., 108 F.3d 621, 625 at n. 7 (5th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot establish his prima facie burden because he was not replaced by an individual outside his class, and Defendant cites Singh v. Shoney's Inc., 64 F.3d 217 (5th Cir. 1995) in support. However, in Nieto v. LH Packing Co., 108 F.3d 621, 624 at n. 7 (5th Cir. 1997), the Fifth Circuit noted that Singh ignored earlier precedent in this circuit which explicitly recognized "that the single fact that a plaintiff is replaced by someone within the protected class does not negate the possibility that the discharge was motivated [by] discriminatory reasons." The Fifth Circuit further cautioned that: "It bears noting that our earlier precedent on this point continues to be controlling law in this circuit". Id.
Once the Plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the Defendant must articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the discharge. If the Defendant states a legitimate reason, the Plaintiff must show, by preponderance of the evidence, that the reason provided by the Defendant was a pretext for discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d at 678. The ultimate question is whether or not the Defendant intentionally discriminated against the Plaintiff on the basis of race. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-11, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2749, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993).
"The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the Defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination." St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at 511, 113 S.Ct. at 2749.
In the employment discrimination context, a jury issue will be presented and a plaintiff can avoid summary judgment if the evidence taken as a whole: (1) creates a fact issue as to whether each of the employer's stated reasons was what actually motivated the employer; and (2) creates a reasonable inference that [race] was a determinative factor in the actions of which plaintiff complains. LaPierre v. Benson Nissan, Inc., 86 F.3d 444, 450 (5th Cir. 1996)
In applying the burden-shifting analysis to this case, the court finds that Plaintiff has submitted competent summary judgment evidence with the Affidavits of Steve Guillot, Greg Wright and Kenneth Bryant to create genuine issues of material fact regarding whether or not Plaintiff can a establish a prima facie case of race discrimination and whether or not BellSouth's proffered reason was pretextual and that the real reason for his discharge was his race.
Accordingly;
IT IS ORDERED that BellSouth's Motion for Summary Judgment be and is hereby DENIED.